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2' ABSTRACT
fI
This thesis examines the functioning (or rather, in most cases, the 
noh-functioning) of residential tenancy law in urban Ghana*
Arising out of a deeply-held conviction that analysis and investigation 
of law should be rooted in its societal context, the first chapter examines 
the process of urbanization in Ghana and the housing situation in the urban 
areas* The interesting juristic issue of the applicablity of customary law 
to residential tenancies is also examined.
The second chapter examines the nature of the residential tenancy in 
modern urban conditions* This is then compared and contrasted with other 
seemingly similar institutional arrangements*
The substantive and procedural law affecting the creation of the residen­
tial tenancy relationship and the informality which characterizes the creation 
of the relationship is examined in chapter three.
Examination of the rights and obligations of landlords and tenants starts 
from chapter four* The maintenance and repairing obligations of the parties 
are considered in chapter five*
The obligation to pay rent is considered in chapter six - its historical 
antecedents and the resulting consequences being analysed*
Chapters seven and eight deal with the important legal (but also political 
and socio-economic) issues raised by rent control and security of tenure*
The thesis ends where it started from with a consideration of the concrete 
socio-economic and political realities of Ghanaian society and the resulting 
divergence between law and practice*
3TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract
Table of Cases •
Table of Legislation • • • • • • • • • • •  13
Table of Subsidiary Legislation • • • • • • • • •  17
Biblography • • • • • • • • • • • • •  18
Preface  ...................................................28
CHAPTER 1. Setting the Context • • • • • • •
2. The Urban Residential Tenancy • • • • • •  65
3* The Creation of Tenancies • • • • • • * 9 0
4. The Rights and Obligations of Landlords and Tenants • • 13^
5# Maintenance and Repair • • • • • • • *170
6* Rent • • • • • • • • • • . 212
7. Rent Control • • • • • • • • • •  23I
8. Security of Tenure • • • • • • • •  279
9. The Social Context and its Influence
on the Law • • • • • • • • • • o *3/1,
4TABLE OF CASES
A. GHANA PAGE
Abadoo v, Awotwi {l973j 1 G.L.R.395.................... . . . . 9 6
Adu-Sarkodie v. Karam |l973| 1 G.L.R.411. I ...........126-128,129
Akwei v. Agyapong jl962j 1 G.L.R.277*. *.................... .IOJL
Al lame dine Bros, v. Paterson Zochonis jwij 2 G.L.R.403. ... ^ 2 2 8 ^ 2 8 6  * 287-289
Amah v. Picas (1957) 2 W.A.L.R.79%...........................249
Ami3sah-Abadoo v. Abadoo ^97^J 1 G.L.R. 110. ....... ......... 82,92
Arnpiah V. G.B.011 ivantftW )Q.C, (ImI)*48-51. 46. ...I67-I6 9 ,202-203,209,293
Amusu v. Fenukufl^ 62jft■C/i-M'52-55. 75* .........  80
Asafu-Adjaye v. Abboud (1970) C.C.45................. 79“80,282,283
Asafu-Adjaye v. Yaw Dabanka (1930) 1 W.A.C.A.63................. 79”80
Asante v. Brown (1969) C.C.94................................. 314
Asante v. Gold Coast Drivers* Union (1957) 3 W.A.L.R.5..............57“64
Asare v. Antwi [l975j 1 G.L.R.411....................... .....103,114
Asare v. Brobbey fl97^ 2 G.L.R.331........................... 129,130
Aschkar v. Somuah (1957) 2 W.A.L.R.264...... . .................. 329
Ashley v. James Colledge |l96lj 1 G.L.R.469.....................197-198,200
Azar v. Assad (1957) 2 Y/.A.L.R.242..............................3 H
Barclays Bank v. Thome [l973j 2 G.L.R.137......... 132,143,185,193,202
Bassil v. Said Road (1957) 3 W.A.L.R.231. ... 144,148 , 281,282 ,293 ,296 ,307-8
Bassil v. Sfarijhani (1967) C.C.20 .............................  281,309
Bhagwan v. Thome (1970)  ................................ 272-273
Biei v. Akomea (1956) 1 W.A.L.R.174.............................322
Bikhazi v. Secretary of State of the U.S.A. (1952) D.C.(Land) *52-55, 12^ .. .327
Biney v. Biney |l974] 1  ............................... 92-93
Borketey v. Larkai Land Court, Accra, 28th Feb.1953. ...........  .72
Boston v. Khemland [1962J 1 G.L.R. 68..............................162-163
Carroll v. Andrews (1956) 1 W.A.L.R.I76........................... 85
C.F.A.O. v. Thome [I966J G.L.R. ............ 190 ,195 »19^ , 207-209
Chahin v. Epope Printing Press 1963 1 G.L.R.163. ................ 33I
Cod joe v. Kwatchey (1935) 1  ......................... 9^*9^
Coleman v. Shang Jl96l] G.L.R.145 ..........................  81,323-324
Dennis v. Agbetetei (1970) C.C.21........ 152 , 3^4 ,315 »3I7~3I9
Diep v. Kaba jl973J 2 G.L.R. ...........................227,267
Djan v. Owoo p 97 |^ 2   106-107 ,114
5George Grant v. Tikobo Sawmills Ltd* (1969) C.C.118.............88,150
Haroutunian v. Medz-Moroukian |l962j[ 2 G.L.R.9 4 . ...................330
Hausa v. Haruna |*963| 2 G.L.R.212................................ 322
Hinnawi v. Bassil (1958) 3 W.A.L.R.495. ................ 249,250,252,264
Karam v. /fehkar [1963] 1 G.L.R.138. ................ 157 * 225,284,294,295-6
Kararn & Sons v. Traboulsi & Co. [l964j G.L.R.513»................ 87*281,309
Kuntoh v. Joseph (1955) D.C.(Land) *52-^ 55, 341.................. 87,332
Kwofie v. Kakraba [l966] G.L.R. ...............................125
Larbi v. Cato [j-959] G.L.R.35; /l96o] G.L.&146................ 95~96
Lartey v. Bannerman jj.97^ j 2 G.l1r.461.........................116-119
Lokko v. Konkjofi (1907) Ren.451.......... ....................83
Mans our v. Sukumah (1958) 3 W.A.L.R.376.  ..................... 213
Mensah v. Abbey-Quaye |l975"] 2 G.L.R.463*  ..........  228-229*230
Mills-Lamptey v. Yeboah ^97 lj 1 G.L.R.18.................... 2 1 7 , 3 0 0 - 3 0 1
Mont a v. Paterson Simons ^97 ^ 2 G.L.R.I&2.  ....... 2 8 5-286
Moubarak v. Eguakun (1956) 1 W.A.L.R.88....................... 281,282, 300,308
Moukarzel v. Hannah (1947) 12 VT.A.C.A. 125*  ............. . • • 164 , l65*166 , I67
Nimako v. Ar chi bold £1966^ G.L.R.612....... ...............51*324,326,327
Norh v. Gbederaah(j'1i|)f’C, ; 395  • •   78
Nuamah v. Frimpong £l9737 2 G.L.R.37 , , , .   72
Nukpa v. Hunter ( 1 * 1 5 0 ) 1* 253............... 182,183 * 184,187,295,297
Nunoo v. Nyimfa (1958) 2 W.A.L.R.95*  ................ •••••• .105
Nyame v. Ana ah (1970) C.C.99........    .283
Oblee v. Armah (1958) 3 W.A.L.R.484...............................90
Ocansey v. Teiko [l973j 1 G.L.R.203 ............................... 3 00
Ofori v. Arthur (1970) C.C.112. •••••••.............   152*316—317
Ogde v. Pearl & Dean [l96l] G.L.R.  ..............164-165* 166,219-220
Osekre v. Saah [1967] G.L.R.144................................ 147-148
Othman v. Accra Perfumery Co Ltd. (1942) 8 W.A.C.A.173.............88
Ovrusu v. Aidoo (1946) D.C.(Land) *38-47, 241....................325
Ramia v* Mouissie U945) D.C. (Land) >38-47,177........85, 281,282,286, 28? , 308
Rawanji Bros, v. Paterson Zochonis [l975j 2 G.L.R.352................ 327
Re Lokumal & Sons?Application /l962j‘2G.L.R.53. . . 271
Republic v. Accra Rent Magistrate; Ex pg.ftL Ofosu-Amaah /1965J G.L.R.613. . . .272
Republic v. Tamakloe; Ex Kessie (1968) C.C.90 ............  272,274
Ribeiro v. Chahin (1954) 14 W.A.C.A.476. ......................301,303
6Richardson v. Fynn (1909) - I J • «< <> * •  ..............     .83
Saad v. City Food Supply (1967) C.C.33..........................   272
Sackey v. Ashong (1936) 1 W.A.L.R.108.......... II2-II3»169 > 195» 209,293
Sackey v. Kumah [l978] 1 G.L.R.361................................. 273
Safo Badu (1977] 2 G.L.R.63.................. 8§T89,30^,3I2-3I3
Savage v. G.I.H.P.C. [l973] 2 G.L.R.242 ............... 219-220,284T285
Sbaiti v. Samarasinghe [l976j 2 G.L.R.361...... 7^-70 , 8l , 108,126,127 »129
Schandorf v. Zeini |l976] 2 G.L.R.418 .................. 144,148,302
Seraphim v. Pacific Stores ^970 1 G.L.R.301............ 327*329
Sey v. Abadoo (I885)  ..................................57
Short v. Morris (1958) 3 W.A.L.R.339..................................103
Tackie v. Banner man (as yet unreported)..............-........   »273
Tetteh v. Malm [l959] 1 G.L.R.368.......................... 02
Thome v. Barclays Bank Co Ltd. ^ 97 }^ 2 G.L.R. 126.* • 132-3 1184-6,190,192 , 200 , 20
Thompson v. Mensah (1957) 3 W.A.I.4240........................... 91
Total Oil Products v. Obeng [1962^ ] 1 G.L.R.228.................... 91
Twene v. Far ah (1970) C.C.120.................................242-243
.......96
  129
United Products Ltd. v. Afari (1929) Div.Ct. >29J31, H« ......
Usghef v. Darko |l977j 1 G.L.R.476................... *.........
U.T.C. v. Karam [j975] 1 G.L.R.212........................... .
Vanderpuye v. Botchvay ( H S ’O tS Sd-Juolj' /? •) lb/j-
323
Wilkinson v. Edusei
Woode v. Dadson
1963] 1 G.L.R.393. 
£9761 2 G.L.R.185
Yamak v. Yawson {^971] 2G.L.R.465
155
268
29^
B. OTHER COUNTRIES 
United Kingdom
Abbeyfield (Harpenden) Society v. Woods [1968] 1 W.L 
Abingdon R.D.C. V. O'Gorman £968] 2 Q.3.811.*
Anthrusther-Calthorpe v. McOscar Jl924| 1 K.B.716. 
Answorth v. Johnson (1832) 2 C. & P.239* .......
Appleby v. Myers (1867) L.R. 2 C.P.651...........
Baker v. Holtzapfell (1811) 4 Taunt.45* .........
Bayley v. Fitzmaurice (i860) 8 E. & B.664.........
Beams Property Investment Co. v. Stroulger Jl948] 2 K.B
R.374............ 70
............ 227
195,196,198,199
..........193
  289
 221
....... Ill
1..........135
7Bendal 1 v. McWhirter .^952j 2 Q.B.466..............................305
Blewett v. Blevett 2 All E.R.183............................ 299
Bottomley v. Bannister ^932j 1 K.B.458.  ................. 173
Brama v. Cabarro jl947j K.B.954. ...  ..................     . .104
Brew Bros, v. Snax (Ross) [l97oj 1 Q.B.612.................... 200,201
6 < W  ft v. Doxh^s [195s] I Ckr&.UI.............................S I O S
buJdScdtv* Qgr\i at Q 0!0 ^]......*55^ ..................  .......... 15^
Bulleck v. 'Qo.ftuvutir (17^ 3- £ ................................ 0
BUjj^AcJI v. CTjPocl-U)i^  [iqnQ ivJ-l-H- °\%  .......................... 'jto%
% us wail v. CA/tukfo SduJ 0°P-5]liO&.uq..............................................
Cannock v. Jones (1849) Ex.233......   .....176,186
Cave v. Horrell |l912] 3 K.B.533*................................ 139
Central London Property Trust Ltd v. High Trees House Ltd. [1947^  K.B. 130.309,320
Chaplin v. Smith |l926j 1 K.B.I98....................    l4l
Chappell v. Gregory (1863) 34 Beav.250. • • • •  .............   173
Chaproniere v. Lambert /1917] 2 Ch*336......................   -^3
Charrington v. Camp ^902^ 1 Ch. ................................ 303
Chillingworth v. Esche ^924J 1 Ch. ........................... 104,106
Clarke v. Fuller (1864) 16 C.B.(N.S.)  ........................... m
Cockburn v. Smith |l924j 2 K.B.795*...............................
Coe v. Clay (1829) 5 Bing 440.  .................................*56
Cole v. Kelly jl92oJ 2 K.B.106.   ®5
Collins v. Hopkins ft.923] 2 K.B.617................................
ot/iCoomber v. Howard (1843) 1 C.B.440. ........................ . . . . •
Counter v. Macpherson (1845) 5 Moore P.C.83......   .121
Coward v. Gregory (1866) L.R. 2 C.P.153................... *.....
Cricklewood Property & Investment Trust Ltd. v. Leighton Investment Trust Ltd.
^ 5 ]  A.C.221.     222,291-292
Cruse v. Mount fl933J Ch.278. .............................. 172,216
Cuthbertson v. Irving (l859~60) 4 H. & N.142................... 224
Denman v. Brise |l949j 1 K.B.22............................... 290,292
Dobson v. Jones (1843) 5 M. & G.54. ......................... . . .71
Doe d.Ellerbrock v. Flynn (1834) 1 C.M. & R.137................... 304
Doe d.Phillips v. Benjamin (1839) 9 A. & E.644......................110
Doe d.Price v. Price (1832) 9 Bing 356. .........................88
Doe d.Rigge v. Bell (1793) 5 T.R.471............................ 86
Doe d.Worcester School Trustees v. Rowlands (l84l) 9 C. & P.734.....208
Dolling v. Evans (1867) 36 L.J. Ch.474........................... Ill
8Punster v. Harris [l918^ 2 K.B.795............................. .181
Edward v. Jones (1912) 124 L.T.740 . . . . •.......... . . . . .110
Fachini v. Bryson |l952j 1 T.L.R.740........................... 71
Flexman v. Corbett fl93o| 1  ............................. I69
Flight v. Bolland (1828) 4 Russell 298.  H 5
Foster v. Lyons J1927Q 1 Ch. .............................. 139
Fox v. Hunter-Paterson |*948j 2 All E.R.813*....................88
Frederick Platts & Co Ltd. v. Grigor jl95oJ 1 T.L.R.859*..........3^9
Gange v. Lockwood (i860) R. &. F.113..........   ...201
Granada Theatres v. Freehold Investments [1959J 1 W.L.R.578. •••182,186
Gray v. Spyer J1922J 2 Ch.22......... ..........................^86
Great Western Railway v. Smith (1876) 2 Ch.D.235.......... ....... 305
Griffiths v. Young [l97oJ 1 All E.R.601.  ^ 4
Gore v. Lloyd (1844) 12 M. & W.463.................................
Hall v. Burgess (1826) 5 B. & C.332. .......................     . . .220
Hammond v. Farrow [l904| 2 K.B.332............... *«99
Hampshire v. Wickens (1878) 7 Ch.D.555*  168,169
Hanson v. Newmann [l934| Ch.298. ............... .................207
Harmer v. Jumbil (Nigeria) Tin Areas Ltd. £1921j 1 Ch.200.............. 159
Hart v. Rogers [1916] 1 k.b.646. •............................ 188,215,216
Hart v. Windsor (1844) 12 M. & W.68. ........................  172,217
Harvey v. Pratt [1965] 1 W.L.R.1025. ............................... 84
Hayes v. B ickerstaff ( 1669) Vaugh. 118.  ................  157
He 1 man v. Horsham & Worthing Assessment Committee JvjltzJ 2 K.B.333.70
Hesketh v. Marlow |l928j 2 K.B.45*....................................204
Hill v. Barclay (l8l6) l6 Ves.Jun.56.  ..........   189*208,209
Holiday Fellowship v. Hereford [l959] 1 W.L.R.211. .   133 * 13911^3 »186
Houlder Bros. & Co. v. Gibbs ^92^ CK.575* ........................... 142
Hugall v. McLean (1885) 53 L.I.94. ................................ 183
Hughes v. Chatham Overseas (1843) 5 M. & G.54........................7^
Hyman v. Rose [1912J A.C.623* ".................................. 192-193
Izon v. Gorston (1830) 5 Bing N.C.501.  221
Jackson v. Simons [1923] 1 Ch. 373................................ I4l
Jaquin v. Holland £960] 1 W.L.R.258. ' I l l............... ....... 19^
Jenkins v. Jackson (1888) 40 Ch.D.71.  .................... 15^
Jenne v. Queens Cross Properties £l974j Ch.97*.......   .189
Jinks v. Edwards (I856) 11 Ex.775. ..............................15^
Jones v. Christy (1963) Solicitors, Journal 374.................... 164
Jones v. Having ton 1^903J 1  ..........................   157
9Keith v. Twentieth Century Club Jl904j L,2 W.L.R.544........... .........69
Kenny v. Preen (1963] 1 Q.B.499...................... 155,158,225
King1 s Motors (Oxford) Ltd* v. Lax |l970j| 1 W.L.R.426.  ...........213
Kingswood Estate Co. v. Anderson [1963J 2 Q.B.I69. ..................... H 3
Krell v. Henry JI903J 2 K.B.740.................................. 122,289
Kushner v. Law Society |l952j 1 All E.R.404:.  ...... ..................99
Lace v. Chantler .^949] K.B.368..........    84
Lam Kee Ying Sdn.Bhd. v. Lam Shes Tong [l975j A.C.247............ .....I4l
Law v. Jones jl97^ Ch»112.................... ................... . .104
Leeds v. Cheetham (1827) 57 E.R.533............................121,211,221
Lee-Parker v. Izzet £ 971] 1 W.L.R.1688............................. 189,223
Lemon v. Lardeur jl 94^ K.B.613. ....... •••••••••• .287
Lewis & Allenby Ltd. v. Pegge |l9l4j 1 Ch.782.  ...................... 145
Lister v. Lane ^ 893] 2 Q.B.212................................. 199*200
Liverpool City Council v. Irwin £l.976j 2 W.L.R.562.     . I8l
London & County (A. & D.) v, Wilfred Sportsman .^9^ 9J 1 W.L.R.1215* ...224
London & Northern Estates Co. v. Schlgsinger ji191&J 1 K.B.20 ........  290
Lovelock v. Margo fl964^ 2 All E.R.346   • • • . 143
Lucy v . LevistonJ: (l673)Frcem. I 0 J ............................. 157
Luganda_ v. Service Hotels (IQ6qT 2 All E.R .6 9 2........... 69,71
Luxmore v. Robson ft8l8j I B.&Ald. 584..................  I95
MaCarrick v. Liverpool Corporation Jl947J A.C.219................... 183
Madison v. Alderson (1883) 8 App.Cas.467. ••••..................... 114
Mafo v. Adams [l97o] 1 Q.B.548..................................... 156
Marley v. Fearn |l946j 1 All E.R.583*.............................. 1^8
Malzy v. Eicholtz -^9l6j 2 K.B.208. ..................  ••• .131# 155*157
Manchester Bonded Warehouse v. Carr (1880) 5 C.P.D.507* .......... .204
Manchester Brewery Co. v. Coombs 1^90lJ 2 Ch.608. ................... J2^ f
Marsden v. Heyes L^927j 2 K.B.l...................... 191,192 ,193» 201
Marshall v. Berridge (1881) 19 Ch.D.233........................... .110
Matania v. National Provicial Bank Ltd. [l936j 2 All E.R.633* * * * *^371158
Mathey v. Curling Jl9221 2 A.C.180 ....................  221,290 , 291,292
Matthews v. Smallwood Jl91oJ 1 Ch. .............................. 2^6
Milldr v. Emcer Products jl95^J Ch.304.  .......................131»155
Moore v. UllCoats Mining Co.Ltd |l908j 1 Ch.575*...................... 295
Morgan v. Liverpool Corporation fi-927] 2 K.B.131*.....................
o ol±
Morrison v. Chadwick (1849) 7   .............................
Murphy v. Hurly [1922J 1 A.C.369. .................... ..............
10
Neale v. DelSoto [l9^ 5^  1 K.B.144....................................... 70
Neale v. Mackenzie (1836) 1 M. & W.747. ................................ ^5
O1 Brien v. Robinson [l973j 1 All E.R.583. ............................ *$4
Paine v. Me 11 or (1801) 6 Ves.349.................................... 121
Palmer v. Carey jl926| A.C.703.  .................................. 123
Palmer v. Fletcher (1663) 1 Lev.122................................ •••159
Paradine v. Jane (1647) Aleyn.26..............    217*221,290,292
Parker v. Tasvell (1858) 2 De G. & J.559..............................
Penniall v. Harbone (1848) 11 Q.B.D.368................................ 162
Pent on v. Barnett [1898J 1 Q.B.276........................... *....... ^00
Pereira v# Vandiyan [l953j 1 All E.R.1109*................................ *225
Perry v. Davis (1858) 3 C.B.(N.S.) 769. ............................... 295
Precious v. Reddie |l924j 2 K.B.149.  ....................   288
Premier Confectionary Co. v. London Commercial Sale Rooms 1^933^  Ch.4o4. ..14-2 
Printing and Numerical Registering Co. v. Sampson (1875) L.R.19 Eq.462. .• . I?8
Proudfoot v. Hart (1890) 25 Q.B.D.42..........   196-197
Purchase v. Lichfield Brevery Cn> (l915] 1 K.B.184 ....................  86f J2 4
Quesnal Forks Gold Mining Co v. Ward [l92o] A.C.222.................... 294
R v. Battersea, etc* Rent Tribunal, Exparte Parikh [1957J 1 All E.R.352. . .6 9
Ramage v. Womack [I900J 1 Q.B.116......................................194
Ravenseft Properties v. Dawstone Holdings ^979^ 2 W.L.R.878............ 200
Re Hunter’s Lease, Giles v. Hutchings [l942J 1 All E.R.27................164
Re National Savings Dank, Ex parte Brady (I867) 1 W.R.753...................113
Re Pain [1919] 1 Ch. 38.................................................. 124
Re Smith's Lease jl951] 1 All E.R.13..................................... 143
Redpath v. Roberts (1800) 3 Esp.225............... *.....................218
Redmond v. Paint on [1920] 2 K.B.256...........     210
Regis Property Co Ltd. v. DUdley Jl959j  .................... 193*204,205
Remon v. City of London Real Property Co Ltd. [l92l] 1 K.B.49....... $9*310
RQbbins v. Jones 15 C.B.(N.S.) 221.................................... 172
Rom Securities Ltd. v. Rogers (Holdings) ltd. (1867) 205 E.G.427........
Rose v. Hyman [l91l] 2 K.B.234.  .................................... -^ 92
Rossiter v. Miller (1878) 3 App.Cas.  ..............................^ 4
Rutter v. Michael (1967) 201 Estates Gazette 299*  .........* *142
Santley v. Wilde [1892] 2 Ch.479........... *......................... 73
Scamell v. Ouston [19411 1 All E.R.13*       .104-105
Shaw v. Groom [j-970j 2 Q.B.504........................................^ 9
Shubrick v. Salmon (1765) 3 Burr.l639» • •  ......    »I39
11
Sidebotham v. Holland jl.895] 1 Q.B.378............................... 101,286
Silvester v. Ostrowska jl959] 1 W.L.R.1060......................   .299
Sleafer v. Lambeth Council ^1960J 1 Q.B.43.......   .172
Smith v. Marrable (1843) 11 M. & W.5».................................. I?2
Smith v. Seghill (1875) L.R. 10 Q.B.D.422...............................7*
Sftillers v. Cardiff Assessment Committee ^ 1 9 3 2  K.B.21................ 139
Steadman v. Steadman [l97&] A.C.536. ...............................II3*H5
Stening v. Abrahams ^931j 1 Ch.470. ...... ...........................
Stuart v. Joy & Nantes jl9o£j K.B.362. .................. . ........ .13^
Surplice v. Farnworth (1844) 7 Man. & G.576...................... ... .188
Swansea v. Fort on fl9^9) Ch.l43.......................*............... 1^2
Swift v. Macbean £942] 1 K.B.37 5....................................
Taylor v. Beal (1591) Cro.Eliz.222. ...............................189,223
Taylor v. Caldwell (1863) 2 B. & S.826. ........................... 122,289
Taylor v. Webb [l937j 2 K.B.283. ............................. 18? , 205,215, 216
Thatcher v. Pearce & Sons [1968j 1 W.L.R.748...................... 301
Thomas v. Sorrell (1673) Vaugh.330..................................... ^
Thompsons (Funeral Furnishers) Ltd. v. Phillips [l945j 2 All E.R.49........ 71
Thursby v. Eccles (1900) 70 L.J.(Q.B.) 91............................ 113
Tod-heatly v. Denham (1887) 40 Ch.D.80. .............................. 152
Toms v. Luckett (1847) C.B.5 C.B.23................................ 69-?0
Torbett v. Faulkner [l952j 2 T.L.R.659......     69
Toriano v. Young (1833) 6 C. & P .8   .193* 19^
Torrens v. Walker [l906j 2 Ch.l66.  .........     182
Vernon v. Smith (1821) 5 B. & Ald.l......................    135
Viscount Tredegar v. Harwood [1929] A.C.72........................... 142
Von Hatzfield-Wildenburg v. Alexander [1912] 1 Ch.284............... 10^,106
Walls v. Atcheson (1826) 3 Bing 462........................   220
Walsh v. Lonsdale (1882) 21 Ch.D.9..................... . .8 6,123 * 213»238
Warner v. Sampson [1958J 1 Q.B.404.....................       *30^
Warren v. Keen [l954j 1  ................................... 191*193*19^
Webber v. Smith (1689) 2 Vern.103........................     284*
Wedd v. Porter 1^916] 2 K.B.97*  ......  *........   .193
Weg Motors Ltd. v. Hales Jl9^oJ 3 All E.R.181.  .................  ^35
Weigall v. Waters (1795) 6 T.R.488........................ . . . . 210, 211,223
Westacott v. Hahn £ 918^  1 K.B.495 4....................... 133*139*163*186
12
White v* Harrow (1902) 86 L.T........     138-139
Whitehall Court Ltd. v. Ettlinger [1920J 1 K.B.68O . .................. 292
Wilkinson v. Rogers (1864) 2 De G.J. & S.62.................. ...... ^35
Williams v. Earle (1868) L.R.3 Q.B.739............................... ^35
Wilson v. Finch (I877) 2 Ex.D.336.................................. ....
Wilson v* Rosenthal (1906) 22 T.L.R.233.*...................   303
Winters v. Dance £l949j L.T.R.165.......   70
Wisbech St.Mary Parish Council v. Lilley £l956j 1 W.L.R.121............^0^
Wordsley Brewery Co. v. Halford (1903) 90 L.T.89. ...................
Yellowly v. Gower (1855) 11 Ex,274,..................................^93
.Nigeria
Breedy v, Khalife (1952) 20  ..............................^26
Childiak v, Coker (1954) 14 W,A,C,A,506, ............................. ^9^
Oshinfekun v. Lana (1955*56) W.N.L.R.93. ...........................86
United States
Gardiner v. Butler (1918) 245 U.S.603} 38 Sup.Ct.214............... 218
Javins v. First National Realty Corp. 428F.2d.1071 (D.C.Cir. 1970). . . . 17? , 215
Johnson v. Pemberton (1950) 197 Misc.739» N.Y.2d.l53................... 226
13
Table of Legislation
a . ghana Page
Administration of Lands Act, 1962 (Act 1 2 3 ).........................................150
Control of Prices Act, 1962 (Act 1 1 3 ).................................................... 3^7
Control of Prices (Amendment) Act, 1965 ............................................... 347
Conveyancing Decree, 1973 (N.R.C.D.175)
s.1  9 8 ,9 9 ,1 0 0 ,1 1 0 ,2 8 3
s.2  9 9 ,1 0 0 ,1 0 1 ,1 0 2 ,1 0 7 ,2 8 3
s.3 (1)  99,283
s .3 (2 ) .............................................................................................100,283
s . 18......... .............................................................. ..................................120
s .22 ( I )   1 55 .156 ,157 ,159 ,160
s.22 (2 )  160
S.22' ( 3) . . ..........................................................................................160
s*22 (7).................................................................................................131.156
s#23 (1)..........................................136 , 138 , 139 . 140 ,1 4 2 ,1 5 1 ,1 7 9 .1 9 4 ,196 ,213
s.23 (2 )  153 .154 .284
s.23 (3 )..................................................................................................... 135
S.23 (5)  131 ,139,1^0
s*2 4 ...................................................................................................... 134,138
s.25 .................................................................................................134,136
5 .26............................................................. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3 4 , 1 3 6
5.27  12^,13^,137
5 .28  134,137
5 .29  298-299
5 .30 . . ! ...................................1 44 ,1^ 8 ,2 9 8 ,30 2 -3 03 ,30 ^ ,3 05
5 .31  187 ,207 ,208
s.32  297
S.33  146,298
s.4o (1)........ .................................................................................... 99,100
s.4o (2 )  - ............................................ 99
2nd Sched., Part I  ....................................................... 15,5-157,159,160
2nd Sched., Part I I  ......................................................................... 160
2nd Sched., Part I I I  ....................................................................... 160
3rd Sched., Part I  ............................138 , 139 ,140 ,142 ,15***79> *94»2*3
14
3rd Sched., Part II  *................. 153.154
.................. 136,15^3rd Sched., Part III .................................  ^
Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372)  9 8 ,1 0 2 ,1 4 4 ,2 2 7 ,2 6 8 ,3 0 3
Farm Land Protection Act, 1962 (Act 107).... .................. ^50
Interpretation Act, 1962 (C.A.4) .............................59>288
Land Registry Act, 1962 (Act 123).............. .......124,I25~I30,150
Loans Recovery Ordinance, 1918 (1951, Cap. 175)  346-347
Marriage Ordinance, 1948 (1951, Cap.127) .................. 3%3
Moneylenders Ordinance, 1941 (1951, Cap.176) ........ 77 ,79 1346-347
Mortgages Decree, 1972 (N.R.C.D.96)  73“*74»78
Prices and Incomes Decree, 1972 (N.R.C.D. 119)     .256
Price Control Decree, 1974 (N.R.C.D.305)  ^47
Rent Act, 1962 (Act 220)
s .i  .............................................................................................................
S.2..... .......................................................
s#5 (1)  246 ,265 ,266 ,271
s. 5 (2)  266
s. 5 (4) .  267
s>6 (1)........... .................................................................................246 ,266 ,267 ,270
s .6 (2) ................................................ .
s.7  246,266
5.8  288
5.9 (2)  267
 246’248 
 246
 270S.12.....................................................
............................................... .247s .13 ............ ............................................................
S .l4    247,253
s l6  248 ,2 49 ,25 0 ,2 5 2 ,3 11
s! 17 (1) 7 7 7 7 7 ..........................................151.152 • 305 • 306-331
............ 87,331s. 17 (5) .....................................
...........................305s .17 (6) .....................................................................
s.18 (1)
s. 20
330
228
15
5 .22 (1) ............................................................................................
5 .22 (2) 149
5 .22 (3)    1^9
5.23  70
s .24     356
S. 25 (1)........ ...................................................148 ,14-9 ,150 ,2 2 8 , 2 2 9 ,245 , 246
s.25 (3 ) ................................................ 240 ,241 ,2 42 ,2 43 ,316
s.27 ( l )  .....................................................................................158,333
s'29  8 7 ,8 8 , 150 , 305.311
s-3°   244
s<53  229
Rent Control (Amendment) Decree, 1973 (N.R.C.D#153)•
5.1 • • - ....................................................................................   252
5.1 (2)   252
5 .2   250,252
5.4  252,254
s*5   253
s'. 10 : : ? l? .25 i
1 s t. Seined.  ................................  252
2nd. sched  ..................   251
Rent (Amendment) £)4,c|,<W-; (AF-ft-C-0 -5)
s .l  ( l )  : .............................................................................................258-260
s .l  (2)  258-260
s .l  (3)  258 - 260,261
s.2  250,263
s.4 ( 1)  262
s.4 (2)  262
5.5  258
5.6 (1)  278
s.6 (2)  263,278
s.7  262,264-
s.8 ( i )   258 - 260 , 2 6 1 , 262,336
5.8 (2)  261^62,336
5.8 (3 )  261 ,262,336
s.8 (4)  261 , 262 , 2 6 3 , 264-
5.8 (5 ) ..........................................................................................262
5.9   262,265
s. 10  264
s . 1 2 ............ ..............................................................................................258
/C
Sched.
16
259
Rent Control (Amendment) Ordinance (Nd.39), 1947 .......... .241
Rent Control Ordinance (N0.2), 1952 ___ 249,281,307 ,308 ,309,32? ,331
B. UNITED KINGDOM
Distress for Rent Act, 1689 (2 Will# & Mair* C# 5)  227
Distress for Rent Act, 1737 (11 Geo. 2, C#19)  227
Landlord and Tenant Act, 1927 (17 & 18 Geo. 5, C.36)........... 142,207
74 98 134 144 299 
Law of Property Act, 1925 (15 & 16 Geo.5, C.20) .... 302-303*
Real Property Act, 1845 (8 & 9 Yict. C.66)  9^
Rent Act, 1968 (1968 C.23) ..................................
Rent Act, 1977 (1977 C.42)  142
Statute of Distribution, 1670 (22 & 23 Car.2, C.10) ...  323
Statute of Frauds, 1677 (29* Car.2, C.3)  9^ > 102 ,I07-I08
Statute of Marlbridge, 1267 (52 Hen.3) .......................... 193
17
TABLE OF SUBISIDARY LEGISLATION
GHANA Page
Defence (Rent Restriction) Regulations, 19^2  236,237
Defence (Rent Restriction) Regulations, 19^3..........28l,308»325
Prices and Incomes Regulations, 1973 (L*I*805) ......256-257»262,263
Rent Regulations, 1964 (L.I.369)  228,328
18
Bibliography
Aboagyfc^A.A,, "Questionable fall in thr rate of inflation", (1980) 12 The Legon 
Observer 166.
Abrams, C#, Man^ Struggle for Shelter in an Urbanizing World, Cambridge, 
Massachussetts, 1964.
Acquah, 1., Accra Survey: A Social Survey of the Capital of Ghana, London, 1958.
Addae-Mensah, 1., "The causes and effects of the (i^ odus of Ghanaian graduate 
science teachers", (1979) H  The Legon Observer 31*
Addo, N.O., Dynamics of Urban Growth in South-East Ghana, Unpublished Ph.D.
thesis, Univ., London, 1969* "Some aspects of the relation between migra­
tion and socio-economic development in Ghana", in Addo, N.O., et.al(eds.),
Population and Socio-Economic Development in Ghana, No.2 Ghana Population 
Studies, Univ., Ghana, Legon, 19&9.
Allott, A.N., The Limits of Law, London, 1980.
The Ashanti Law of Property, Stuttgart, 1966.
The Akan Law of property. Unpublished Ph.D.thesis, University of London, 1954.
New Essays in African Law, London, 1970.
"Legal personality in African Law", in Gluckman, M., (ed.), Ideas and
Procedures in African Customary Law, London, 19&9•
A Note on the Ga Law of Succession, (1953)» 15 Bulletin School of Oriental
and African Studies, 164.
Ames, J.B., Lectures in Legal History, Cambridge, Massachussetts, 1913*
Apter, D., Ghana in Transition, Princeton, New Jersey, 1972.
Aubert, V., "Some social functions of legislation", (1969) Acta Sociologica 99*
Austin, D., Politics in Ghana, London, 1964.
Bannor, T.M., "Social injustices in housing", (1979) H  The Legon Observer 227*
Beckstrom, J., "Handicaps to legal social engineering in a developing nation", 
(1974) 22 American Journal of Comparative Law 697*
19
Beirne, P., Fair Rent and Legal Fiction, London, 1977*
Bennett, D.E., "The modern lease - an estate in land or a contract”,
(1937) 16 Texas Lav Review 47*
Bentsi-Enchill, K., Ghana Land Lav, London, 1964.
Botchway, E.A., "Operational autonomy and public accountability; a case
study of Ghana's development experience and a blueprint for reform”,
(1973) Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 55.
Bradbrook, A.J., ”The law relating to the residential landlord-tenant relation­
ship: an initial study of the need for reform”, (197^0 9 Melbourne Univer­
sity Law Review 589*
Busia, K.A., Report on a Social Survey of Sekondi-Takoradi, London, 1950.
Caldwell, J.C., "Migration and urbanization”, (in) Birmingham, V* et.al.,
A Study of Contemporary Ghana, Vol.2, London, 1967*
Chambers, J.D. and Mingay, J.E., The Agricultural Revolution: 1750 - 1880, 
Batsford, 1966.
Cheshire, G.C., Modern Law of Real Property, London, 1976.
Cheshire, G.C. and Fifoot, C.H.S., Law of Contract, LQndon, 1976.
Chitty, Chitty on Contract, Vol.l, London, 1968.
Cioffi, J., "The landlord-tenant relationship: a new urban structure”,
(1973) 18 New York Law Forum 725*
Danquah, J.B., Akan Laws and Customs, London, 1928.
Date-Bah, S.K., "Legislative control of freedom of contract”, (in) Ekow-Daniels, 
W.C. and Woodman, G.R. (eds.), Essays in Ghanaian Law, Accra, 1976.
de Graft-Johnson, K.E., Administration and Corruption in Ghana, unpublished
paper prepared for the conference on Administrative Reform and Corruption 
at the Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, Brighton, 
March 12-14, 1975*
Denman, D.R., Origins of Ownership, London, 1948.
20
Lord Denning, M.R., The Discipline of Law, London, 1979»
Dickson, K.B., The Ghanaian Town, its Nature and Function, Accra, 1971•
Ehrlich, E., Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law, Cambridge, 
Massachussetts, 1936*
*
Essf^n, S.N., "Tenants and landlords", The Mirror, February 2, 1979» p*6.
Evans, D., The Law of Landlord and Tenant, London, 197^«
Ewusi, K., "The towns of Ghana and their levels of development", (1977)
6 Universitas 176.
Field, M.J., Social Organisation of the Ga People, London, 1946.
Foa, E.C., General Law of Landlord and Tenant, London, 1957*
I
Friedman, L.M., "Legal culture and social development", (1969) tfrLaw and 
Society Review .
Law and Society, New Jersey, 1977*
Friedman, M.R., Friedman on Leases, New Ycrk, 1974 "Leases - a last outpost 
of feudalism", (1971) 26 New York Bar Association Record 638.
Friedman,MvR,and Stigler, G., "Roofs or ceiling? the current housing problem", 
(in) Verdict on Rent Control Readings No*7i Institute of Economic Affairs, 
London, 1972.
Friedman, W., Law in a Changing Society, London, 1972.
Frimpong, J.K., Towards an Effective Control of Rents of Premises in Ghana, 
unpublished LL.M. dissertation, University of Ghana, 1973*
"The N.R.C. and the standard rent", (1973) 8 The Legon Observer $7*
Fry, Specific Performance, London, 1921.
Fuller, L.L., The Morality of Law, New Haven, Connecticut, 1969*
Garner, J.F., "A.lease or licence", (1963) 107 Solicitors1 Journal 246.
Gaulie, E., Cruel Habitations,hLondon, 1974.
Ghana,
Report of the Standing Advisory Committee on the Cost of Living, 1941 (repro­
duced in) Report of the Committee of Enquiry into Rentals, Accua, 1951.
(Cont.)
21
Report of the commission to enquire into disturbances in the Gold Coast,
London, H.M.S.O., 1948.
Report of the Committee of Enquiry into Rentals, Accra, 1951*
Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the operation of the Rent Control 
Ordinance (NO.2), 1952, Accra, 1962.
Report of the Committee of Enquiry into alleged irregularities and malpractices 
in connection with the issue of import licences, Accra, 1964.
Report of the Commission to enquire into the Kwame Nkrumah Properties,
Accra, 1966.
Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the affairs of NADECO Ltd.,
Accra, 1966.
Report of the Special Audit Investigation into the accounts o'f the United 
Farmers1 Council Co-operatives, Accra, 1966.
Report of the Committee of Enquiry into the local purchasing of cocoa,
Accra, 1967*
Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Irregularities and Malpractices 
in the grant of import licences, Accra, 1967.
White Paper on the Report of the Commission of Enquiry into irregularities 
and malpractices in the grant of import licences, White Paper No.4/67*
Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the operation of the State Housing 
Corporation, Accra, 1968.
White Paper* on the report of the Commission appointed to enquire into the 
the manner and operation of the State Housing Corporation, White Paper No.3/68, 
Accra, 1968.
Report of the Commission to enquire into the assets of specified persons 
(Mr.Justice Sowah, chairman), Vol.l, Accra, 1968} Vols.2 & 3$ Accra, 1969* 
Report of the Commission to enquire into the assets of specified persons 
(Mrs.Justice Jiagge, chairman), Accra, 1969*
Report of the Committee of Enquiry into alleged malpractiecs in the affairs 
of the Tema Development Corporation, Accra, 1970.
Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Bribery and Corruption, Accra, 1975* 
Gilbert, Baron, A Treatise on Rents, Dublin, '1792*
Gluckman, M.et.al., Introduction (to) Gluckman, M. (ed.), Ideas and Procedures 
in African Law, London, 1969*
22
Gray, M., The Cost of Council Housing, Institute of Economic Affairs 
pamphlet No.l8, London, 1968.
Gugler, J* and Flanagan, W.G., Urbanization and Social Change in West Africa, 
Cambridge, 1978.
Hanbury, H.G., Modern Equity, London, 1976.
Hannigan, A* St.J., "The question of notice under the Ghanaian system of
registration of deeds", (1966). 3 University of Ghana Law Journal 27*
Hart, H.L.A., The Concept of Law, London, 196I) "Definition and theory in 
jurisprudence", (195^) 70. Law Quarterly Review 37*
Harvey, J.B., "A study to determine whether the rights and duties attendant
upon the termination of a lease should be revised", (1966) 5^ California 
Law Review ll4l.
Hauser, P.M., The Study of Urbanization, New York, 1967.
Hayek, F., "The repercussions of rent restriction" (in) Verdict on Rent
Control, Readings No.7» Institute of Economic Affairs, London, 1972.
Hayward, F., "Political participation and its role in development: some
observations drawn from the African context", (1973) 7 Journal of
Developing Areas, 591* "Political expectations in rural Ghana", (1972) 
Rural Africana.
Heidenheimer, A.J. (ed.), Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative 
Analysis, New York, 1970.
Hill, H.A. and Redman, J.H., Law of Landlord and Tenant, London, 1976.
Holdsworth, .W.R., History of English Law, Vol.3» London, 1923; Vol.7»
London, 1926.
Holmes, O.W., "The path of Law", (1897) 10 Harvard Law Review 457*
Kantorowicz*,H., The Definition of Law, Cambridge, 1933*
Kaunda, K.K., "Mulungushi Speech", Zambia Daily Mail, Lusaka, July 1, 1975*
Kelsen, H., General Theory of Law and State, New York, 1961.
The Pure Theory of Law, Berkeley, California, 1970.
23
Kessler and Sharp, Contracts: Cases and Materials, Boston, 1953*
Killick, T., "Price controls in Africa: the Ghanaian experience", (1973)
Journal of Modern African Studies 405#
Kilson, M., "The grassroots in Ghanaian politics", (in) Foster, P., and 
Zolberg, A.R., (eds«), Ghana and the Ivory Coastt Chicago, 1971*
Kludze, A.K.P., Ewe Law of Property, London, 1973*
"Problems of intestate succession in Ghana", (1979-)^ U*G ^ '
«vioJ^a fikna ian  Isuj) eJ? *tor-(<jac|
"Developments in specific performance", (1977) 9 Review of Ghana Law 10jU 
"The equitable tenant and protection against eviction", (1976) 8 Review 
of Ghana Law 63-
"The termination of leases", (1975) 7 Review of Ghana Law 1$.
Korn, E.D., "Unlawful disposition of family land - void or voidable", (1967) 4
University of Ghana Law Journal 111*
Kraus, J«, "Political change, conflict and development in Ghana", (in) Foster, P. 
and Zolberg, A*R«, (eds«), Ghana and the Ivory Coast, Chicago, 1971*
Lawson, F*H», Introduction to the Law of Real Property, London, 1958*
Levasseur, A.A., "The modernization of law in Africa with particular reference
to family law in the Ivory Coast", (in) Foster, P* and Zolberg, A«R* (eds«),
Ghana and the Ivory Coast, Chicago, 1971#
Le£ffl£ H*H*, "Landlord and tenant reform", (i960) 35 New York University Law 
Review | .
Le Vine, V«, Political Corruption: The Ghana Case, Stanford, 1975*
Lipsky, M* and Neumann, C.A., "Landlord-tenant law in the United States and 
West Germany - a comparison of legal approaches", (1969) 44 Tulane Law 
Review 36*
Luckham, R., "The economic base of private law practice", (in) Ekow-Daniels, W#C* 
and Woodman, G«R«, (eds*), Essays in Ghanaian Law, Accra, 1976*
Mabogunje, A.L. et.al., Shelter Provision in Developing Countries, S.C.O.P.E.11, 
Chichester, 1978.
Maitland, F»W«, Lectures of) Equity, Cambridge, 1936*
Zk
Malinowski, B. Introduction (to) Hogbin, I., Law and Order in Polynesia,
London, 1934.
Massell, G., "Law as an instrument of revolutionary change in a traditional 
milieu: the case of Soviet Central Asia", (1968) J7. Law and Society 
Review 179*
Maxwell, P.B., The Interpretation of Statutes, Lbndon, 1969*
Megarry, R.f^nd Wade, H.W.R., The Law of Real Property, London, 1975*
Megarry, R.^Note (1963) 79 Law Quarterly Review 479*
Mends, E., "Traditional values and bribery and corruption", (1970) 5 The 
Legon Observer 13•
Milsom, S.F.C., Historical Foundations of the Common Law, London, 1969*
Moskovitz, M., "The implied warranty of habitability: a new doctrine raising 
new issues", (1974) 62 California Law Review 1444.
Mundt, R. J., "The internalization of law in a developing country: the Ivory
Coast Civil Code”, (1978) l6 African Law. Studies 176.
Mutungi, O.K., "The communication of law under conditions of development: 
the Kenya Case", (1973) 9 East African Law Journal 11.
Myrdal, G., "The * soft state* in Underdeveloped countries", (1968) 1$ University 
of California (Los Angeles) Law Review 1118.
Ocran, T.M., Law in Aid of Development, Accra, 1978*
Ofori-Boateng, J. , "Rules of evidence under Act 220", (197Z)
w T k e ^ a t u < ' a - t f  <» c o m m o n  Hjxm a r t « s (  t i n d t r  lUiu #JU\L
A c ^ , ^ bi (<Tctaao;*, (lW ) 3 i w .
Ollennu, N.A., Principles of Customary Land Law in Ghana, London, 1962.
Onwuamaegbu, M.O., The Nigerian Law of Landlord and Tenant, London, 1966.
Peasah, J.A., "Institutionalized corruption", (1967) 2 The Legon Observer 11.
Pennace, V.G., Introduction (to) Verdict on Rent Control, Readings No.7» 
Institute of Economic Affairs, London, 1972.
25
Phillips, E & Quinn, T.M., "The law of landlord and tenant: a critical evaluation 
of the past with guidelines for the future", (1969) 38 Fordham Law Review 38.
Pogucki, J.H., Land Tenure in Ghana'(Vols.1-5 titled Gold Coast Land Tenure),
Vols.2, 3 & 4, Accra, 1935? Vol.6, Accra, 1957*
Pollock & Maitland, History of English Law, London, 1911*
Pozen, R.C., "Public corporations in Ghana: a case study in legal importation", 
(1971) Wisconsin Law Review 243*
Rank, P.M., "Repairs in lieu of rent", (1976) 40 Conveyancer 196*
Reynolds, I#I., "Statutory covenants of fitness and repair; SOCi Cl jL jlKjfcsla-
tuw artd (l °i 7 ^ 3 7  /Ho Join LawfttQi U o  3 7 7  ,
Sarbah, J.M., Fanti Custometry Laws, London, 1904.
Seidman, R.B., The State, Law and Development, London, 1978.
Sharpston, M.J., "The economics of corruption", New Society, London,
26 November 1970.
Simpson, A.W.B., Introduction to the History of Land Law, London, 1961.
Simpson, S.R., Land Law and Registration, Cambridge, 1976.
Sjoberg, G., The Pre-»industrial City:Past and Present, Glencoe, Illinois, I960. 
"Theory and research in urban growth" (in) Hauser, P.M., (ed.), The Study 
of Urbanization, New York, 1967.
Smith, R.B., Land and Politics in the England of Henry VIII: The West Riding 
of Yorkshire 1530~40, London, 1970.
Smith, W.F., Housing: The Social and Economic Elements, Berkeley, California, 1971*
Snell, Principles of Equity, London, 1973*
Steel, F.M., "Hyperinflation in Ghana", (1979) H  The Legon Observer 308.
Street, H., "The Rent Act, 1974: an evaluation", (1974) 38 Conveyancer 394.
/26
United Kingdom
Report of the Committee on the Enforcement of Judgment Debts, London, 1969, 
Crand•3909•
Report of the Committee on the Rent Acts, H.M.S.O., 1971» Cmnd.4609*
Select Committee on Race Relations and Immigration, Report on Housing,
H.M.S.O.H.C.508-1/1970-71.
Vanderlinden, J., Introduction au Droit de l»Ethiope Moderne, Paris, 1971.
Weber, M., The theory of Social and Economic Organization, New York, 1964*
Werlin, H.H., MThe roots of corruptions the Ghanaian case", (1972) 10 Journal 
of Modern African Studies 247*
West, W • A •, The Law of Dilapidations, London, 1974.
Williams, G., MInternational law and the controversy surrounding the word 
'law'**, (in) Laslett (ed.). Philosophy, Politics and Society, Vol.l,
London, 1956* 1
‘‘pcui Qtro ms pfdrtii\'<2-5; J u f c  o P  n.or\- c  cc-Ufiz-rs 01
( Y w l )  5  (Yl JcJe-Trl LcuuJ &.ZA)i<UQ H 4 - .  1 r
KT«v<L Coro n a t i o n  c e o s ^ . %  L w J  &Ut<UX> C U t *  ,
Williston, S., "Freedom of contract", (1921) Cornell Law Quarterly 365*
Wirth, L., "Urbanism as a way of life", (1938) 44 American Journal of Sociology 1 
Woodfall, W., Law of Landlord and Tenant, London, 1978.
Woodman, G.R., "Land law and the distribution of wealth" (in) Ekow-Daniels, W.C. 
& Woodman, G.R. (eds.), Essays in Ghanaian Law, Accra, 1976.
"Some realism about customary law - the West African experience", (1969) 
Wisconsin Law Review 128.
"The family as a corporation in Ghanaian and Nigerian Law", (1974) 11 
African Law Studies 1.
"The acquisition of family land id (AlxflrtCl^ ^^ yjournal of African Law 13^ >.
"The alienation of family lewd ;*1 GUcwia , (116^7 1 u  G H - 2 - 3
" H o w  can rXflts be, cantroljUcI", (l172.)l Ike l&qtM 4-66.
"The recent rent control legislation", (1973) 8 The Legon Observer 198.
"In defence of section 17 of the Rent Act (Act 220)", (1975) 7ft.C*L’lA+.
r t a x A t f a o f  w s + A m M f c s
"Too many illegitimate children?", (1975) *2 Of - 0 f— 'JL I
" PafolUl dtVfeU) \n S j^ ’Cc ^/|or«\artce," ^ { O d-Q.k. I 8 5 '
27
Yahuda, S., ’’Frustration and the chattel interest”, (1958) 2*L Modern Lav 
Review 637*
Zander, M., ’’The unused Rent Acts”, New Society, 12 September 1968*
Zolberg, A.R*, Creating Political Order: The Party-States of West Africa, 
Chicago, 1966.
28
PREFACE
This study is first and foremost an essay in applied juristics; about 
the interplay of the forces of law and the concrete economic and socio­
political dynamics of Ghanaian society* It deals with one of the legal 
arrangements for the provision of housing for many members of the urban
population* The study springs from a deeply-held conviction that the study,
analysis and investigation of legal phenomenon must be rooted in its societal 
context* It is imperative that doctrine is not abstracted from its socio­
economic and political context*
Arising out of this major perspective, this study emphasises the usefulness
(indeed, the imperative) of an inter-disciplinary approach to the study of
legal phenomena* Residential tenancy law is the "legalised version" of a 
human and social arrangement* It has and is affected by demographic, social, 
economic, political, technological and administrative.factors* A study of 
the functioning of the institution cannot therefore be usefully done by 
abstracting the legalised part from the societal whole* This study therefore 
draws heavily on demographic material, like the population censuses of 19^8, 
i960 and 1970* It also relies on more particularly demographic and sociolo­
gical surveys and on sociological, economic, political and housing literature*
Law operates in context; it does not exist in a vacuum* The third 
objective of this study is to demonstrate that the English common law of 
landlord and tenant (the common law makes no conceptual distinction between 
urban residential tenancies and rural agricultural tenancies) the foundations 
of which were laid in a certain historical formation (an agrarian economy, 
and a political and judicial system in which the land-owing class had a lot 
of clout) is singularly ill-suited for investigation and analysis of residential 
tenancies in urban Ghana. Without major surgery, it is ill-equipped to deal 
with the problems thrown up by the residential tenancy relationship*
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It is, however, not only the translocated common law of landlord and 
tenant which is out of fit with societal conditions in urban Ghana. ’Local' 
legislation on the rights and obligations of landlord and tenant having being 
passed without regard to the rules of the science of legislation have been 
rendered frustrate by the socio-economic and political realities of Ghanaian 
society* The gap between the rights and protections offered by the law and 
the use (or non-use) made of them is highlighted*
Lastly, this is an examination, analysis and critique of the balck- 
letter rules of the law.
1
In researching this area of the law, a survey was carried out in the 
three cities of Accra, Kumasi and Sekondi-Takoradi. But for reasons largely 
of finance (and therefore of personnel) the survey had to be of a limited 
kind. In all 2,000 tenants and 500 landlords were interviewed. The conclusions 
that were established cannot, therefore, be said to be scientifically accurate 
for the whole of urban Ghana. The conclusions, however, confirmed some 
impressions about this aspect of the law of Ghana not confined to the present 
writer. This is that large aspects of residential tenancy law have fallen 
into desuetude. The survey was carried out between July and December 197&*
It was designed to establish how far (if, at all) some of the law-in-the-books 
(like restriction of rental levels, security of tenure, and the repairing 
obligations of landlord and tenants) operate in practice. It is hoped that 
in the not too distant future a more comprehensive and scientific survey into 
this and other aspects of law would be undertaken.
Use has also been made of other primary sources, like legislation, judicial 
decisions, parliamentary debates, reports of various commissions and committees 
of enquiry, official publications, government White Papers, etc.
1. Selection of interviewees was not based on any quota sampling.
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This has been fortified by consultation of and reference to secondary 
material, like reports of surveys, books, journals, articles, seminar papers, 
unpublished theses and dissertations, etc*, not only of a strictly legal 
nature, but crucially, from the other social sciences*
Researching this subject has been made more interesting, more rewarding
and infinitely easier by the excellent supervision of Prof* Antony Allott*
He has been helpful in his comments, perceptive and critical in his analysis, 
but always encouraging* I am indebted to him.
The thesis also owes much to Dr* Gordon Woodman and Mr* Tsatsu Tsikata 
who, as my teachers in jurisprudence and immovable property law when I was an 
undergraduate at Legon, impressed upon me—  in those formative years of my 
legal education—— the Rootedness of law in society, and the imperative never 
to abstract doctrine or theory from its concrete context* In short, they 
introduced a young mind to the study of law and society —  to the need to 
study law and "legalised problems" as part of societal whole* To them I says 
"Thank you for setting me on the right path"*
I am also Indebted to Mr* JuliUs Wellens - Mensah and Mr*R.O*Laryea
who through their letters and by steadily supplying me with Ghanaian newspapers, 
news journals, statutes and other publications kept me informed of developments 
in Ghana*
Nee-Ashie Kotey 
London, April 1981
31
CHAPTER ONE
SETTING THE CONTEXT
1
"Law operates m  context; it does not exist in a vacuum" •
This chapter examines some of the contextual factors which have a
bearing on the functioning of residential tenancy law* These provide the
flesh which clothe the skeleton of legal doctrine* The course of the process
of urbanization is plotted and urbanity is identified* The housing situation
in Ghana is examined; the housing shortage and consequent overcrowding in
< the urban areasf and the nature of the rented accommodation market being
demonstrated* These factors have important consequences on the functioning
of the legal rules affecting the residential tenancy relationship - these
are highlighted at various points of the essay*
It should not be supposed that these are the only contextual factors
which condition the functioning of residential tenancy law, that the context
is exhausted by an examination of urbanization and the housing question*
Other social, economic, political, and administrative factors are equally 
2
important • Thus the current general socio-economic situation characterized 
by hyper-inflation, failure of price control, frequent shortages of essential 
items, including building materials, institutionalized and endemic corruption 
and breakdown in the status order, is a crucial factor in the functioning 
of residential tenancy law* Equally important are political factors like 
minimal participation by most people in the political process and resultant 
alienation from, delegitimising of and non-identification with the polity* 
These are all very much part of the context within which residential tenancy 
law operates in Ghana*
For reasons, largely of style and presentation, these other contextual 
considerations are analysed in the final chapter*
1* Allott, A*N*, The Limits of Law, London, 1980, p*99. 
2* See infra, Chapter 9•
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A URBANIZATION 
I What is an urban area?
In its post-independence population censuses (i960 and 1970), Ghana 
has adopted the U.N. proposal and defined an urban area as one with more 
than 5,000 people. In both these censuses, therefore, the sole determinant 
of urbanity has been the size of population. This is also in accord with 
the view of Hauser that urbanism is a function of size, and that size and 
density must be sole determinants of urbanity*.
The view that size is the sole determinant of urbanity has, however, 
not gone unchallenged. In his article theory and research urban^growth",
Sjoberg argues that it is practically difficult if not impossible to adopt
2
size as the sole criterion for determining urbanity • Commenting on size 
and density as the sole determinants of urbanity, Sjoberg writes!
. these are insufficient. Ve add the requirements of
a significant number of full-time specialists including a
literate group engaged in a relatively wide range of non-
3
argncultural activities” •
Due to the functional complexity of urbanity, it is not scientific to
4use population as the only index of urbanity •
1. Hauser, P.M., The Study of Urbanization, New York, 1967*
2. Sjoberg, G., "Theory and Research in Urban Growth”, in Hauser, P.M., 
The Study of Urbanization, New York, 1967*
3* Sjoberg, G*, The Pre-industrial City: Past and Present, Glencoe
Illinois, I960.
4. See Ewusi, K., "The towns of Ghana and their levels of development",
(1977)i Vol.6, No.l, Universities, p.156.
The population of a locality should provide the base from which a 
definition of urbanity must start; but it should not end there. W(L 
that Ghana has adopted the U.N* norm that all localities withApopulationoJL 
over 5,000 should be considered urban* Applying this norm the 1970 
population census showed that there were 47*634 rural areas and 135 urban 
centres* (See Table 1, for urban areas and their population and other 
important demographic facts as shown by 1970 population census)*
TABLE 1
TOWN Population in 1970
Population 
in i960
Growth Rate 
per Annum)
% Employed 
in Agric*
Accra 564,194 337,828 5.3 2.3
Kumasi 260,286 180,642 3.8 6.0
Tamale 83,653 40,443 7.5 19.0
Tema 60,767 14,937 15.1 5.2
Takoradi 58,161 40,937 3.6 3.3
Cape Coast 51,653 41,230 2.3 8.5
Koforidua 46,235 34,856 2.9 7.9
Teshie 39,382 19,823 7.1 10.5
Sekondi 33,713 24,513 3.3
Old Tafo 33,661 10,909 11.9 7.0
Obuasi 31,005 22,818 3.1 7.8
Winneba 30,778 25,376 2*0 23.7
Nsawam 25,518 20,240 2.3 16*0
Ho 24,199 14,519 5.2 9.7
Sunyani 23,780 12,160 7.0 21*2
Nkawkaw 23,219 15,627 4*0 16.4
Ashiaman 22,549 2,624 23.5 5.2
Yendi 22,072 16,096 3.2 38.9
Agona Swedru 21,522 18,293 1.6 14.9
Wa 21,374 14,342 4.1 22.8
Contu
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TOWN Population 
in 1970
Population
in i960
Growth Rate 
(56 per Annum)
% Employed 
in Argric.
Oda 20,957 19,666 0*6 14.8
Bawku 20,567 12,719 9.3 13.3
Effiakuma 20,182 10,167 7.1 4.0
Balgatanga 18,896 2,575 13# 1 22.6
Asamankese 16,905 16,718 0*1 26.6
Dunkwa 15,457 12,689 2.0 13.1
Prestea 15,145 13,246 1.4 6.3
Hohoe 14,775 9,502 4.5 21.2
Agogo 14,717 10,356 3.6 66.7
Tlarkwa 14,702 13,545 0*8 5.3
Keta 14,446 16,719 16.6
Berekum 14,296 111,148 2.5 33.1
Anloga 14,052 111,038 2*4 33.9
Mampong (Ash*) 13,895 7,943 5.7 31.6
Nungua 13,839 7,068 6.9 8.0
Wenchi 13,836 10,672 2*6 33.1
Tema- Newt own 13,176 7,662 5.6 21.6
Kpandu 12,842 8,070 4*8 20.4
Suhura 12,421 10,193 2*0 12.3
Akwatia 12,177 12,592 16.5
Techiman 12,068 8,775 3.2 45.4
Saltpond 11,849 9,869 1.9 15.9
Aflao 11,397 7,439 4.4 13.1
Elmina 11,401 8,534 2.9 23.0
Bekwai 11,287 9,093 2.2 14.9
tyyakrora 11,252 13,467 58.9
New Tafo 11,114 10,557 0.5 11.2
Begoro 11,043 9,289 1.7 62.6
Konongo 10,881 10,771 0.1 24.9
Ejura 10,664 7,078 4.2 47.2
Dzodze 10,390 5,776 6.0 23.8
Moree 10,086 7,634 2.8 39.0
S.Bereku 9,921 7,984 2.2 35.0
Savelugu 9,895 5,949 5.2 63.9
Cont• ••
Town Population 
in 1970
Population 
in i960
Growth Rate j< 
(# per j^ nnum )
# Employed 
in Agric.
K.Mintsim 9,7^7 6,333 4.4 13.4
Bibiani 9,691 12,942 29.2
Mim 9,630 6,805 3.5 56.7
Somanya 9,326 9,258 15.2
Oorma Ahenkro 8,959 7,107 2.4 39.2
Apam 8,903 8,728 0.2 4.3
Tegbi 6,628 5,924 1.1 35.6
Mumford 8,566 8,666 40.3
Nsuatre 8,467 6,262 3.1 77.6
Akyease 8,466 9,760 65.8
Axim 8,107 5,619 3.7 33.1
Bimbilla 8,068 4,214 6.7 50.6
Peki 8,054 5,154 4.6 55.6
Bechem 7,770 5,501 3.5 39.4
Damongo 7,760 6,575 1.7 52.5
Sfcama 7,739 6,718 1.4 38.8
Akosonbo 7,716 178 4 5.5 5.5
Aburi 7,616 4,715 5.0 31.2
Madina 7,715 - - 3.9
Besease 7,451 7,542 61.5
Akropong 7,426 55,606 2.9 31.7
Achirua 7,355 5,672 2.6 41.6
Akmadan 7,310 4,847 4.2 70.5
Foso 7,249 5,284 3.2 42.0
Xechimentia 7,207 5,583 2.6 74.5
Kadjebi 7,194 7,491 15.0
Nkoranza 7,191 6,250 1.4 60.3
Samreboi 7,151 4,514 4.7 18.1 j
Kintampo 7,149 4,678 4.3 39.7
Effiduase 6,967 6,213 1.2 40.6
I Esikuma 6,948 5,356 2.6 49.9 |
Larteh 6,725 6,381 0.5 48.8
Tepa 6,696 5,409 2.1 36.3
Kumawu 6,670 4,962 3.0 65.4
Kwanyarko 6,648 4,216 56.5
Atebubu 6,630 4,216 4.6 40.9
Kade 6,627 6,274 0.6 31.3
D.Nkvanta 6,585 5,576 1.7 60.4
Cont.
Town Population 
in 1970
iPopulation
in i960
Growth Rate 
(% per Annum)
% Employed 
in Agric.
Asankrangua 6,571 5,497 1.8 57.2
Salaga 6,413 4,199 4.3 42.1
Jasikan 6,403 4,989 2.5 24.8
Krobo Odumase 6,343 4,519 3.5 28.1
Akwatia 6,285 4,826 2.7 49.3
Effiduase 6,207 3,6o4 5.6 29.0
Viamoase 6,185 4,843 2.5 71.4
Bawjiase 6,183 5,723 0.8 58.1
Gyenegyene 6,164 4,288 3.7 82.2
Asasewa 6,111 4,282 3.6 15.8
Kukurantumi 6,067 5,061 1.8 4 5.5
Agona Swedru 6,037 6,881 45.5
Wamfie 6,025 4,963 2.0 71.7
Abetifi 6,024 4,973 2.0 42.1
Komenda 5,966 4,261 3.5 24.0
Anomabu 5,931 5,423 0.9 32.3
Mpraeso 5,908 5,193 1.3 24.8
Mampong 5,818 4,449 2.7 33.5
Akoroso 5,741 5,398 0.6 44.1
Sefwi Wiawso 5,558 4,430 2.3 37.1
Brakwa 5,499 2,198 9.6 77.2
Yeji 5,485 2,198 9.6 29.6
Yamfo 5,474 4,264 2.5 73.2
Awaaso 5,449 3,548 4.4 37.5
Half-Assini 5,428 4,575 1.7 35.7
Afiedenyigba 5,424 4,920 1.0 26.4
Kibi 5,408 5,009 0.7 24.0
Obo 5,328 3,983 2.9 53.0
Valewale 5,302 4,493 1.7 38.6
Bepon 5,265 4,178 2.4 79.8
Odumasi 5,209 5,540 47.8
Abodom 5,195 5,085 0.2 74.6
Old -Nihgo 5,H6 2,332 8.3 37.6
Kunbugu 5,153 4,481 1.4 63.2
Dzelukope 5,153 5,111 14.0
Odoben 5,101 4,723 0.8 62.2
Bobikuma 5,097 4,726 0.7 73.7
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Town Population 
in 1970
Population
in i960
Growth Rate 
per Annum)
% Employed 
in Agric*
Kete-Krachi 5,097 3,928 2*6 20.9
Sekodumasi 5,075 4,710 0.7 78.8
Kpedze 5,062 4,576 1.0 33.3
Juabeng. 5,018 3,426 3.9 61.8
Nkenkaso 5,007 4,487 3.7 69.6
Goaso 5,001 3,454 3.8 30.6
The application of the U*N. norm does not, however, really distinguish 
the urban from the rural* From the 1970 census figures this table may be 
drawn*
TABLE 2
Classification Size No* of Localities
Cities 100,000 and more 2
Large towns 20,000 - 100,000 21
Medium-Size towns 10,000 - 20,000 29
Small towns 5,000 - 10,000 83
As can be seen from the table a majority of these localaties fall into
the category Ewusi labels "Small Towns". These localities, as Addo points 
1
out and as will be demonstrated presently, show characteristics closer to
rural agricultural localities than urban centres. As Ewusi points out, most
2of them are really overgrown villages • It is therefore suggested that the 
base-limit for urbanity should be a population of 10,000*
1* Addo, N.O., Dynamics of Urban Growth in South-East Ghana, 
Unpublished Ph*p. thesis, Univ* London, 1969, P*28.
2* Ewusi, K., The towns of Ghana and their levels of develop­
ment, (1977)i Vol.6, No*l, University s, p*l56.
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II Structure of .employment as a determinant of urbanity
Occupation is an important determinant of urbanity* Hence the definition 
of urban/rural was adopted during the planning of the Census on the assumption 
that localities with a population of 5*000 and over are mainly non-agricultural* 
The 1970 population Census provides useful information on the employment 
structure of localities* Table 3* gives the distribution of towns according 
to their employment structure*
TABLE 3
Towns with proportion of employment 
in agriculture (%)
Number of Towns
0 - 1 0 19
10 - 20 21
20 - 30 20
01OK'N 27
4o - 50 15
. ....... 50...andabove
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It was suggested by some commentators during the 1970 Census
. that localities with more than 30% of their working
population employed in agriculture should be considered rural* On this
basis 33 localities designated by the census as urban should be considered 
1
as rural towns •
The 1970 population census showed that the largest centres had the 
smallest percentage employed in agriculture* Accra had only 2*3% of its
2
workers employed in agriculture, Takoradi 3*3%, T&ma 3*2% and Kumasi 6*0% •
It thus showed that there is some correlation between size of town and
3
employment in agriculture • The largest rural towns (each of which tead a 
population of more than 10,000) were Agogo, ;Nyakrom and Begoro; but all these 
towns are famous for cocoa, farming
1* See Table 1: Source 1970 Population Census .
2* Source: 1970 Population Census* See Table 4 .
3* See Table 1, supra.
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An urban area may thus be defined as a town with a population of at 
least 10,000 and with less than half of its working population involved in 
agriculture. These are the towns with which this study is concerned. It 
must be pointed out, ex Abundanti cautelai that this definition is formulated 
firstly for modern Ghana and secondly for the purposes of this study.
Like all definitions it makes no claim to 'rightness*• It, therefore, does 
not seek to exclude from the definition of urbanity towns and cities of 
earlier civilizations. The definition is supposed to be entirely functional. 
Of necessity, different epochs (and analysis of them) will require different 
definitions.
The compendious term "Urban Ghana" will, therefore, be used in the 
following pages to mean (unless otherwise indicated) the areas which satisfy 
the above definition. These ares
TABLE 4
TOWN Population in 1970
Working Population 
involved in Agric. (%)
1. Accra 564,194 2.3%
2. Kumasi 260,286 6.0%
3. Tamale 83,653 19.0%
4. Tema 60,777 5.2%
5. Takeradi 58,161 3.3%
6. Cape Coast 51,653 8.5%
7. Koforidjfta 46,235 7.9%
8. Teshie 39,382 10.3%
9. Sekondi 33,713 3.3%
! jlO. Old Tafo 33,661 7.0%
11. Obuasi 31,005 7.8%
12. Winneba 30,778 23.7%
13. Nsawam 25,518 16.0%
14. Ho 24,119 9.7%
15. Sunyani 23,780 21.2%
16. Nkawkaw 23,219 16.4%
17. Ashiaman 22,549 5.2%
Cont
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Town Population in 1970 Working Population 
involved in Agric. (%)
18, Yendi 22,072 38.9%
19. Agona Swedru 21,522 14.9#
20* Wa 21,374 22.8#
21. Oda 20,957 14,8$
22. Bawku- 20,567 13.3#
23. Effiakuma 20,182 4.0#
24. Bolgatanga 18,896 22.6#
25. Asamankese 16,905 26.6#
26. Dunkwa 15,437 13.1#
27. Prestea 15,143 6.3%
28* Hohoe 14,775 21.2%
29. Tarkwa 14,702 5.3%
30. Keta 14,446 16.6%
31. Berekum 14,296 33.1%
32. Anloga 14,032 33.9%
33. Mampong (Ash.) 13,895 31.6%
34. Nungua 13,839 8.0%
35. Wenchi 13,836 33.1%
36. Tema Newtown 13,176 21.6%
37. Kpandu 12,842 20.4%
CD • Suhum 12,421 12.3%
39. Akw'atia 12,177 16.5%
4o. Techiman 12,068 45.4%
41. Saltpond 11,849 15.9%
42. Aflao 11,397 13.1%
43. Elmina 11,401 23.0%
44. Bekwai 11,287 14.9%
45. New Tafo 11,114 11.2%
46. Konongo 10,881 24.9%
47. Ejura 10,664 47.2%
48. Dzodze 10,390 23.8%
49. Moree 10,086 39.0%
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III. The process of urbanization
Plotting the course of urbanization in modern Ghana is hazardous* It 
depends very largely on one’s definition of urbanity. It also depends on 
how far back one is prepared to go. But perhaps crucially, it depends on 
whether one considers the socio-economic developments engendered by 
colonialism as being of a particular genus, or whether they are just a 
variant of socio-economic developments which had been taking place in 
West Africa since the days of the ancient Ghana, Mali and Songhai empires 
and the kingdoms of the Yoruba, of Dahomey, of Asante and of Benin, and 
of the spread of Islam and the activities in the northern half of what is 
now modern Ghana.
Belonging to the latter school is Louis Wirth, who has written:
MIt is particularly important to call attention to the danger 
of confusing urbanism with industrialism and modern capitalism • •
Different as the cities of earlier epochs may have been by virtue
of their development in a pre-industrial and a pre-capitalistic 
order from the great cities of today, they were nevertheless 
cities"1.
Agreeing with this view, Gugler and Flanagan have traced the process 
of urbanization in West Africa to the earlier civilization of ancient 
Ghana, Mali and Songhai atf'd the relatively later civilization of Boruu - 
Karnem, the Hausa states y the kingdoms of the Yoruba, Asante, Gonja, etc.,
and the trade and enterprise generated within the region (intra-regional
2xtrade ). The socio-economic forces unleashed by colonialism are thus a 
variant (the early colonialists were attracted by gold, ivory, etc., which 
were some of the main items in the trans-saharan trade) of socio-economic 
and political factors already at work in the sub-region. The process of 
urbanization is, therefore, seen as a continuum, with changes on the way —  
new cities being born, some old ones being transformed, others not surviving — ■ 
in response to changed and changing socio-economic dynamics within the 
society and in her relations with the outside world.
1. "Urbanism as a way of life", (1938) 44 American Journal of Sociology 1 •
2. Gugler, J & Flanagan, W.G., Urbanization and Social Change in West Africa, 
Cambridge, 1978, pp.1-26 .
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In the particularly Ghanaian context, Kwamena Dickson has traced the
origins of urbanism in Ghana to pre-colonial times and noted the specializ-
1ation which led to the development of "embrtjpnic towns" • Dickson notes that 
changes in social organisation, the establishment of dominance by one political 
group over others and the establishment of larger chiefdoms and the conver­
gence of trading caravans and long-distance traders led to the development 
of embryonic towns which were urban in their characteristics* He cites as 
example of such towns Wa, Yendi, Kintampo and Kumasi*
While not wishing to deny the status of urbanity to pre-colonial towns 
like Kumbsi-Saleh, Timbuktoo, Kano and Ibadan in other parts of Africa and
Wa, Yendi, Kintampo and Kumasi in Ghana, it is suggested that urbanism — -
2as we know it today — is predominantly a post-colonial development • It is 
a result of socio-economic forces unleashed by colonialism* In considering 
the process of urbanization, therefore, the pre-colonial antecedents of all 
the Ghanaian urban centres (with the possible exception of Kumasi) need not 
be examined*
IV. Urban Growth
The population of Ghana has increased repidly in the last three decades*
The 1948 population of 4,118,000 rose to 6,726,815 in i960 and to 8,559,313«t 1^ 70.
It would now be over 10 million*
Even more phenomenal is the increase in the number of people living
3
m  the urban areas* The number of people living in urban Ghana rose from
538,000 in 1948 to 1,551,000 in i960 and to 2,472,456 in 1970. Thus by the 
definition employed in the 1970 Census, 28*9/6 of all Ghanaians lived in urban 
areas* Exception has been taken to census definition, but even using our 
own definition shows that in 1970, 1,766,976 lived in urban centres*
It may be useful to look at the growth of some of the major urban centres*
1* Dickson, K*B*, The Ghanaian Town, its Nature and Function, Accra,
1971, PP.1-5.
2* See Addo, N*0*, "Some Aspects of the relation between immigration 
and socio-economic development in Ghana, in Addo, et.al (eds*)
Population and Socio-Economic Developments in Ghana, No*2, Ghana 
Population Studies, Univ* Ghana, Legon, 1969, p.101.
3* Census definition*
TABLE 5
Growth of Major Urban Centres (Since 1948)
TOWN Pop. in 1948 Pop* in i960 Pop* in 1970
Accra 134,000 337,828 564,194
Kumasi 71,000 180,642 260,286
Tamale 17,000 40,443 60,767
Tema - 14,937 60,767
Takoradi 17,000 40,937 58,104
Cape Coast 23,000 41,230 31,653
Koforidua 19,000 34,856 . 46,235
Thus from 1948-60 the population of the seven largest towns increased
by about 400,000— about 40% of all inter-censal population growth and a
growth rate of 38*7%* From 1960-70 the population of these seven towns
increased by about 425,000 —  about a sixth of inter-censal population growth*
What then are the causes of this exceptionally rapid rate of urbanization?1*
The first reason is the general increase in population, the result of
a low-mortality rate which is due, in part, to better health facilities,
better education, the oboJiifen of the slave trade and of inter-tribal and
internecine wars, etc*
But the most important single cause of urbanization in Ghana has been
migration —  both immigration from neighbouring countries in search of jobs
2and opportunities and internal rural-urban migration • In more recent
3
times internal rural-urban migration has been the more important factor • 
Migration is nearly always a response to socio-economic and political
1* The reasons are crucial in considering whether the customary law 
is applicable to residential tenanties in urban Ghana:
See infra, pp.22-30.
2* See Caldwell, J.C*, "Migration and urbanization", in Birmingham,
W., et.al*, A Study of Contemporary Ghana, Vol.2, London, 1967, p*lll-
3* ibid*
4* See Caldwell, J*C*, supra and Addo, N.O., "Some aspects of the relation 
between migration and socio-economic development in Ghana, op*cit*
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In the present context, it is invariably a corollary to industrialization 
and 'modernization1. Addo notes:
"In traditional, subsistence, and settled agricultural
communities the forces that give rise to migration and
rapid turnover of population are either absent or they
are usually marginal and of little significance. In
Ghana, no convincing evidence exists to show that any
systematic type of individual migration took place
1
within the country before the m  neteenth century" •
Migration in Ghana was a response to economic and socio-political impulses 
unleashed by the establishment of colonial rule in Ghana.
The socio-political environment was significantly altered by the 
establishment of suzerainty over the whole country by a superior power.
The establishment of law and order made the country safer (inter-tribal wars 
and fatricidal struggles were reduced, the marauding bands of slave conquerors 
were brought under control and the whole country became one British colonial 
'possession')• In short, it was safer to move within different parts of the 
country.
The establishment of a safer socio-political climate would not have 
resulted in migration had it not been paralleled by cfucial economic develop­
ments. These were the introduction of the modern system of mining and the 
introduction and development of cocoa farming.
country was the first major economic dynamic. This was soon followed by 
the introduction of cocoa. These two developments provided stimuli for 
growth and development of the economy.
1. Addo, N.O., "Some aspects of the relation between migration and 
socio-economic development in Ghana", in Addo, N.O., et.al. (eds) 
Population and socio-economic development in Ghana, No.£
Ghana Population Studies, Univ.-Ghana, Legon, 19&0, p.101.
The introduction of the modern system of mining into of the
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New opportunities were opened up for people to move into the wage and income - 
earning economy. Little wonder that mining towns like Ohuasi and Tarkwa and 
cocoa-producing towns like Nkawkaw, Tafo and Sunyani have been in the fore­
front of urbanization in Ghana.
But, perhaps more importantly, both cocoa and ffok* modern system of 
mining indirectly led to more rapid urban growth. The establishemht of this 
export-oriented economy necessitated the development of infrastructural 
facilities to service these industries. Hence the establishment of admi­
nistrative centres, shipping ports, trade centres, railway transportation 
and stations, road, schools, etc. The development of urban centres like 
Accra, Kumasi, Takoradi, Tema, Cape Coast, Sekondi, Tamale and Koforidua is 
traceable to one or several of such factors.
Though the pattern of urbanization was established in colonial times, 
it must be pointed out (though it must be self-evident to any student of the 
political economy of neo-colonialism) that this pattern of urbanization has 
persisted in independent Ghana.
Urbanization in Ghana (as it manifests itself today) is, therefore, a 
twentieth century phenomenon. As an example, we note the rapid growth of 
Accra.
TABLE 6 
Pace of Accra*s Growth
Year Population
1931 70,000
1948 134,000
i960 337,828
1970 564,194
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V. Why limit descussion to urban Ghana?
The crucial factor is that Ghana is fast becoming urbanized, i.e.,
1
more and more of her people are? becoming urban rather than rural dwellers •
This process is continuing and will continue for some time. In a recent 
2
SCOPE study. Shelter Provision in Developing Countries, Ghana was classified!
\
as having a low ”urban stability”, i.e., an unstable urban situation. Urban 
stability was defined by the report ass
”. • • the potential capacity of a country to
continue to urbanize, given the size of its
population, its level of economic development,
the pattern of demographic, and the current balance
3
between rural and urban residence” •
This study thus looks at one of the arrangements for the provision of 
shelter to an increasingly growing part of Ghanaian society. Between 1921 
and 1970 the rural population multiplied about 2^ times while the urban 
population (census definition) multiplied 8^ times.
1. Supra, pp.
2. Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environment, |t is a committee 
of the International Council of Scientific Unions.
3. Mabogunje, A.L., et.al., Shelter Provision in Developing Countries, 
SCOPE 11, Chichester, 1978, p.17-
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Secondly, the housing situation in the urban areas as will be presently 
1
demonstrated , is different from that prevailing in the rural areas* In fact 
oruaxof the central themes of this study is that residential tenancies in an 
urban context activate different issues fn?m tenancies in a rural environment*
B. THE HOUSING SITUATION
House-building in Ghana is mostly undertaken by private individuals, 
rather than by corporate groups* Most of the houses are built by a mason, 
bricklayer, carpenter and labourers employed individually by the house-builder 
or mason acting on his behalf and not by corporate contractors* The United 
Nations Technical Assistance team (under the chairmanship of Charles Abrams) 
which studied the housing problem in Ghana reported:
•’Most of its building operations are still undertaken 
through self-help operations* Unlike the more urbanized 
countries its people have not yet reached the point 
where home building must be dome through a multitude
2
of specialized sub-contractors using specialised materials” •
In more recent times public corporations have been established and 
uhHv
charged A the function of building houses* The main such body is the 
A
State Housing Corporation; another is the Tema Development Corporation*
The attempt at public housing construction has, however, had minimal effect 
on the housing situation* The public corporations have failed to achieve 
their building targets* Up to 1972 the State Housing Corporation (S*H.C*)
was building at the rate of 500 units per annum instead of its target of
32,000 per annum • The only period when the S.H.C., was near reaching its 
target was between 1972-75 when it launched a ’’crash programme”* This low- 
level efficiency is partly due to economic conditions in the country with 
the attendant shortages of building materials, the particular problems of
4the British-style public corporation in Ghana , and other socio-political
1* infra, pp^-JG*
2. Housing in Ghana, New York: United Nations, 1957*
3* See The Mirror. Feb,2, 1979* p*6.
4. See Pozen, R.C., "Public corporations in Ghana: a case study in legal 
importation”, (1971) 130 Wisc*L.Rev*243: Botchway, E.A., "Operational 
autonomy and public accountability: A case study of Ghana's development 
experience and a blue print for reform”, (1973) 3 Ga*J*Intl* & Comp.Law 55*
administrative incompetence and mismanagement • The government White Paper 
to the report of the commission of enquiry into the operation of S*H*C* notes:
MThe findings of the Commission which the government
accepts generally follow the now familiar pattern of
dishonesty, incompetence, favouritism, barefaced
stealing, intimidation, arbitrary use of powerm over
centralization of authority*, indifference and ineptitude
by persons placed in positions of authority and responsi^
2bility over the Housing Corporation • • *M •
Allocation of the houses built by these public bodies presents another 
chapter in the sad and sordid story which has made Ghana what it is today*
The government White Paper cited above noted:
"On the question of allocation, the corporation set out 
to follow the policy of 'first come first served1 related 
to the payment of the minimum deposit laid down by the
Corporation; but this policy was abandoned early on and
having consitituted Allocation Committees in all the 
regions composed entirely of C*P*P. supporters, houses 
under the cloak of 'priority list' 'special reasons',
'special instructions' and so on were allocated to party 
supporters regardless as to when they paid their deposits
and how much deposits they paid" I
The catalogue of corruption, incompetence and mismanagement was also
4
found in the allocation of houses by the T*D*C* • That it is continuing 
is evidenced by a recent report in West Africa *^
1* See Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Operation of the 
State Housing Corporation, Accra, 196$
2* White Paper on the Report of the Commission appointed to enquire
into the manner and operation of State Housing Corporation, W*R3/68 ,para.
3* ibid.
4. Report of the Committee of Enquiry into Alleged malpractices in the 
affairs of the Temgt Development Corporation, Accra, 1970
5* No*3300, 20th October 1980, p*2090. Introducing the report of the
"One man, one house" Committee the Managing Director of T*D*C* noted 
that one woman had eight T*D*C* houses* These she let out and charged 
rents of £300-0400 a month compared to the official rent of 020 and 
030 a month.
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"Despite the variety of classifications! the bulk
of housing under all the classifications are still
represented by self-built housing in which government
1
aid or sponsorship plays a minor part" •
I. The housing shortage in the urban areas
Urbanization brings housing problems* This is an almost universal
2fact • The report of the United Nations Technical Assistance team noted:
"For the very urbanization which is a sign of industrial
progress complicates the housing problems by specializing
tasks concentrating people, intensifying housing demand,
raising land prices, building costs and taxes and
enforcing regulations for the more concentrated pattern
3which further widens the gap between rent and income" •
The rapid growth in the urban population coupled with inadequate resources
for housing provision has led to an acute shortage of housing in the urban
. 4areas* This has been attested to by Busia in Sekondi-Takoradi , by the
5 6government statistician in Kumasi , and by Acquah in Accra •
In 1954-55 when the United Nations Technical Assistance team visited
Ghana, the population of Accra was approximately 162,000, the number of
houses about 9*700 and the number of households 26,260* There were thus
2*71 households per house; and the average numberof rooms per household 
8was 1*79 • The many people interviewed by the team were agreed on three
9significant points 3
1* op.cit*, p*9t para*21.
2* See Abrams, C., Man's Struggle for Shelter in an Urbanizing World, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1964*
3* op.cit*, p*6, para.12 .
4* Busia, K*A*, Report on a Social Survey of Sekondi-Takoradi, London, 1950.
5* Social Survey of Kumasi, Accra, i960.
6. Acquah, I*, Accra Survey; A Social Survey of the Capital of Ghana,
London, 1958 .
7* Housing in Ghana, New Yorks United Nations, 1957* P*9» para*23.
8* ibid, appendix A» p*50*
9* ibid, appendix A, p*44 .
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(I) housing conditions in the urban areas were unsatisfactory;
(II) there was overcrowding; and,
(III) the situation was getting worse.
Comparison of the 1948 and i960 census figures shows that the number
of persons per dwelling increased from 10,5 to 18,5 in Accra, from 10,4 to
21,3 in Kumasi, and from 13*6 to 18*3 in Takoradi* The i960 population
census also showed that more than a third of the population lived 20 or
more to the same house; and that there was a 25% inter-.cental increase in
1
the number of persons per house •
The 1966 Annual Report of the Building Research Instiute, U.S.T,, 
Kumasi, commenting on the housing situation, noted:
"The country has not solved its housing problem. The 
accute shortage of houses in the urban areas has become 
worse in recent years because the construction of houses 
has not kept pace with the migration to the urban areas*
The 1968 Two-Year Development Plan prepared under the N,L,C, also noted
"The expansion of industry and commerce in Ghana has 
drawn a large number of |g£cple from the rural areas 
into the principal cities and towns. This migration 
has imposed a heavy strain on the available housing.
The result has been overcrowding and with it the
3associated evils of social maladjustment and crime" •
1* The i960 and 1970 Census defined a house as " , , , a structurally 
separate and independent place of abode* The essential features are 
separateness and independence* An enclosure may be considered as 
separate if it is surrounded by walls, fences, etc,, so that a person 
or group of persons can isolate themselves from otherpersons in the 
community for the purposes of sleeping, preparing and taking their 
meals or protecting themselves from hazards of climate such as storm 
and sun"*
2, Kumasi, 1966, p*3.
3* Two-Year Development Plan, Accra, 1968, p*88 .
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The 1970 census showed that of the 172,087 houses in urban Ghana (census 
definition) 88,488 (nearly 50$) housed more than ten people, 34,312 (about 20$) 
housed more than 20 people* The census also showed that the number of persons 
per house was 15*7 in Accra, 22.1 in Kumasi, 12*06 in Tamale, 20*3 in Takaradi
X
and 6*06 in Tema* It further showed that the number of households per house
in urban Ghana (census definition), was 3*423*
That there is a housing shortage in Ghana was recognised in Kimako v*
2Archibold * In a case involving the eviction of tenant in Accra,
Siriboe J.S.C., took judicial notice of the fact that there is a housing 
shortage*
The acute housing shortage is a very important contextual fact* It 
has an enormous impact on the working (or lack of it) of rent restrictions, 
on the security of te nure of tenants and on the rights and obligations of 
landlords and tenants. It is one of the factors which determines the bargaining 
power of landlords and tenants* The effect of this was captured in the opening 
paragraph of a recent article in The Mirror:
MIf the government can relieve workers of the perennial
housing shortage, at least, half of the many social
problems facing workers will be solved* But as long as
this major problem remains with us, workers will continue
3
to be at the mercy of landlords" •
The figures on the number of persons per house highlights another feature 
of residential tenancies in urban Ghana* This is that most tenants do not 
rent a whole house or a complete flat* Tenants usually rent a room or two 
in a large house (with other tenants renting the other rooms and the landlord 
sometimes living in the same house)* Utilities like kitchen, bathroom and
4
lavatory facilities are shared • Commenting on this phenomenon the report 
of the United Nations Technical Assistance team noted:
1* A household is defined by the census as consisting of "a person or group of 
persons who live together in the same house or compound, share the same 
house-keeping arrangements and are catered for astfrtfcunit".
2. 0966] G«L.R. 612.
3* Feb.2, 1979, P*6.
4* This is relevant in considering the traditional tenancy/licence dichotomy: 
See infra, pp. ^^”72
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The Committee which was chaired by Mr.G.K.A Ofosu-Amaah, a senior lecturer
in law at the University of Ghana, found overwhelming evidence of corruption,
1incompetence, mismanagement and ineptetude • On the particular issue of the 
allocation of houses the committee reported:
1 • • • the establishment of Tema Development Corporation
has a social and economic objective. It follows, therefore,
that in making allocations to the general public, policies
should be advanced which have the effect of advancing this
objective. Again we could not find any clear rule relating
to allocation to members of the general public. We were at
various times told that it was the policy of Tema Development
Corporation to allocate not more than one unit to an individual
tenant. If that was the case we were surprised by the number
of cases we found where allocationsof more than one unit have
2been to the same person”
Continuing on the policy issues raised by the systemless? mode of allocation 
the committee reported:
"We were informed that housing units built by Tema Development
Corporation were classified as low-income and high-income.
Those in the low-income group were subsidised. We would have,
therefore, thought that in making allocations especially of
low-income units, attention would be paid to the economic status
of the applicants. We were disappointed to find out that this
was not done and to that extent, the social objective of subsidising
3
rents of low-income group was deliberatley and completely defeated" •
The Ofosu-Amaah Committee reported that employees of T.D.C., were sub-letting
4
at a profit subsidised accommodation let out to them by the corporation •
1# Committee of Enquiry into alleged malpractices in the affairs of
Tema Development Corporation, Accra, 1970.
2. i(>id., p.3^» para.l4o.
3* ibid., p.37» para.150.
4. ibid., p.36, para.l46.
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"The- mission inspected several privately-built new three 
or four storied apartment houses at Kumasi where each
room was let out to a different family while lavatory,
1
bathing and cooking facilities were used in common'1 •
This contextual feature is important when considering the tenancy/licenee 
mystification which causes problems for English landlord and tenant law and 
is employed skilfully to frustrate the welfare intention of various Rent Acts.
II. The rented accommodation market
2
Most landlords are private individuals • The S.H.C., and the T.D.C., 
build mainly for sale—either by outright purchase or on hire-purchase terms. 
They both have schemes for the building of some rental units; but as with 
so much in Ghana today the operation of the scheme is riddled with all the 
imaginable vices. Commenting on the social injustices in housing, Bannor notes:
"The rental units which were meant to attract cheaper rents 
were taken over by the few people of power and influence who 
had no immediate use of them and sublet at fantastic rents to 
people who were in dire need of them. The same thing happened 
and is still happening to the S.H.C.,houses meant for hire - 
purchase. Many of these houses have been acquired by the few 
powerful people in our midsts and rented to needy people at 
rents which far exceed the monthly payments the owners were 
making towards the acquisition of the building. In other words
3
the tenants are paying for the building on behalf of the owners'1
The Report of the Committee of Enquiry into alleged irregularities and 
malpractices in the affairs of the T.D.C., is even more damning.
1. op.cit•, p.5* .
2. There are no figures on this, but my own impression is that at least 90%
of landlords in the rental market are private persons. The public sector
is very small, and even where the ultimate landlord is a public body the
proximate landlord may be a private person.
3. Bannor, T.M., "Social injustices in housing", The Legon Observer, (1979)i 
Vol.XI, No.10, p.227*
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The Committee which was chaired by Mr.G.K.A. Ofosu-Amaah, a senior lecturer
in law at the University of Ghana, found overwhelming evidence of corruption,
1incompetence, mismanagement and ineptitude • On the particular issue of the 
allocation of houses the committee reported:
" • • • the establishment of Tema Development Corporation 
has a social and economic objective. It follows, therefore, 
that in making allocations to the general public, policies 
should be advanced which have the effect of advancing this 
objective. Again we could not find any clear rule relating 
to allocation to members of the general public. Ve were 
at various times told that it was the policy of Tema Develop­
ment Corporation to allocate not more than one unit to an 
individual tenant. If that was the case we were surprised
by the number of cases we found where allocations of more
2than one unit have been to the same person" •
Continuing on the policy issues raised by the systemless? mode of allocation 
the committee reported:
"we were infortned that housing units built by Tema Development
Corporation were classified as low-income and high-income.
Those in the low-income group were subsidised. We would have,
therefore, thought that in making allocations especially of
low-income units, attention would be paid to the economic
status of the applicants. We were disappointed to find out
that this was not done and to that extent, the social objective
of subsidising rents of low-income group was deliberate Ly and
3
completely defeated" •
The Ofosu-Amaah Committee reported that employees of T.D.C., were sub-letting
4at a profit subsidised accommodation let out to them by the corporation •
1. Committee of Enquiry into alleged malpractices in the affaris of
Tema Development Corporation, Accra, 1970.
2. ibid., p.34, para.l40.
3. ibid., p.37f para.150.
4. ibid., p.36, para.146.
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It also reported that houses let to members of the general public were being 
sub-let at a profit1* It concluded:
" • • • it is evident that the practice of sub­
letting would in many cases defeat the social and
2economic objectives of Tema Development Corporation" •
It was noted that it i« not only rental units from the S*H*C., which 
were being sub-let* Houses bought outright or on hire-purchase termsy were 
let out to members of the public at huge profits* The same is true of T*D*C* 
The Ofosu-Amaah Committee reported:
"It was the corporation's policy that any person
could purchase two or more houses under the scheme
provided that person has finished all instalments*
This meant that any one who could pay the cost of
three or four buildings at once was at liberty to
procure any number of these houses* Besidesv the
system of one-third deposit meant that the corpora*
tion lent two-thirds of the cost of the house of
the prospective buyer* The net result of this
policy is that since the demand for houses is
greater than the supply in Temay the purchaser rents
his house at rents two or three times higher than the
3
instalment payments under the scheme" •
By 1973 the practice of people buying subsidized housing from public
bodies and then letting them out at huge profits had become sufficiently
4
widespread for statutory notice to be taken of the development • The social 
injustices of this practice are sufficently clear from the report of the 
Ofosu-Amaah Committee. The judgment of a recent article is even more forth­
right:
"The current system whereby the affluent few acquire 
large portions of houses built by government agencies 
with the tax-payers' money and hired at prohibitive
5
prices to the ordinary workers is nothing short of a fraud" •
1. supray p.37, para.151*
2. ibid.
3* ibid., p*4l, para.165.
4. See Rent Control (Amendment) Decree, 1973 (N*R*C.D.158), s.7»
5* Essien, S.N., "Tenants and landlords". The Mirror, Feb.2, 1979, p*6.
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Indeed the case for subsidised public housing which inevitably goes to 
the relatively rich has not been made. This is so irrespective of the issue 
of letting or sub-letting at a profit. This point is also taken by Woodman, 
who writes:
"It appears that in each case the state does not aim to
extract the highest possible payments from those who
eventually use the buildings. There is indeed some public
stress on the object of making them available as cheaply
as possible. However, since the supply is limited they
cannot be made available to everyone who could use them.
It would appear that selection is related in part to the
existing wealth of possible applicants. . . .  The rent
payable for these houses is more that could be afforded
by a person with an average income. Thus the general
result is to make property available at less than its
market price to persons selected in part by the character-
1istic of having more wealth than most" •
The main feature of the rented accommodation market — that it is non-socialised
and that the public bodies have failed to bring any significant measure of
socialization into the jungle (it is not a system)— is an important contextual
fact which has tremendous lessons for attempts at regulating non-socialised
markets in developing economies.
C. RESIDENTIAL TENANCIES AND THE CUSTOMARY LAW
Do residential tenancies exist in, or are they known to, the customary
2law? There is no doubt that tenancies of land exist in the customary law.
The text writers and the judicial decisions attest to this fact.
1. Woodman, G.R., "Land law and the distribution of wealth", in Ekow- 
Daniel, W.C., & Woodman, G.R., (eds), Essays in Ghanaian Law, Accra,
1976, p.158 at 173-174.
2. Despite Ollennu's attempt to include fixtures in his definition of 
land in the customary law, the preponderance of authority is that 
land in the customary law is distinct from fixtures upon it: See 
Ollennu, N.A., Principles of the Customary Land Law of Ghana, London,
1962, pp.1-3; Contra Allott, A.N., Ashanti Law of Property, Stuttgart,
1966, p.143? Kludze, A.K.P.., Ewe Law of Property, London, 1973* pp.103-105, 
Pogucki, R.J.H., Land Tenure in Ghana, Vol.6, Accra 1957» p.8.
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Yet all but two of the text writers in their treatment of tenancies make no
mention of customary-law residential tenancies, confining themselves entirely
to various forms of agricultural tenancies and tenancies of land for building
1
purposes (the so-called building lease) •
There is judicial authority which suggests that residential tenancies
2are unknown to the customary law; viz; Asante v. Gold Coast Drivers1 Union • 
In this case, the plaintiff sought damages for breach of an alleged agreement 
to let three rooms at a fixed monthly rental. The case originated in a native 
court. On appeal to the High Court it was held that agreement for a tenancy 
of a house or of rooms is an institution which finds no place in customary 
law. The rights and liabilities of the parties could, therefore, only be deter 
mined by reference to the common law. The native court, therefore, had no 
jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The judgment of Adumua-Bossman J., was
3
based m  part on the fact that Sarbah, in his Fanti Customary Laws, writes 
about agricultural tenancies and the building lease, but not residential ten­
ancies. Nor, the learned appeal judge noted, is there any mention of resid­
ential tenancies in the reports and cases in the appendix to Sarbab's Fanti
4Customary Laws. The learned judge then cited Sey v. Abadoo a case involving 
arrears of rent for occupation of premises, where it was held that English law 
is applicable. The only plausible basis for the decision in Sey v. Abadoo, 
argued the learned judge, is that the hire of premises is"a transaction unknown 
and unrecognised by the customary law". Adumua - Bossman J., concluded:
1. The text writers are Ollennu, N.A., op.cit., Bentsi - Enchill, K., 
Ghana Land Law, London, 1964; Kludze, A.K.P., op.cit.*, Sarbah, J.M., 
Fanti Customary Laws, London, 1904. The two who accept the existance 
of customary-law residential tenancie^are Allott, A.N., The Akan Law 
of Property, Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Univ. London, 1954, p.470 and 
Pogucki, R.J.H., Land Tenure in Ghana, Vol.IV, Accra, 1955* P*33»
2. (1957) 3 W.A.L.R.5.
3* supra.
4. (1885) F.GU32.
5* supra, at p.9*
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"It seems reasonably clear, therefore, from the foregoing 
survey of the situation, that the agreement for hiring 
and/or letting of a house or a room has not been one of 
the transactions known and recognised by native customary 
law, having well-defined formalities or rites for its crea­
tion and with well-recognised incidents and results such 
as the transactions of outright sale, mortgage or pledge, 
or tenancy of land* It is one of the many useful forms 
of transactions introduced to us by our contact with • 
European merchants, and must no doubt have started when
merchants required premises for their trading activities
1
in the large towns in the early days" •
(,
If one were to rely sol^y on judicial opinion as expressed through the 
decided cases, one would conclude that residential tenancies are unknown to 
the customary law. But this would be to foreclose discussion of very inter­
esting issues thrown up by Asante v* Gold Coast Drivers1 Union. It, therefore, 
becomes necessary to investigate the question has jurisprudential impli­
cations) of what in the law of Ghana, is meant by "customary law", and what 
are the sources of its rules.
I• Customary Law
It is now in modern jurisprudence that defintion is often
2a question of choice, not of abstract logic • There is no logical connection 
between a word and phenomena it seeks to describe. There can thus be no 
'correct; 'true1, or 'proper' as opposed to 'incorrect', 'false', or 'improper' 
defintion of a word. A definition may, however, be‘useful' or 'useless', 
'adequate' or ‘inadequate' for a particular purpose. A jurist is thus free 
to fashion his own definition, provided it is made clear in what sense the 
word is^used, its usage is consistently followed, and the jurist does not
1. (1957) 3 W.A.L.R.5, 9-10.
2. See Williams, G., "International Law and the controve^y concerning the 
word 'law'y, in Laslett (ed.), Philospohy, Politics and Society, Vol.l, 
London, 195&, P*134} Hart, H.L.A., "Defintion and Theory in Jurisprudence", 
(1954) 70 L.Q.R.37} Allott, A.N., The Limits of Law, London, I98O, chap.l, 
esp.pp.1-4, 34-36} Woodman, G.R., "Some realism about customary law - the 
West Africa experience", (1969) Wise. L.R.128} Kantorowicz, H.,
The DefiiJtion of Law, Cambridge, I958
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arrogate to himself the right to legislate on what the * proper* meaning of 
the word is*.
This view on definition does not entail agreement with Glanville Williams*
2apparent attitude towards theory and concept • Theory and concdpt are only 
relevant as an account of objective social reality. Some theories can there­
fore be useless because they fail to take account of objective social pheno­
mena. A theory of law is not to be suspended in the air but must be rooted
in human historical reality. Juristic science must not be based primarily
3on ideas and abstractions - law is part of social reality .
The Interpretation Act, i960 (C.A.4.) defines customary law thus:
Customary law as comprised in the laws of Ghana consists
of rules of law which by custom are applicable to comraun- 
4lties in Ghana" •
The definition is not helpful; it begs the question. It does not indicate 
how to identify a ’rule of law* in contradistinction from, say, a rule of 
morality or convention. Perhaps more importantly, it gives no indication as 
to how custom obtains the force of law, for not all custom is law"*.
Due to the, perhaps inevitable, impreciseness of the definition of custom­
ary law in the Interpretation Act, i960, the courts have been left with the 
task of fashioning customary-law rules from the practices of the people. In 
this process there has developed (inevitably?) a cleavage between the practices 
of the people and the customary law administered by the statutory courts.
1. The fallacy of the "one proper meaning" approach misled Austin into arguing 
that customary law and international law were not law "properly so-called".
2. op.cit., at 148, where he says: "The first misconception is the idea that
a controversy as to concepts is not a verbal but a scientific controversy". 
That such a controversy ought to be scientific is demonstrated by Allott's 
masterly answer to Hart's and Ross' claim that some societies are so simple 
they have no law: See The Limits of Law, op.cit., pp.45-72.
3. See Allott, A.N., The Limits of Law, op.cit., esp. p.45; also Hart who says 
in the preface to The Concept of Law, that the book is also "an essay in 
descriptive sociology".
4. S 18 (1).
5« For the inadequacies of this definition and the resultant problems for the 
courts^ See Woodman, G.R., "Some realism about customary law - the West 
African experience", op.cit.
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The question being considered does not, however, turn on the judicial/ 
practised customary law dichotomy* It is one of classification; there is 
no doubt that there is a practice of renting/letting of rooms and houses*
Nor is there any disagreement that this practice is a legal arrangement*
The controversy is whether it is a customary-law arrangement or a translocated 
English-law institution*
II* History of residential tenancies
The renting of residential accommodation for a money rent is a relatively 
recent development* The United Nations Technical Assistance team which visited 
in 1954-55, reported:
"The rise of the renter class is still at its beginning"1.
Residential tenancies are an urban phenomenon* The need for a highly
developed set of rules to deal with the renting of residential accommodation
2
did not, therefore, exist in pre-colonial times • In traditional society
land was plentiful and building a house was not an expensive operation*
Every adult member had free access to land and the building was erected from
local material with communal help* The societies were settled and there was 
3
little migration • There was thus no need for rented accommodation*
4
Colonialism and the forces which it unleashed led to migration • People
moved in search of jobs in the new mining towns, and in administration,
commerce, etc* It also became more and more difficult for people to build
5their own houses as land became more expensive and as building costs went 
higher and higher*
Residential tenancies are, therefore, a relatively recent development; 
a development no doubt, occas ioned by forces unleashed by colonialism - 
migration and resultant detachment form the traditonal community base,
1* Housing in Ghana, op.cit*, p*6, para*11 (c)*
2. See Pogucki, Gold Coast Land Tenure, Vols.III & IV, Accra^ 1955* P*33.
3* supra, pp. W - U
4. supra, pp.
5* For a survey of increases in the price of building land in Accra: See Poguki, 
R.J.H., Gold Coast Land Tenure, Vol.Ill, op.cit*, pp*10-12.
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urbanization, the rise in the price of land due to its relative scarcity! 
and the increased cost of building a house (the result of the specialization 
of tasks and the change form the traditional earth and thatch houses to more
modern sandcrete houses in aluminium or asbestos roofing).
III. Do residential tenancies exist in customary law?
The analysis so far has shown that -there was no need for people to rent 
accommodation in traditional society* The law did not, therefore, develop 
facilitative rules to cater for a non-need (?)• Does this then mean that
residential tenancies are unknown to the present customary law?
Various forms of permissive occupancy existed in traditional society* 
Ollennu writes:
"In olden days when money was not of much value and a
person's material wealth was measured by the produce of
his farm or the size of his herd of cattle, land and
house owners permitted strangers to farm portions of
their land or to occupy portions of their buildings in
return for their working for the owner on his land, in
his house, on his farm, or in his creek or pond as the 
1
case might be" •
Most of these relationships were, however, informal* There was no 
money rent, and the complex body of rules establishing rights and obligations 
of landlords and tenants as in, say, English law had not been developed*
Aclu mua-Boss*Ctn J*, was, therefore, right when he said that it was not an 
institution:
" . * • having well-defined formalities or rites for its
2creation and in the well-recognised incidents and results" .
But this should not necessarily have meant, as he asserts:
" • • • that the agreement for hiring and or letting
of a house or rooms has not been one of the transactions
3
known and recognised by native customary law" •
1* Ollennu, N.A*, Principles of the Customary Land Law of Ghana, 
op.cit*, p*79 (emphasis supplied)*
2* Asante v. Gold Coast Drivers' Union (1957) 3 W*A*L*R*5» 9"10* 
3* ibid*
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That a new practice had developed and was developing was evidenced by the
case before the learned appeal court judge* Appealing to Sarbah and the
absence of specialised and differentiated rules dealing with the institution
was not very helpful* The learned judge was faced with a juristic choice: to
which body of law do we allocate this new development, the developing customary
law or the translocated English law? The learned judge plumped for the English
1
law; but it is submitted that such a result was not inevitable •
Can the decision in Asante v* Gold Coast Drivers' Union be justified?
Some scholars have argued that the payment of a money rent is such a fundamental 
fact that it changes the nature and character of the arrangement*
Onwuamaegbu writes:
"There is no doubt, however, that some forms of tenancy
are foreign to customary law* Thus a weekly, or a
monthly tenancy at a rent was unknown to, and, therefore,
cannot be governed by custom* This means that when a
customary tenant is later asked to pay rent monthly, it
could be implied that the general law will begin to
2apply to the relationship between the parties" •
The inexplicable interchange from the present to the past is evidence
of the confusion in the author's analysis* It confuses what institutions
were known to the customary law and what is the present customary law* It
singularly fails to take cognizance of the flexible and dynamic character
of customary law. Nor is it clear why the change ffCm seasonal rent in
land to a monthly money rent marks such a fundamental change in the character
of an institution; there is no logical or intrinsic reason for the sudden 
3
change • It is perhaps for this reason that Allott classifies residential 
tenancies at a money rent as customary-law institutions,Allott argues:
1* See Allott, A.N*, The Akan Law of Property, Unpublished Ph*D* thesis,
Univ. London, 1954, p*470*
2* Onwuamaegbu, M.O., The Nigerian Law of Landlord and Tenant, London, 19^0, p*131*
3* It may be noted that rent was for a long period of time in English law in
forms like military *ervice, labour, etc* In fact the payment of rent is not 
essential to a tenancy* See Lynes v. Smith (1899) 1 Q.B.486.
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"Perhaps the most frequent instance of tenancies for a 
definite term is to be found in the letting of houses 
or rooms* The practice of letting rooms is prevalent; 
rent is payable monthly, and the tenancy is, therefore, 
by English law a monthly tenancy* These tenancies are 
usually informal and without written agreement* Although 
English-type law has intruded, sufficient of customary 
ideas remain for one to consider such tenancies as custom­
ary in nature, and not as the pure off-spring of English 
law"*.
A very important point thrown up by this discussion is the time factor
. . 2 m  the definition of customary law «
Customary law is based on the practices of a society* It is, therefore, 
dynamic and flexible, being moulded by changed and changing societal conditions*
A developed, specialised and differentiated body of rules may not have existed 
for the letting of residential accommodation in traditional society (the 
concrete and objective situational context not requiring such a body of rules).
But this should not necessarily have led to the conclusion (when the objective 
social and economic facts changed and renting of residential accommodation 
became prevalent) that it was an arrangement being fashioned under the trans­
located English law*
The people reacted to a changeJ and changing socio-economic dynamic; it
is arguable that in doing this they are involved in practices from which new
3
customary-law rules developed • Jurist ically, therefore, it is perfectly 
proper to classify the institution as a new customary law form.
IV. Is it a live debate?
ti
The juristic decision on whether an ins^ution is a customary-law, common-law,
1* Allott, A.N., The Akan Law of Property, op.cit*, p*470.
2* See Allott, A.N., New Essays in African Law, London, 1970, p*l80, also
Allott, A.N., Gluckman, M. and Epstein, Introduction (to), Gluckman, M. (ed). 
Ideas and Procedures in African Law, London, 1969*
3* Allott notes that he was informed of the practice of people building houses
for the purpose of letting in the urban areas, and comments that this 
indicates the increasingly commercial attitude developed by modern urban 
conditions: See The Akan Law of Property* op.cit, p*471* See also
Housing in Ghana, New York: United Nations, 1957* P*51*
SH-
or statutory institution ought not to be important* It is primarily a 
classification based on form* It is the content of these bodies of law and 
their functioning in the concrete Ghanaian context which is important* It 
was quite possible, if a more questioning and analytical attitude had been 
adopted by both legislature and judiciary, for the English-law rules (both 
common-1aw and statutory) to have been vigorously examined and tested at 
each turn for their utility and appropriateness to the Ghanaian context to be 
established* The resulting law would have been more firmly based on practice 
and it would not have mattered how this body of law is classified, as long 
as it was effective* The sad thing about decisi-ons like Asante v* Gold Coast 
Drivers1 Union is not that it said residential tenancies are an English-law 
institution; but that having once decided that, the Ghana courts adopted (some 
would say sheepishly) the English common law lock*stock and barrel , regardless 
of the context within which it developed and the society it was now to serve 
(or not serve)•
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE URBAN RESIDENTIAL TENANCY
"A tree that flourishes and is evergreen by the riverside
1
will not flourish and be evergreen by the desert11 •
Introduction
The English law of landlord and tenant (the foundation of which was laid
in a certain historical formation) was translocated to urban Ghana* This
chapter examines how appropriate the "estate-concept" of the tenancy in English
law is as an objective account of residential tenancies in urban Ghana* The
urban residential tenancy is subsequently distinguished from other similar
relationships* It is not intended to provide a detailed account of the English
2law on these issues • It is only intended to provide enough treatment as a 
basis for enquiry*
A* Nature of the Institution
The landlord/tenant relationship has been described as:
"that which exists when one person (the lessor or landlord)
being possessed of an estate or interest in real property,
has granted or is deemed to have granted to another (the
lessee or tenant) an estate or interest therein which is
less than the freehold and less than the estate of the 
3
grantor" •
4
At common law the residential tenancy is seen as creating an estate in 
land in favour of the tenant* The tenancy relationship though derived from 
agreement is seen, as resulting in the conve yance of an estate in land*
The estate-concept of the residential tenancy derives from the historical 
development of the tenancy relationship at common law*
Tenancies of land were being used by the tweJ^h century"*• This was at
1* Kaunda, K.K., "Muluhgushi speech", Zambia Daily Mail, Lusaka, July 1, 1975*
2* Interested readers may consult: Woodfall, Law of Landlord and Tenant, 
London, 1978* Vol.l, pp*l-2', Evans, D*, The Law of Landlord and Tenant, 
London, 197^» pp*12-13 for a fuller account*
3* Foa, General Law of Landlord and Tenant, London, 1957t p*l*
4* The common law makes no distinction between residential tenancies and 
agricultural tenancies of land*
5* Holdsworth, W*R., History_of English Law, London, 1923* Vol*3» p*213» also 
Denman, Origins of Ownership, London, 1948, pp.l44*-5, 152^5.
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a time when the feudal system of land tenure was still in operation. The
tenancy was, however, not part of the feudal system. Rather, it developed 
in response to the desire of land owners to use land in a more commercial 
manner. Lawson, writes thus:
"They (tenancies) were indeed and always have been a
commercial intruder into a way of looking at property,
1
which was essentially uncommercial • • • " •
One of the most important results of this attitude can be seen in the
remedies that tenants originally had against trespassers. Holdsworth states:
"The lessee may, it is true, repel by force; he may, that
is rejfect the would-be ejection if he can, but all the
legal remedy he has is a personal action against his
lessor on the convenant, by which he may recover damages
or, if the term has not expired, possession of the land
leased. As against third persons, he has probably no
remedy at all. An ejectment by a third person is a
wrong to the freeholder, and it is the freeholder alone,
who can bring the assize of novel dissessin. The lessees's
2right is a jus m  personam not a jus in rem" .
This situation became extremely inconvenient and it later became necessary
3
to protect the tenant by affording him the right to an action for trespass •
k
The reasons for this change were partly economic and partly political •
These legal developments resulted in a widespread use of the tenancy as 
an arrangement for farming. Simpson writes:
"With the decay of the feudal tenurial system and the 
full recognition of the lease as an adequately protected 
interest, the lease for years became the legal institution 
under which a very great proportion of the land of the 
country was farmed"**•
The foundations of the common law tenancy waylaid in mediaeval agrarian 
England. It was then used as an institutional arrangement for the farming 
of agricultural land.
1. Lawson, F.H., Introduction to the Law of Real Property, London, 1958, p.118.
2. Holdsworth, W.R., op.cit., p.213*
3* Pollock & Maitland, History of English Law, London, 19H, p*106.
4. For a discussion of these developments: See Holdsworth, F.R., op.cit, pp.2l6-
2 1 7, a I BO Mii3om, s . f . c . , f o m J a t i x M s  x>L H*. C o m v n  Law,
», L-Ort wcrt I I o j i , i * I) f .^  / i o <7 ^
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It was only later that the tenancy became used in relation to residential
property*# Initially this was mainly in rural communities where it was used
for farm hands and agricultural labourers particularly during periods when
2
agricultural labour was badly needed • It is thus clear that the foundations 
of the common law regulating the landlord/tenant relationship are rooted in 
agrarian and rural England#
"We are back with the land now and land is really what
landlord-tenant law is all about • • • the land is
the thing# It is the fields, the orchards, pastures
and streams and their possession anduse th&tiis
important# To comprehend the law it is helpful to
envision the tenant leaning on a fence at twilight,
watching his fields and awaiting the call to dinner#
It is against this simple background that landlord
and tenant law took the shape it has essentially 
3
retained today" •
Secondly, the foundations of the common law regulating residential ten­
ancies were developed in a historical formation in which the landowners (the
4
landlords) wielded great political power • They constituted the governing 
class. They wielded great power in parliament and as justices of"the peace, 
had great power in their neighbourhoods having responsibility for the admin­
istration (and, hence the making) of the law.
V. Urban residential tenancies: contract or conveyance?
Having seen that the basis of the common law of landlord and tenant was
formulated in rural mediaeval England, it is pertinent to examine how adequate
this estate - concept is as an explanation of residential tenancies in urban
Ghana. This is because the landlord/tenant law is structured on this premise;
5from this premise certain consequences flow • Friedman notes:
1. See Gaulie, E., Cruel Habitations, London, 1974, esp. pp.30-31#
2# ibid.
3. Quinn, T.M., & Phillips, E., "the law of landlord and tenant : a critical
evaluation of the past with guidelines for the future", (1969)38 Fordham L.R.38#
4. See Chambers, J.D. & Mingay G.E., The Agricultural Revolution: 1750-1880, 
Batsford, 1966, p.17; Thompson, F.M.L., English Landed Society in the 
Nineteenth Century, London, 1962, esp. pp.201 ff; Smith, R.B., Land and 
Politics in the Engljbid of Henry VIII: The Vest Riding of Yorkshire 1550-40, 
London, 1970.
3# These are discussed in the course of the thesis.
"The theory of a lease as a conveyance under which a
landlord fully discharged his duty by signing a lease
and thereby entitled himself to instalments which were
periodically to 'issue' out of land fitted in with the
ancient farm lease* The lease was essentially of land;
1
the house was incidental" •
The urban residential:tenancy is,Lhowever, not concerned with the purchase 
of land* It is concerned with the provision of housing—  shelter and amenities 
like electricity, water, bathroom and lavatory facilities* It deals not with 
land and interests in land as a factor of production, but with the provision 
and use of accommodation*
It has been established thats
" • • • the law as to leases is not a matter of logic
in vacuo, it is a matter of history that has not
2forgotten Lord Coke" •
It has also been established that the urban residential tenancy is more
3
of a "package of goods and services" than an estate in land* It would 
thus be*
" • • • revolting to have no better reason for a rule than
that it was so laid down in the time of Henry IY* It is
still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid
down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists
4from blind imitation of the past" •
It is suggested that the estate - concept of a tenancy is not adequate 
for analysis of the modern urban residential tenancy and does not identify 
the central nature of the institution* The modern urban residential tenancy 
is concerned with the continuous provision of a package of goods and servicer- 
housing —  in return for periodic payments of rent* It is an arrangement for 
the continuous exchange of consideration by either par$y,
1* Friedman, M»R** Friedman On Leases, New York, 197^» P*5*
2* Gardiner v* Butler (1918) 245 U.S.603; 38 Sup.ct., 2l4,^ LM)ftcl i n -»
3* That the modern urban residential tenancy is a "package of goods and services 
was recognised by United States court in JaviHS v* First National Realty 
Corp., 428 F*2d* 1071 (D.C.Cir. 1970)
4* Holmes, 0»V/*, "The path of the law", (1897) 10 Harv* L*Rev.457» at 469*
5* A package which includes not merely walls and roof, but also adequate light 
and ventilation, suitable water and lavatory facilities, secure windows and 
doors, and electricity.
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rather than a once-for-all purchase of an estate in land* The common law
draws no conceptual distinction between agricultural tenancies of land (and
real property generally) and urban residential tenancies* This is unfortunate;
1
it leads to monstrous consequences • The modern urban residential tenancy 
has little functional similarity with the sale of land or with agricultural 
tenancies in rural England* The urban residential tenancy is more like an 
ordinary commercial contract*
B, Distinguishing the residential tenancy from other arrangements*
1* The tenancy and the licence
2The common law has traditionally distinguished a tenancy from a licence •
In drawing this distinction the common law relied on the concept of "exclusive 
3
possession" • It is not intended to give a detailed treatment of this English- 
law issue* Suffice it to note that the English courts have now realized that
4the concept of "exclusive possession" is an unnecessary mystification • The 
English courts have increasingly taken a functional approach* 
a* Shared premises *
At common law:
" • • • the question whether a man is a lodger merely, 
or whether premises have been let to him so that he is 
a tenant must depend on the circumstances of each case"'*.
But traditionally the common law proceeded from the position that if the
grantor lived in the house it was not a tenancy. In Toms v* Luckett,
1* These are examined throughout this thesis*
2* See Corbett v* .Faulkner (1952) 2 T*L.R.659> Thomas v* Sorell (1673) 
Vaugh*330*^ Keith v* Twentieth Century Club,(1904) 52 W*L.R*5^H 
Hill & Redman, Law of Landlord and Tenant, London, 1976, para*5» p*l6.
3* See Megarry, R* & Wade, H.W.R., The Law of Real Property, London, 1975 
p*6l8; Evans, D., op.cit*, pp*36-39» Garner, J.F*, "A lease or licence", 
(1963) 107 Solicitors' Journal 246.
4* See R. v. Battersea, etc.. Rent Tribunal, ex parte Parlkh £l957J 1 All
E.R.352.; Luganda v* Service Hotels [19&9] 2 All E.R.692.
5* Woodfall, op.cit*, p.ll.
6. (18 7^) C.B.5 C.B.23.• - ****
u i \ J . s £ r  A lit3 (Mw-vT, (n7il3 
Lord Maule said s
"Where the owner of a house takes a arson to reside 
in part of it, though such aperson has exclusive 
possession of the rooms appropriated to him, and 
the uncontrolled right of ingress and egress, yet 
if the owner retains his control of the house,the 
individual so occupying a part occupies it as a 
lodger (or licensee)only and not as attenant".*
the onus was on the gratee to prove that he was in fact a tenantA 
Some judicial decisions even suggested that the nature of a grantee'
interest ( tenancy or licence ) depended , in part , on the rooms 
and / or facilities he shared with his grantor.-^
Such a view of the law would lead to absurd consequences in 
Qhana. It has been noted, that a feature of the hiring/letting of 
residential accommodation in Ghana is that different people take 
a room or two in a house (sometimes the landlord lives in the hou­
se) with utilities being used in common.^ To hold that such pers­
ons are licensees (or that there is a prima facie case against the­
ir being tenants) would not only fail to take cognizance of pre­
vailing practice, but would result in a monstrous state of affairs 
as a number of low-income tenants are denied what little protect­
ion they have.^
1. (18^7) 5 .CB. 23, 36.
2. Helman v. Horsham & Worthing Assessment Committee ^ 9 4 2K.B«335: 
Abbeyfield (Harpenden) Society v. Woods 1^968^IW.L.R.37^•
3SkQAs Neale v. Del Sotcj* ^ [9^5]lK.B.I*j4: Winters v. Dance [1 9 ^ 9 ] L.T.R.I6 5 .
See Ofori-Boateng, "The nature of alease at common law and under 
the Rent Act,I963(Act 220)",(I97I)3R.G.L.I9*k
5 . Supra, pp.50-53*
6. For example, the implied covenants of landlords stipulated by 
section 2 3  of the Conveyancing Decree, 1973*
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It is in recognition of these contextual facts that the Rent Act,
1963 (Act 220) defines a lease to include:
" • • • every agreement for the letting of any premises
whether oral or btherwise, and whether the terms thereof
grant the right of exclusive occupation to the tenant or
include the use of any premises in common with the land-
1
lord or any other person'1 •
This functional approach to the definition of tenancies is in accord
with more recent English-law decisions on "exclusive occupation"* In
2 - Luganda v* Service Hotels , Lord Denning MLR* said:
"a lodger who takes a furnished room in a house is in
exclusive occupation of it; notwithstanding that the
landlady has a right of access at all times • • • A
person has a right to "exclusive occupation of a room
when he is entitled to occupy it himself and no one
3
else is entitled to occupy it" •
It is suggested that this mystic of exclusive possession should be 
abolished altogether* In all cases where a person occupies someone's else*s 
property for residential purposes, therebeing no special factors like friend­
ship, affection, family ties, etc*, the relationship should be considered as 
a tenancy relationship*
b* Service tenancy or service occupancy?
The issue of service tenancy or service occupancy arises, at common law,
whether an employee occupies accommodation provided by his employer, i.e.,
L
when a "service situation* existed* It is a subbranch of the tenancy/licence
mystique; and is supposed to turn on whether or not "occupation is necessary
5
for the performance of services" • A cursory acquaintance with the application
6
of this test demonstrates how illusory the whole exercise is •
1. S. 36 2. [1969] 2 All E.R.692. 3. ibid., at p. 6^5.
4. This phrase is borrowed from Arden, A*,; "Service tenancies and service 
occupancies", (197^) L.A.G. Bulletin 108*
5* Smith v. Seghill (1875) L.R.10 Q.B.D.422, per Mellpr J.at^28.
6* See Hughes v. Chatham Oversees (1843) 5 M*, & G.54; Dobson v. Jones 
(1843) 5 M & g.54; Thompsons (Funeral Furnishers) Ltd. v* Phillips 
£l945j 2 A11.E.R.49; Fachini vl Bryson £1952) 1 T.L.R.1368.
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It is suggested that in all cases where accommodation is granted as a 
result of a service situation, the employee should have the rights of a tenant 
while his employment continues# Once his employment ceases, he should be given 
reasonable notice (to be determined on the basis of the rules for the termination 
of tenancies) to vacate the premises# Section 17(1) (j) of the Rent Act,
1962 (Act220) gives the landlord the right to recover possession in such circum­
stances1.
c. Customary-law permissive occupancies
Various forms of permissive occupancy exist under customary law. Servants 
reside in the house of their masters, farmhands and labourers in the houses of 
their employers, brothers, sisters, nephews, nieces, etc., in the houses of 
relations.
Identifying the legal nature of these arrangements is fravAght with
difficulty. It is suggested that when a servant or slave lives in his master's
house to perform the household chores then a gratuitous permissive occupancy
is created. This is also the result when, out of affection or family' ties, a
2person is allowed to live in the house of another • But it is submitted that 
where there is a commercial nature to an arrangement (like a paid seEvant or a 
farmhand or labourer) and the employee lives in premises separate from that 
occupied by his employer, a tenancy relationship (on the lines indicated above) 
exists.
It would be preposterous to assume that the above analysis provides a
solution to all the problems thrown up by these socio-economic arrangements.
The difficulty encountered in analysing these arrangements is typified by
3
Borketey v. %,arkai • In this case, the defendant had been allowed, as of grace, 
to stay in a woman's house as her servant. She remained in possession-with the 
acquiescence of the woman's successors - on the death of the woman.
1. See infra, pp«3$0*
2. Allott argues, albeit with some reservation, that where a relation is 
allowed to live in the soley-acquired house of another a tenancy is 
created*, vide , The Akan Law of Property, op.cit., p.455* This is 
inaccurate, what is granted is a gratuitous permissive occupancy: See 
Nuamah v. Frimpong [l973] 2 G.L.R.37.
3. Land Court, Accra, 28th Feb., 1953.
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2office; and the property must be handed over to the 'state' •
In a later action by the deceased woman's successors to evict the defendant* 
it was held that the original service occupancy (revocable at will) ha^ ripened 
into an irrevocable gratuitous tenancy* irrevocable during the lifetime of the 
defendant. It is submitted that what happened here was that having represented 
to the defendant (by their acquiescence) that she could live in the house as 
long as she wanted it was considered unconscionable —  at customary law — >to 
evict the defendant.
Another type of customary-law permissive occupancy is that of customary-
066*
law office holders. Some holders of customary-law^occupy an^official residence.
The office may be political such as a chief or it may be religious* like a
1
priest or VulomQ. Such occupants are not tenants; they are entitled to live 
in these official houses because of the nature and/or status of the office they 
occupy.
Occupation of such residences come to an end with their to hold
3 e'^
II. The tenancy distinguished from a mortgage,
3
Until the enactment of the Mortgages Decree, 1972 (N.R.C.D.96) * the 
Ghanaian law of mortgages consisted of the common law and any English statutes 
of general application applicable to Ghana. Under this law a legal mortgage 
could only be created by conveyance of legal title in the mortgaged property 
to the mortgagee. The mortgagee held the legal title, though equity protected 
the beneficial interest of the mortgagor. It was thus accurate for Lindley M.R.* 
at the turn of the century* to define a mortgage ass
11 • . • a conveyance of land . . .  as security for the 
payment of a debt or the discharge on some other obligation
4for which it is given" •
1. This is not inconsistent with our earlier position. It is no more incon­
sistent than saying that the Prime Minister is not a tenant of No.10
Downing Street. It is important to note that (like the Prime Minister) 
these office holders are not employed by the community. They are officers 
of the Community —* servants.
2. The analogous situation of the removal vans in fromt of No.10 the morning
after a general election is now notorious.
3* By S.26 the Decree came into force on January 1, 1973*
4. Santley v. Wilde J1892) 2 Ch.479.
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The pre4973 mortgage is similar to the residential tenancy in that both 
arrangements involved the transfer of an interest in property. But in a 
mortgage this is to secure the payment of a debt or other obligation, while 
in a tenancy it is for the occupation of the tenant. While the legal mode 
of creation was the same, therefore, the function of the two arrangements is 
very much different. Furthermore while a mortgagee had an equitable beneficial 
interest in the property, the tenancy relationship produced no such equty in 
the landlord; the landlord had only a reversion.
The Mortgages Decree, 1972 f<L^SxM (*
conveyance of legal title to the mortgagee^ lie Cj tii that a
mortgage is essentially a security transaction which QIYVKLo! Ckt QjftSllflvU^
Section 1 (i) defines a mortgage as:
" • • •& contract charging immovable property as security 
for the due repayment of debt and any interest accuring
thereon or for the performance of some other obligation
for which it is given11.
The Decree further stipulates that a mortgage does not give rise to a new owner­
ship interest and, ex abundanti cautela, provides that;
" . . .  a mortgage shall be an encumbrance on the prop­
erty charged and shall not . . .  operate so as to change 
the ownership, right to possession or other interest
1
(whether present or future) in the property charged” •
The effect of these provisions is to retain title and possession in the 
mortgagor despite the creation of the mortgage. Hence from 1973» conveyance
of legal title to the mortgagee is no longer necessary in^creation of a mortgage •
This contrasts (at the historical or legalistic level) with the creation of a 
tenancy, where transfer of title is essential. A consequence of this is that 
a mortgage is only an encumbrance on property charged while a tenancy creates 
an interest in land.
1. N.R.C.D.96, S.l (2).
2. This method for the creation of legal mortgages of leasehold property is
still possible in England under section 86 (1) of the Law of Property Act 1925 
Under the Law of Property Act, 1925» S.86 (1) a legal mortgage of freehold 
property can be created by a demise for a term of years, subject to a proviso
for cesser on redemption. 
t f W  q i\ (Xtconrtk e t  f ix -  OfUQj\k Sqsl K. (A ld x ^ ,
£U<xaou'w\ laws ej1 &e<4<ja<iLS,,/ 0 ^ 7 /y / ( JU Q- u J . I .
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At the more functional level, it must be emphasized that the two institutions
are both socio-economic arrangements. The mortgage arrangement like the 
tenancy may be used for the provision of accommodation. A person not having 
all the capital to build or buy a house on his own may enter into an arrange­
ment with a lender by which he is given a loan to build or buy a house. The
loan (the mortgage debt) is then secured with the house. In this case the 
mortgagor has used the mortgage institution as an arrangement for providing
himself with accommodation. The mortgagor has possession of the house (the
mortgagee may be granted possession if the mortgagor defaults in thepayment
of the loan). Payment of the loan (the mortgage debt) is normally by way of
1
monthly instalments •
It should be clear that in this functional manifestation the mortgage is 
not much different from the tenancy. All tenants require accommodation. The 
position of the landlord and the mortgagee appears different at first glance, 
the one providing housing the other money, but careful consideration reveals 
that they both provide a needy person with a facility. The factor motivating 
both landlord and mortgagee is the same; profit. The need of most tenants 
and mortgagors is also the same, housing. That the tenancy and mortgage are 
different institutional arrangements aimed at solving a common problem (that
of people who cannot acquire housing soley out of their own resources) is
evidenced by the fact that the tanancy relationship (as an institutional arrange­
ment for the provision of housing) plays a more important role in societies 
where mortgage funds are limited or n<^J existent. Commenting on man's struggle 
for shelter in an urbanizing world, Abrams has noted:
"In the more developed areas, the mortgage system enables
most families to buy houses with a reasonable down payment
and monthly payments for twenty to forty-five years.
Subsidies are generally available there for lower-income
families. But in the underveloped areas, where the average
family has small savings, a house must usually be paid for 
2outright • ••**.
1. Not much different from rent.
2. Abrams, C., Man's Struggle for Shelter in an Urbanizing Vorld, 
Cambridge, Massachussetts,1964.
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Where purchasing or building outright is impossible and public housing is
almost non-existent, renting is the only alternative.
But it should not be supposed that this (provision of accommodation to 
the mortgagor and of profit to the mortgagee) is the only way in which the
mortgage institution manifests itself at the functional level. It may also
be used by a houseowner who, for some reason or other, requires finance.
The houseowner receives a loan from a moneylender or loan-institution and 
he uses his house as security for the paymentof theloan. It is quite clear 
that in this arrangement the mortgager is not motivated by the need for housing.
What he requires is finance; and for this he mortgages his house.
III. A new kind of charge?
A new, less documented institutional arrangement is being increasingly 
used in the desperate housing situation in urban Ghana • It is an arrangement
' v - \
which has been necessitated by the difficult economic circumstances of Ghana 
and of most Ghanaians, and the monumental outlay of capital involved in building 
a house only to realise (before completion) that they have not the resources 
to finish building. What is happening is that the person building the house 
enters into an arrangement with another person with the resources to complete 
or make money available for completion of the house. The grantor (i.e., of
the money), under the agreement, lives in the completed house for a number
of years.
It is quite clear that this is one of the institutional arrangements for 
the provision of housing in a country where so many people cannot own their 
accommodation. But what is the legal nature of this institutional arrangement?
It may perhaps be helpful to distinguish this arrangement from the transaction
.2 \ in Sbaiti v. Samarasinghfr • In the latter case, the defendant entered into
an oral agreement with the plaintiff to let him premises then uncompleted for
use as a school. The agreement was to let the premises for a five-year term
at an annual rent of 0 5»000. The agreement, like many such in Ghana, was not
reduced into writing; but a note confirmatory of the grant was prepared by the
defendant to show to the Ministry of Education. To ensure early completion of
the building, the plaintiff supplied building materials worth 0 8,000.
2. [l976) 2 G.L.R.361.
When the premises were completed the defendant refused to give possession to 
the plaintiff, who then sued for specific performance* The application for 
specific performance was granted by the High Court. The court held that 
though the agreement was never reduced into writing, the evidence clearly 
showed the essential terms of a tenancy. And since the defendant had bene- 
fitted under the contract (the cost of the building materials being i:5ed to 
offset rent) an equity has been created in favour of the plaintiff and the 
defendant should perform her part of the contract.
The agreement in Shaiti v. Samarasinghe* was for the grant of a tenancy.
It was only to ensure speedy completion of the premises that the plaintiff 
provided the building materials for the completion of the main premises while 
occupying the out-house. There was thus a prior tenancy agreement} and it 
was not even a term of the agreement that the tenant provided building materials.
While recognising the functional similarity of the economic arrangements 
in Sbaiti v. Samarasinghe and the kind of charge being examined, it is sub­
mitted that there are legal differences in the two arrangements. It is important 
to note that in the arrangement being examined there is no prior relationship 
before the agreement to complete the house. There is only one single agreement 
in which a person agrees to complete a house so that he will live in the house
2 afor a period of time • It would be much too sophisticated and^distertion to 
see the arrangement as in fact two separate transactions} the first, a simple 
loan transaction, and the second, a residential tenancy with the loan as rent 
paid in advance. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, discussion with some 
of the parties to such arrangements indicated that they do not regard their
1. op.cit.
2. The period of time is normally calculated on the basis of the money spent 
and the unexpressed interest (usually 50%) and what the parties regard as 
the usual consideration for living in a similar house. To this is added
a number of extra years for the goodwill of the grantor. Under the Money­
lenders Ordinance (No.21), 1946, the lending of money at an interest or 
for profit by unre£jl$(jlf(uj persons is prohibited. This may explain the 
reluctance of parties to some of these arrangements to allow documents 
evidencing the transaction to be photocopied.
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1
relationship as one of landlord ant tenant • The grantor/occupier is regarded 
as being entitled to live in the house in his own right for the agreed period*
It is also inaccurate to regard the arrangement as a simple loan trans­
action* The whole basis of this arrangement is completion of the house on 
the understanding that the grantor will live in the house for an agreed period 
of time* There can thus be no question of the grantor being, for some reason 
or other, paid his money - the principal loan and the unexpressed interest*
This would not only be unjust as being contrary to the intention of the parties, 
but would (in the concrete context of the housing situation in urban Ghana) 
work considerable hardship on the grantor because of the difficulty he would 
have in securing suitable alternative accommodation*
Can it be regarded as a mortgage transaction? This would be inaccurate*
In the arrangement being analysed the grantor is placed in occupation on the
completion of the premises* This would negate the existence of the mortgagor/
2
mortgagee relationship* In Norh v, Gbedemah , illiterate parties to a trans­
action thumbprinted a document which was expressed to be a mortgage* But the 
document stipulated that the creditor be put in possession o£ the property*
It was held that this was not a mortgage transaction. Furthermore, a mortgage
3
is not to operate so as to change the right to possession of the mortgagor 
nor can the mortgagee enter into possession if the mortgagor has not defaulted
4in paying the mortgage debt • The effect of these provisions is that a trans­
action which is founded on the creditor going into possession is not a mortgage.
The arrangement being analysed creates a charge which operates as an 
encumbrance on the property* But the property is not security for a loan*
The property is actually to be enjoyed in satisfaction of what the creditor 
has spent in completing the building* It is thus submitted that this arrange­
ment is a variant of the customary-law seTp-liquidating pledge.
1* Though their opinion as to the legal nature of their arrangement is not 
conclusive, it is worthy of some importance*
2. ,395.
3* Mortgages Decree, 1972 (N*R*C.D*96)* S.l.
4* ibid*, S.l (2) and 17 (!)•
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IV. The tenancy and the pledge.
The institution of giving one's property as security for a loan is of
1ancient vintage in the customary law . In the Ghanaian customary law the 
use of immovable property as security for a loan has been called the customary- 
law pledge2#
The self-liquidating pledge is a relatively recent development - a develop­
ment resulting from the more permanent development and appropriation of land
(cocoa, coffee and timber instead of yam, pepper, etc*, and cement and aluftinium-
3
roofed houses instead of earth and thatch) and a more commercial environment •
In the self-liquidating pledge of a house the pledgee lives in the house
for an agreed period of time. The debt is considered as extinguished after a
fixed term and the pledged property is returned to the pledgor# Interest is
4charged on the loan in practically every case; but to circumvent the law the 
loan is described as interest-free even in any document or memorandum evidenc­
ing the transaction# The rate of interest, according to information, is usually 
fifty per cent. In fixing the period of time for which the creditor will live 
in the house the money spent is added to the unexpressed interest. The parties 
then take into account what would be regarded as the normal rent for that type 
of accommodation. On the expiry of the agreed term the debt is considered as 
Automatically extinguished.
An essential requirement of this arrangement is that the pledgee is given 
possession. If the grantor is not given possession then it would be considered 
as a simple loan transaction or a mortgage'*# In Asafu Adjei v# Yaw Dabanka, 
a security transaction by deed contained this clause;
1# Danquah, J.B.^ Akan Laws and Customs and the Akim Abuakwa Coustitution,
London, 1928, p#219» Ollennu, op.cit., p.79*
2# See Ollennu, N.A., PrAlciples of Customary Land Law in Ghana, London, 1962
p.9^ *2T» Kludze, A.K.P., Ewe Law of Property, London, 1973* pp.237_248.
3. See Kludze, A.K.P., supra, esp. pp.245-248; Bentsi - Erichill, K., op.cit.,
PP.372-399.
4. The Moneylenders Ordinance (No.21), 1946 which prohibits money-lending at 
a profit by unregistered persons.
5» It has been argued that this stereotyped approach to customary law charges
is erroneons: See Bentsi - Enchill, K., op.cit., pp.372-399*, Allott, A.N., 
Akan Law of Property, op.cit*, p.440.
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’’That the said building shall remain in the possession, 
use and control of the mortgagor who shall also draw 
and receive all rents accruing thereprw\ Wl&l' the end 
of the year from the date of these presents"•
It was held that the transaction was an equitable mortgage and not a pledge, 
said Michelin, J. :
"It is an essential element of the native mortgage that
possession of the mortgaged premises should be given to
the mortgagee at the time when the transaction takes
1
place between the parties" •
While in possession the pledgee is not accountable to the pledgor* The 
pledgee stays in the premises in satisfaction of the money spent in completing 
the house (and the unexpressed interest).
An issue of extreme importance is whether this type of self-liquidating 
pledge is redeemable before the expiry of the fixed term. Writing about self- 
liquidating pledges of farms, Kludze says:
"A pledge for a fixed term of years unless expressly stated
otherwise, is redeemable at any time by the pledgor tendering
2the whole of the original debt" •
It is submitted that this statement of the law is not appropriate to the
arrangement being analysed and should be restricted to pledges of farms and
3
creeks upon which Amusu v. Fenuku was decided. The self-liquidating pledge 
of houses is based on the understanding that the creditor will live in the 
house for the whole of the agreed term. The arrangement should be considered 
within the context of the acute shortage of rental accommodation and the arrange­
ment (from the creditor's view point) is to secure accommodation for a period
of time.
1. (1930) 1 W.A.C.A.63, 66.
2. Kludze, A.K.P., Ewe Law of Property, London, 1973* 247. The authority 
cited by Kludze for this statement of the law is Amusu v. Fenuku f|c|15’'2 ;
D.C^Landj f5^SS.75»
3. Supra.
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It would not only be unjust» but would result in serious hardship (because
of the difficulty of securing suitably alternative accommodation) if the
property is redeemed before the expiry of the agreed term. The law should,
therefore, hold the pledgor to his agreement and prevent him from redeeming
the property before the time agreed on.
The functional similarity between the self-liquidating pledge and a
tenancy for a fixed term (particularly those in which rent is paid, albeit
1
illegally, years in advance) is striking • The legal nature of particular 
transactions would be a fine matter of judgment to be made by the courts in 
individual cases. It is largely a question of the intention of the parties 
to be derived from the concrete facts of individual arrangements.
V. The tenancy and the rights of a member in "family house".
Discussion of this branch of the customary land law has often been obfu­
scated by the injudicious use of terms like "family" and "family house". While 
recognising that definition is often a question of choice not of abstract logic, 
it is submitted that it would make for much clearer CM<S|lysis if "family house"
is restricted to cases where the whole family (as a corporate entity) has title 
2
to a house • Where specified members of the family suceed to property (as for
example, when children of an Osu man inherit their father's house under the
3
intestacy rules of Osu customary law ) it is not helpful to refer to the prop-
4
erty as a "family house" • In short the assertion normally made that on the 
death i»\4,<L>state of a Ghanaian his property becomes "family property" is not 
considered illuminating. Without identifying what constitutes 'family' in 
individual cases the statement tells us very little. That being the case the 
reference to the family should be skipped; in particular customary law contexts 
investigation should focus on who exactly inherit what.
The administrative/judicial functions of the family should also not be 
confused with succession-rights. The family, acting as a court of probate, may 
adjust the rights of successors in certain cases, and determine what particular 
items go to each of the successors but this should not be interprated to mean
1. See Sbaiti v. Samarasinghe (l976] 2 G.L.R.3&1*
2. For the concept of corporate bodies in the customary law: See WToodman, G.R.
"The family as a corporation in Ghanaian and Nigerian Law", (1974)
11 Afr.L.Std. 1 and Allott, A.N., "Legal personality in African Law", in 
Ghickman, M.(ed.), Ideas and Procedures in African Customary Lawt op.cit., pH<|
3* See Coleman v. Shang [1961J G.L.R.145.
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that it is the family who determines who should inherit property# There are
clear rules of inheritance; the family has no fiat* These rules may only be
departed from in a clear and demonstrable cases* This function of the family
is no different from the power of a court of probate to vfpry the will of a
testator in order to provide for some one not provided for or determine the
1entitlements of successors •
"Family house”is, therefore, used in this section to refer to houses held 
corporately by the family* Though the house is held corporately by the family, 
the day-to-day administration is vested in the head of family* The head of 
family may delegate his functions to another memeber of the family*
These houses were either built some years past by the ancestor of the
2family or more recently by money and effort contributed by the whole family •
It may also have passed to the family because a member of the family built on
3
land appropriated by the family •
Where title to a house is held by a family, then any member of the family
4
is entitled as of right to a room • In practice, however, a grant has to be 
made by the head of family or administrator of the property* Though all members 
of the family have an undifferentiCited right of residence, occupancy of specific 
portions is always the result of a grant* Members are rationed in the number 
of rooms they may be granted* Since members of a family, almost invariably, 
outnumber thr rooms in a family house, the head of family or family council 
decides on who should live in the house and who not. The right of the member, 
writes Allott:
" . . • is only a right to be accommodated if possible, and 
not a vested right entitl 
without prior permission"
ing him to take possession of a room
5
4. See Kludze, A.K.P., Ewe Law of Property, nop.cit*, pp.256-3l4 ; "Problems 
of intestate succession in Ghana", (197 ) 9 U.G.L.J.89*
1. See Kludze, A.K.P*, Ewe Law of Property, op.cit*, Chap.13* esp* pp.
2* For the acquisition of family property generally: See Ollennu, N.A., op.cit.,
pp34«35 ; Allott, A.N.; The Akan Law of Property, op.cit*, pp. 258-281 » 
Kludze, A.K.P.*, Ewe Law of Property, op.cit**, Bentsi-Eflchill, K., op.cit., 
pp. 249-60.
3* See Amissah-Abadoo v. Abadoo [l974j 1 G.L.R.110.
4. Tetteh v* Malm |l959] 1 G.L*R.368.
5* The Akan Law of Property, op.cit., p.278.
a. Nature of the members1 interest ^
The member of the family has occupancy of the part of the family house which
he occupies. He has no individual interest in the house or indeed of the room he
occupies, except as a member of the corporate family which has title to the house.
A member's occupancy is for an unlimited time as long as he confor-ms to the direct­
ives of the head of family or other person managing the house. He must be loyal 
to the family and not deny the title of the family. If he so behaves himself, his
right of occupancy is quite secure.
S
It must be emph^ised that these are family arrangements, aid that the member of 
the family usually outnumber the available rooms. The people who are to live in 
the family house is, therefore, reviewed as the social conditions of members change. 
A member who while living in a family house acquires his own house, may be prev­
ailed upon to vacate his room in favour of a needier member. This does not mean 
that the privfoas occupant has lost his inherent right to reside in the family 
house. This is an indefeasible right flowing automatically from membership of the 
family. It only means that the family (acting through the head of family or a
council of elders or a general meeting) thinks that another member of the family
has a stronger case for living in the family house.
Members living in the family house have a duty of diligence and care and are 
required to make contributions to minor repairs to the house. Major structural 
repairs and remodelling are, however, undertaken by the family as a whole.
The general principle of this branch of the law is that a member cannot
2 , alienate the room he occupies • But children of the occupant (where members of
the family) have a right to continue living in the room on the death of their 
3
father •
The member living in a family house is not a tenant of either the head of 
family or administrator of the house, nor of the whole family. He is a member of 
the family which has title to the house; and he has an inherent undifferentiated
4right to live in the house •
1. See Allott, A.N., The Akan of Property, op.cit., p.279.
2. See Lokko v. Konklofi (1907) Ren,451.
3* Richardson v. Fynn (1909). Earn.13*
4. It would be inaccurate to describe him as a licensee (as used in English law).
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A tenant, however, has no inherent legal right to the grant of accommodation.
His right to occupy premises derives from contract (between him and the landlord), 
not status.
C. Types of Tenancies
Having identified the central feature of the urban residential tenancy and 
having compared and contrasted it with other institutional arrangements for the
provision of housing the various types of residential tenancy are now examined.
I. Tenancies for a fixed term?
A tenancy may be granted for any period of time, no matter how long or how
short. There may be tenancies for ninenty-nine years, for ten years, or three 
years. The common law still retains the doctrine that the duration of such a 
term must be certain, i.e., that the parties must be agreed on the dates for
l
the commencement and determination of a proposed tenancy*. Such agreement may 
be established by reliance on the maxim; 
id certum est quod certum reddi potest.
But introduction of security of tenure legislation which restricts the 
landlord's common-law rights of eviction (in Ghana and in England) has rendered 
somewhat hollow this supposed requirement of certainty. Under these security 
of tenure provisions^ though the contractual tenancy may have determined, the 
tenant remains in possession as a statutory tenant unless the landlord gets
/• 2an eviction order by satisfying one of the requirements of the Rent Act, 1963 •
A functional analysis, therefore, shows that the tenancy is not for a
fixed or certain term. It may continue for much longer. The agreed term is 
not a certain term, but a minimum term.
II. Concurrent tenancies
A concurrent tenancy is one granted for a term which is to commence on
the expiration or other determination of a previous tenancy of the same premises
3
to another •
1. See Harvey v. Platt [1965J 1 W.L.R. 1025• *, Lace v. Chantler [i.944^  K.B.368 at 370.
2. See infra, PP*3$£>~33«sL*
3» This type of tenancy is hardly created in Ghana. It only occurs when getting
to the end of an existing tenancy (but before the tenancy has expired) the
landlord grants tenancy of the same premises to another person.
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tenant relationship between the first and second tenants and supplants the
In traditional legal analysis a periodic tenancy is said to differ fund­
amentally from a tenancy for a fixed term because the former continues automatic­
ally from period to period until determined by notice. But it must be pointed 
out that in these days of Rent Acts and 'security of tenure' the practical 
effect of the two arrangement may, in certain cases, not be that much different.
A periodic tenancy is one from period to period; it has the feature of 
perpetual renewability unless determined (after which a statutory tenancy may be
created unless the landlord gets an eviction order). The 'period' may be a year,
4a month, a half-year or a quarter. Monthly tenancies predominate in Ghana •
Weekly tenancies which are prevalent in the United Kingdom are non-existent^.
In English law there has been lively controversy about what consitutes a 'year',
'month' or 'week'. Technical rules have developed on this issue; but these
6rules do not necessarily apply to Ghana •
Periodic tenancies may be created either expressly or impliedly. In Ghana,
it is usually by implication. A periodic tenancy arises by implication whenever
7
a person occupies premises and pays rent measured by reference to a period •
The implication is, however, rebutted if there is sufficient evidence to show 
that some other kind of tenancy was intended. A tenant who holds over after 
the determination of a fixed-term (?) tenancy may become a tenant at will or on 
sufferance (the security of tenure provisions render this possibility rare).
1. See Neale v. Mackenzie (1836) 1 M & W.7^7»» Cole v. Kelly [1920J 2 K.B.106.
2. See Wordsley Brewery Co. v. Halford (1903) 90 L.T.89*
3* This is the most prevalent type of residential tenancy in Ghana. In the 
survey carried out by the present writer 1,658 out of the 2,000 tenancies 
(about 80%) were periodic tenancies. In Allamedine Bros, v. P.Z. [l97l[]
2 G.L.R.403) 411, Sowah J.A. observed that the bulk of tenancies in Ghana 
were monthly tenancies.
4. ibid., This is largely because rent is calculated on a monthly basis— a 
product of the facvthat generally wages and salaries are paid monthly.
5« ibid., j See Allamedine Bros, v. P.Z., op.cit., at 410.
6. See Allamedine Bros.v. P.Z., op.cit., pp,Ano_Am
relationship between the original landlord and the first tenant2.
3III. Periodic tenancies
7» Carroll v. Andrews (1956) 1 W.A.L.R.I76 Ramia v. Mouissie
*38-47 ^77.
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A tenancy at will may easily become a periodic tenancy by the tenant paying
rent upon some regular periodical basis* But it must be emphasized that the
important consideration is the intention of the parties to be inferred from
1
all the circumstances, for, as Ademola C.J* held in Oshinfekun v. Lana a 
periodic tenancy is created not by payment of rent but by consensus between 
parties*
A periodic tenancy may also arise by implication of law where a person
is let into possession under a void lease or an agreement to create a tenancy
2and then pays rent upon some regular periodical basis • A person m  occupation
3
under a specifically enforceable contract may, however, have an equitable
lease* He is considered as having a tenancy from the time of entry and upon
4the same terms as if the lease had been granted •
a. Computation of the ♦period1 and the frequency of rent days*
The test for determining whether a periodic tenancy is a yearly, monthly 
or other tenancy is the period by reference to which the parties calculated 
rent, rather than the times at which rent is actually paid* There is a dis­
tinction between a quarterly or monthly instalment of a yearly rent and a 
quarterly or monthly rent* Thus an agreement for premises at "0 6,000 per 
annum payable at 0 500 monthly", prima facie, creates a yearly tenancy while
one for premises at "0 500 a month” creates a monthly tenancy* The law was
5
thus stated in Allamedine Bros* v* Paterson Zochonis :
”In my opinion it is not the mode of payment that should 
determine the nature of a tenancy* It is rather the basis 
of computation of rent payable* If the agreement, either 
written or oral, has as its term that the premises is let 
at such and such a rent per month or when the rent is paid $n 
the basis such an amount the presumption in law is that
the rental is on a monthly basis* • • •
l .  (1955-56) W.fc.L.R.93.
2* See Doe d* Rigge v* Bell (1793) 5 T.R.471*
3* infra, pp. 111.- 1*1-3.
4. infra, p p . l Walsh v* Lonsdale (1882) 21 Ch*D*9*i Purchase v* 
Lichfield Bittt^ ery* Co* pL915] 1 K.B.184*
5* [l971] 2 G.L.R.403*
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A multiplication of the monthly sum and payment of
the resultant figure without more in my view does
1
not change the nature of the original tenancy" •
IV. The statutory tenancy
The statutory tenancy is not created by contract but by law. In Ghana 
two classes of statutory tenancy exist.
A statutory tenancy of the first type is created when a tenants
" . . .  remains in possession of premises after the
determination by any means of his tenancy and cannot
by reason of the provisions of this Act (the Rent Act,1963)
2be deprived of such possession by his landlord" •
This refers to a tenant whose tenancy has been terminated but cannot be evicted
because his landlord cannot satisfy the requirements of section 17(1) of the
Rent Act, 1963 (Act 220).
Tt is not necessary for the creation of a statutory tenancy that rent be
3
paid and accepted by the landlord ; nor is it necessary that the tenant pay 
4double-rent •
The second type of statutory tenancy arises if before the termination of
5
head-lease the head-lessee has created a lawful sub-lease.. The sub-lessee
6
then becomes statutory tenant • It is important that the sub-lease is lawfully
7
created. In Kuntoh v. Joseph , a sub-lease was created in breach of a conven-
g
ant not to sub-let. It was held that the sub-tenant is not protected •
A statutory tenant (of either type) holds as a tenant from month to month,
but on the terms of his original tenancy as far as they are consistent with
q
the provisions of the Rent Act, 1963 •
1. op.cit., per Sowah J.A. at 409, quoting from the judgment of the trial 
magistrate.
2. Rent Act 1963 (Act 220), S.36.
3* Karam & Sons v. Traboulsi & Co., [1964] G.L.R.513.
4. ibid.
5. Combined effect of S. 36 and S.17 (5) of Act 220.
6. ibid.
7. (1955) D.C^Land^ ’52->55, 341.
8. For a critique of decisions like Kuntoh v. Joseph., : See infra, pp.I9'7~ ’
9. Act 220, S.29 (1) (a).
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By section 22 (1) of Act 220 a statutory tenant cannot sub-let the premises^
without the written consent of the landlord* In George Grant v* Tikobo 
1
Sawmills Ltd. a statutory tenant purported to assign the premises to a third-
party. It was held that a statutory tenancy is a law - protected right of
occupancy and that the statutory tenant had no interest in the premises capable
of alienation* In statutory tenancies of the second type (sub-tenant holding
over after termination of head lease) the tenant is subject to any restrictive
2convenant between the landlord and the head-lessee •
V. Tenancies at will
MA tenancy at will arises whenQtf&JT a tenant, with the
consent of the owner, occupies land as tenant (and not
merely as a servant or agent) on the terms that either
3
party may determine the tenancy at any tiem" •
The main feature of this arrangement is that either party may determine it
at will. This is a reciprocal right enjoyed by both parties; it cannot be
4extinguished by contrary agreement • The tenancy is determined simply by
a demand for possession by the landlord*
At English common law, a tenancy at will may be created either expressly
or by implication. In practice, tenancies at will are hardly ever created
in Ghana* They normally arise by implication of law. This may happen when
there is occupation under a void lease or an agreement for a lease'** It has
also been held to arise in a case where a person was granted occupation with-
6 7out obligation to pay rent and for no specified length of time • In Safo v* Badu:,
the law on the creation of tenancies at will was
1. (1969) C.C.118.
2. Act 220, S.29 (1) (a).
3* Megarry, R. and Wade, H.W.R. . t-CM** ^  ' P
4. See Doe d* Price v. Price (1832) 9 Bing 356*', Fox v* Hunter-Paterson
[1948J 2 All E.R.813*
5* Othman v. Accra Perfumery Co.Ltd., (1942) 8 W.A.C.173*
6. Safo v. Badu -^977] 2 G.L.R.63.
7* ibid.
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thus stated by Korsah, J. s
" • • • a tenancy at will may be created by agreement 
express or implied, where a person lives in a house 
rent free by permission of the owner. It may also arise 
by implication of law where a tenancy from year to year 
cannot be inferred for example, in the case of an entry 
under a void lease without any payment of rent or obli­
gation to pay it* Such an estate may be determined by 
either party by express words or by any act which is inco­
nsistent with the continuance of the tenancy; it is
determined as soon as notice thereof reaCh^S the other 
1
party" •
It is sometimes very difficult to distinguish between a tenancy at will
and a licence -— another reason for abolishing the tenancy/licence dihotomy.
VI. Tenancy on sufferance
A tenancy by sufferance arises, in English common law, when a tenant
holds over, without the consent of the landlord, on the expiry or other
2determination of a previous tenancy • This legal animal hardly exists in
Ghana. Under the Rent Act, 1963 a tenant who cannot be evicted because of
3
the provisions of the Act becomes a statutory tenant • This type of tenancy
can, therefore, only exist if the premises are not covered by the Rent Act,
4
1963* These are very few indeed •
1. op.cit., at p.67.
2. See Remon v. City of London Real Prop. Co.Ltd., jl92l] 1 K.B.49*
3* Supra, pp.^l~$9.» infra, pp.£7^-333*
4. infra, pp.£ 3 7
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE CREATION OF TENANCIES
A. THE SUBSTANTIVE LAV
I. Capacity to grant tenancies
It may be stated as a general rule, that all persons not under any legal 
disability may grant tenancies for such periods as are not inconsistent with 
the nature and quantity of their interest in a house.
The application of this principle does, however, entail enormous difficulty 
(in individual or groups of ca^es) because of the system of land holding.
It is thus important to consider different kinds of interest in a house in 
order to locate who may grant a tenancy of that house and for how long. This 
may in turn be dependent on how the house was built (was it by an individual 
or two or more members of a family, or the whole family, and on what under­
standing?) and on the land on which it is built (was the land individually- 
acquired, is allodial title to the land held by a family or stool, is the 
land being used by the family?).
The law stated in this section is that of the peoples of southern Ghana, 
the Ga-Adangbe, the Akan and the Ewe (most of urban Ghana is situate within 
this area) whose customary land law has been more fully investigated. The
law stated in this section is, therefore, not necessarily that of the tribes
1
of the northern and upper regions. The courts and some of the text writers
have taken the view that these general principles hold true for the whole
2country. But KllAdze's work is timely reminder that there may be significant 
differences in these systems of customary law.
a. Building by an individual on land allodial title to which is 
held by the stool (Akan and Ga)
It has always been the customary law for a member of a stool to appropriate
a piece of unappropriated land (allodial title to which is held by his stool)
to his beneficial use. As regards land needed for the purpose of building
the trend, in recent times, has been for the traditional authorities to make
3
express grants for the purpose .
1. For example, Ollenu, N.A., Principles of customary land law in Ghana, op.cit.
2. Kludze, A.K.P., Ewe Law of Property, op.cit.
3» See Oblee v. Armah (1958) 3 W.A.U2484.
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The legal question posed here is, who is the proper legal authority to
grant tenancies of such premises? Can the individual who built the house grant
a tenancy alone, or does he need the knowledge and/or consent of the stool?
There used to be some doubt about the answers to the above question;
and some stools (particularly in Ashanti) insisted that their consent was
necessary for a valid grant of tenancy1*
But it is now well settled that the individual member has the capacity
to grant tenancies of such premises without the knowledge and/or consent of 
2
the stool • Such tenancies granted by the individual, may continue beyond 
his life* The law is thus stated by Ollennu:
" • • • an outstanding incident of the determinable estate
is that it is inheritable and alienable either by transfer
3inter vivos or by testamentaty desposition" •
4In fact the present law is that an individual can alone sell such property • 
Building by individual on land allodial title to which is held by his family 
(Adangme and Ewe)•
Writing on the Ewe, Kludze disagrees with the propositions of law (in
5 6Vcases like Thompson v* Mensah and Total Oil Products Ltd* v* Obeng )
that an individual can alienate, either by sale or gift, a house built on 
7
such family land • He argues that in Ewe law the individual can only alienate 
the developments he has made to the land but not the land itself* He can sell
g
the house on the land but not the land itself* Kludze, however, recognises
that with development of land taking a more permanent nature (cocoa and coffee
farms rather than cassava and okro farms, and concrete and sandcrete rather
than earth and thatch buildings) the distinction he draws (which may have
existed in the customary law) is becoming increasingly fictional*
1* Private conversation with Antony Allott who had carried out field invest-
gation among the Akan*
2* See Ollennu, N.A*; Principles of customary land law in Ghana, op.cit*, p*57;
Thompson v. Mensah (1957) 3 W*A.L.R*240; Total Oil Products v* Obeng 
Q 962] 1 G.L.R.228.
3* Ollennu, N.A*; Principles of customary land law in Ghana, op.cit*, p*57*
4. See Thompson v* Mesah, supra; Total Oil Products v* Obeng, supra*
5* supra. 6* supra*
7* Kludze, A.K.P*, Ewe law of property, op.cit., pp. 128-130
8* ibid., pp. 130-131.
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Despite KlUdze’s view on the outright alienation of such houses, he
impliedly agrees that the individual alone can grant tenancies of such 
1premises •
b. Building on land in the occupation of the family
The law is now well - settled that if an individual member of a family
builds on land in the occupation of his family (as distinct from unappropriated
land to which the family holds the allodial title) then he has only a life
interest in the house* Such member may grant a tenancy of the house, but
2
this will not subsist beyond his life • To grant a tenancy, subsisting beyond 
his life, the member will need the consent of the head and principal members
of the family.
. . 3This position has crystallised in Amissah Abadoo v. Abadoo • fA’,
with the consent of his family built a house on family land* The portion of
land on which he built was part of a site on which was a family house* The
particular portion on which he built was used as a play ground by all members
of the family and also housed a well used by the family. The land was thus
not unappropriated land but land appropriated to the ber\eficial use of the
family, i^ i purported to dispose of the house by will. It was held by Wiredu J*,
sitting in the High court, that the purported alienation was void and that
the individual member who built the house could not dispose of it beyond his
lifetime*
The crucial test is whether the family has appropriated the land to its
4beneficial use* What constitutes occupation by the family? In Ollennu’s
view, the member would only have a life interest if the land on which it was
5built is ”a site on which family structure of any sort exists” • This form-
6ulation is too wide • It is suggested that the question whether a family has
appropriated land to its use, must be a question of fact to be determined
from the circumstances of each particular case.
These propositions of law are supported by the court of Appeal decision 
7m  Biney v. Biney •
1. See Ewe Law of Property, op.cit., pp.170-174.
2. See Amissah-Abadoo v. Abadoo (l974/ 1 G.L.R.110.
3. ibid.
4. This is very important because of concept of abandonment in customary law.
(5.6.7- p.t.o.)
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The material facts of this case are that 'A* conveyed his land with buildings 
thereon to three persons as tenants for life, and thereafter to his four 
children. The property was known as "Bineyvill©'. The plaintiff was the sole 
survivor of thr remaindermen and the court held that the principle of ius accres 
cendi operated to vest "Bineyville" in him absolutely. There was, however, 
another tract of land which was not included in the settlement. This piece 
of land was, for all practical purposes, treated as part of "Bineyville”.
With the authorization of the head of family, the plaintiff built on this 
other piece of land. In an action to partition the property, it was held by 
the trial judge (which decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal) that the 
land not included in the settlement had on the death of 'A' become "family
1
land"} and that the plaintiff had only a life interest in the house he built • 
The Court of Appeal held that this is the position whether the individual member 
built with or without the permission of the family. The only exception is 
where the member of the family obtains an express grant, in his own right, 
out of a portion of family land.
1. Kludze thinks that Biney v. Biney may have laid down a wider principle
(affecting unappropriated land to which a family holds the allodial title)} 
vide, "The fate of buildings on family land", (197^2 ^ R.G.L.226, 233-243•
If Kludze is right this would cast some doubt on the propositions of law 
in the last two sections. But with respect, he is wrong. Kludze falls 
into this error because he refers opaquely to "family land" without differ­
entiating and distinguishing the rights of benefit and the powers of control 
which a family may have in different piecies of land. Admittedly, part of 
the blame must lie with the Court of Appeal which did not draw these distin­
ctions. If Kludze had drawn this distinction he would not have lumped all 
lands in which a family has some interest of a sort as 'family land'• He 
would then have realised that unappropriated land (to which a family holds 
the allodial title) is 'family land' in a distinctly different sense from 
appropriated land solely acquired by a member but which has fallen to the 
family on the death intestate of the member. The two should be analysed 
separately. It was with the latter (appropriated land) that the court was 
concerned in Biney v. Biney. It could not conceivably had made statements 
of law about the former (unappropriated land).
Cont.
5* Ollennu, N.A., Principles of customary land law in Ghana, op.cit., 
6. See Amissah-Abadoo v. Abadoo, supra, per Viredu J. at 125-126.
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c« Building with the help of the Family or some members of it.
It is now well settled that a house does not lose its quality as solely-
acquired property simply because the individual member of the family received
some help from the family or some members of it. It is now the view that
1
the important consideration must be the intention of the parties • In deter­
mining the intention of the parties, an important factor would be the nature
and extent of the assistance offered by the family or some members of the
2
family. In Codjoe v. Kwatchey , the builder had used wood, roofing material
and a gate from a demolished 'family house1, in building his own house. He
also received £100 from the family, part of which went directly into the building
of the house. The rest he used in trading, the profits from which also went
into building the house. On account of these facts it was contended that the
individual member had only a life-interest only, in the house. This contention
3
was rejected by the trial judge, who said :
"Is any assistance in money or in kind, however slight, 
sufficient to impress a block of buildings worth thousands 
of pounds, otherwise erected by a man entirely at his own 
expense and on a valuable land he himself has purchased, 
with the character of family property? Surely there must 
be some limit . . .  and I venture to suggest as such a limit, 
the proviso that the family's contribution, whether in money 
or in kind, must be a substantial contribution before the 
court will hold that the whole of the land and buildings 
in question in any case have been thereby impressed with 
the character of family property. What will amount to sub­
stantial contribution must, of course, always be a question 
of fact depending on the particular circumstances of every case".
On appeal to the West African Court of Appeal, Kingdon C.J., dissented from 
the test enunciated by the trial judge, but the decision of the trial judge 
was unanimously upheld.
1. See Acquisition of Family Land" (1963), 7 J.A.L.131*
2. (1935) 2 W.A.C.A.371.
3* Quoted in Codjoe v. Kwatchey, fcP* at 377
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That the intention of the parties is the decisive factor is made clear
1
by the decision in Larbi v. Cato • In this case the legal education of
the individual member who built the house, had been financed from the proceeds
of a family farm. Out of the fees earned from his legal practice he erected
a building on land purchased from his own resources. In building the house,
he also used a small amount of money, received by him as his personal share
from the proceeds of a family cocoa farm. It was contended that the individual
member had a life interest only, in the house. This argument was rejected
2by the trial judge, who said :
MIn my opinion, however, it would be repugnant and contrary 
to all principles of natural justice and good conscience to 
hold in modern days that where, for example, a man employs 
contractors to build on his land, the house So built would 
become family property simply because one member or another 
of the family occasionally visited the site of the work 
when it was in progress, and casually carried a pail of 
water, a piece of brick, or helped the contractor's labourers 
to lift a board or so. I should take the same view where 
a member of the family gave the member building on his own 
land some temporary financial assistance to an amount which 
was insignificant when considered in relation to the actual 
cost of the building".
In the Court of Appeal, this view was not upheld, though the appeal against
3the decision was dismissed. The court said:
" . . . although we agree that according to the best 
authority a real contribution towards the building of 
a family house, need not be substantial in the accepted 
sense of the word it must be a real contribution and 
cannot accede to the view that customary law is a stranger 
to the doctrine 'de minimis non curat lex1".^
An indication of the proper criterion was given when the Court of Appeal said:
1.
2. ibid, 37-38.
3. [i960] G.L.R.146, at p.13^ -
4. ibid., p.1*33-.
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"We do not doubt for one moment that those family 
members who make contribution to the building of 
a house are entitled to share the enjoyment of the 
building but this is and must be, on the basis that 
by accepting support and contribution from the family, 
the builder recognises that he is building a house for 
the family".
The nature and extent of the assistance of the family or some members of it 
is, however, very important. This is because the intention of the parties 
is to be determined objectively from all the circumstances of the case —  
and the contribution of the family or some members of it, is a very important 
fact •
In determing the intention of the parties, we suggest, that the court 
should have regard to the changed and changing social and economic conditions 
with its emphasis on individual acquisition and enjoyment of property • In
this connection, we suggest, that the principle that " . . .  the presum-
* * 2 ption with regard to land in this country is that it is family property"
should not be applied in such circumstances.
1. Judicial notice was taken of the changed and changing social and economic 
facts in Abadoo v. Awotwi jj-973] 1 G.L.R.393 Edward Wiredu J., had this 
to say when considering the question whether an individual needed the 
consent of his family when alienating his solely — acquired property*
"For sometime now the customary law has undergone considerable 
changes . . .  The requirement of the family's consent to 
perfect any form of alienation is no longer good law and 
is now dead and buried. No attempt should, therefore, be 
made to resurrect it. With this apart, that requirement 
does not reflect the present social changes which are now 
apparent in Ghanaian society about modes of acquisition of 
property which are unlike the past • • . The development 
of money economy has introduced other means of assisting in 
the acquisition of wealth so that it will be contrary to 
reasoning to enforce the claim of the family to have a say 
in respect of property, when they may even not know how it 
was acquired".
2. United Products Ltd. v. Afari (1929) Div.Ct. 29“31»H at p*12.v 
In Codjoe v. Kwatchey, (supra) at 378* Kingdon C.J.
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d. Family-house
It has been seen that there are certain circumstances in which title 
to a house is held by the family as a unit* There are also cases where 
the family builds a house out of its resources* Such houses are seldom the 
subject of a tenancy, the usual practice being for such houses to be occupied 
by members of the family*
But it is not impossible for such houses to be let* Who is the proper 
authority to grant tenancies of such houses? The competent authority to 
grant tenancies of such houses or rooms therein is the head of family acting 
with the consent and concurrence of the principal member or elders of the 
family. A grant purported to be made by a person or body of persons other 
than the head and principal members is void ab initio *^ There may be cases 
though where the family may be estopped from denying the validity of a grant 
not made by the competent body as a result of its acquiescence or laches*
II* To whom may tenancies be granted
Every person who is not rendered incompetent by a legal 'disability' is 
capable of being a tenant* By disability is meant any restriction upon or 
bar to a person's right to deal with property or enter into contractual relations.
though that the presumption was "not nearly so strong" as it had been* But 
in Larbi v* Cato (supra) the Court of Appeal said it still existed.
1. There has been considerable controversy in the case law and by academics
on whether different permutations of irregular grants are void or voidable. 
This controversy is not central to this study and will not be joined. 
Interested readers may consult Kludze, Ewe Law of Property, op.cit., 198” 
207*i Ollennu, Principles of Customary Land Law in Ghana, op.cit., 127” 
130.*, Bentsi-Enchill, Ghana Land Law, op.cit., 49”59*» Woodman, G.R.,
"The alienation of f a m i l y \ d  (aIi\CW\C^( 1964) 1 U.G.L.J.23«» Kora, E.D., 
"Unlawful disposition of family land - void or voidable", (1967)
4 U.G.L.J.Ill.
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B. THE FORMAL REQUIREMENTS
The formalities for the creation of tenancies are governed by the
Conveyancing Decree, 1973 (N*R*C*D*175)• The Decree came into force on
1st January 1974*. The Conveyancing Decree, 1973 is one of several recent
Ghanaian statutes aimed atreformof aspects of the land law. Much of the
Decree is a re-enactment, with amendments and rephrasing, of various sections
2of the English Law of Property Act, 1925 • The provisions of the Decree regard­
ing the formalities for the creation of tenancies are not therefore novel and 
much of the old law is still applicable; the Decree is not a code and one has 
to rely on prior decisions to construct a complete picture of the formal 
requirements*
'Conveyance1 is defined in the interpretation section as including!
" • • • any document in writing by which an interest in 
land is transfered, an oral grant under customary law duly 
recorded in accordance with this Decree, a lease, disclaimer, 
release and every other assurance of property or an interest
3
therein by any instrument except a will" *
'Land' is defined to include "any house, building or structure what- 
,4soever" •
It is submitted that these provisions are sufficently wide to cover all 
residential tenancies*
1. Leases for three years or more 
The Decree provides that:
"A transfer of an interest in land shall be.by writing
HiS
signed by the person making the transfer or^by agent
5
duly authorised in writing" •
1* S*46* Prior to the enactment of the Decree, the position was governed by
the Statute of Frauds, 1677 end the Real Property Act, 1845* These two
imperial Acts were statutes of general application, applicable in Ghana
before 1974*
2* Various sections of the Law of Property Act, 1925 were made applicable to
Ghana by section III (1) of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372)*
3* S*45* (emphasis supplied)*
4* ibid*
5# N.R.C.D-175, S.l (1)
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This applies to a tenancy for three years or more, though the tenancy
1
is determinable within three years • A lease for three years or more must, 
therefore, be in writing. The writing must be signed by the landlord or 
by his agent duly authorised in writing. A departure from the old law is
that sealing shall not be necessary for documents executed by individual /:
2 , . 
persons • The conveyance (?) must be executed in the presence of one witness
3
who must attest to it •
II. Tenancies for less than three years
The requirement of writing is dispensed with when a tenancy takes effect
4
m  possession and is for a period of less than three years • This is so whether
or not the tenant has the power or option to extend the duration of the tenancy**.
Periodic tenancies are considered as tenancies for less than three years^.
This is so despite the fact that if not determined by notice (and in accordance
with section 17 of the Rent Act, 19&3) it will endure for more than three years.
7
Most tenancies in Ghana are created under this rubric, orally and informally •
A tenancy taking effect in possession is to be distinguished from one
taking effect in reversion. An example of the latter is a tenancy granted 
today, but which provides that the tenant will move into the premises in a 
month's time. This is to be differentiated from a contract to grant a tenancy
Q
in a month's time • With the former the tenancy has been created, but the 
tenant will not move into the premises till after a month; with the latter, 
the parties agree to create a tenancy in a month's time, possession being 
granted immediately on creation. Possession is not confined to physical 
occupation but includes the payment and receipt of rent.
1. See Kushner v. Law Society (1952] 1 All E.R.404.
2. Conveyancing Decree, 1973 (N.R.C.D.175), ^.40 (2).
3* ibid., S.40 (1).
4. ibid., S.3 (1) (f).
5* ibid., S.3 (1) (f).
6. See Allamedine Bros, v. Paterson Zochonis, op.cit.', Hammond v. Farrow 
[1904] 2 K.B332.
7• supra, pp.^5-^7.
8. It must be noted that by section 2 of the Conveyancing Decree, 1973i a 
contract for a tenancy not evidenced in writing is unenforceable, unless 
supported by a sufficient act of part performance.
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III* Creation by estoppel
By section 3 (2) of the Conveyancing Decree, 1973* the requirement of 
writing in the creation of leases:
" • • • shall be subject to the rules of equity, including 
the rules relating to unconscionability^ fraud duress and 
part performance • • • "
It is, therefore, submitted that tenancies can still be created by estoppel - 
estoppel coming under the general rubric of "unconscionability"*
Estoppel, in this context, has been defined as:
11 • • • a principle of the law of evidence which • • • 
precludes parties who have created a tenancy from denying 
their respective capacities as against one another"**
Under this principle a person who purports to grant a tenancy, though
he has no such right, and a person who takes such a grant with knowledge of
the landlord's incapacity, will be estopped from denying the creation of a
tenancy* A tenancy by estoppel, however, binds only the parties to the
transaction (and their successors and assigns)but not third parties*
IV* Operation of an invalid lease as a contract for a tenancy
A lease for three years or more, if created otherwise than in accordance
with section 1 of the Conveyancing Decree, 1973» will be construed as a contract 
2
for a tenancy • Since a contract for a tenancy has to be in writing and signed
3
by the grantor or his duly authorised agent , the only possible instance where 
a purported lease can serve as a contract for a tenancy is where either the
4
purported lease is signed by an agent whose authorisation was not in writing ,
5
or the lease was not executed in the presence of a witness who attested to it •
The contract for a tenancy is created only if the constituents of an
6enforceable agreement are present •
1* Megarry, R* and Wade, H*V*R*, op*cit*, p.645.
2. See Parker v. TasslMil (1858) /^De.G* & J.559.
3* Conveyancing Decree, 1973» (N*R*C*D*175), S.2 (a).
4* By section 1 (1) of the Conveyancing Decree, 1973i the authorisation of
an agent who signs a lease must be in writing.
3* By section 40 (1) of the Decree, a tenancy must be d&ecuted in the presence
of at least one witness, who must attest to it*
6. See infra, pp.lOO-~/0^-
101
V. Contract For a Tenancy 
a* Distinction Between a Lease and a Contract for a Tenancy
The distinction between a lease and a contract to create a tenancy is
that a lease is the actual conveyance by which the transfer of interest in
the premises from thelandlord to the tenant is effected, while a contract
to create a tenancy is a binding agreement between the parties - the one to
transfer interest in the premises, the other to accept such transfer of
interest* The distinction has been so put by Woodfall£
"A contract for a lease is an agreement enforceable 
in law whereby one party agrees to grant and another
to take a lease • • • A contract for a lease is to
be distinguished from a lease, because a lease is 
actually the conveyance of an estate in land, whereas 
a contract for a lease is merely an agreement that 
such a conveyance shalJL be entered into at a future 
date"*
Whether a document operates as a lease or an agreement to create a tenancy
depends on the intention of the parties, which intention must be ascertained
2
from all the relevant circumstances •
Is
b*,.Formal Requiremnts
3
The Conveyancing Decree, 1973* provides that:
"No contract for the transfer of an interest in land 
shall be enforceable unless -
(a) it is evidenced in writing signed by the person 
against whom the contract is to be proved or by a
person who was authorised to sign on behalf of such
person".
The statutory requirement is that either the contract itself, or some 
memorandum or note thereof is in writing* In the first case the writing 
is the actual contract between the parties* In the second9 the contract
is entered into orally and the writing is only a note or momorandum evidencing 
the already concluded contract.
1* Woodfall, op.cit.,^127.
2. Gore v* Lloyd (1844) 12 N & V 463J Sidebotham v. Holland [1895J
1 Q.B.378, 385.
3* Conveyancing Decree, 1973* S.2 (a).
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A contract to create a tenancy, to be enforceable, must be in writing
1
or must be evidenced in writing • Failure to comply with the requirement of
writing renders a contract unenforceable - unless the contract is supported
2
by a sufficient act of part performance* In Akwei v* Agyapong the plaintiff 
sued for trespass and recovery of possession of his land* 1 U, d ^ M c l c i h ^  rtr
JjL&i M  flu t|a c £  [v\t\ a p x io it oX&JL a < | iCmA fur
Ixklftd • This contention was rejected by Ollennu J*, because
fajis pW tfc OXctL ■ AKXXsS ir t
ftot o)0A (M tsiid^incoj JUoutifTCj os ^
i/WO S*
The writing must be signed by the intended landlord and tenant-— since 
it is impossible to know against whom it will be sought to enforce the contract 
—  or a person authorised to sign on their behalf* The authorisation need not 
be in writing^*
c« There Must Be a Complete Contract.
A contract to create a tenancy to be enforceable must, like any other 
contract, satisfy the general principles of contract law* To constitute a 
concluded contract, there must be an offer by the intending landlord to let 
and an unconditional acceptance by the intending tenant* The agreement must 
be supported by consideration and there must be an intention to enter into 
legal relations*
A contract to create a tenancy, to be complete, must include agreement 
on some essential issues*
1* Rent
There must be agreement on the rent payable, or the mode by which the
rent is to be determined* If there is no agreement on the rent to be paid,
£
or how it is to be arrived at, there is no concluded contract •
1* This was also the position under the Statute of Frauds, 1677, which was 
(M fbrce in Ghana as a statute of general application prior to the coming 
into force of the Conveyancing Decree, 1973*
2. [1962] 1 G.L.R*277. - „
3 < lK u\ JUma) JbUfc-' 1 7 7/
4. Conveyancing Decree, 1973, S*2 (a)*
5 ‘ ImiuioilU i l-- ^ 3--
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In his judgment in Short v. Morris, Adumua-Bossman J, as he thefc) «as; said1:
"In my opinion the momorandum does not evidence a concluded 
agreement to sell even at a price to be asertained. It states 
clearly and unequivocally that a price was to be agreed on, 
as the offer of the defendant and her brother at £1,000 had 
not been accepted, but on the contrary a counter offer of 
£830 had been made which in turn had not been accepted .. • •
I am satisfied therefore that there was never any concluded 
agreement to sell".
2. Premises to be Let.
2There must be agreement on the premises to be let. In Asare v. Antwi 
the plaintiff offered to buy a plot of land from the defendant who had several 
plots of land.' The plot to be bought/sold was never identified. The plaintiff 
paid an advance of £30 and a receipt was issued by the defendant which stated 
that it was "part payment of the cost of plot . . .  to be sold to him". An
application for specific performance was granted by the trial judge. On appeal
thus JiCtStftl was and the order for specific performance was .
Court of Appeal 30U of •
"From the foregoing analysis, it is apparent that the 
parties to this action merely entered into negotiations for 
the sale of an undefined plot of land which did not however
mature into a binding, colcluded or definite contract.
The evidence does not disclose that they were 'adidem' 
about either the price or the subject-matter".
3* Other Terms.
There must also be agreement on when the tenancy is to commence and on
4the duration of the tenancy •
1. (1958) 3 W.A.L.R.339 at p.3^1.
2. [1975] 1 G.L.fS.16.
3. ibid., at p.22.,
4. Th£se are discussed more fully when considering what the writing evidencing 
a contract must contain: infra., pp.tQt- Hi -
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d. Contract Must be Binding.
There is no binding contract when the writing appears only to be terns 
agreed on as a basis for a contract and not the contract itself. Nor is 
there a binding contract where the agreement is expressed to be "subject 
to the preparation and approval of a formal contract" or just "subject to 
contract".
The principle which governs these cases was stated thus by Parker J:*
"It appears to be well settled by the authorities that if 
the documents or letters relied on as constituting a contract 
contemplate the execution of a further contract between the 
parties, it is a question of construction whether the execu­
tion of the further contract is a condition or term of the 
bargain or whether it is the mere expression of the desire 
of the parties as to the manner in which the transaction 
already agreed to will in fact go through. In the former 
case there is no enforceable contract either because the 
condition is unfulfilled or because the law does not recognise 
a contract to enter into a contract. In the latter case there 
is a binding contract and the reference to the more formal 
document may be ignored".
In more recent times, the words "subject to formal contract" or "subject 
to contract" render unenforceable any contract into which they are introduced, 
unless there are some very exceptional circumstances necessitating a different 
construction^. • .
It is clear, however, that the mere fact that the parties have expressly
stated that a formal contract is to be drawn does not imply that they continue
i 3 4merely in negotiation . As.pointed out in Scaraell v. Ouston .A ' - J
1* Von Hatzfield-Wildenburg v. Alexander 1 Ch.284.
2. Chi1lingworth v. Esche [l924] 1 Ch.97«» Griffiths v. Young
|l970j 1 A11.E.R.601.j Law v. Jones 197?! Ch. 112.
3. Rossiter^v. Killer (1818) 3 App.Cas.1124, 1151.*, Brama v. Cabarro
[1947] K.B.854.
(39^ 1 All.E.R.14., at p;24, per Lord Wright.
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"The court will do its best if satisfied that there was 
an ascertainable and determinate intention to contract,
to give effect to that intention looking at 
substance and not mere form"*
This was what happened in Nunoo v. Nyimfa1* In this case the plaintiff
sought specific performance of an agreement to execute a lease* The agreement
contained the clause "lease as finally drafted to be approved by the parties".
The agreement was reached ' in an out of court settlement in a case in which
there was a dispute as to the proper authority to grant a tenancy* The terms 
of the lease were not in dispute* It was argued for the defendants that the 
clause was analogous to the "subject to contract" clauses common in agreements 
for a lease and that until a lease was produced and approved, it effectively 
prevented any enforceable contract from coming into existence* It was held 
that although the agreement between the parties contemplated the preparation
and execution of a formal lease, it was intended by the parties to be enforceable*
2After a review of some of the English cases, Adumua-Bossman J* continued:
"It is to be particularly observed that, unlike the cases 
relied on by counsel for the defendants, the agreement 
does not even contemplate the drawingup, approval and sign­
ing of any formal agreement or contract, before the drawing 
up of the formal lease* In my construction of it, it falls 
within the class of complete or concluded agreements* The 
very background to, and circumstances surrounding the making 
of it, in my view, negative the suggestion that it was no: 
more than mere nogotiation to be subsequently converted into 
a concluded agreement only after further discussions to agree 
on terms • • • Those words construed by learned counsel for 
the defendants as introducing a new term into the agreement, 
would seem to have been inserted 'ex abudanti cautela' to 
use the words of Lord CaVfrtS in Hussey v* Horne-Payne as:
1. (1958) 5 W.A.L.R.95.
2. ibid.* at fY’ $11- I 0 0 *
tofc
•meaning nothing more than a guard against it b ing 
supposed that the draft lease would be accepted wit­
hout it being approved in the usual way*. Therein,
Ithink, lies the all-decisive, real and vital diff- 
between our particular case and those cited and relied 
on by counsel for the defendant".
It may be pointed out that in Von Hatzfield-Wildenburg v. Alexander
Parker J. said that the courts will not enforce a contract to contract.
This is not a correct statement of the law. Acontract to enter into a
3
contract to create a tenancy is a valid and enforceable contract.
e • What the writing must contain.
In Djan v. Owoo^ the law was stated by Edusei J. He said:
" There cannot, in  my view , be a completed co n trac t 
in  terms of sectio n  2 (a ) of N .R .C .D .I75»  unless  
the c o n tra c t in  w r it in g  gives ( i )  the names o f the 
p a r t ie s ,  ( i i )  the p rop erty  to  be tra n s fe rre d , ( i i i )  
the purchase p ric e  of the property  and la s t ly  ( iv )  
the defendant must have signed the w r it te n  c o n tra c t.
It is important that there must be written evidence 
of at least these matters"
1• Rent
The rent agreed to must be evidenced in writing. In Djan v. 
C^Oo__the parties orally agreed to buy/sell a house. The uuyer made 
two advance payments towards the purchase price For this he was 
issued with receipts which though satisfying the test laid down 
by Edusei J. in every other respect did not state the agreed 
purchase price. It was therefore held that there was not
1. op. cit.
2. It was criticised by Sargant L.J. in Chillingworth v, Esche op. cit., 
at pp. II3-H^.
3* Foster v. Wheeler (1888) 38 Ch.D.130*
It, ^1976] 2 G.L.R.ifOI.
5 . ibid. ,^0 3 .
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a sufficient note or memorandum of the contract to satisfy section 2 (a) of 
N. R.C.D.175, I K C  &ol ^ai d  )
" • • • there is no mention of the purchase price in the
payment made by the plaintiff and there is nothing in either
of the two receipts to show for how much the house was to be
sold* It is true that the purchase price of 0 25*000 has
been stated in the statement of claim and this is admitted
by the defendant ink his statement of defence but this cannot
cortmcL
in my view be incorporated in the writtenA . In short the 
purchase price is not stated in the written contract"•
2
This decision has been criticised by Kludze • He argues that Djan v. Owoo
interpreted the requirement of writing rather mechanically* In Kludze»svi©w
the rationale underlying section 2 (a) of the Conveyancing Decree* 1973* (&nd
its predecessor* section k of the Statute of Frauds* 1677) was the elimination
of fraud and perjury by insisting on written records of contract* But the
legislation must not be used as an engine of fraud and therefore* since £he
parties had in their pleadings accepted that they had agreed on the purchase
price, the contract should have been enforced* We agree with Kludze that
on the facts of Djan v* Owoo* the learned judge was in error* The Decree
does not stipulate that the writing evidencing the contract must be in a single
document* Therefore* since the agreed purchase price was evidenced by the
3
written statements of the parties, the contract should have been enforced 
This should not mean that a contract should be enforceable if part of 
it only is evidenced in writing— for this would lead to disputes as to what 
the terms of a contract are; the disease which the Decree sought to cure*
1* Djan v* Owoo* supra* at p.403*
2. Kludze^ a*K*P. , "Developments In Specific Performance", (1977), 9 R*G*L*103* 
112-113*
3* In English law, however* the position is that the written contract or 
mnmorandum thereof must have existed before the action based on it 
commenced*
2. The duration of the tenancy and the time for commencement
The writing evidencing the contract must the duration of the 
tenancy to he granted and the time from which it is to commence.
Tiis statement of the law was confirmed in Sbaiti v. Samarasinghe 
Ifl this case the defendant entered into an oral agreement with the 
plaintiff to let him premises which were then uncompleted. The 
agreement was to let the premises for a five-year term at an annual 
rent of C 5,000. The agreement was not in writing, but a note of it 
was made. When the premises were completed the defendant refused to
0#*'<*ito-the plaintiff who then sued for specific performance .The appli­
cation was not granted on this ground because the note in question 
did not contain the date of commencement and the duration of the 
tenancy.
3
This ruling has been criticised by Kludze. Firstly, Kludze 
considers it settled law that where thr date for commencement of 
a tenancy is not stated it is deemed to take effect immediately.
With respect, Kludze seems to be confusing two separate issues, 
namely:
(i) whether the date of commencement must be stated in 
a memorandum evidencing a contract to create a ten­
ancy and;
(ii) whether a lease which does not stipulate a dateffor 
commencement is to take effect immediately ?
The court was concerned with the former question,not the latter.
The ruling is the corre one on the issae. Woodfall
1. [1976] 2 G.L.R.361
2. The case was decided on the basis of the Statute of Frauds ,I6 ? 7 «s.4-
3 . Kludze, A.K.P .,"Developments in specific performance" (1977)9 R .G .L . I03.
4 .  W o o d fa ll, op. c i t . , p . l 4 2 .  Kludze c ite s  W o o d fa ll, Landlord and Tenant 
(2? th . e d . , 1968,v o l . I , p .21^ , in  support of h is  v iew . But W oodfall was 
there  w r it in g  about the commencement of a tenancy and not what a
contract to create must contain.
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a tenancy is not stated, it is deemed to take effect immediately. With 
respect, Kludze seems to be confusing two separate issues, namely:
(I) whether the date of commencement must be stated in a writing
evidencing a contract, to create a tenancy and;
(II) whether a lease which does not stipulate a date for commence­
ment is to take effect immediately?
The learned judge was concerned with the first question and not the
second. His statement of the law, as far as the first question is concerned,
1
iethe correct statement of the law. Woodfall states the law thus:
1. Woodfall, op.cit., p.l4l. Kludze cites Woodfall, Landlord and Tenant, 
(27th ed. 1968), Vol.I, p.214, in support of his view; but Woodfall was 
there writing about the commencement of a tenancy and not what a contract 
to create a tenancy must contain.
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"Where no date is mentioned, there is no inference that 
the term is to commence.from the date of the agreement 
in the absence of language pointing to that conclusion,
nor that it is to commence 'within a reasonable time'"*
That Kludze considered the latter question is shown from the fact that he cites
1
Doe d. Phillip v. Benjamin , where the words "agrees to let" were construed
as an immediate grant rather than as an agreement to grant a tenancy* Kludze
continues*^
"It is submitted, therefore, that as the defendant had signed - 
a note confirming the grant of the lease without stipulating 
a date of commencement therein, it ought to have been construed 
as an immediate grant in possession rather than a reversionary 
lease to commence from a future date"*
3
With respect, this was not the issue before the court • Though Kludze seems
to be arguing that the note evidenced the grant of a lease, the issue that
the court dealt with was that the note was a memorandum of a contract for a lease*
Kludze further argues that the learned judge erred in holding that the
contract was unenforceable because the note did not contain the duration of
the tenancy* Kludze's view is that since the note expressly stated that the
lease was "at a rental of £ 5*000 per annum" a yearly tenancy is presumed by 
4law. Says Kludze •
1* (1839) 9 A* & E.644. Kludze does not, however, refer to cases like, Marshall
v* Berridge (1881) 19 Ch.D.233 and Edward v. Jones (1921) 124 L.T.7^0, 
both of which support the position of Lamptey Ag. J*, and state the law with 
regards to contracts for a lease*
2* Kludze A.K.P.,supra, p.109, (emphases supplied).
3* It could not have been argued that the note constituted a lease* This is
because by section 1 (1) of N.R.C.D.173 a lease must be in writing* The note 
in this case was not the conveyance - the agreement was entered into orally 
and the note was just evidence of the oral agreement, indeed under the law
prior to the Conveyancing Decree, which was the law by which the judge, albeit
wrongly, decided the case, a tenancy for five years must be by deed*
4* Kludze A.K.P., "Developments in specific performance", op.cit., p. 109«
Ill
"It is respectfully submitted that in the absence of a 
stipulated duration of a lease, if rent is measured by 
the year, a yearly tenancy is presumed in law. As in
the instant case the rent was reserved by reference to
the year, it was a yearly tenancy and it is respectfully 
submitted that the learned trial judge could have so held".
Again Kludze is confusing the two separate and different issues already
1 2 identified • The learned trial judgefc statement of the law is the correct one .
The parties orally agreed to a five - year term and though it is a correct
statement of the law that when the grantee enters into possession and proceeds
to pay rent measured by the year, a yearly tenancy is implied, it is not the
law that when the grantee applies for a decree of specific performance of the
oral agreement, on the ground that there is a sufficient memorandum of it,
the court should imply a yearly tenancy because the note stipulates that a
rental of 0 5,000 per annum was to be paid •
Other Terms
The writing must also contain,(1) the name of the parties;(II) a description 
of the premises to be let and (III) must be signed by the parties.
1. He cites Megarry & Wade, The Law of Real Property, 1966, p»640 in support
of his position. But Megarry & Wade does not support Kludze$ the learned
authors said that a yearly tenancy is pre sumed if a person occupies land
under a void lease and rent, measured with reference to a year, is paid
and accepted.
2. Bayley v. Fitzmaurice (i860) 8 E & B 6o4j Clarke v. Fuller (1864) 16
C.B.(N.S.) 24} Dolling v. Evans (1867) 36 L.J. Ch.474.
3. In the present case there is no evidence whatsoever that rent, measured
with reference to a year, was paid and accepted.
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VI. Specific Performance
Specific performance is an order of a court directed at a 
particular person to compel the discharge of an obligation. A 
pre-requisite for the grant of an order of specific performance 
is that there must be a complete and binding lawful contract or 
lease. It is not intended to discuss all the established English- 
law rules for the grant of specific performancevncr is it inten­
ded to examine in detail the re-examination of some of these rules
2
occurring in both systems. Discussion will be aimed at establi­
shing the nature of the new developments taking place and to areas 
where re-examination of the English-law rules is considered nece­
ssary,
a . Part performance
By section 3 ( 2 )  of the Conveyancing Decree, 1973» the require­
ment that a lease must be in writing end that a contract for a te­
nancy must be evidenced in writing*
” shall be subject t® the rules relating to.....
part performance ".
An oral contract for a tenancy or oral lease, if supported by a 
sufficient act of part performance, is specifically enforceable.
The basis for specific performance in this instance is that one par­
ty having altered his position on the basis of the promise of the 
other party, it would amount to fraud if the other party is allowed 
to renege on his promise. The proposition is thus expressed in 
Chitty on Contracts*
I. Interested readers may consult Hanburv.H .G .. Modern Equity,L ondon,
1976; S n e ll .  P r in c ip le s  of e q u ity , London,1973; F ry , S p e c ific  Perform ­
ance , Lo nd on ,I921.
2.See D.ian v. Owoo [lQ76] 2G.L.R.40I1 Lartey v . Bannerman [i97&\2 G.L.R.46I; 
Steadman V.Steadman [l976j A.C. 536: Price v. Strange [l977l 2 W.L.R.9^3;
Kludze,A . K . P . , "Developments in specific performance",(1977)9 R.G.L.I02;
Woodman,G.R., * o l l u ^ Z o | ? ( p T g J )  jo d-QL'
113
" Where the plaintiff has partly performed an oral 
contract required by statute to be evidenced in 
writing, in the expectation that the defendant 
would perform the rest of the contract, the co­
urt will not allow the defendant to escape from 
his contract upon the strength of the statute, 
but will order specific performance of the oral 
contract”
An oral contract to create a tenancy supported by a sufficient
act of part performance was held to be specifically enforceable in
2
Sackey v. Ashong . In this case, the plaintiff offered to grant ten­
ancy of a house to the defendant. The offer was made in a letter 
which stipulated the rent payable, the date of commencement and the 
minimum duration of the tenancy, a description of the subject-matter 
and ”usual covenants". It was a condition for the grant of a tenancy 
that the defendant carried out some repairs to the property, he 
defendant, who was already in possession due to his connection with 
the previous tenant, undertook substantial repairs to the property. 
Furthermore from the date of the commencement of the tenancy, the 
proposed rent was either received by or credited to the plaintiff.
In an action for recovery of possession, it was held by the West 
African Court Of Appeal that the execution of repairs coupled.with 
possession constituted a sufficient act of part oerformance which 
excused the need for writing. Delivering the judgment of the court, 
Coussey P. saids
1. Chitty, Chittv on Contracts. London,l9 6 8 ,vol.I, p.9°»Para*I8I.
2. (1956)1 W.A.L.H.108.
m" There were acts of part performance, referable only 
to the agreement, on the plaitiff's part in letting 
the defendant into possession and on the defendant’s 
part in doing repairs and paying rent as from Jan­
uary I, 1951* In these circumstances the plaintiff 
cannot run away with the benefits to her done by the 
defendant. Equity looks upon that as done which
ought to be done, for here on a promise for a lease
the defendant had laid out his money on repairs to
the extent stated already. He cannot be treated as
a trespasser”.*
The act of part performance, asCoussey P. pointed out, must be 
unequivocally referable to the contract alleged. Continued poss­
ession coupled with special expenditure by the tenant is a suffi­
cient act' of part performance.*^ But mere continuance in possession
h
would not be enough - it is an equivocal act. The expenditure of 
money, on repairs, by a proposed tenant is a sufficient act of 
part performance. The payment of an increased rent by a tenant, 
who continues in possession, may be sufficient. But the traditio­
nal English-law position had been that advancement payment of rent 
is not a sufficient act of part performance.^ This traditional Eng- 
lish-law position is now being re-examined both in Ghana and in
n
England. These developments indicate that advance payment of rent
1 . op. cit., at 1 1 5 .
2. See also Fry, op. cit., s.5^2? Kingswood Estate Co. v. Anderson
1 9 6 3  2Q.B.I69; Steadman v. Steadman [l976| A.C.536.
3 . Sackey v . Ashong, op.cit.
ii. Re National Savings Bank Ex parte Brady (1867) I W.R.5 3 6 .
5 . Madison v. Alderson (1883)8 App. Cas. ^6 7 ; Thursby v. Eccles (1900)
2 Ch.5 3 6 .
K.P., "Developments in Speci-
L.J. (Q.B. )9Ij Chaproniere v. Lambert [l9l7j 
6 .See Djan v. Owoo (l976|2 G.L.R.^OI; Kludze,A.
:fic Perf ormance” , (I9 7 7 ) 9 R.G.L.I02.
, Uk~qI• • i -faraLkl Jlt/aXopma-tfJb
" of> u £ -  '
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if established to be unequivocally referable to the contract { as, 
for a example, by the evidence of a receipt) would be a sufficie­
nt act of part performance,
b. Mutuality
It used to be supposed that specific prrformance would not be 
granted if the remedy is not available to the other party,i.e., if
T
there is a want of mutuality. But(in addition to the academic
writers who have challenged this view of the law for some time ), 
in o irt h
the courts bothAGhana^andAEngland are re-examining the position
on mutuality.
It is suggested that this re-examination is long overdue. The
absence of mutuality should not by itself prevent the grant of spe­
cific performance. The courts have been empowered by section 18 of 
the Conveyancing Decree,1973, to set aside a conveyance or a con­
tract to transfer an interest in immovable property if it is sat­
isfied (on the basis of all the evidence ) that it would be uncon­
scionable to enforce the contract or conveyance . This provision 
may be used in cases where it is thought that an injustice will 
be done if a particular contract is specifically enforced, this pri­
nciple may be extended to other types of contract.
1. Flight v. Bolland (1828) k Russell 2 9 8 1  Fry, Specific Performance,
London,I9 2 I ,p.2 I9 .
2. See Ames, J.B..Lectures in Legal History,Cambridge,Massachussetts,1913» 
p.370? Maitland,F.W., Lectures on Equity,Cambridge ,1936,p.3^.
3 . See Lartey v. Bannerman \l97&\ 2G.L.R.^6l; Kludze,A.K.P.,"Develop­
ments in specific performance",(1977)9 R.G.L.I02. 
l±. See Price v. Strange 977^2 W,L.R.9^3j Woodman, G.R.,"'$K'C(\LIjlL
i
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1
c. Destruction of the Property .
The common-law rule is that the accidental destruction of premises, the
subject - matter of a lease or a contract to create a tenancy - after the
contract or lease has been concluded but before the tenant goes into possession
2- affords no defence to an action for specific performance • The reason given
for this rule is that the intended tenant, under a contract to create a tenancy,
is in equity regarded as being a tenant and since he would be entitled to any
benefits from the tenancy, he should have the burden of any loss • The tenant
was deemed to have an interest in the land despite the fact that tHe premises
have been destroyed. He would be obligated to pay rent not withstanding dest-
$ruction for which he is not responsible. Equity did not intervene •
This rule hardly seems justifiable today.■ It may have been justified 
in feudal England when conveyances were mainly concerned with land and what 
structures there were mainly indidental and not quite valuable. It is wholly 
inappropriate when dealing with residential tenancies in modern urban condtit-
4
ions. To quote Friedman:-
"The common law rule may not have been inappropriate at 
the time and in the circumstances it was developed - 
an agricultural lease in which the improvements were 
merely incidental. Damage to the house, or its destr­
uction, might make life inconvenient but the land was still 
still tillable".
This common law rule shows one area where the rules governing the resid­
ential tenancy relationship differ from the ordinary principles of contract 
law. Under normal principle of contract law, if a contract becomes incapable
1. The related question of destruction or damage to premises during the
existance of a tenancy, is discussed below at p p -'XXXand
2. Paine v. Me11or (1801) 6 Ves*3^9j Counter v. Macpherson (1845) 5
Moore P.C.83*
3. Leeds v. Cheetham 1 Sim 146, 57 E.R.533*
4. Friedman on Leases, Vol.l, New York, 1974, r307*
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of performance because of ttnforseen circumstances, both parties are relieved
1
from their obligations under the contract* In Taylor v* Caldwell , the 
plaintiff agreed to let out a music hall for four days for the express purpose 
of it being used for giving concerts and fetes* The music fcall was burnt down 
before the time of hire* It was held that the plaintiff was not entitled to 
damages because the contract has been frustrated —  and that both parties should 
be relieved from their obligations*
Woodfall has sought to distinguish Taylor v* Caldwell and similar
2contract law cases which establish the doctrine of frustration, on the ground 
iLft- foy'CJL ftj' <v\cd)£QX' wcl^ ad
that in these^implied condition of the contract and that its continued exist nee
3
was the foundation for fulfilling the other obligations of the contract •
With respect the distinction hai'dly .seems Existentj for surely the existence
of premises must be a pre-condition for a residential tenancy* There is no
logical reason for the distinction and we would recommend that where premises,
the subject-matter of a contract to create a tenancy or a lease, is destroyed
before the tenant can take possession, the contract should be treated as having
4
been frustrated— and the parties should be relieved of their obligations •
1. (1863) 3 B & S 826.
2. Krell v. Henry [1903] 2 K.B*740.
3* Law of Landlord and Tenant, London,(1978), 28th ed., Vol.l, p.165.
4* In Rom Securities Ltd*, v* Rogers (Holdings) Ltd*, Goff J* had no
doubt that the doctrine of frustration could apply to a contract to 
create a tenancy, at least before entry into possession*
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d* Equitable tenancies
An order for specific performance of a contract to create a tenancy will 
be complied with by the execution of a lease (irrespective of any rights an 
occupier may have acquired as a tenant at will or a periodic tenant)* The 
courts (exercising their equitable jurisdiction) enforce the terms of the 
intended tenancy if the contract is specifically enforceable* But since 
"equity looks on as done that which ought to be done", the effect of a speci­
fically enforceable contract is to immediately create an equitable interest
1
in the property ennuring to the benefit of the grantee • Hence the expression
'equitable leases'* The equitable tenant would be held to hold under the same
terms as if the lease had been actually granted*
Since equiable rules prevail over rules of law in cases of conflict, it 
A
2
has been established as a general proposition of law (since Walsh v* Lonsdale )
that a contract for a lease is as good as a lease* But there remain important
3
differences which should not be overlooked •
1* Dependence on specific performance
There can be an equitable lease on the terms of a contract for a lease
only if the contract is specifically enforceable* If, for any reason (like
laches, undlean hands, etc*) the court is unable or unwilling to grant speci­
fic performance the position may be very different from if a tenancy had been 
granted*
2* Third-parties
In legal theory there are basic differences as to third parties. A ten­
ancy creates a legal interest, good against the whole world* An equitable
lease is binding and enforceable between the parties only* It suffers the
weakness of all equitable interests; it is not good against a
. 4
bonafide purchaser of legal estate for value without notice •
In practice the difference is not that fundamental as regards residential 
tenancies in urban Ghana* Tenants occupy their rented premises; the absence of 
notice (and this includes constructive notice) would therefore be difficult to 
establish*
1* Walsh v* Lonsdale (1882) 2 1 Ch* D*9? Palmer v* Carey 1^926jl A*C*703 
(F.N.2,3,4, p.t.o.)
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3* Assignment
A legal tenancy gives the tenant a legal interest and an assignment
passes both the rights and obligations of the tenant under Covenants
relating to the property • A contract to create a tenancy creates only
rights in personam. It is thus governed by the ordinary rule that the
benefit but not the burden of a contract is assignable * Only the benefits
of covenants and rights under the contract (including the right to claim
specific performance) are assignable; but not the burdens* So, while the
assignee can sue the landlord to enforce any of his rights under the contract,
the landlord can only sue the assignor (in case of breach of the tenant's
3
obligations) but not the assignee t even though the assiggee has taken poss­
ession*
1* Conveyancing Decree, 1973 (N*R*C*D.175) ss*27 &.23*
2* See Re Pain |i.919j 1 Ch*38j Snell, Principles of Equity, op.cit*, p.72.
3. See Purchase v. Lichfield Brewery Co. jl9l5") I K*B.I85
2* supra*
3. See Manchester Brewery Co*, v* Coombs [l90l| 2 Ch*6o8, 617•
4. Since by the Land Registry Act, 19^2, s 25 (l) registration of a contract 
serves as actual notice to the \^ hole world, a registered contract for a
lease (or memorandum of such a contract) does not suffer from this frailty*
Oral grants and contracts supported by acts of part performance, however, 
continue to suffer from this weakness*
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V. Registration of Instruments affecting residential property
introduction
A system of registration is primarily aimed at introducing a mea­
sure of certainty into a system of landholding.^ The amount of certa­
inty actually offered depends on a number of factors including the
type of registration system,i.e.,whether it is a title registration
2
or an instruments'registration system.
There is no system for the registration of title in Ghana. What
3exists is an instruments'registration system. The register contains 
evidence of the title-situation (various instruments affecting a 
piece of property) and not judicial or administrative determination 
of title. Registration of an instrument under this system does not 
confer a state-guaranteed title.
The system for the registration of instruments affecting residen­
tial property is governed by the Land Registry Act ,19^2 (Act \|2-).
I . What is registrable.
The Land Registry Act,l962(Actj|2. ) provides for the registra­
tion of any "instrument".** The interpretation section of the Act 
defines an instrument as "any writing affecting land".^ The definition 
would cover a deed of conveyance and, as Woodman has pointed out, the
. For a discussion of the purposes of registration, see Simpson,S.R.,
Land Law and Registration. Cambridge,1976, PP»
For a discussion of the distinction between a title registration 
system and an instruments registration system,s^ Simpson,S.R.,op. cit., 
pp.19-23? also Kwofie v. Kakraba [1 9 6 6 ] G.L.R.229*
3 . Act 112,s.3i Kwofie v. Kakraba [l9 6 6 | G.L.R.229,per Archer J. at23I-232 
A. Ktem v.Ankwandah f I97^^-G.L.R./J£'2. .per Apaloo C.J.at459l Kwofie v. 
Kakraba ,op* cit.,231-232.
5 . Act 112,s.3*
6 . ibid.,s.3 6 .
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term is sufficently wide to cover contracts to create tenancies or memoranda
evidencing contracts to create tenancies.* But does it cover such things
as letters exchanged between parties who have contracted to create a tenancy
2
or receipts given for rent paid? The courts have given a wide construction
3
to the term. In Adu-Sarkodie v» Karam the plaintiff bought a house. The 
defendants claimed that the house was subject to a lease in their favour for 
ten years. The lease upon which the defendants relied, was never reduced 
into a formal written conveyance. But there were tendered in evidence letters 
signed by the defendant and the plaintiff's vendor, which embodied the essential
terms of the tenancy. The letters had not been registered. It was held by
*
Aboagye J., that no valid tenancy existed because the instruments evidencing 
the contract had Aot been registered. In the view of the learned judge, the
4letters were registrable and failure to register was fatal •
The decision in Adu - Sarkodie has been criticised by Kludze**. He argues
that such a wide construction works injustice between the parties; and that 
since the intention of the parties is clear from the letters exchanged, failure 
to register should not be fatal. Kludze argues that this should particularly 
be so as most people do not realise that even letters affecting property ought 
to be registered. He further argues that purely practical
a letter should not be held to be registrable. This is because, under section 
4 of Act 122, an instrument should contain sufficient particulars on the loca­
tion and description of the property it affects. In fact, section 4 envisages
I- W o o  cl cirt, G- &  /  T w t  fU jU tro it im  of  h  cj Land”, C-L/6,
2. See criticism of the expression "writing affecting land" in Bentsi-Enchill,
Ghana Land Law, op.cit, p.329• This is a very serious issue because if 
these facts are registr&bta/ , failure to register would result in invalidity.
3. [l975] 1 G.L.R.411.
4. See also, sbaiti v. Samarasinghe ^97^] 2 G.L.R.36I.
5« Kludze A.K.P., "The Equitable Tenant and Protection Against Eviction",
(1976) 8 R.G.L.63, at pp.65-66.
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1
the drawing up of a cadastral plan in appropriate circumstances • Kludze, 
therefore, argues that it will be difficult to register correspondence exch­
anged between parties who have negotiated the grant of a tenancy since such 
correspondence might not contain the particulars required by law. He conc­
ludes: 2
MIn effect, it is submitted, with ^ respect, that it 
is an impracticable proposition to say that letters 
affedting land must be registered to confer an interest 
in land".
There is an important policy consideration justifying the decision in
3
Adu - Sarkodie and similar cases , which Kludze seems to have overlooked,
4This is deterrence • If there is a considerable number of transactions not 
registered, because letters and receipts given for money paid are non - 
registrable, a system of registration Cxf>IdEvery un­
registered instrument ^  ^ j for the greater
the number of transactions which are not registered, the less effective and 
reliable the register, |jL iUf Q-**0((L MCI k.(LS S.<^
to apply the strongest possible pressures to ensure that as many transactions 
as possible are registered. One way of doing this is to interpret as widely 
as possible the expression, "any writing affecting land". If it becomes clear 
that the courts will insist that even letters and receipts given for money 
paid must— to be effective— be registered, then parties will make sure that 
the property is described with sufficient particularity to satisfy the registrar. 
Indeed Kludze himself says that:^
"If, for purposes of registering letters between parties, 
they would have to get a cadastral plan prepared for 
them, they might accompany it with the less expensive
1, The registrar is empowered under section 4, to refuse any instrument which, 
he considers, does not describe the property with sufficient particularity,
2, Kludze, A,K,P«, "The equitable tenant and protection against eviction", op.cit,,| 
3* Sbaiti v, Samarasinghe, supra,
4, This point is made by Woodman, G,R«, in another context: See, "Giving Teeth 
to the Land Registry Act", (1972) 4 R,G,L,231*
5# "The equitable tenant and protection against eviction", op,cit,, p«66«
to Land
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preparation of a formal lease".
This result would be so much the better for a system of registra­
tion.
_2. The mode of registration
The original instrument and a duplicate must be presented to 
the registrar. The authencity of the instrument and proof of it
having been executed by the grantor is to be established by the
2
oath of one of the parties or a witness. Where a map or plan is
comprised in or annexed to an instrument, a true copy Of the map
3
or plan must accompany the instrument to be registered. The regis­
trar has a discretion to refuse an instrument if any alteration 
was not signed or initialled by the executing parties.
When all the conditions have been satisfied,the registrar is
required to endorse both the original and the duplicate with a cer­
tificate of registration.^ The duplicate is filed at the registry 
and the original returned to those who presented it^ The registrar 
is to keep a register in which, upon the registration of any ins­
trument, he is to enter the particulars on the instruments.He is
7
also required a list of published instruments in the Gazette.
1. Act 122, s.12.
2. ibid., ss.5 and 6. By s.7, a judge's certificate or probate is taken 
as duly executed without further proof.
3. Act 122,s.16. 
h. ibid.,s.20(d).
5.ibid.,s.10.
6. ibid.,s.12.
7. ibid.,s.18.
i
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3« Consequences of registration 
a. The effect of non-registration.
Act 122 provides that an instrument, other than a v/ill or 
judge's certificate, "shall he of no effect until registered"1 .
This provision has been interpreted in a number of cases 
starting with Asare v. Brobbey^. In this case a mortgagor sued
to recover the mortgaged property, which had been sold under a 
power of sale conferred by the mortgageddeed. The mortgage deed 
had not been registered. It was held that the mortgage was invalid 
and the deed could not therefore confer a power of sale. The Court 
of Appeal explained that non-registration did not render an instr- 
ment void, because it could always be validated by registration.
But it would be "invalid" and "ineffectivem until registered.
The significance of Asare v.Brobbey is that it held that an 
unregistered instrument was "invalid" and hence unenforceable not- 
withstanding that the mortgagor had actual notice of its existence.
The decision in Asare v. Brobbey has been followed in Adu-Sarkodie
l\, er
v. Karam and Sbaiti v. Samarasinghe . In these cases non-registra - 
tion of correspondence about a negotiated lease and a note confirming 
a contract to create a tenancy was held to render the instruments 
invalid. In the latter case the dispute was between the original 
parties.The decision in Asare v. Brobbey was further endorsed by 
the Court of Appeal in Ussher v. Darko^. In this case a purported 
sale was by an unregistered deed of conveyance. It was held that since
I. Act 122, s.2^.
3 . See Woodman,G.R.,"The registration of instruments affecting land", 
(1975) 7 R.G.L.^6, esp. 5 6 .
2 .
i
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the conveyance was unregistered it sinned against section 24 (1) of the 
Land Registry Act, and was thus 'invalid'.
The Court of Appeal, however, continued that the decision in Asare v. 
Brobbey implies that where there is nothing intrinsically invalid about an 
instrument, section 24 (1) does no more than deny it legal efficacy until 
it has been registered* This means that a party can perfect his title by 
the formality of registration at any time; unless a conflicting instrument 
affecting the same property has meanwhile been registered*
b» The Effect of Registration as Notice.
Act 122 provides that:
"S 25 (1) The registration of any instrument shall be 
deemed to constitute actual notice of the instrument 
and of the fact of registration to all persons and 
for all purposes, as from the date of registration, 
unless otherwise provided in any enactment 
(2) This section does not apply to judge's certificate 
or a probate*
c* Oral Grants
The Land Registry Act, 19&2, governs only instruments affecting property* 
Therefore, the priority and effectiveness of oral grants of tenancies - like 
tenancies taking effect in possession, for less than three years and oral 
contracts to create a tenancy supported by part performance - are unaffected*
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF LANDLORDS AND TENANTS
A. COVENANTS GENERALLY
Once the residential tenancy is created, the rights and obligations of
the landlord and the tenant inter se are governed by the express terras of the
tenancy agreement and terms implied by law*
A well-drawn lease recites the rights and obligations expressly agreed
upon by the parties* But in Ghana most tenancy arrangements are entered into
orally and informally— with little more than rent and the period of payment
agreed upon* Even where there is documentary evidence of some sort, this is
1
not very helpful since most tenancies are entered into without legal advice •
It is for these reasons that the Conveyancing Decree, 1973 (N*R*C*D*175) implies
2
a number of terms in all residential tenancies •
The stipulations in a tenancy agreement are known as 'covenants'* A
covenant, strictly speaking, is a contract made by deed* At the present time, 
however, the rights and obligations of any tenancy*— formal or informal — are 
loosely referred to as covenants*^
d. W f \jjj
A covenant is either express or implied* An express covenant is one which
is spelt out in the tenancy agreement* An implied covenant, on the other hand,
is one which is implied either by virtue of the creation of the residential
tenancy, or by statute, or by virtue of what the courts consider to be the
5
intention of the parties*
In English law the existence of an express covenant excludes the operation
3
of the implied covenant dealing with the same matter •
1* In the survey of 2,000 residential tenancies carried out by the
present writer, 1658 (about 80%) were entered into orally and informally;
219 (over 10%) had written documents of sorts drawn up by the parties 
or ' letter-writers',: and only 133 (about 7%) were properly-drawn and 
executed leases*
2* ss*22-28*
3* Malzy v* Eicholtz [l9l6] 2 K.B.208; Miller v. Emcer Products |l958j
Ch*304* This is the law on covenants implied Jiy tjhe < 
Conveyancing Decree, 1973, ss*22 (7) and 23 (5K?tiat t
common law* The 
J^ Ti hough the covenants 
the Decree implies may be varied or extended, the covenantor cannot oust 
his personal liability* Any such ouster is void* , «
^  (M ■, l-QUJ l-Qfldilftfcl qvtc( ( Qx\gflfc f •, f  f  ^
5 • J «-
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Though a covenant may be implied in a tenancy by a court, this is not
to be done unnecessarily* This is made clear by the Full Bench of the Court
1
of Appeal in Thome v* Barclays Bank Co*Ltd*, • In this case, the landlord 
demised to the tenant premises which comprised two parts— -a part for the 
business of banking and a residential part. The tenant covenanted; "to keep 
the interior of the said premises and the doors, windows, fittings and land­
lord's fixtures in good and tenantable repair and condition11* The tenant 
undertook massive alteration to the premises and converted the residential 
part of the premises into offices* The landlord sued to enforce his right 
of re-entry for breach of the covenant to repair* This was granted by the 
High Court* But the ordinary bench of the Court of Appeal held that the 
trial judge was wrong because a covenant giving the tenant a right to under­
take the alteration ought to be implied in the lease. Jiagge J.A., implied 
a term; "reasonably to alter and adapt" from the tenant's right to assign 
and sub-let* She concluded:
"The appellants, in my opinion, are free, to make the
alterations complained of as a right, in exactly the
same way, as if the power to do so has been expressly
2granted by the lease" *
Archer J.A*, thought that a covenant was implied giving the tenant the
right to alter the premises: firstly from the tenant's right to assign and 
3
sub-let ; and secondly, from the length of the lease and the nature of the
4tenant's business as bankers •
On an application to the Full Bench, the implication of any such covenant
5
(entitling the tenant to alter the premises) was rejected • The Full Bench 
in a well - considered, unanimous judgment delivered by Azu - Crabbe, C.J., 
laid down the following statement of principle as a guide to whether a term 
ought to be implied in a tenancy agreement*
1. [1976] 2 G.L.R.126.
2* Barclays Bank Co*Ltd*, v* Thome |l973) 2 G*L*R*137t 1 7^*
3* ibid., at 148-149*
4* supra, at 149*
5. [1976] 2 G.L.R.126, 133-138.
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” • • • the first thing to consider is the express
words the parties have used. Secondly a term they
have not expressed is not to be implied merely because
the court thinks it is a reasonable term, but only if
the court thinks it is necessarily implied in the
1
nature of the contract the parties have made” •
In the present case, the Full Bench held that the implication of a term 
entitling the tenant to alter the premises not having been shown to be demon­
strably necessary, could not be said to have been intended by the parties.
It would also be inconsistent with the express covenant to repair.
II. Covenants and conditions
A covenant governs the rights and obligations of the parties during the 
tenancy. A condition, on the other hand, is a qualification of the interest 
granted—  the tenancy not being created until any condition precedent is 
satisfied or, more commonly, terminable on the occurrence of a condition 
subsequent•
Whether a term is a covenant or a condition is a question of construction.
It is dependent on the intention of the parties. This is to be gathered from
3the words the parties have used and the context in which they occur • Being 
a question of construction, decisions which have placed a particular meaning
case the intention of the parties has to be ascertained by an examination of
III. Enforceabliity of covenants
a. Liability of covenantor
At common law liability between the original parties is based upon both
on certain forms of words are not necessarily to be taken as
(iJL V\aJL0l\\k cTZ wl (tlL C&-4(LS Ot/lcl dM- h In every
5
the uJhole transaction •
the privity of contract and privity of estate
doM f\t>b o^ uJz tUjL* (FfcfrjLtcunaniz
5 • 1 U1 u .
See Woodfall, The Law of Landlord and Tenant, op.cit., 431-440
See Westacott v, ttalm. fl9I8l IK.B.4-95,Per Pickfo,rrd 
ScruTfonTTj. a^lt ' JVol.'J,... t- .  Ufl.VeJksW H 5 1
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r . w a s  ix>H.
i
The assignee, on the other hand, is obliged only because of privity of 
estate and is liable only on those covenants which "relate to an interest in
cannot benefit or be a burden on an asignee simply by virtue of privity of
estate. In other words, a covenant which does not relate to the ... can-
b. Covenants relating to the tenancy
Any covenant which affects the landlord qua landlord or the tenant in
his capacity as tenant will probably be within the class of covenants relating
to the tenanby. All the covenants implied by the Conveyancing Decree, 1973»
. 4
relate to the tenancy and run with the tenancy or reversion •
The following covenants are stipulated by the Conveyancing Decree as
5
relating to the tenancy •
2. This is the phrase used by the Conveyancing Decree: See ss.25-28. The 
phrase, it is submitted, has the same meaning as the phrase "having 
reference to the subject-matter" used by the English Law of Property Act, 
1923« and the common-law phrase "touch and concern the land".
3. Conveyancing Decree, 1973» ss.25-28. The English-law rules on this sub­
ject are very technical, and Often practically unworkable. It is not
clear how functional the provisions of the Conveyancing Decree, 1973* 
would be. At the time of writing, the Decree has been in force for six 
years. As yet there is not a single reported case in which these rules 
have been applied. This is evidence, albeit inconclusive, of the irrel- 
vance of those provisions and the judicial process to many landlords and 
tenants. It is also evidence of the "legal culture" which now prevails 
in Ghana: See infra, Chapter 9»
2
land" • Unless a covenant is one which "relates to an interest in land" it
. 3
not run with the tenancy or the reversion •
1. lectio katt\d-(jp/'cl.&r7cl / w i a n  LA
4 .  s . 24.
5. ibid.
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1* Covenants by the tenant*
To pay rent
Not to assign, sub-let or part with possession without landlords consent 
To permit repair to adjoining premises
Not to make alterations or additions without landlord's consent 
Covenant against illegal or immoral user 
Covenant against nuisance or annoyance
1. Additional covenants by sub-tenants
Future observance of the head - lease 
Permit repair under the head - lease 
II• Additional covenants by assignees 
Payment of rent
Future observance of the head - lease
Indemnity to the assignor
22. Covenants by landlord
The right to convey 
Quiet enjoyment 
Freedom from encumbrances 
Further assurance
I. Additional covenant by assignors and sub-lessors
Validity and past observance of the head - lease
II. Additional covenants by sub-lessors
Future observance of the head - lease 
Production of title-deed and delivery of copies
The following additional covenants have been held to relate to the ten-
3
ancy m  the common law •
1* Covenants by tenants 
• 4To repair •
5
To insure against fire •
6To use for residential purposes only •
2* Covenants by landlord
7
To renew the tenancy •
. . 8 Not to determine a periodic tenancy within the first three years •
1. S.23*
2. S.22.
3* The Ghanaian courts will probably hold that such covenants relate to the 
tenancy.
4. Williams v. Earle (1868) L.R.3 Q.B.739*
5* Vernon v. Smith (1821) 5 B. & Ald.l.
6. Wilkinson v. Rogers (1864) 2 De.J. & S.62.
7» Weg Motors, Ltd., v. Hales • jl96o] 3 All E.R.181.
8. Beams Property Investment Co.Ltd., v. Stroulger &9481 2 K.B.l.
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Personal or collateral covenants, on the other hand, do not relate to 
the tenancy since they have no direct reference to the tenancy* Covenants 
relating to a matter not normally relevant to the landlord and tenant relation­
ship do not run with the Land -
Ct Benefit of covenants relating to the premises
If the covenant relates to the tenancy, section 25 (1) of the Conveyancing
Decree, 1973 provides that the benefit of such a covenant can be enjoyed and 
enforced by the covenantee and his successors in title and all those deriving 
title through him*
Restrictive covenants relating to the tenancy (such as a covenant that 
the premises shall be used for residential purposes only) shall be enjoyed 
and enforced by the owners and occupiers of the premises at anytime*
The Decree also provides that for the benefit of such a covenant to run 
^ith the tenancy no special expression need be used, if the benefit of such
2a covenant would run with the tenancy prior to the commencement of the Decree •
If a covenant which runs with the premises is breached, the tenant and 
an assignee entitled to the premises at the time of the breach are each liable 
to be sued by the landlord or any person claiming through him* But the primary 
liability is that of the assignee* If the original tenant is sued, he is
3
indemnified by the assignee "against all proceedings, costs, claims and expenses" • 
d* Burden of covenants relating to the premises
By section 26 (1) of the Conveyancing Decree, 1973* the burden of a cov­
enant relating to the premises shall, unless a contrary intention is expressed,
kbe binding on and enforceable against the covenator, his successors in title
and all persons deriving title through or under him. This extends to a covenant
5
entered into when the premises was not in existence •
1. S*25 (2).
2. S.25 (3).
3* S.23 (1) and 3rd. Sched., Pt.III*
4* By S*26 (3) successors in title includes the owner or occupier of the
premises at any time if the covenant in question is restrictive of the 
use to which the premises may be put*
5* S.26 (2)
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e. Benefit of covenants to run vith the reversion.
Section 27 (1) provides that rent and any covenant, provision or conditiont 
relating to the tenancy and required to be observed or performed by the tenant, 
shall run with the reversion.
The rent, covenant, provision or condition shall be attached to the rever­
sionary interest? and the benefit of such rent, covenant, provision or right 
of re-entry shall be enjoyed by the person entitled to the income of the whole 
or part of the leased premises*. Such rent, covenant, right of re-entry or 
provision may be enforced or taken advantage of not withstanding that the person
entitled &o to do became entitled after the condition of re-entry or ^Ol^feiture
2
has become enforceable • This does not, however, render enforceable any right
of re-entry or other condition waived or released before the said person became 
3
so entitled •
The benefit of a covenant relating to the tenancy runs with the reversion
4regardless of the liability of the covenantor or his estate on his death •
f. Burden of covenants to run with the reversion
The obligations of the landlord having reference to the subject matter
of the tenancy shall, to the extent that the landlord has power to bind the
revessionary interest'*, be attached to the reversionary interest or any part
6
thereof notwithstanding severance of that reversionary interest • The obli­
gations—  relating to the tenancy—  undertaken by the landlord is binding on 
any person entitled to the reversionary interest at any particular point in
7
time • Such an obligation may be taken advantage of and enforced by the ten-
8
ant and anybody claiming through him •
Like the benefit of covenants running with the reversion, the burden of
such covenants shall have effect notwithstanding any liability affecting
9
the landlord on his death •
7* ibid.
8. ibid.
9# S.28 (2).
1. S.27 (2).
2. S.27 (3).
3. ibid.
4. S.27 (4).
5. See supra.
6. S.28 (1).
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B. Covenants Implied by the Conveyancing Decree, 1973 
I, Implied Obligations of tenants1*
a. Repair to Adjoining Premises.
In a tenancy for valuable consideration, the tenant impliedly convenants 
to permit the landlord, his agents and all necessary workmen, at all reasonable
times, to enter the premises to execute repairs or alterations to any adjoining
2property belonging to the landlord • The right of the landlord is to be exer-
3
cised at all reasonable times after the tenant had been given written notice •
4The landlord is liable for all damage occasioned by such entry • The benefit
5
and burden of this covenant run with the tenancy and with the reversion •
As with most of the covenants implied by the Decree, this provision has 
not yet been the subject of judicial interpretation by the Ghana courts. In 
English law, however, the word * adjoining* has been the subject of judicial 
interpretation. In Vhite v. Harrow, the plaintiff, a tenant of a house sub­
let it to the defendants who convenanted that he would not "objectt o any works 
to adjoining premises". The defendant brought an action to restrain the erect­
ion of buildings on neighbouring land because he alleged that this would obst­
ruct the access of light hitherto enjoyed by his premises. In holding for 
the defendant, the Court of Appeal decided that the words "adjoining premises" 
only applied to buildings which came into physical contact with the demised 
premises and that though the proposed buildings were near, they were not 
physically adjoining.
It is not suggested that the Ghana courts will follow this English decision. 
In the first place, this is a matter of construction to be gathered from the 
circumstances of each particular cases ; and, therefore decisions which have
1. The tenant's rental obligation is considered separately in a chapter 5*
See infra, pp. 2-3 Q.
2. Section 23 (1) and 3rd Schedule, Part I.
3. ibid.
4. ibid.
3* Section 24.
6• White v• Harrow ^ 0 3-^  %  ^  L • I. ^ .
placed a particular meaning on a particular form of words are not to be taken
as authorities for the proposition that those words must always bear the same 
2meaning • Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, in White v. Harrow the
English court was dealing with an express covenant* In Ghana, however, the
covenant is statutorily implied and as a general rule express covenants are
3
more strictly construed •
b. Alterations and additions
The tenant further covenants that, without the previous written consent
of the landlord, he will not erect any new building on the premises or make
4
any alterations or additions to the premises • Like all the implied covenants
by the tenant, this covenant may be varied or extended, but the personal^liabil
5 . . .ityr'of the tenant cannot be ousted • A purported ouster of personal liability
6would be void •
An * alteration' has been defined by Evans ass
"a change in the form and constitution of building, such 
as the conversion of a bedroom into a bath, the sub­
division of two rooms, or the insertion of windows into
walls, but not just a change in the appearance of the 
7
building" •
But the Decree also forbids any 'additions' to the premises without the
written consent of the landlord* It is submitted that the effect of this is
to prohibit any change whatsoever to the p r e m i s e s I* suggesi^that this has
the result of departing from the present English-law position* In English
law, if there is a qualified covenant against alterations (i*e., without the
consent of the landlord), section 19 (2) of the Landlord and Tenant Act, 1927
2» See, Westacott v* Hahn |l9l8] 1K*B*485» per Pickford L*J* at p*505 and
Scrutton L*J* at p*5H} Holiday Fellowship v. Hereford 1959 1 W*L.R*211
In fact in Cave v* Horrell Jl912[ 3 K.B.533, Foster v* Lyons 
[l927] 1 Ch.219} and Spillers v. Cardiff Assessment Committee [193^
2 K.B*21, the word 'adjoining' was given the very construction rejected 
in White v. Harrow, op.cit*
3* See, ShU brick v* Salmond (17&5) 3 Burr*1639*
4* Conveyancing Decree, 1973, section 23 (1) and 3rd Schedule, pt I*
5* Section 23 (5)
6. ibid*
7• The Law of Landlord and Tenant, London, 1975j f’ .
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further qualifies it in respect of any alteration that is an improvement, 
by stipulating that in such a case consent is not to be unreasonably with­
held* This English-law exception is not followed in Ghana* The Conveyancing
Decree forbids ,fany alteration or addition” to the leased premises without
1
the consent of the landlord • There is no proviso that if such alteration
or addition constituted an improvement then the consent of the landlord is
2not to be unreasonably withheld • The result is that a tenant cannot carry
out improvements to the premises without the consent of the landlord} this
is so even if the consent of the landlord has been unreasonably withheld*
3
c* Injury to walls
The tenant impliedly covenants not to cut or injure any of the vralls or
4timbers of the premises or to permit such cutting or injury to be done •
d. Assignment and sub-letting
The tenant impliedly covenants not to assign, sub-let or part with poss­
ession of the leased premises or any part thereof without the prior written
5
consent of the landlord • The consent of the landlord is not to be unreason-
6ably withheld in the case of "a respectable and responsbile person” • The
covenant may be varied or extended but the personal liability of the tenant
7
cannot be completely excluded • The Decree gives no guidance on who is a 
respectable and responsible person in Ghanaian society* It is suggested 
that this is a question of fact for the trial judge*
1* Scope of the covenant
The covenant prohibits an assignment, sub-letting or parting with poss­
ession without the written consent of the landlord*
1. S*23 (1) & 3rd Sched* Pt.I.
2* In the case of the covenant against assignment and sub-letting the Decree
provides that consent is not to be unreasonably withheld; by implication, 
it does not apply in this instance*
3* See infra, pp*l^2-“l *} Kxo-' CCwmoil-IcuaJ C o i f l C {/tCL&tll'.
4. S.23 (1) & 3rd Sched* Pt.I.
3* ibid*
6. ibid*
7* S.23 (5).
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An ''assignment” is defined in the interpretation section of the Decree
as "the transfer of the residue of a terra or interest created by lease"*,
a sub-lease is defined to include "an agreement for a sub-lease where the sub-
2lesee has become entitled to have his sub-lease granted" •
The terras of the implied covenant are sufficiently wide to cover most
instances in which the tenant parts with possession of the leased premises
3
or any part thereof • It may however be that this form of words would not
be wide enough to cover all cases of occupation by third-parties. In English
law, it has been held that as-long as the tenant remains in possession he may
permit another to use the premises without breaching the express covenant not
4to assign sub-let or part with possession of demised premises • This is bec­
ause the English courts have taken the view that possession in this context 
means legal rather than physical possession. The covenant against parting 
with possession is therefore not breached so long as the tenant retains legal 
possession. Thus in a case in which the tenant allowed user of premises during 
certain hours to a third party, it was held that this was not in breach of 
a covenant not to assign, sub-let or part with possession though it will be
in breach of a covenant against sharing or occupation of any part of the 
5
premises . In Stenmg v. Abrahams the English law position was stated thus:
" . . .  a lesee cannot be said to part with the
possession of any part of the premises unless his
agreement with his licensee wholly ousts him from 
6legal possession"
This is unsatisfactory. As has been argued this concept of "exclusive
7
possession" or "legal possession" is an unnecessary red-herring • It is thus
1. N.R.C.D.175* S.45 (1).
2. ibid., S.45 (2).
3. In English law the covenants are construed strictly if they occur indivi­
dually; a covenant against sub-letting will therefore not prohibit assign­
ment.
4. Chaplin v. Smith B.926J 1 K.B.198; Lam Kee Ying Sdn,Bhd. v. Lam Shes Tang 
Jwijj A.C.247.
5. Jackson v. Simons £923] 1 Ch. 373.
6. [l93l] 1 Ch.470, per Farwell J, at p.473*
7. Supra, pp.*70-71 .
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suggested that in caseSwhere the tenant has parted with occupation or any
part thereof, it should be open to the Ghanaian courts to hold that the ten-
1ant is in breach of his implied covenant • This is reasonable, for otherwise
tenants could by granting 'licences’ for valuable consideration defeat the
2purpose of the covenant •
2# Consent must be in writing
The Decree specifically states that the consent of the landlord must 
. . 3be in writing • The writing need not be in any particular form# In English
4
law, it has been held that a letter will suffice #
3# Consent riot to be unreasonably withheld
The Decree stipulates that the consent of the landlord is not to be un­
reasonably withheld where the prospective assignee or sub-leasee is "respectable 
and responsible person"'*. In English law the proviso as to reasonableness
is general, not confined to cases where the prespective grantee is "a respect-
6
able and responsible person • If follows that under the Ghanaian provisions
the landlord can unreasonably withhold his consent if the prospective grantee
7
is not a respectable and responsible person •
In English law the considerations affecting the reasonableness or other­
wise of withholding consent include the effect of the proposed grant on the 
use and occupation of the leased premises or kindred matters arising either
g
during or after the tenancy , the effect the transaction would have on the
9
ability of the landlord satisfactorily to let different parts of the property , and
10the proper management of the premises •
1# It is impossible to lay down rules as to what facts constitute effective
passing of occupation# Each case will have to considered on its own 
peculiar circumstances#
2# The use of this device to circumvent the Rent Acts is well known in England#
3. S#23 (1) & 3rd Sched., Pt.I#
4. Rutter v# Michael (1967) 201 E.G.299
5* S.23 (1) & 3rd Sched., PtI.
6# Landlord and Tenant Act, 1927» S#19 (1)« It applies only if the covenant 
is a qualified one (i#e#, without the consent of landlord)#
7* It may, however, be that in practice this does not constitute much of a
divergence. It may be that if the prospective tenant is not a respectable
and responsible person then the landlord's refusal to give consent would
be reasonable and that the same result would follow under English law#
8# Houlder Bros Co v. Gibbs 1^925^  Ch#573» Swansea v* Forton |l94^ Ch#l43
9* Premier Confectionary Co v. London Commercial Sale Rooms £93^ Ch.904.
10# See Houlder Bros v# Gibbs supra, per Pollock M#R# at; Viscount Tredegar 
v* Harwood Jl929j A.Q72#
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Whether the withholding consent is reasonable or not must be deter­
mined not on abstract considerations) but in the light of the particular 
circumstances* It was thus stated by Jiagge J*A*, in Barclays Bank v* Thomei
"A lessor considering whether to withhold his consent 
or not is to act reasonably, not arbitrarily or capriciously, 
but prudently in his own self-interest • • • The issue 
whether or not the respondent in withholding his consent 
acted reasonably and prudently in his own self-interest 
is a matter of fact to be deaded from the evidence”1*
In English law it is not clear whether the test of reasonableness is 
2
objective or subjective • The opinion of Jiagge J*A«, quoted above, would 
seem to indicate that in Ghana the test would be an objective one* It is 
submitted that this isih& better approach and that the landlord's reasons 
for his decision are irrelevant!
”In short, what must be tested for unreasonableness
is the withholding and not the landlord, tha act not 
3
the ikait” •
1* Jl973j 2 G*L*R*137» 147* (The case involved alteration)*
2* See Re Smith's Lease &95l] 1 All E*R*346, per RoxburghtJ, at 349$ contra. 
Lovelock v* Margo [1964] 2 All E*R*13, per Denning M*R* at 15*
3* R*E* Megarry, Note, (1963) 79 L*Q*R*479, at 482.
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4. Effect of breach of the covenant
If the tenant disregards such a qualified covenant andmakes a grant of 
the premises or any part thereof without theconsent of the landlord what 
would be the result?
If he omits to apply for consent he is liable in any event for damages*
It is essential that the consent of the landlord is sought9 however unreason­
able a refusal would be*
The tenant may be liable to forfeiture if the covenant is supported by 
a proviso for re-entry* It is important to note that thelimplied covenant 
in the Conveyancing Decree does not contain a proviso for re-entry* Breach 
of the implied statutory obligation will not entitle the landlord to re-enter 
unless the implied covenant is extend^to give a right of re-entry •
Even where the covenant is fortified by a right of re-entry consequent 
on its breach and there is a breach of the covenant this does not imply that 
the assignment or sub-lease is void ob initio • The landlord may bring an act­
ion for ejectment against the assignee or sub-tenant9 but the courts now
have the right to grant relief from such forfeiture9 having regard to the
3 4circumstances of each particular case • In Schandorf v* Zeini 9 Amissah J*A*9
relied on English cases and section 146(2) of the Law of Property Actt 1925^
as giving the Ghanaian courts the power to grant relief in the appropriate
circumstances* This power is now statutorily conferred by section 30(2) of
6the Gonveyancing Decree •
1* Bassil v* Said Rqad (1937) 3 W.A*L*R*231* This case holds that breach
of the express covenant not to assign9 sub-let of part with possession
does not empower the landlord to re-enter on its breach if it is not 
supported by a forfeiture clause*
2* Schandtflff v. Zeini Jl976] 2 G.L.R.418, per Amissah J*A* at 437*
3* ibid.
4* ibid.
5* By the Courts Act9 1971, S.Ill this and other sections of the Law of
Property Act9 1925 became part of the common law of Ghana* *
6. For a discussion of forfeiture and relief from forfeiture see Chapter
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In English law, if the tenant makes a formal request for consent and 
meets with a refusal then, provided the refusal is in fact unreasonable, he 
incurs no liability if he proceeds to make the grant without the landlord's 
consent* The law was thus stated by Neville J*, in a case where the landlord 
had expressly covenanted not to withhold his consent to an assignment to a 
"respectable and responsible person"t
"It is obviously a formality 16 apply for the consent of 
the landlord in a case where under the terms of the covenant 
he has no power to prevent the assignment by withholding 
his consent* It matters not where the proposed assignee is 
a respectable and responsible person whether the landlord 
gives or does not give his consent* The cases shown that 
if on the_one hand • • • the landlord had been asked and 
has withheld his consent, the lessee retains his interest 
under the lease, whereas if he has not been asked and there­
fore is unable to give the consent that he should give, the 
withholding of which is inoperative if the request be made,
Ihep^thp whole of the property of the lessee becomes the 
property of the lessor* It certainly seems strange that 
so small and perfectly indifferent a matter should make such 
a difference but so stands the law"\
1* Lewis & Allenby Ltd* v* Pegqe jl9l4j 1 Ch.782.
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5* No payment to be exacted for consent to be granted
By section 34 (1) of the Conveyancing Decree, 1973» the landlord may 
not require the payment of any money for or in respect of a licence or consent 
to assign, sub-let or part with possession of the leased premises; unless 
express provision for such payment is contained in the lease or tenancy agree­
ment* This does not, however, preclude the landlord from recovering any reason­
able legal expense, incurred in the grant of such licence or consent**
6. The effect of consent
By the Conveyancing Decree, 1973* section 33 (1) (a) the consent of the 
landlord shall, unless a contrary intention is expressed, extend only to the 
assignment, sub-letting or parting with possession specifically authorised
and to none other* All the landlord's rights remain in force and are available
2against any subsequent assignment, sub-letting or parting with possession •
Tk&  pSifcbon jucras tb 1^ 71 JUrtjfoX
HrfJb (oju) J10CL4 j ckuort‘iw. ( A S 1 Hva£
CPJASQmL  o«1 Ck cjWirt dkktaJeJ bo Subs <Ujuln£ ^
7* Rent Act, 1963
The Rent Act, 19^3 (Act 220) also controls the sub-letting of residential
premises* 'Premises' is defined in the interpretation section of the Rent Act
as "any building, structure, stall or other erection or part thereof, movable
5
or other wise, which is the subject of a separate letting"
1* Section 34 (2)*
2* Section 33 (2)*
3. (1603), 4 Co. Rep 119 b .
4* The rule is also abrogated in England by section 143 (3) of the Law of 
Property Act, 1925* This is one of the provisions made applicable to 
Ghana by the Courts Act, 1971*
5* Section 36*
1*1
By section 22 (1) of the Rent Act, 1963* a monthly or shorter tenant 
shall not sub-let without the written consent of his landlord. It is impor­
tant to note that in this case there is no proviso that the landlord's consent 
is not to be unreasonably withheld in the case of a respectable or responsible 
prospective sub-lessee. It may be that the legislature has decided that in
all such short tenancies the landlord's refusal to consent should not be quest-
1
ioned. In Osekre v. Saah plaintiff let his premises to 'T' on a monthly 
basis. 'T' without the knowledge and consent of the landlord granted a sub­
lease of part of the premises to the defendant. When plaintiff sought to eject 
the defendant4-assignlM-' , defendant argued that he was a sub-tenant and was 
therefore protected by the Rent Act, 1963* It was held by Edusei J., that
since the purported assignment was without the consent of the landlord, the
2defendant was unlawfully let into possession •
Edusei J., does not examine what the effect of such unlawful sub-letting
is. lie assumed that because section 22 (1) prohibits a monthly tenant from
sub-letting without the written consent of the landlord, therefore, such sub-
3
letting is ineffective •
With respect, this is not good enough. The sub-letting may be unlawful; 
but this does not dispose of the question; what legal consequences flow from 
such unlawful activity? In English law, it is a notorious principle that the 
covenant against assignment or sub-letting does not by itself invalidate an 
assignment or sub-lease as against the grantee; but that<ther6 will, be A. breach 
i esult in
the sub-lesseecan apply for relief. These principles have been accepted and
2. ibid., at p.147*
3. It may be pointed out that this case did not involve the effect of a sub­
tenancy granted in contravention of a covenant after the landlord has been 
granted possession vi)^ ere ^he courts have consistently held that such
an unlawful tenant would not be protected.
1.
applied in Ghana1. In Schandorf v. Zeini* Amissah J.A. said:
" • • • a sub-lease in contravention of the covenant always
gives the head-lessor a right to damages and he may deter-
2mine the lease but the sub-lease is not void ab initio** •
The Rent Act* 1963 does not fortify its provisions against sub-letting 
with a forfeiture clause • The Rent Act* 1963 provides that breach of any
4
of its provisions is a criminal offence • A monthly tenant who sub-lets
5
without the written consent of his landlord therefore commits a crime •
But the fact that the tenant/sub-lessor has committed a crime does not
necessarily imply that the purported grant is void.
It may* however* be that Edusei J.* considers that the provisions of
the Rent Act* 1963 need not be construed in the same way as express convenants
6or* indeed* the covenants implied by the Conveyancing Decree • It may also 
be that on policy grounds monthly tenants should not be allowed to get away 
with sub-letting or assigning without the consent of the landlord) if this 
is so the learned judge did not articulate those policy considerations. It 
is also arguable that the sub-tenant should not be able to rely on the Rent 
Act* 1963 when the sub-tenancy had been granted contrary to the provisions 
of the Act^.
It is not b e i n g S t h a t  the learned judge's decision was demon*
strably wrong* only that it was not inevitably . right - as
/
a result of its failure to consider all the issues.
1. See Basil v. Said Rqad (1957) 3 V.A.L.R.231) Schandorf v. Zeini
[197&J 2 G.L.R.4l8) Conveyancing Decree* 1973* S.30.
2. supra* at 437*
3* Nor does the Conveyancing Decree* 1973*
4. S.25 (1) (i)«
5* Taking such a sub-lease* however* is not a crime.
6. The learned judge himself relies on an English case Maley v. Fearn
[l946] 1 All E.R.583t where an express covenant was involved.
7* The Rent Act* 1963 does not* however* prohibit the taking of a sub-lease
granted without the consent of the landlord) it only prohibits the granting 
of such a tenancy.
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Section 22 (2) of the Rent Act, 1963* provides that in all other tenancies 
of residential premises the premises shall not, in the absence of agreement 
to the contrary, be sub-let for a period in excess of the tenancy* This is 
a strange provision since it is a notorious principle of Ghanaian law that 
nemo dat quod non habet* It has the effect, though, of making it a criminal 
offencei1
Section 22 (3) is a more interesting provision* -It provides that:
"Every person sub-letting his premises shall inform the 
landlord of such premises in writing within fourteen days 
after he has so sub-let the premises the fact of such sub­
letting and its terms"•
This provision will be useful in residential tenancies granted before
2
the Conveyancing Decree came into force , if the tenancy agreement does not
contain a covenant against sub-letting* But under the Conveyancing Decree
a covenant against sub-letting is implied and personal liability cannot be
totally ousted* In such circumstances this provision of the Rent Act, 1973*
may create a monster* Is the tenant obliged to supply the landlord with such
information after the landlord has consented to grant of the sub-tenancy?
3
If he is, what if he doesn't?
It does seem that in drafting the Conveyancing Decree, 1973 attention 
was not given to section 22 of the Rent Act, 1963* The Rent Act does not 
control all conveyance • But it does control most residential tenancies*
The result of this apparent inadvertence to its provisions has been to create
confusion* It may however be that the Conveyancing Decree being later in
point of time impliedly repealed section 22 of the Rent Act, 1963*
By section 25 (1) of the Rent Act it is a criminal offence to demand or 
receive "any consideration whether in money or in kind or in any other manner 
whatsoever" by way of "rent, fine, premium or otherwise" for the grant or assign-
1. S.25 (1) (i).
2* The Decree came into force on 1st January 1974: S*46*
3* By section 25 (1) (i) any person who contravenes the provisions of the 
Rent Act, 1963 shall be guilty of an offence and upon conviction shall
be liable to a fine not exceeding £G 100 (0 ?) or to imprisonment for
a term not exceeding six months*
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ment of any tenancy • Any person found guilty of this offence shall be
liable to a fine not exceeding £ G 100 or to imprisonment for a term not
2
exceeding six months or to both •
a* Statutory tenants
A statutory tenant cannot assign, sub-let or part with possession of3
premises • In George Grant & Co.Ltd., v. Tikobo Sawmills Ltd*,5 a tenant
purported to assign his rights to another person after the expiry of his lease* 
It was held that a statutory tenant is only a law-protected tenant and has 
no, proprietary interest in the premises* He therefore cannot make a legal 
assignment of the property to a third party* The purported assignment was 
there a nullity* This decision was followed in U*T.C* v. Karara^ * In this
1* This is another in the long list of crimes created ad hoc by statutes
concerned primarily with immovable property law. See also, e*g*: Convey­
ancing Decree, 1973* S*7 (2)j Land Registry Act, 1962 (Act*122), S*34$ 
Administration of Lands Act, 1962 (Act 123), S*27» Farm Land (Protection) 
Act, 1962 (Act 107), S*3* It should not, however, be supposed that this 
practice has stopped* It has not had this effect because (a)^ao not really 
consider it as a ■crime', and (b) some people commit -crimes* The multip­
lication of criminal offences in support of the civil law is a development 
which must be discouraged* For reasons to be discussed in the last chapter 
those aspects of the law are not enforced* When large parts of law are 
not complied with and not enforced, this anarchy permeates the whole system 
and the very foundations of a law-state are threatened*
2. Rent Act, 1963 (Act 220), S*25 (1) (i).
3« For definition of statutory tenant, see s u p r a , 87-%%-
4. Rent Act, 1963 (Act 220), S.29 (1).
5* (1969) C.C.119* The case involved a business letting but the same principle
will apply to residential tenancies*
6* 1 G*L*R*212* The case involved a business letting but the same 
principle will apply to residential tenancies.
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case the tenant failed to exercise his option to renew but remained in occup­
ation of the premises* While holding over the tenant purported to under-let 
the premises* The landlord sued for recovery of possession* It was held 
that the tenant had after the expiry of the original term become a statutory 
tenant and he therefore could not sub-let*
e. Illegal or immoral user
The tenant further covenants:
"Not to use or permit the premises leased or any part 
thereof to be used for any illegal or immoral purpose"*
This is a provision enjoying the tenant to use the premises in a lawful 
and decent manner* Illegal user will prohibit use of the premises for purposes 
by Ghana law are unlawful, such as gambUw^ or treason* It is important to 
note that illegality is not confined to criminality* Immoral user is, however, 
more problematic—  K&i'ClU being a more difficult concept to define and being 
in most instances subjective* For example, would a tenant be in breach of 
this covenant if he sells pornographic magazines on . or runs a
brothel in the premises?
f. Nuisance or annoyance
The tenant impliedly covenants:
"Not to do or permit anything to be done in or upon
the premises which may be or become a nuisance or
annoyance or cause damage to the covenantee, his
tenants, or the occupiers of adjacent or neighbour- 
2ing premises" •
Neither "nuisance" nor "annoyance" is defined by the Decree* Nuisance 
has been defined in another context as:
" • • • an act or omission which constitutes or results
in an interference with, disturbance of, or annoyance to,
another person in the use, exercise or enjoyment of a
right, title, ownership or occupation of land, premises,
3
easement or other right connected with land"
1* Conveyancing Decree, 1973 (N.R.C.D*175), S.23 (1) and 3rd Sched*, Pt*I*
2* ibid*
3* Kludze, A*K*P* , "The termination of leases", (1975) 7 R*G*L*, 11 at 19*
This definition was formulated in respect of S.17 (1) (c) of the Rent Act, 
19o3 (Act 220) 7
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Annoyance is wider in meaning and includes whatever reasonable troubles 
the mind of an ordinary sensible person1*
It does not appear that this implied covenant is restricted to the 
enjoyment of property* It does seem that a tenant would be in breach of 
this covenant if his acts on the premises cause damage to the landlord*
For example, if the tenant publishes or permits publication of material 
impugning the character of his landlord (such publication being done on 
the leased premises) and this results in the landlord losing some business 
contracts, it is submitted that the tenant would be in breach of his implied 
covenant, though the damage caused to the landlord does not affect the 
enjoyment of a proprietary interest*
What constitutes a nuisance or annoyance or causes damage to others
2
will always remain a question of fact* In Dennis v* Agbetetei it was
held that the pounding of fufu on the top floor of a storey building amounted
3 4to a nuisanceI In Ofori v* Arthur 'B' granted tenancy of a room to 'A'
who in turn sub-let to *C,*i;r.*ct immediately wrote to the head-lessor alleg­
ing that * A* was disreputable and urging that the original tenancy be granted
to him* This application was turned down and »C* was given notice to quit*
0
When »C* refused to vacate the room the head-lessor applied for an eviction 
order on the ground that *C' was a nuisance* In granting the order9 Kingsley- 
Nyinah J*9 saidt
1* cf* Tod-heatly v* Benham (1887) 40 Ch.280, at095.
2* (1970) C.C.21. The case was concerned with provisions of the Rent Act9
19^3 (Act 220).
3* The case is more fully discussed below, at pp. $17-31^ *
4* (1970) C.C.112. The case was decided on the basis of S*17 (1) (C) of
the Rent Act, 1963*
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"It is not at all surprising, then, that neither the Rent 
Regulations, 1964 (L*I*369), nor its parent statute, the 
Rent Act, 1963 (Act 220), ventures a definition of the 
word Nuisance1 or the word *annoyance'• This omission 
I think entitles one to interprete the word not abstract- 
ly, but beneficially, having regard to the very peculiar 
facts and circumstances of each particular case* I do 
earnestly hope that when this Act comes to be revised, or 
amended, the draftsmen would give us a reasonable and practic­
able definition of these important words 'nuisance* and 
.1* annoyance * •
Unfortunately Kingsley-Nyinah J*|s earnest hope was not realized when 
the Conveyancing Decree, 1973 enacted* 
g* Further covenants implied in a sub-tenancy
The sub-tenant impliedly covenants to discharge all obligations under­
taken under the head-lease, except the obligation to pay rent and any other
2obligation for which the sub-lessor is liable under the head-lease • He also
covenants to indemnify the sub-lessor against any claims, damages, costs and
3
other expenses relating to the obligations he has undertaken •
The sub-tenant further covenants to permit the landlord/sub-lessor his 
agents and workment^ after giving written notice, to enter the premises at
1* (1970) C.C.112.
2* Conveyancing Decree, 1973t S*23 (2) and 3rd Sched*, Pt*U. 
3* ibid.
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All reasonable times for the purpose of enabling the sub-lessor to perform 
any obligations he has undertaken under the head-lease which are not to be 
performed by the sub-tenant1* 
hj Further covenants by an assignee
An assignee impliedly covenants tot
"• • • observe and perform all the covenants, agreements
and conditions contained in the lease creating the term
or interest for which the land is conveyed and thenceforth
2on the part of the lessees to be observed and performed” •
He also covenants to idemnify the assignor and his property against all
claimsi damagesf costs and expenses relating to the obligations he has under-
3
taken •
II* Implied Obligations of Landlords
a* The right to grant
The landlord impliedly covenants that he has capacity to grant the premises
4
in the manner in which it is expressed to be granted • This covenant is implied*
l .  CjDMUjMCArt^ $ 23(2) a n d  ^  •
2* Conveyancing Decree, 1973* S.23 (2) and 3rd Sched*, Pt.III.
3* ibid.
4* For the difficulties caused as a result of the system of landholding, 
see supra, Pft90-S7-
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"not withstanding anything done, omitted or knowingly
suffered by the covenantor or anyone through whom he
1
derives title otherwise than by purchase for value"
It is important to note that all that the landlord undertakes under this 
covenant is that he has capacity to grant the tenancy at the time of the grant.
It has no bearing on the future conduct of the landlord or persons claiming
2 3through him • In Wilkinson v. Ed(|3ei , 'A' assigned a lease of land to 'R'.
The deed contained only one covenant by »A' to the effect that he had not at
anytime done or been privy to any act which prevented him from assigning the
land or whereby any part of the land was encumbered. Three weeks later a third
party entered the said land and started to build on it. 'R' then sued 'A* for
damages for failure of consideration and for breach of the covenant for quiet 
4enjoyment • It was held that since there was no proof that 'A* had no title 
to the land or that his lease was invalid, 'R»fs remedy lay in an action for 
trespass against the third party. 
b. Quiet enjoyment
By section 22 (1) of the Conveyancing Decree a covenant for quiet and 
peaceable anjoyment is implied in all residential tenancies.
The position is the same in English law, where the landlord/tenant relation­
ship automatically implies a covenant for quiet enjoyment by the landlord^.
In English law the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment is excluded by any
6
express covenant for quiet enjoyment contained in the lease or tenancy agreement •
1. Conveyancing Decree, 1973* S.22 (1) and 2nd Sched., Pt.I.
2. This is the distinction between the covenant of title and the covenant for
quiet enjoyment. The latter covers the subsequent acts or omissions of the 
landlord and those claiming through him.
3. [1963J 1 G.L.R.393* This case involved an assignment of land and an express 
covenant of titlej but the principle enunciated is applicable here.
4. The case was decided on the basis of the common law as it stood in 1874.
At that time 1quiet enjoyment' was not implied in leases.
5. It used to be thought that the covenant, was implied from the use of technical
words of demise. That view is now discredited: See Budd-Scott v. Daniel
2 K.B.351} Kenny v.
6. Malzy v. Eicholz 2 K.B.308} Miller v. Emcer Products
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The Conveyancing Decree departs from this position. Under the Decree the
statutorily implied covenant can be varied or extended, but the personal
1 . 2 liability of the landlord cannot be removed • Any such attempt shall be void •
1. Scope of the covenant
The covenant gives the tenant the right to be put into possession of the
premises. In the words of the Decree; Mthe subject-matter expressed to be
conveyed shall remain to and be quietly entered upon^ received, held, occupied 
3and enjoyed” by the tenant. This means that the tenant be placed in actual
physical possession at the commencement of the tenancy. It is not enough for
4only the legal right of possession to be transferred • The covenant also gives
the tenant the right live in the premises without interference or disturbance
5
from the landlord or any person claiming through him •
The right of the tenant to enter upon and live in the premises peaceably
is guaranteed, "not withstanding anything done omitted or knowingly suffered
by the covenantor or anyone through whom he derives title otherwise than by
6purchase for value” •
The covenant is not for quiet enjoyment in the sense^. The
COVtt/rtW't 'S n o i a t  b t c  tin u  {l^£, -f&nqnjb .jVtftfi r tu j —
sartw- a t ikriCjW bo &JL or pcmsjto* Itsl
fc w fti/ lt  . jW i lonc/l»%ci ox h i t  ^a{CMkc>%S , SUCCtSSOhS 05-
10 xThe covenant extends to the acts ("disturbance or interruption” ) of the:
”• • • covenantor or any person conveying by his direction, 
or any person through whom the covenator derives title otherwise
1. Conveyancing Decree, 1973» S.22 (7).
2. ibid.
3. Conveyancing Decree 1973i S.22 (1) and 2nd Sched. Pt.I.
4. See Coe v. Clay (1829) 5 Bing.440; Jinks v. Edwards (1856) 11 Ex.775«
5. Conveyancing Decree, 1973* S.22 (1) and 2nd Sched., Pt.I.
6. ibid.
7» See Jenkins v. Jackson (1888) 40 Ch. D.71» Mafo v. AdamsJl970| 1 Q.B.
548, per Sachs L.J. at 557*
8. For these tenant has his remedy in tort.
9. It may be otherwise, though, if noise or dirt renders premises uninhabitable.
10. Conveyancing Decree, 1973, S.22 (1) and 2nd Sched., Pt.I.
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than by purchase for value, or any person rightfully
claiming (not being a person claiming in respect of an
interest to which the conveyance is expressly made subject)
by, through, under or in trust for any of the foregoing 
1
persons” •
In English law, the covenant has been held to extend to the rightful and
wrongful acts of the landlord? but only to the lawful acts of persons claiming 
2
through him • The reason for this is said to be that the tenant would have his
3
remedy m  tort against the unlawful acts of others • This is different from
the English-law position between vendor and v.endeje where the covenant extends
kto the unlawful acts of persons claiming through the vendor • The Conveyancing 
Decree does not draw any distinction between the lawful and unlawful acts of 
persons claiming through the landlord; both would seem to be covered by the 
covenant^•
The covenant does not give the tenant any remedy if he is ejected or
6disturbed by a person having a superior interest • This rule is very important
because of the hierarchical system of land-holding (with the distinction between
powers of control and rights of benefit), and the manner in which the premises
were constructed which determine who can create what interest in the premises 
7
and for how long •
2» What amounts to breach?
The fcastc <2xa»n|?ia< op hf<u*>cl\ of the covenant for quiet enjoyment occurs 
when the landlord enters the premises prior to the expiration of the tenancy, 
and forcefully removes the tenant* The covenant protects the tenant from acts 
which cause interference with his enjoyment of the property* Thus, where the 
landlord in order to get rid of a tenant causes damage to the property, this 
was held to be in breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment. In Karam v*
Ashkar ,^ the landlord demolished part of the premises so as to make it unsafe
1. Conveyancing Decree, 1973i S. 22 (1) and 2nd Sched., Pt*I.
2* Malzy v. Eicholz [19l6j 2 K.B.308; Matania v* National Provincial Bank Ltd. 
]l93b] 2 All E.R.633*
3* Hayes v* Bickerstaff (1669) Vaugh*ll8; Lucy v. Leviston (1673) Freem.103*
4. See Megarry and Wade, The Law of Real Property, London, 1975» PP604-677.
5* This may be due to the way in which tta Conveyancing Decree, perhaps rather 
clum$ily, lumps both sale and tenancies together*
6. See Jones v. Havington £903] 1 K.B.253* (F.N.7,8. P*t.o.)
for tenants portion of the premises to remain in use. It was held that this 
was a breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment. Under the Rent Act, 1963 
(Act 220) it is a criminal offence to do any act whatsoever, or refrain from 
performing any of the obligations undertaken under a lease or tenancy agreement, 
if this is done with intent to compel the tenant to give up possession^.
In English law it has been held that there need not be physical inter-* 
ference with the premises for the covenant to be breached. Thus where noise,
dust and dirt from building operations on adjacent property render the premises
A 2
uninhabitable this may constitute a breach of the covenant • The covenant is
also broken if the landlord threatens the tenant by letters and by shouting
3 4and banging on the front doors , or cuts off gas and electricity supplies •
It is our submission that the terms of the covenant as sQ^ fcf out in the decree 
are sufficiently wide to cover all these instances. The premises is to be 
enjoyed "without interruption or disturbance" from the landlord; and this, 
it is our submission, cover all cases where the acts or omissions of the land­
lord interfere with the tenant's enjoyment of the property.
5
3. Constructive Eviction
Constructive eviction is a result of breach of the covenant for quiet
enjoyment. It is established when the tenant shows that the landlord has
prevented his enjoyment of the property; and that consequent upon that he, 
the tenant, has abandoned the premises. In such a case the tenant's liability
for rent ceases. He may also sue for breach of the covenant.
7. Supra, pp. 90-9 1.
8. |l963] 1 G.L .R.I38. The case was decided on the basis of an express covenant 
for quiet enjoyment.
1. See. 27 (1)
2. Matania v. National Provincial Bank [1936] 2 All E.R.633.
3. Kenny v. Preen (1962) 3 All E.R.814. This would constitute a breach of
S 27 (1) of the Rent Act, 19&3 (Act 220).
4. Pereira v. Vandiyan |i953j 1 All E.R.1109* This will also be a criminal
offence.
5. This and other related doctrines are more fully treated in a later chapter: 
See infra, pp. Z X 5 ~
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4. Non-derogation from Grant?
The Conveyancing Decree, 1973 does not expressly provide that there shall
be implied in all conveyances a covenant that the grantor shall not derogate
from his grant. The effect of the absence of a specific covenant against
derogation from the grant is not clear. Does it mean that this covenant is
not to be implied in conveyances; or does it mean that the common-law covenant
against derogation from the grant will continue to be implied? In our considered
opinion the absence of a specific covenant against derogation from the grant is
deliberate; and this is because the content of the covenant for quiet enjoyment
1
is expressed so widely that most of the set of facts which would normally 
amount to breach of the covenant against derogation from the grant would amount 
to a breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment under the Decree. Furthermore,
the principle that the grantor must hot derogate from his grant is one of general
2application - not being restricted to conveyances •
c. Freedom From Encumbrances
The landlord further covenants that the property is "freed and discharged
*
or otherwise sufficiently 4ndemni'fied by the covenantor against" all interests,
encumbrances, claims and demands (other than those to which the conveyance is
expressly made subject)"^. The covenant extends to the acts and omissions of
the landlord and those claiming through him; and to the acts and omissions of
persons through whom he claims except those from whom he has taken the property
4for valuable consideration •
1. See 2nd Schedule, Pt.I.
2. See Palmer v. 1 Lev.122; Harmer v. Jumbll (Nigeria)
Tin Areas Ltd. at 225, where Younger L.J. said that it
is "a principle which merely embodies in a legal maxim a rule of common 
honesty". ; also (1964) 80 L.Q.R.244 (D.W.Elliott)•
3* Conveyancing Decree, 1973, Sect.22 (1) and 2nd Sched. Pt.I.
4. ibid.
l6o
d. Further Assurance
The landlord impliedly covenants that he and any person conveying by his
direction, and any person through whom he derives title otherwise than by
purchase for value will, at all times and at the expense of the tenant, execute
assurances and do everything that is right and possible in order to perfect
1
the title of the tenant and those deriving title through him •
e. Further Covenants Implied in a Assignment or Sub-lease
In a tenancy created by way of an assignment or sub-lease, there shall 
be implied a covenant by the assignor/sub-lessor that:
lf • • • the head lease is at the time of the conveyance
a good, valid and effectual lease of the property conveyed,
and is in full force, unforfeited and unsurrendered, and has
2not become void or voidable" 
r*
Furth^more the assignor/sub-lessor impliedly covenants that (1) all rent
payable under the head lease by himself have been paid up at the time of the
conveyance; and (2) all the covenants, conditions and agreements contained in
the head-lease which are to be performed by him have been observed and performed
3
up to the time of the conveyance •
f. Further Covenants Implied in a Sub-lease
In a tenancy created by way of a sub-lease, the landlord/sub-lessor impli­
edly covenants that for the duration of the sub-lease he will pay the rent
reserved by the head lease and perform those covenants of the head lease which
4
the tenant/sub-lessee does not undertake to perform •
1. Conveyancing Decree, 1973» Sec.22 (1) and 2nd Sched., Pt.I.
2. Conveyancing Decree, 1973* Sec.22 (2) and 2nd Sched., Pt.II.
3. ibid.
4. Conveyancing Decree, 1973* Sec.22 (3) and 2nd Sched., Pt.III.
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Furthermore in a tenancy created by way of a sub-lease the Decree implies
a covenant by the landlord/sub-lessor that At all reasonable times he will
produce the head lease for the inspection of the tenant/sub-lessee or any
person authorised in writing by the tenant1* The landlord/sub-lessor is also
obligated to produce the head-lease in any proceedings of a court or Commission
of Inquiry or on any occasion on which production is reasonably required for
proving or supporting the title of the tenant^* The landlord/sub-lessor also
3
covenants to deliver to the tenant/sub-lessee true copies of the head-lease ;
k
and to keep the head lease safe, whole, uncancelled and undefaced •
These are very strange provisions in as m|ich as it assumes that in every 
case of sub-lease there is a head lease which can be produced, copied or defaced* 
These imply the existence of a document or writing} and yet by section 3 (1) 
of the Decr*ee tenancies for not more than three years taking effect in possession 
are excused from the requirement of writing, as are equitable tenancies under 
section 3 (2).
1. Combined effect of section 22 (3) and 35 (2) (a) (i)*
2* Combined effect of section 22 (3) and 35 (2) (a) (II)*
3* Combinedeffect of section 22 (3) and 35 (2) (b).
4* Combined effect of sections 22 (3) and 35 (2) (c)*
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c. EXPRESS COVENANTS
In addition to the covenants implied in all tenancies by the Conveyancing 
Decree, 1973* there are a number of others which are very often found in prop- 
erLy-drawn leases or agreed upon by the parties which need consideration* 
d* Covenant to Insure
In the absence of an express covenant to insure, neither the landlord 
nor the tenant is obligated at common law to insure* It has thus been the 
practice in England, except in short leases, to provide expressly for insur­
ance of the premises against fire and other damage* In Ghana covenants to
1 2insure are not common in tenancy agreements * - A colleague who has researched
into insurance law and practice in Ghana has found that in the small number
of cases where premises are insured, this is done by the landlord, and this
not as a result of a covenant in thelease or agreement but because he considers
it to be a prudent thing to do*
Where there is a covenant to insure, it has been held by the English
courts that omission to keep the premises insured for any period, no matter
3
how short, constitutes a breach of the covenant • There is authority for the 
proposition that there can be no breach of covenant to insure where no amount
4is stipulated in the covenant* In Boston v* Khemland Bros* the tenant
Q
covenanted, inter lia to insure the premises* The covenant was fortified
by a forfeiture clause* When the tenant failed to insure, the landlord sued 
for recovery of possession* It was held that the tenant was not in breach 
of his covenant because no amount was stipulated in the covenant* The learned 
judge gave no reasons for his decision; nor did he cite any authority for this
1* In a survey of 2,000 residential tenancies in only one lease has
the tenant covenanted to insure*
2* F.Akyearapong, Univ. of London, Ph.d* student* 
3* Penniall v* Harborne (1848) 11 Q.B.368.
4.
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proposition*. It is not clear from the report what the terms of the covenant 
in question were. It may be that the decision is based on an appreciation 
of the practical implications of a covenant to insure which does not stipulate 
any amountor require that the premises be insured at full value. For theore­
tically the tenant could have insured it for lp. But this is an extreme example; 
and even under such a covenant the tenant could not insure the premises at 
zero value. It is thus our view that this decision is questionable and should 
not be followed. It must also be emphasised that with express covenants) the
extent of the obligation of the covenantee depends on the words used and the
2circumstances in which they appear • Consequently, decisions which have placed 
a particular interpretation on a certain set of words are not to be regarded
3
as authorities for the proposition that they should always have that meaning •
II. Covenants Restrictive of User
In English law, residential tenancies often contain a covenant restricting
user of the premises to residential purposes only and against any trade or
4business being done on the premises. In Ghana such terms are uncommon ; and 
frequently tenants carry on their business, or parts thereof in the rented 
premises with the acquiescence of the landlord. This is, in our view, due 
to the peculiarities of Ghanaian society and her trading and business patterns.
In Ghana many people, like traders, bread bakers, kenkey sellers, tailors 
and seamstresses, carry on their businesses, or parts of their business, in
1. See 1 G.L.R.68 at pp.72-73
2. See tfestacott v. Hahn jl9l8] 1 K.B.495* per Pickford L.J. at p.505 
and Scrutton L.J. at p*51i; also Holiday Fellowship v. Hereford [1959J
1 W.L.R.211.
3* ibid.
4. In the survey of 2,000 residential tenancies only nine leases contained 
express covenants restricting user to residential purposes only.
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the premises where they reside* We would thus suggest that in construj/^ .
covenants which, in the handful of cases, restrict user to residential purposes
only, the courts should take judicial notice of these social facts and give
1
a liberal construction to such covenants* Cases like Jones v* Christy 
where the garaging in the demised premises of a taxi which the tenant used 
for his business was held to be in breach of a covenant to use the premises 
for residential purposes only, should not be followed in Ghana*
III. Option to Renew
2Quite apart from any statutory right of continuation of the tenancy ,
the lease itself, not uncommonly provides expressly for renewal at the end
of the original term by way of an option to the tenant to renew*
Options for renewal run with the land and with the reversion and cannot
3
be revoked as long as the option is exercisable •
(a)* Exercise of the option
The option is normally expressed to be exercisable upon notice being
4given to the landlord* Before the Conveyancing Decree came into force , such 
notice need not be in writing —  unless the terms of the lease expressly state 
that notice must be in writing* In Ogde v* Pearl & Dean^, premises were 
let for one year with an option to renew for a further period of four years, 
'•provided notice of intention to renew the tenancy is given to the landlord"* 
The tenants gave the landlord an oral notice} and on the expiry of the first 
term continued in occupation and paid rent* Before the four years, however, 
the tenants vacated the premises after a month's notice* The landlord sued
1. (1963) Sol.Journal 374.
2* See infra, pp* 2 T J - 3 3 3 .
3* Moukarzel v. Hannah 12 W• A.C»/J125> Re Hunter's Lease Giles v* Hutchings 
£942) 1 All E.R.27 at p. 60.
4* By S.46 the Decree came into force on January 1st, 1974.
5* 1 G.L.R.142.
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to recover rent for the unexpired term. The tenants contended that they had 
not exercised their option because their notice was not in writing. It was 
held that the notice to exercise the option need not be in writing unless 
the covenant so stipulated. Ollennu J., said;
"I hold further that it is not necessary in an agreement
of this nature that notice of the exercise of the option
1
should be in writing" •
In fact it is not even necessary that a formal notice—— oral or written —
be given in such a case. Notice can be inferred from the conduct of the
2
parties., In Moukarzel v. Hannah premises were let for a term of six years. 
The tenant had an option of renewal for a further:terra. Before the first
term could expire the parties entered into an agreement for the tenants to
make some improvements to the premises and debit the landlord with the cost 
as rent for a period of term. On the expiry of the original term, the land­
lord sued for recovery of possession. It was held that it was not necessary 
for the option to be exercised in writing and that the conduct of the land­
lord and the resultant action by the tenant indicated that they intended that 
the tenancy be renewed. The law was thus stated by Harragin C.J.s
" . . .  a lessor by his treatment of his tenant may 
lead him to believe that he will renew the term of 
his lease, and if on the faith of this belief the 
tenant expends his money • • • , the lessor will be
3
compelled to give him such renewal • • ." .
What conduct amounts to such estoppel is, of course, a question of fact 
to be decided on the circumstances of each particular case. The mere accep­
tance of rent is, however, not sufficient to ground such estoppel. In U.T.C*
1. [1961] 1 G.L.R.142 at p .143
2. 12 W.A.C.A.125•
3. ibid., at P*125
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1
v* Karam plaintiffs let their premises to the defendants for five years and
ten months* The defendant had the option to renew for a further term of ten 
years* The defendant continued in possession after the expiry of the first 
term and continued to pay rent* The plaintiff gave him several notices asking 
him to quit the premises* After the defendants had failed to vacate the prem­
ises, the plaintiff sued for recovery of possession on the ground that the 
defendant had failed to exercise his option to renew* The defendants contended 
that the plaintiffs were estopped by conduct —  the acceptance of rent— from 
denying that the option has been exercised* It was held that the mere accept­
ance of rent, after the expiration of the tenancy, did not justify the inference 
that the option has been exercised by the defendant and that a new contractual 
tenancy has been created*
The Conveyancing Decree, 1973» has impliedly overruled some of these 
2decisions • Section 39 of the Decree provides that:
Thlils, with the coming into force of the Decree, any notice to exercise 
an option to renew must be in writing, unless there is contrary agreement*
It is not clear, however, what the position will be if the conveyance 
simply gives the tenant the option to renew without stating that it is exercis­
able on notice being given* Can such an option be exercised by conduct? On 
the face of it this would seem to be possible since ’notice1 is not 'required1• 
It may however be that the courts will take the view that the clear intention 
of the Conveyancing Decree, 1973j is to impose a requirement of writing in as
"Unless otherwise provided in a conveyance, any notice 
required to be given under the conveyance shall be in 
writing . .
1.
2* Ogde v* Pearl & Dean, op.cit*, and Moukarzel v* Hannah, op*cit*
167
many cases as possible*; and that one cannot manifest an intention to exercise 
an option by conduct because such a manifestation of intention is 'notice' 
and by section 39 such 'notice' must be in writing#
Provided no time is fixed for exercise of the option, it can be exercised
at any time during the landlord and tenant relationship# In Moukarzel v#
2
Hannah , the facts of which we have already seen, it was further held by 
Harragin C.J., that:
" • • • as no time haS been stated in which the option
is to be exercised, the right to do so will continue
so long as the relationship of landlord and tenant exists
3
even though the original tenancy has expired” •
Where the tenant has an option to renew, the landlord has no right to
refuse to renew the tenancy unless the tenancy is otherwise determined by
some other reason, such as breach of a covenant fortified by a forfeiture
4clause# In Ampiah v# G#B» Ollivant , tenants who had covenanted to keep 
the premises in repair and had an option to renew sought to exercise the 
option. The landlord refused to renew the tenancy but the tenants remained 
in possession after the expiry of the first term# The landlord sued for 
recovery of possession on the erroneous grounds that the lease should have 
contained a 'usual' covenant for re-entry for failure to repair# It was
held inter °lia that the tenants were not in breach of their covenant to repair"A 1
and that the landlord had no ri£ht to refuse to renew the tenancy#
1# See the momorandum to the Decree#
2. 12 W#A.C.A#125.
3* at p 125 *
4. (lciif-S)fl.C{Utc))'48 - ’51 , 46.
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D. »USUAL* COVENANTS
As <U‘A seen, tenancy agreements and leases are sometimes preceded
by a contract to create a tenancy • In such a case the rule at common law 
is that the 'usual* covenants shall be implied in the contract* In Ampiah
a lease. The contract made no mention of the "usual and proper covenants"*
The lease contained a covenant by the tenant to keep the premises in repair*
The landlord alleged breach of the covenant to repair; and in an action for
recovery of possession argued that a 'usual' covenant should be implied giving
him a right of re-entry for breach of the covenant to repair* It was held
by QuistJ., that the law implied that the 'usual' covenants should be inserted
3
even if the contract for a lease did not mention them •
'Usual' covenants add little more to the lease or tenancy than the 
covenants which would in any eventbe implied at common law* With the coming
into force of the Conveyancing Decree, most of the 'usual' covenants are
4 5statutorily implied in leases - which include contracts to create tenancies •
6The following covenants and conditions are always 'usual' •
3* It was, however, held that as a 'usual' covenant the proviso for re-entry 
applied only to non-payment of rent*
4* The exceptions are the covenants by the tenant to pay rates and taxes,
to keep the premises in repair and the proviso for re-entry for non-pay­
ment of rent•
5* See 45 (1) & (2). We are not of the view that 'usual' covenants will
cease to be implied in leases* The Conveyancing Decree is not a compre­
hensive code of Conveyancing law; nor of the law of landlord and tenant* 
The common law rules are therefore unless the Decree provides otherwise*
6* See Hampshire v* Wickens (1878) 7 Ch.D.555*
2v* G«B.Ollivant , the execution of a lease was preceded by a contract for
1* A covenant by the landlord for quiet enjoyment* 
2* A covenant by the tenant to payment*
1* Supra, pp40| -|||.
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3* A covenant by the tenant to pay rates and taxes other
than those which the landlord is statutorily obliged to pay.
4. A covenant to keep and yield the premises in repair.
5. A covenant to permit the landlord to enter and view the
state of repair in cases where the landlord has undertaken 
to make some repairs.
6. A condition of re-entry for non-payment of rent, but not 
for breach of any other covenant*.
In English law there is authority for a more liberal interpretation of
the word 'usual* which requires the question to be decided as one of fact
rather than of law, so that as the practice changes, so may the * usual•coven- 
2ants • It is doubtful whether in Ghana a court would be willing to imply 
additional terms, other than those implied by the Conveyancing Decree, as 
'usual' covenants.
1. Ampiah v. G.B.Ollivant, op.ci$.{ Sackey v. Ashong (1956) 1 W.A.L.R.108
2. Hampshire v. Wickens (1878) 7 Ch.D555tf per Jessel. M.R., at p*5^1 $ 
Flexman v. Corvett Jl93oJ 1 Ch.672 at p. 678 , per MaughamJ.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
MAINTENANCE AND REPAIR
"The first object of landlord - tenant law should be 
the making of repairs and the general maintenance of 
the property"1*
Introduction
This statement of priorities may not appear to be applicable to Ghana 
in view of the virtual absence of legislation and public debate on the subject 
and the contrasting amount of legislative time and public debate spent on 
the other two sides of the triad— rent restriction and security of tenure*
But the maintenance and repair of residential property is of crucial 
importance* It is important to the landlord interested in maintaining the 
value of his reversion* It is also important to the tenant who wants livable 
accommodation* But perhaps crucially, it is important for society; for failure 
to maintain and repair will result in the creation of slums with its effects 
on productivity and morale and the attendant problems of disease, crime, 
vandalism and adult and juvenile delinquency*
It is thus crucial that there be a good, effective and equitable regime 
of laws for the maintenance and repair of residential property, the subject- 
matter of a tenancy*
In most properly- drawn:leases there is usually agreement on the repair-
2 . . ing obligations of the respective parties • The comraon-law position is that
parties to a tenancy agreement could "agree" on their repairing obligations 
without interference — i*e*, apart from the tenant's duty to use the premises 
in a tenant-like manner and not to commit waste* Quite apart from the disad­
vantaged position of the tenant in a landlord's market situation, this commom-
1* United States model Urban Residential Landlord and Tenant Act*
2* Of the 352 written tenancy agreements in the survey of 2,000 residential 
tenancies, Jl6 contained provisions affecting the repairing obligations
of the parties* All the 133 property-drawn and executed leases contained 
covenants to repair*
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law position can have serious consequences on the state of residential prop­
erty in Ghana* This is because most tenancies are created orally and infor-
. 1mally with no provision made for repair •
The role of the law in this situation is far from clear* There appears
to be a complex conflict of interests and the law must get the balance right
if the law is to be seen to be fair and is to succeed in its desired policy -
objectives* On the one hand, society as a whole stands to suffer if property
is not maintained and repaired) on the other hand landlords and tenants may
suffer (or, more probably, fail to comply) if their repairing obligations are too
onerous* Underlying all these is the crucial question of finance* Simply
put, who is to pay for the maintenance and repair of residential property,
the subject-matter of a tenancy? Some countries, appreciating the wider
societal implications of the maintenance and repair of residential property,
have placed part of the obligation to repair on society (local authorities
in the case of England and Vales)* In the present economic conditions of
Ghana state aid in the maintenance and repair of houses is not a live option*
It may, however, be worthy of consideration if and when conditions improve*
A* THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE LANDLORD
. . 2I* Implied warranty of habitability
The Conveyancing Decree, 1973 does not impose an obligation on landlords 
to grant tenancies of premises in a habitable condition* There is no implied 
covenant by the landlord that the premises he is letting is fit for human habit­
ation* This is the general position at common law, where there |:S' no implied
1* Field research indicated that in these cases most landlords carried out
external repairs and repairs affecting 'common parts' like kitchen, roofing, 
and lavatory facilities* Some tenants said they painted the interior of 
their rooms themselves; but they consider this to be because of their desire 
to keep their rooms 'nice' rather than the discharge of a legal obligation* 
Gratuitous repair, it must be noted, does not impose a legal obligation to 
repair*
2* The implied warranty of |y»brfo&ility is used here restrictively in a consider­
ation of the condition of the premises at the inception of the tenancy*
The condition of the premises during the course of the tenancy is considered
“ pp-l7£-lS7-
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warranty by the landlord of an unfurnished house (flat or room?*) that the
2premises are reasonably fit for occupation • At common law, there is an
implied warranty of habitability in lettings of furnished houses, flats or 
3
rooms • In such cases the habitability of the premises is a condition of
4
the tenancy and this must be fulfilled before the commencement of the tenancy • 
This qualification of the general rule is of limited use/importance in Ghana, 
where there are only a few furnished lettings - these being in the upper ranges 
of the market for diplomatic missions, financial institutions, public corpora- 
tions, etc. Fieldwork carried out by the present writer did not disclose any 
in the lower and middle ranges of the market.
The absence of an implied warranty of habitability in residential tenancies 
is based on the theory that a tenancy created an estate in land to which the 
maxim caveQt emptor applied. This required that the tenant should examine 
the premises and thereafter take it as he finds it. The landlord is not 
taken to warrant that the premises are fit for habitation. The fact that the 
tenant may not have inspected the premises or may not have noticed some less 
obvious defects is considered irrelevant. This view is epitomised in the 
following dictum:
" . • • fraud apart there is no law against letting a 
tumbledown house, and the tenant's remedy is upon his 
contract if any"^.
1. Glanville Williams has argued cogently that it is still open for an 
English court to hold that a warranty of habitability is implied in 
lettings of flats or rooms: See "Dangerous premises, the duties of non­
occupiers in respect of", (1942) 5 M.L.R.194.
2. Hart v. Windsor (1844) 12 M & W.68; Cruse v. Mount [l933j Ch.278;
Sleafer v. Lambeth Council [i960) 1 Q.B.43. These authorities are not 
as strong as sometimes supposed. It has been argued that the law could 
easily have developed in the opposite direction: See Williams, G., supra; 
Reynolds, J.I., "Statutory covenants of fitness and repair", (1974) 37 M.L.R.377
3. Smith v. Marrable (1843) H  M. & W.5; Collins v. Hopkins ^ -923] 2 K.B.617*
4. Wilson v. Finch (1877) 2 Ex.D.336.
5. Robbins v. Jones 15C.B. (N.S.) 221, per Earle C.J. at 240.
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After a tenant inspects premises, he takes the risk of their condition;
and he cannot complain because the landlord did not disclose defects in respect
1
of which he has opportunity of informing himself • If the tenant intends to 
hold his landlord responsible for the habitability of the leased premises,
he should have a covenant to that effect incorporated in the lease or tenancy*
2
Where there is no express covenant in the lease or tenancy agreement , caveat 
emptor applies; the tenant assumes the risk and no liability attaches to the
3
landlord •
This coramon-law position derived from the single basic rural agricultural
4situation: a tenancy of agricultural land • Though there might be some struc­
tures on the land, these were incidental to the main purpose of the transaction-
5
the granting of agricultural land as a factor of production . This traditional 
real property approach (deriving from a specific historical formation) was 
appropriate at a time when tenancies were primarily a means of securing the 
use of land— the land itself being used for producing profit*
This basis for justifying of the traditional real property rules is far
1* Bottomey v* Bannister |l932J 1 K.B.458, per Scrutton L.J* at 468.
2* It has been noted that most residential tenancies in urban Ghana are
created orally and informally. There is no agreement on anything except 
the amount of rent and how it is to be paid. Judicial notice was taken 
of these facts by Sowah J.A., in Allamedine Bros, v* Paterson Zochouis 
|j97i] 2 G.L.R.403, at 411.
3* MA mail who takes a house from a lessor, takes it as it stands; it is his
business to make stipulations beforehand, and if he does not, he cannot
say to the lessor, 'this house is not in a proper condition, and you • • 
must put it into a condition which makes it fit for my living in'"^ per
Romilly M.R., in Chappell v. Gregory (1863) 3^ Beav*250, at 253* In
England various exceptions have been introduced by the Housing Acts, 1957 
and 1961.
4. supra, pp*
5* See Friedman, M.R., Friedman on Leases, op.cit*, pp*\— \0 J Moskovitz, M., 
"The implied warranty of habitability-— a new doctrine raising new issues", 
(197^) 62 Calif.L.R.1444; Quinn, T.M., & Phillips, E., "The law of land­
lord and tenants a critical evaluation of the past with guidelines for 
the future", (1969) 28 Fordham L.R.38; Bennett, D.E., "The modern lease - 
an estate in land or a contract?(1937) 16 Texas L.Rev.47*
nk
removed from the socio-economic realities within which residential tenancies 
in urban Ghana operate. An American writer^commenting on the nature of the 
residential tenancy, noted:
The socio-economic conditions underpinning the common-law rule have
been eroded} it behoves the legal scientist to consider whether it is (a)
necessary; (b) desirable; and (c) possible for the law to imply a warranty
of habitability in residential tenancies in urban Ghana?
The first question to consider is the housing situation in urban Ghana
2
and the state of the private rental sector • There is an acute shortage of
rental accommodation in Ghana — particularly in the urban areas. This is due
3 4
to a number of factors including: (a) increase in population ; (b) migration ;
and (c) the high cost of building which is the result of the lack of adequate
5 6 planning, the shortage of building material , and the high level of inflation •
The committee of enquiry set up to investigate the operation of the Rent Control
Ordinance (No.2), 1952, had this to say in 19&2:
1. Cioffi, J., "The landlord-tenant relationship: a new urban structure”,
5* There are frequent shortages of cement, roofing material, louvre glass, 
iron rods, nails, etc. Though the prices of these items are controlled, 
the items are seldom available at the controlled price. Most people buy 
these items at the Kalabule price, which, in some instances, is about 
five times the control price. For the failure of price control in Ghana;
See Killick, T., "Price controls in Africa; the Ghanaian experience", (1973) 
11 J.of.Mod. Afri.Stud.405.
6. The rate of inflation accelerated from 22.8% in 1974 to 116% in 1979*
See infra pp^£3'3£6 f°r a fuller discussion of inflation.
7* Report of the Committee. Accra, 1962, p. 9>para. 4.
"The contemporary urban tenant is primarily interested
'•1
m  the property for shelter rather than for profit • ♦
"Though the various agencies of production in the public
and private sectors are producing'houses of various types,
there is still a shortage of suitable accommodation, both
in quantity and in quality, especially for the low and
7
middle income groups" •
(1973) 18 New York L.F.725* at 733.
2. supra, pp.^ -7 •
3.
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The demand for rental accommodation is far in excess of supply* In this 
situation, Q landlord's market has been created* Given this imbalance between 
the supply of and demand for rented accommodation, the 'right* of a tenant 
to secure his interest by an express warranty ceases to be a practical propo­
sition* Most tenants are compelled to take premises on the terms indicated 
by the landlord, without such a warranty*
In this concrete context, the maxim caveat emptor becomes particularly 
questionable; for when the bargaining positions of the parties are so unequal 
and alternative accommodation is virtually non-existent, a prospective tenant 
may well consider it prudent to be unaware.
The maxim caveat emptor is an esentially laissez faire doctrine 
Q Itfilicli stressed individual freedom and autonomy
of the will*. It may be well suited to situations where the concrete socio­
economic realities make for more equal bargaining levers and where both parties 
can reasonably be expected to look after themselves* In urban Ghana, however,
the landlord is in a superior bargaining position; he offers a scarce "commodity"
2and is operating m  a "landlords' market" situation • The tenant, on the other 
hand, is either holding a tenancy which has expired or expires at about the 
tijna^ the new tenancy becomes effective; or he may be a first-time prospective 
tenant. In either of these situations he has not got much leverage. The 
laissez faire doctrine caveat emptor is grossly out of fit in a situation like 
this; the tenant, for all practical purposes, does not have the option of shop­
ping around for available rental accommodation of his choice.
These concrete socio-economic facts would seem to argue for the need to
imply a warranty of habitability in residential tenancies in urban Ghana.
3
But these same realities argue for caution and circumspection • Care must be
1. See Williston, S., "Freedom of contract", (1921) Cornell L.Q.365*
2. See Date - Bah, S.K., "Legislative control of freedom of contract", in 
Essays in Ghanaian Law, (eds.') Ekow-Daniels, w »C> & Woodman, G.R., Accra, 1976.
3* One of the fascinating insights of the study of law and society is that
socio-economic factors which seem to cry out for legislative action severely 
limit the effectiveness of such 'regulation'• Thus, the imbalance between 
supply and demand (due to foreign exchange problems, etc.) in the non-soci- 
alised Ghanaian economy which led to price control legislation sure partly 
responsible for the failure of such controls.
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ltaken not to impose too onerous an obligation on the landlord • If this is 
done and the law is effective (this is most unlikely) the following consequences 
may emerge* Landlords unable to comply with the stringent requirements of 
the law may opt out of the rented residential sector altogether* It may also 
lead to rent increases which most of the urban poor will find difficult to 
pay* The consequences of implying a warranty of habitability in urban resid­
ential tenancies might worsen an already bad housing situation and lead to
serious consequences •
II* Duty of maintenance and repair
a. Implied obligation
In general, the landlord is under no implied obligation to maintain the
premises or to keep the premises in repair during the existence of the tenancy;
only if he expressly covenants to do repairs is he liable for any repairs that 
3
become necessary • Field research by the present writer indicated that in 
multi-dwelling premises tenants were not expected to carry out external repairs; 
the landlord took responsibility for it, but the actual repairs were either 
not done or done in their own good time* There were complaints about land­
lords failing to make repairs* The committee set up to enquire into the 
operation of the Rent Control Ordinance (No*2), 1952, noted similar complaints; 
but this was all it had to say in its reports
"Some of them, such as responsibility for repairs and
decorations, are entirely matters of agreement between 
4the parties" •
The principal reason for this common-law position is historical, and lies
5
in the peculiar nature of the leasehold interest as an estate in land • The
1* For an account of how the overweening ambition of legislators serves to 
limit the effectiveness of laws See Allott, A.N*, The Limits of Law,
London, 1980, pp*67-69.
2* It is doutful whether in the present economic and socio-political conditions 
of Ghana (including but not limited to the housing situation), implying a 
warranty of habitability in residential tenancies would have any practical
effects See infra, pp* 363.
3* Cannock v. Jones (1849) Ex*233; Coward v. Gregory (1866) L.R* 2 C*P* 
153, at 172.
4* Report of the Committee, Accra, 1962, p. 18 1 para*20 (e).
2
i?7
traditional landlord-tenant relationship was primarily concerned with land.
What ever structures were on the land were incidental to the main purpose 
of the transaction*.
This quaint notion of residential tenancy as an estate in land is far 
removed from the realities of modern urban Ghana. The residential tenancy 
in modern urban conditions is a package of goods and services concerned prim­
arily with shelter and other services like electricity, water, kitchen and
2
lavatory facilities which make for a decent and comfortable living . Land
is not an important consideration; and in most instances where a tenant rents
a room or two, it is highly fictional to consider him as having an estate in
land. The common-law rule may have been well-suited to the agrarian economy
within which it developed, where the tenant-farmer was fully capable of making
repairs to the simple structure himself. But it is archaic and out of fit
with the realities of modern urban conditions where the tenant is most likely
a salaried worker with a single specialised skill unrelated1 to the repair of 
3
premises • Moreover, the buildings in urban Ghana are more complicated than 
the simple structures of mediaeval England— within which the foundations of 
landlord-tenant law were laid.
1. Placing the legal duty to repair on the landlord
It has been argued that the concrete socio-economic facts of urban Ghana 
have changed the factual assumptions on which the cononon-law rule is based.
As a result of the changed social and economic circumstances residential ten­
ants in urban Ghana, unlike their agrarian predecessors in mediaeval England, 
do not use their tenancies as a factor of production; nor do they have the 
ability or time to ma|<e repairs once easily made by the ”jack-of-all-trades” 
tenant-farmer.
It may however be argued (^tj some) that when the concrete circumstances 
underpinning a particular transaction has changed and a rule is no longer
1. supra, pp.
2. See Javi'ns v. First National Realty Corp. 428F.2d.1071 (D.C.Coc. 1970) •
5. See Cioffi, J.J., ”The landlord-tenant relationship: a new urban structure”, 
op.cit.', LeSQT, H.H., "Landlord and tenant reform”, (i960) 35 New York Univ.
L.R.1279; Bennett, D.E., ”The modern lease-an estatej.n iand or a contract?” 
(1937) 16 Texas L.Rev.47. ’
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desiraole the parties are free to change it; and that the tenant can have
a specific covenant inserted that imposed an obligation to repair on the
landlord. This is the classic freedom of contract theory epitomised in the 
words of Sir George Jessel M.R.s
"If there is one thing which most than another public policy 
requires, it is that men of full age and competent understanding 
shall have the utmost liberty of contracting and their contracts 
when entered into freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred
and shall be enforced by courts of justice"'*'.
This view, however, is not appropriate in the present housing situation. 
Residential tenancies are not the product of arms- length bargaining. Given 
the gross inequality in bargaining positions, most tenants— particularly low- 
incorae tenants— find themselves in a"take - it or leave - it" situation.
Their lack of bargaining leverage in a strong landlords' market compels them
to take premises on the landlord's terms. Secondly, and more importantly,
most residential tenancies are entered into orally and informally, and apart 
from rent and the period of payment nothing else is agreed. Moreover, most 
tenants are not aware of these common-law rules and will therefore not seek 
to change them by express stipulation. The committee of enquiry into the 
operation of the Rent Control Ordinance (No.2), 1952, reported:
"There appears to be, however, some ignorance on the part
of landlords and tenants as to their rights and obligations
and a system by which landlords and tenants can be educated
2as to their duties and rights is clearly necessary"
The following additional reasons would seem to argue for the duty of repair 
to be imposed on the landlord.
In the first place the value of the landlord's interest in the property
1. Printing and Numerical Registering Co. v. Sampson (1875) L.R.19Eq.
462, at 4)65.
2. Report of the Committee, Accra, 19&2, P*19i Para.21.
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l
is greater than the present interest of the tenant • The landlord will
ultimately enjoy the benefit of any repair* Most residential tenants are
monthly tenants and it is unreasonable to expect them to make repairs when
2there is no guarantee that they will continue to reside in the premises •
Society also has a responsibility to see to it that houses are not left
unrepaired because of the deleterious social consequences which will follow 
3from neglect • Such state intervention may be thought by some to be a fetter
\
on the freedom of contracting parties* .
As has been argued, such freedom is already absent in 
most tenancy - situations* Society has an interest in seeing to it that houses 
are repaired and this cannot be left to individuals* Kessler and Sharp have 
noted that:
"In the evolution of the law of contracts, the basic assum­
ption of the past that contract deals with the individual 
relations of man with each other has gradually given way to 
the recognition that in large sectors of our social and econb- 
mic life contract is no longer an individual and private affair,
but a social institution affecting more than the interests
4of the two contracting parties" •
The Conveyancing Decree imposes an obligation on tenants to leave premises 
5
in repair • It is not clear whether the legislature has made a deliberate 
policy-decision that repairing obligations are better placed on tenants* It 
is more likely that the legislator thinks that the landlord can do as he pleases
1* See Bradbrook, A*J*, "The law relating to the residential landlord-tenant 
relationship: an initial study of the need for reform", (197^) 9 Melbourne 
Univ.Law Rev*589*
2* The security of tenure provisions of the Rent Act, 19&3 have been largely 
ineffective: Setinfra, PP« 3 ^ 6  "332> .
3* In the present economic conditions of Ghana state-aid for the repair of 
property is not a realistic option*
4* Kessler and Sharp, Contracts: Cases and Materials, Boston, 1953* P*9j
o^4\j S' K.• , tslaHVO, corttW qC£cq.o4o /n c £
. is.  1 1
1*173 ,S a s  0) f d  ft-1-5*
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1
with his own property , but that the tenant should leave the premises in the 
condition in which it was when he entered. The implied statutory covenant 
to leave the premises in repair would not take care of major repair in multi­
dwelling premises, nor does it ensure repair of the premises during the tenancy.
If society is to make sure that houses are repaired (and the society can­
not help pay for the repair), it is arguable that the obligation should be 
placed on the landlord. As a general proposition, the landlord would be in 
a better position than the tenant to discharge this obligation. Most resid­
ential tenants rent only a room or two and it will be difficult to carry out 
fit separate but interdependent rooms in a house. The landlord who has an interest
in the whole premises and has control of common areas like the roof, ceiling,
2bathroom and lavatory is in a better position to carry out the repairs •
But, again, a cautionary note must be sounded. For reasons some of which 
have already been canvassed, but the rest of which will be argued later, impos­
ing a duty of repair on landlords may either make no difference or make things 
even more difficult for the tenants. The only real solution to the problems 
of tenants (lack of repair, absence of security and above-the-law rents) proved 
bargaining leverage for the tenant, and, perhaps more importantly (because 
without this the former cannot be achieved) an improvement in the social, >
economic and political circumstances of Ghana.
1. The Decree does not require the landlord to repair; nor does it require
the tenant to keep the premises in repair.
2. It is not being suggested that landlords are a rich class; nor is it being
suggested that most of them are "slum lords"* Most of them are private
individuals, some of whom live in the house. Most of them are not rich 
and, like most^o^f^he population, have been ravaged by inflation and the 
difficult economic^ **They are not shylocks, just rational men reacting 
shrewdly to economic necessities. But, as a general proposition, their 
situation is better than that of most of their tenants: See Woodman, G.R.,
’•Land law and the distribution of wealth", in Essays in Ghanaian law, op.cit., 
p 158, at 172-17^* Furthermore, the landlord would be in a better position
to secure financing for repairs while the tenant would be unlikely to get
such financing because he has no long-term interest in the premises.
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II. Common Areas and Parts of Premises in Possession of Landlord
The theory that a resides!tial tenancy is a conveyance of an in­
terest in land was easily applied to a tenancy of an entire property. 
There the landlord had no right to enter without the tenants permi­
ssion, and he was held not to have a duty to repair. This theory is 
even more unsuitable when applied to tenancies of parts of premises 
to several different tenants who share entrances* lavatory, kitch­
en and bathroom facilities, and utility lines like water and elec­
tricity. With the latter, the tenants only have a-right of non­
exclusive use. The landlord retained control of these ancilliaries, 
subject to the tenants' right of user.
In English law, it has therefore been held that the landlord is 
under an obligation to keep common areas and parts of premises in
T
his control in a state of reasonable repair. The issue of the - - 
responsibility for common areas and parts of premises was consider­
ed by the House of Lords in the English case of Liverpool City
2Council v. Irwin. In this case, the lifts, rubbish chutes and light­
ing on the stairs of a tower block were not in good working condi­
tion. It was held that the landlord was in breach of an implied 
covenant to maintain these common parts in good working order.
It has been suggested that the decision is not limited to tower 
blocks and that it applies equally to all multi-dwelling premises.
2  K.B.795.
2 . [l97 6 ] 2  W.L.R.5 6 2 .
3 . Woodfall, The Lav/ of Landlord and Tenant, op.cit. ,Vol.1, 622.
I. See Cockbum v. Smith Punster v. Harris
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b* Express Covenant
We have noted that generally there is no implied obligation on the land­
lord to repair* A landlord may, of course, agree to do all or part of the
in this respect should be inserted in the lease or tenancy agreement* Where 
a landlord undertakes some repairing obligations, a licence is implied in
2
the tenancy giving the landlord the right to enter to repair the premises • 
Such a right is to be exercised reasonably*
1* Requirement of Notice
The common-law rule is that the liability of a landlord who covenants
to repair does not arise until he has been given notice of the defective
3 4condition • This rule was applied in Ghana in Nukpa v* Hunter • In this
case the landlord covenanted to make structural repairs to the premises*
The tenant covenanted to keep the interior and exterior of the premises in 
repair* When the tenant defaulted, the landlord sued for recovery of posses­
sion* The tenant argued that the landlord had failed to make structural 
repairs; and that these should be done before distempering and papering —  H\t,
before decoration, the tenant should have informed the landlord of the struc­
tural defects* Since such notice had not been given the landlord was not 
liable* The law was thus stated by Coussey J.j
1* Of the 352 written tenancy agreements in the random survey of 2,000 only 
10 contained express covenants by the landlord to repair*
1 W.L.R.570.
repairs during the term by an express covenant** Whatever he agrees to do
It was held that though structural repair should be done
"Upon a covenant by the lessor to keep in good repair
walls, drains and roofs of demised premises the lessor
cannot be sued for non-repair unless he has received
5
notice of non-repairM
4* '48-51, 253*
Torrens v* Walker
5* ibid*, p* 256.
*83t
The principle that a landlord's repairing covenant is a covenant to
repair on notice is rationalised on the ground that without notice from the
tenant, the landlord has no means of ascertaining the condition of the pre- 
1
mises • As Coussey J., continued in Nukpa v. Hunter:
" • • • the lessor is not on the spot to see what repairs
are wanting and therefore the lessee cannot accuse the
lessor for breach of repairs without notice, for the lessor
2may not know that repairs are necessary" •
This is why the requirement of notice is unjustifiable where the land-
3
lord has been given licence to enter and inspect the premises • It is suggested
k
that in such cases the notice requirement be dispensed with • The landlord
has a very valuable interest in the premises and should take his inspection 
5
duties seriously. The renting of residential accommodation must be seen 
not merely in terms of rent-collecting, but as a service involving property 
management^
Nor is it clear why the tenant should be expected to give notice when
7
he has no way of knowing of the defective condition. In Hugall v. McLean, 
a landlord who has covenanted to repair a drain failed to do so. This result­
ed in the house flooding. The jury found that neither party knew of the 
defective condition of the drains; but that the tenant had not, while the
landlord had, the means of knowing. The rule requiring notice was nevertheless 
1
followed • This is monstrous; there is no justifiable reason why a tenant
1. See Murphy v. Hurly J1922J 2 K.B.369 .
2. supra, at p.256.
3* See Morgan v. Liverpool Corp [l927] 2 K.B.131; MaCarrick v. Liverpool
C o r p [1947] A.C.219* These ca$es hold that notice is required even where 
the landlord has a right to enter and view the premises.
4. See Reynolds, J.I., "Statutory covenants of fitness and repair", (1974)
37 M.L.R.377* The article deals with the English Housing Acts.
5# Under the current law inspection is not a duty; it is a privlege sometimes
conferred by leases. It is suggested that a duty be imposed on landlords 
to make periodic inspections of residential property. For this the tenant 
should allow reasonable access and opportunity.
6. See Williams, G., (ed.) Law Reform Now, London, 1951» PP*H3 and 124.
7. (1885) 53 L.T.94.
should have to give notice to the landlord of defects Mof such a nature that 
the tenant did not know and could not have discovered by reasonable examin­
ation"*. Such a rule is inequitable. Where the defects are obvious, at 
least one can say that the tenant should have brought it to the attention 
of the landlord. Where the defect is latent, no such blame attaches. One 
cannot be expected to give notice of defects which he cannot know about.
1. "Structural" repair
2 . .As was noted in Nukpa v. Hunter , when landlords undertake repairing
obligations it is normally to make "structural" repair. A tenant may also
covenant to do all repairs except those of a structural nature.
3
In Thome v. Barclays Bank Ltd. the meaning of "structural" was deter­
mined by the Court of Appeal. In this case the landlord leased his premises 
to a bank; part of the premises was to be used as a residence and the other
part as a bank. The tenant covenanted to keep the premises in good and
tenantable repair and condition. During the course of the tenancy the tenant 
carried out extensive alteration to the premises— converting the residential 
part of the premises into offices. The architect in charge of the alteration 
gave the following evidences
"We did demolish certain iron load bearing, partition walls 
were demolished . . .  We provided additional offices in 
the places not being used. We provided a new office for the 
manager to replace the existing manager's office which was 
located at a different position. We provided a new office
for the assistant manager and typist . . .  We took the
walls of the previous office for the manager and added that
to the banking hall . . . .  A suspended ceiling was added
1. O'Brien v. Robinson [*973^  1 All E.R.583, per Diplock L.J. at 592.
2. (195©) O-k(i-atfd) *48-51 p 253.
3. tt976"J 2 G.L.R.126.
%S5i
1
to the banking hall1
On the basis of this evidence, the trial judge held that there had been
'structural* alteration to the demised premises* On appeal, the ordinary
bench of the Court of Appeal disagreed* Jiagge J*A*, thought that to construe
the evidence of the architect as an admission that there was 'structural*
2alteration would do violence to language • Archer J*A*, said that the evidence
of the architect showed that there was no alteration to the main structure 
3of the building • The ordinary bench gave a technical interpretation to the 
4
word 'structural' , and relied on the definition of the architect, who said 
that:
"By structure I mean those components of the building 
that support it* After the alteration I would say the 
structure has not been affected"^*
On an application to the full bench, the decision of the ordinary bench 
was reversed* The full bench held that the word 'structural' should be given 
its ordinary meaning and not the technical meaning given to it by civil engin­
eers* Azu - Crabbe J*S*C*, delivering the unanimous judgment of the full bench 
had this to say:
"With great respect, it is unfortunate that the two
learned judges should restrict themselves to the
special meaning the architect gave the word • • • •
6Every part of the building is structure" •
What then constitutes 'structural' repair? Surprisingly there is a paucity
7
of authority on what constitutes 'structural' repair even in English law •
1* supra, p*l4l-l42.
2* [l973] 2 G.L*R*137t at p. 143.
3* ibid, at pp* 148.
4* ibid, Jiagge J.A. at p* 144 ; Archer J*A* at / M - l$D*
5* [1976] 2 G.L.R.126 at p. l4l
6* ibid, pp* 142-143.
7* There is a lot more authority on 'structural' alteration, which was indeed
what Thome v* Barclays Bank Ltd, was concerned with.
*88.
l
Vaisy J., defined ’structural repair* as meaning repairs of, or to a structure • 
Considering the definition of structure adopted by the full bench, this would
mean that all repairs to premises apart from decorative work would be class-
. . 2 lfied as 'structural repair* •
We suggest that the expression 'structural repair' should be used to
distinguish repair which involves the essential structure of the premises --
its walls, roof and foundation«— from those which do not, such as repairing
3
a broken window or door •
3* Dependent and Independent Covenants.
We are here concerned with the relationship between a tenant's covenant 
to repair and a landlord's covenant to repair* Is the tenant's covenant to 
repair dependent upon the landlord performing hi3 repairing obligations?
The first general principle is that it is a question of construction
4whether repairing covenants are absolute, or conditional • Being a question 
of construction, it is dependent on the intention of the parties to be 
ascertained from the words they have used and the circumstances in which they 
appear**. This being the case, decisions which have placed a particular mean­
ing on a particular form of words or covenant are not to be taken as having
6
decided that those covenants must always bear the same meaning • This expla-
7
ins some apparently contradictory English decisions* In Cannock v* Jones 
where a tenant agreed to repair premises, the same "being prevously put in 
repair and kept in repair" by the landlord, it was held that these words 
amounted to an absolute and independent covenant to repair and was not a condition
1* Granada Theatres v* Freehold Investment £l958] 1 W.L*R*845»
2* The definition of the Full Bench is more satisfactory as regards 'structural' 
alteration with which the court was primarily concerned*
3* See W.A.West, Law of Dilapidations, 7th (ed.), 197^» Estates Gazette* p* 80-81
4* Westacott v. Hahn, op.cit*, per Pickford L*J*, at p* 505' » and
Scrutton L.J*, at p* 511 ; Holiday Fellowship v* Hereford Jl959j 1 W.L.R*
211. L
5* ibid.
6* ibid.
7. (1849) 3 Ex*233i (I850) 5 Ex.713.
precedent to the fulfilment of the tenant's repairing obligation* But in 
1
another case where tenants agreed to keep premises in repair "the same being
first put into repair" by the landlord} it was held that the landlord was
under an obligation to put the premises in repair} and that until he had done
this, he could not make the tenant liable for non-repair*
It is the same general rule which will apply in cases where the landlord
undertakes to make structural repair; and the tenant other .tf&pair* In our
2view, this is the way in which the decision in Nukpa v* Hunter should be
considered* In this case the landlord covenanted to make structural repairs
and the tenant covenanted to keep the interior and exterior of the premises
in good, tenantable repair* The tenant failed to distemper and paint the
premises and the landlord sued for recovery of possession* The tenant argued
that the landlord had failed to do structural repairs which were necessary
and that this should be done before distempering and painting* This submission
3
was upheld by Coussey J*, as being "perfectly reasonable" *
This case Should not be interpreted as having held that in every tenancy 
agreement in which the landlord undertakes to make structural repairs, the 
obligation of the tenant to keep the premises in repair is dependent on the 
landlord fulfilling his obligation* The nature of the repairs that the tenant 
has failed to do must be taken into account* There might not be much point 
in distempering and painting a house in want of structural repair* But the 
same cannot be said of, for example replacing a broken louvre pane or putting
in a nail where it is needed, though, the premises are in want of structural
. 4 repair •
/
1. Neale v. Ratcliff (1850) 15 Q*B*9l6.
2. Cp* tx)0.
at p* 256 • The landlord's right to re-enter was, however, upheld
because the tenant had not given notice of the want of structural repair 
to the landlord*
4* By the Conveyancing Decree, 1973* S*31 (2), no damages or compensation
is recoverable on breach of a covenant to put or leave premises in repair 
if imminent demolition or structural repair would render the repair*
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4* Rights of tenant on breach
Where a landlord covenants to make repairs, there is no implied right
1 2 . that the tenant may quit the premises , or is not liable to pay rent , if
the landlord fails to perform his obligations*
This is because, at common law, covenants in a tenancy agreement or
3
lease have always been held to be independent • The tenant's obligation to
pay rent is therefore not dependent on the landlord performing his covenant
4
to keep the premises in repair • The landlords only obligation is to deliver
possession to the tenant* Once the tenant has possession, he is liable for
rent* If the lack of repair is very serious and the tenant abandons the
premises, he might rely on constructive eviction; otherwise his obligations 
5
continue •
I* Damages
The tenant could, of course, bring an action for damages for breach of
covenant^* In an action for damages for breach of covenant to repair during
the course of a tenancy, it is unlikely that the tenant will be able to prove
sufficiently large damages to warrant the time and expense _;of a law-suit*
A suit for damages is perhaps the least effective of the remedies, if
one assumes that the primary goal is to improve the condition of the premises*
The remedy is unpractical* This is because it does not result in building
repair* Moreover, it does not commend itself to widespread use on accouht
of the high expense, the irritation and the frustration of time - consuming
7
legal proceedings, and the unavailability of legal aid •
It is not a condition precedent to the tenant's right to recover damages
1* See Surplice v* Farnsworth (1844) 7 Wan* & G*576*
2* See Hart v* Rogers B.9l6]| 1 K*B*646, 651? Taylor v* Webb fl937]
2 K.B.283.
3* See infra, pp* -X 1*7.
4* ibid.
5* See infra, pp*
6. In view of the legal expenses and the delay before cases are heard, this
is hardly a practical remedy open to the tenant*
7* There is no legal aid scheme in Ghana.
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for breach of the landlord's covenant that the tenant should actually have 
expended money in doing the repairs which the landlord ought to have done1*
II. Repair and Deduct
There is an old English case which holds that the tenant may do the
2
repairs and deduct the expense from the rent ; and there is a fairly recent
3
case which would seem to suggest that this is still the law * This remedy 
has been provided for by statute in some United States jurisdictions* Generally 
these statutes provide that the landlord of a building intended for human 
habitation must put it into a condition fit for such use, and repair all sub­
sequent dilapidations not occasioned by the tenant’s own negligence* If the
lessor fails to make the repairs upon demand, the tenant may make them himself 
and deduct the cost from the rent*
If such a remedy exists under the common law or is provided for by statute,
we suggest that it should not be made subject to contrary agreement#
III. Specific Performance
Specific performance of a covenant to repair should be a proper remedy 
for breach* In English law the courts have held that, in appropriate cases, 
the landlord's covenant to repair is specifically enforceable. In Jenne v*
k^ .Queens Cross Properties , Pennycuick V.C. made such an order. After distin-
5
guishing Hill v. Barclay , he continued:
’’There is nothing there at all inconsistent with a power
in the court to make an order on a landlord to do specific
work under a covenant to repair* I cannot myself see any
reason in principle why, in an appropriate case, an order
should not be made against a landlord to do some specific
6
work pursuant to his covenant to repair” •
1. Woodfall, Landlord and Tenant, op.cit*, p. 6l4 
2* Taylor v* Beal (1591) Cro.Eliz*222.
3* Lee - Parker v* Izzet jj.97^ 1 W*L.R*l688.
4. ]i974] Ch.97.
5* (1810) 16 Ves.Jun.402, 405.
8. supra, at p. jqq
This would appear to be the position in Ghana •
IV. Conclusion
In the present housing situation, care must be taken not to impose too 
onerous an obligation on the landlord* If this is done the tenant will be 
the one to suffer* A tenant who attempts to obtain improved housing cond­
itions may be threatened with or face actual retaliatory measures* Such 
retaliatory action will take the form of increased rent or retaliatory evic­
tion* As we would see later, rent control has been largely ineffective*
1* See C.F.A.O. v. Thome jl960j G.L.R.107 (discussed at p/L.08 infra)•
The case concerned a tenant's covenant to repair, but the observations 
of Apaloo J.S.C., will apply to a landlord's covenant*
B. THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE TENANTS 
I, Implied Obligations
Unlike the landlord) who in the absence of an express covenant or stat­
utory rule has no repairing obligations, the tenant is always under at least 
some responsibility to look after the premises he inhabits* In general, a 
tenant is not liable for injury to the premises resulting from reasonable 
and proper use, but is liable for injury beyond reasonable wear and tear,
and for injury resulting from unauthorised use* At common law, this respon­
sibility is expressed as: (a) a contractual duty to use the premises in a 
tenant-like manner and to deliver up possession to the landlord at the term­
ination of the tenancy in a state of repair, fair wear and tear exceptedj and
(b) a duty not to commit waste* It must be pointed out that the responsibility 
of the tenant is not merely a passive duty of looking after the premises well, 
it is also an affirmative duty to make some repairs—  repairs that are necess­
ary to prevent waste and decay of the premises* 
a* tenant-like* User
A tenant is under an implied obligation to keep and deliver the premises
1in a tenant-like manner • But what does using premises in a tenant-like manner
2entail? In Warren v* Keen , Denning L*J*, gave this answer:
"The tenant must take proper care of the place* He must,
if he is going away for the winter turn off the water, and
empty the boiler* He must clean the chimneys, when necessary,
and also the windows* He must mend the electric light when
it fuses* He must unstop the sink when it is blocked by his
waste* In short he must do the little jobs about the place
3
which a reasonable tenant would do" .
2 G.L.R.126.
2. [i954] 1 Q.B.15.
1* Marsden v* Heyes 2 K*B*1; Thome v*
3* ibid, at p* 20
b, Waste
A tenant is under an implied duty not to commit waste, A tenant commits
waste if he causes any alteration to the premises by way of damage, destru-
tion, addition, improvement or neglect, which injures the reversion*. Liability
is founded in tort,
1, Types of Waste
Voluntary waste is committed by an act, actual or commisive, causing
damage such as destroying, altering or converting the premises. Voluntary
waste chiefly consists of deliberately pulling down premises or parts of
2premises. In Marsden v. Heyes , it was held that the tenant must deliver
the premises in the same character in which they were granted to him. In
3
Thome v, Barclays Bank , where the tenant carried out extensive alterations
to the premises—— including converting the residential part of the premises
into offices— the tenants were held to be in breach of their covenant to
repair. But the court made it clear that the tenant would have been guilty
4of waste if there had been no covenant to repair •
The question whetheri a particular piece of alteration or conversion,
or pulling down a particuleur door or window constitutes waste, is one of .?
fact and of degree. In Hyman v. Rose, Buckley L,J», said in the Court of
Appeal:
’•whether opening a door in a wall is a breach of a
covenant to maintain the wall or is waste is to my
5
mind largely a matter of degree" ,
1. BU $UMJ1 v. Crucible Steel Co, J1925J 1 K.B.119.
2. Ij.927] 2 K.B.l.
3. [l976»] 2 G.L.R. 126,
4. ibid, at p*i39 • The court quoted approvingly this statement of 
Buckley L.J,, in Rose v. Hyman 2 K.B.234 at p.253:
••As regards any alteration of the structure the matter 
must be regarded from two aspects - first, upon the 
covenants of the lease, and, secondly, upon the doctrine 
of waste. It would be waste to make such alterations as
to change the nature of the thing demised".
5. jl91l] 2 K.B.234, at p.XSS.
and in the House of Lords, Lord Lor^buf^ L*C., had this to say:
"I cannot assent to the argument that a lessee with
a covenant such as this can under no circumstances
make a new door, or that doing so necessarily amounts 
1
to waste" •
Furthermore, in considering whether the particular acts of a tenant constitute
waste, regard must be had to changing socio-economic conditions# Nineteenth -
2
century English decisions need not necessarily be followed •
Permissive waste is distinguishable from voluntary waste in that the 
damage caused results from negligence and omission to maintain or repair such 
as by allowing a wall to deteriorate and eventually collapse, or a house to 
fall into ruins, or a fire to spread#
2, Liability for waste
A tenant for a fixed term has since 1267 been held liable for both volun­
tary and permissive waste^, This means that if the terms of the tenancy make
no provision for repair the tenant is liable for waste and must maintain and
.4
deliver the premises in the condition in which he took it •
A periodic tenant is liable for voluntary waste but not for permissive
waste as such^. He was said to be liable, however, to keep the premises wind
6 7and water - tight . But this is questionable . It would seem that the extent
of the liability of a periodic tenant will depend on the length of the ‘period',
8
and that he will not be liable for mere wear and tear of the premises •
3# Conveyancing Decree, 1973
As has been seen^, a tenant, by the Conveyancing Decree, 1973* impliedly 
covenants not to make alterations or additions to the premises or to cause or 
permit injury to its walls*0# The tenant further covenants that:
1. [l912] A.C.623* at 632.
2. See Barclays Bank v# Thome [l973] 2 G.L.R.137* per Archer J.A., at 150.
3# Statute of Marlbridge (52 Hen. 3)j Yellowly v. Gower (1855) 11 Ex.274.
4# Marsden v# HeyesTop,cit»
5# Toriano v# Young (1833) 2 C# & P.8.
6# Answorth v# Johnson (1832) 2 C# & P*239; Wedd v# Porter Q-916] 2 K,B,97«
7. Warren v* Keen [l954] 1 Q#B,15* Regis Property Co#Ltd, v, Dudley
ri959l A.C.370
J Cont
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"At the determination of the term of the lease to yield 
up to the covenantee the premises leased and all additions 
thereto and covenantee's fixtures therein in good and 
tenantable repair"
The combined effect of these provisions is to make much of the common
law of waste redundant* But the law of waste will still apply to residential
2tenancies created before the commencement of the Conveyancing Decree * As 
regards tenancies created after 1st January, 1974, however, the provisions 
of the Decree will apply to 'cases' hitherto governed by the law of waste*
II* Express covenant to repair
It is normal for well-drawn leases to contain express covenants imposing
. . 3repairing obligations on tenants •
a* Contractual nature of the covenant
4An obligation to repair must be founded upon privity of contract • But 
the covenant must be considered in relation to the grant of the tenancy* The 
tenant is not liable for breaches of the covenant committed before the execution 
of the lease, even if the breach is subsequent to the day which the lease or 
tenancy agreement stipulates for commencement of the tenancy* In Chidiak v* 
Coker^, a tenant sub-let and delivered possession to the sub-tenant before 
obtaining the consent of the governor* The consent of the governor was required 
because it was state land* The premises were damaged by fire before the con­
sent of the governor could be obtained* It was held that the sub-tenant is 
not liable on his covenant to repair* Coussey J*A*, said:
" • • • the execution of the lease by the lessor is a
condition precedent to the lessee becoming liable on 
6the covenant" •
8. Toriano v* Young, supra; Warren v* Keen, supra.
9. supra, p p j ^ f -//f0.
10* S.23 (1) and 3rd Sched*, Pt*I.
1. Conveyancing Dectee, 1973* S.23 (1) and 3rd Sched; Pt*I.
2* By section 46 the Decree came into force on 1st January, 1974.
3* Of the 352 written tenancy agreements in the survey 276 (about 70%} con­
tained covenants to repair by tenants* All the 133 properly-drawn leases 
contained covenants to repair by tenants.
4. Ramage v* Womack [1900J 1 Q.B.116.
5* (1954) 14 W.A.C.A.506. 6. ibid., at 50$.
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b. Construction of covenants to repair
Covenants are to be construed according to the words used, and the context
of each particular case* Decisions upon the meaning of particular expressions
give valuable guidance, but are not to be applied blindly to the facts of
another case1*
1* ”To put in repair"
Except where the premises to be let are in a serious state of disrepair
it is comparatively rare for a tenant to covenant that he will put them into
2
repair at the beginning of the tenancy • One of the few decided cases in which
3
there is such a covenant is Sackey v* Ashong • In this case, the premises
were in a ’’very dilapidated condition” when negotiations for a lease took place.
The prospective tenant agreed to put the premises into repair, and this he
4did* C*f *A*0. v* Thome is another example* The premises were in a state 
of disrepair at the time of letting* The tenant agreed to put the-premises 
into repair and to spend for this purpose a sum of £ G 500 (0 ?).
2. ”T0 keep in repair”
A tenant who has covenanted to keep premises in repair must have them
in repair at all times during the course of the tenancy* If the premises are
4 5
at anytime out of repair, he commits a breach • A covenant to keep premises
in repair requires the tenant to put the premises into repair at the beginning
of the tenancy, if necessary* The tenant is obliged to keep the premises in
repair throughout the tenancy and he cannot keep in repair until he has first
put the premises in repair6.
3> ”To leave in repair”
A covenant by the tenant to ’’keep in repair” is commonly coupled with
a covenant to ’’leave in repair”* But this is not necessary since to ’’keep
in repair” requires the tenant to leave in repair* In some cCases, however,
1* See Calthorpe v* McOscar ^L92kJ 1 K.B.716, per Atkin L.J., at 731
2* Of the 276 tenants in the survey of 2,000 who undertook some repairing 
obligation, only 2 covenanted to put in repair.
3. (1956) 1 W.A.L.R.108.
4. [1968] 1 G*L.R*107
5* See Luxmore v* Robson (1818) 1 B & Aid.584. (F*N*6.p.t.o.)
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a covenant to "leave in repair" is the only covenant on repair*. In such
cases no liability can arise until the end of the tenancy—-the obligation
being to deliver the premises at the end of the tenancy in a state of repair.
2
In C.F.A.O. v. Thome , the terras of the tenancy were agreed upon orally.
The tenant covenanted that "at the expiration of the tenancy, the premises 
to be handed over in good and tenantable condition". At the end of the ten­
ancy the tenant could not deliver the premises to the landlord because they 
were not in good and tenantable condition. When after sometime the necessary 
repairs had not been done, the landlord sued for recovery of possession of 
the premises in a state of repair. It was held that the tenant was in breach 
of his covenant and was therefore liable for damages •
c. Extent of repairing obligation
1. Standard of repair
4
In Ant.hrusther t Calthorpe v. McOscar , Scrutton L.J., saw no differ­
ence in meaning between "repair", "good repair", "sufficient repair" or 
"tenantable repair". Unless some special or unusual expression is employed 
these terms mean the same thing.
This does not, however, imply that the standard of repair in any tenancy 
in which either of these terms is used is the same. Such factors as the 
duration of the tenancy and the particular circumstances of each tenancy will 
affect the standard of repair to be imposed. That the standard of repair is 
relative was laid down in Proudfoot v. Hart**. In a case involving a tenancy 
for three years, Lord Esher M.R., defined good and tenantable repair as beingt
6. See Payne v. Haine (1847) 16 M. & W.541.
1. By the Conveyancing Decree, 1973» S.23 (1), a covenant to leave premises
in repair is implied in all residential tenancies for valuable consideration.
3* The specific performance aspect of this case is discussed below, at .
" * • • such repair as having regard to the age, character 
and locality of the house would make it reasonably fit for 
the occupation of a reasonably - minded tenant of the class 
likely to take it'. The age of the house must be taken
1 K.B.716.
(1890) 25 Q.B.242; applied in Jaquin v. Holland
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into account because nobody could reasonably expect that 
a house 200 years old should be in the same condition of 
repair as a house lately built; the character of the house 
must be taken into account, because the same class or repairs 
as would be necessary to a palace would be wholly unnecessary 
to a cottage; and the locality of the house must be taken 
into account, because the state of repair necessary for a 
house in Grosvenor Square ^a richer quarter^ would be wholly 
different form the state of repair necessary for a house
The decision in Proudfoot v# Hart was wholeheartedly endorsed and
to keep the interior of premises in "tenantable order and sanitary condition", 
fair wear and tear excepted. He further covenanted that at the end* or sooner 
determination of the tenancy he would yield up the premises in good and tenan­
table repair and condition. Glass and louvred windows were damaged during 
the course of the tenancy. On the expiry of the tenancy the landlord sued 
for breach of the covenants to repair. Tenant denied that the premises were 
in a state of disrepair and argued that his obligation did not extend to 
"re-decorating the entire internal walls" as the landlord had requested during 
the tenancy.
After approvingly quoting from Lord Esher*s judgment in Proudfoot v. 
Hart, Adumua-Bossman J., said:
The house need not be 
put into the same condition as when the tenant took it; it 
need not be put into perfect repair; it need only be put into 
such a state of repair as renders it reasonably fit for the 
occupation of a reasonably-minded tenant of the class who 
would be likely to take it"*.
2applied in Ashley v. James Colledge • In this case the tenant covenanted
" • • • the defendants obligations under the two covenants 
• . • were to keep, or maintain the interior only of the 
demised premises in such condition that no reasonably - 
minded tenant of the class who obtains leases of premises
2.
1. op.cit., at 52-53*
1 G.L.R.469.
in the locality, confind the premises, the subject- 
matter of this action, such that he can honestly 
condemn it as unfit for habitation and in that cond­
ition, to surrender or yield up possession to the plaintiff”**
Applying this statement of the law to the facts before him, the learned judge 
held that:
" • • • the damage to the glass and louvred windows, 
having been caused, • • • by inher&!!&. defects in their 
construction the defendents cannot be liable for that 
damage • • • In any event I do not believe that the 
damages were of such a nature as to make any reasonably- 
minded person who would desire to be a tenant of the class
2of premises avoid or shun the house as unfit for habitation" •
As regards internal decoration, the learned judge held that the covenant to
3
repair did not extend to decoration •
Where the character of the neighbourhood has changed during the course
of the tenancy, the standard to be attained is that prevailing at the time
when the covenant was entered into; for those were the conditions within the
4contemplation of the parties.•
The age of the house is also material, though only in the sense that the 
tenant's obligation requires him only to keep up the house as an old house 
and not give back a new one to the landlord* The tenants obligation is to 
keep the premises in reasonably good condition considering its age* The 
question of fact which the court has to decide is whether the tenants have, 
in the words of Tindal C*J«:
" • • • done what was reasonably to be expected of them,
looking at the age of the premises on the one hand, and
the words of the covenant which they have chosen to enter
5
into, on the other" •
1* op.cit*, 473-474.
2. [1961] 1 G.L.R.469, 474*
3* Unfortunately, the report does not indicate the locality and the town in 
which the premises were situated; nor the duration of the tenancy*
4* Anthrusther-Calthorpe v. McOscar 1924 1 K.B*7l6.
Gutteridge v* Munyard (1834) 1 M. & Rob*334, 337
2* Repair vrs« renewal
The operation of time and the elements will, in the course of time,
result in damage to premises which could only be remedied by building a
new house* This the tenant is not obliged to do* But he must undertake
all repairs necessary to protect against damage caused by the elements*
The tenant*s duty is to repair and this does not extend to rebuilding the
whole premises* But repair involves the replacement of subsidiary parts*
\A
’’Repair*1, said Lord Atkin^Calthorpe v* McOscar, ■, ’’connotes the idea of
making good damages so as to leave the subject as far as possible as though
it had not been damaged* It involves renewal of subsidiary parts; it does
1
not involve renewal of the whole” *
2Renewal, as distinguished from repair, ”is construction of the entirety” •
But this distinction is not always clear and in one English case it was held 
that the repairing covenant extended to 0 .^
The h would therefore to be between repair and
reconstruction • The former is required, the latter not* Whether work 
necessary for maintenance is repair or reconstruction is a question of degree*
The test to be applied is whether the 1 "f - involves only a renewal
of . parts; or whether it involves reconstruction of Q
subject-matter of the covenant* The latter is not covered by a
repairing covenant* The tenant is not required to give back something differ-
5 6ent in kind from what he took • In the English case of Lister v* Lane ,
the tenant of a house (at least 100 years old) covenanted to ’’well, suffic­
iently and substantially repair, uphold, sustain, maintain, amend and keep” 
the demised premises and yield them up in that condition at the end of the 
term* The house was built on a timber platform* Owing to the timber rotting,
the foundation sank* It was held that the tenant was not liable on his repair­
ing covenant to replace the foundation with one of an entirely different character*
1* op.cit., at 734.
2* Lurcott v* Wakeley [l91lj 1 K.B.905, per Buckley L*J*, at 924.
3* ibid., per Fletcher-Moulton L*J*, at 916-917*
(F*N*4*5*6*p*t*o*)
Lord Esher*M*R*, stated that:
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"However large the words of the covenant may be, a 
covenant to repair a house is not a covenant to give 
a different thing from that which the tenant took 
when he entered into the covenant* He has to repair 
the thing which he took; he is not obliged to make 
a new and different thing"
This does not, however, imply that the covenant will never require a ten­
ant to do work which will constitute an improvement to the premises* It was
2 3
noted , that in Ashley v* Jaimes Colledge , Adumuii-Bossman J*» had held that
4
the repairing covenant does not require a tenant to remedy inherrent defect •
For this proposition the learned judge relied on a statement by Lord Esher M.R*, 
in Lister v* Lane, that:
" • • • if a tenant takes a house which is of such a kind 
that by its own inher&r\& nature it will in the course of time 
fall into a particular condition, the effects of that result 
are not within the tenant's covenant"'**
With respect, this is too sweeping a statement of the law* The mere fact
that a renewal of some part is rendered necessary as a result of an inherrent
defect does not (as the English law stands at the moment) prevent the renewal
from being within a repairing covenant^* The renewal is outside the repairing
obligation only if, in addition to it being necessitated by an inher<LfljL' defect,
it would result in the introduction of something different from the premises 
7
granted •
4* See Cheshire, G*C*, Modern Law of Real Property, London; 1976*
5* Brew Bros* v. Snax (Ross) [l97oJ 1 Q*B*6l2*
6. [1893] 2 Q.B.212.
1* op.cit*, at 216-217* The statement of Lord Esher was quoted approvingly
by Azu-Crabbe J*S*C., in Thome v* Barclays Bank |l97bj 2 G*L*R*126,133*
2* supra, p* •
3* [j96l] 1 g*L.R*469.
4* ibid*, at 474.
5* [l893j 2 Q.B.212, 216.
6. Lurcott v* Wakeley [1911} 1 K*B*905» Brew Bros v* Snax (Ross) [l97o]
1 Q.B.612; Ravenselft Props, v. Davstone Holdings £l979^ 2 W*L*R*878*
7* ibid. Preference is not being expressed for the present English-law position*
5LP1
The question whether the repair would result in the introduction of 
something different in kind from the premises granted, is a question of 
degree* The tribunal of fact should:
" • • • look at the particular building, to look at the
state which it is in at the date of the lease, look at
the precise terms of the lease, and then to come to a
conclusion as to whether on a fair interpretation of those
terms in relation to that state, the requisite work can be
1
fairly termed repair*1 •
3» Obligation to repair implies duty not to destroy
A COVenant to repair raises a duty not to destroy the premises* When
2during the course of argument in Gange v. Lockwood , it was contended for 
the tenants that the opening of doors in the wall was not a breach of the 
covenant to repair, Willes J*, interposed this remark:
'’Pulling down the building to be kept in repair is
3
a breach of the covenant to repair” •
Later, in his directious to the jury, the learned judge elaborated on this 
statement:
"As to the first breach I have already said that a
covenant to repair, uphold and maintain or keep in
good repair, raises a duty not to destroy the demised
premises and pulling them down, wholly or partly, is
4a breach of such covenant” •
Alterations which change the nature and character of the premises are
5 6 generally a breach of the covenant to repair • In Thome v* Barclays Bank ,
l
it will be recalled that the tenants carried out extensive alterations to the 
premises, including converting the residential part of the premises into 
offices, despite convenanting to keep the premises in repair* This was held 
to be a breach* It must not, however, be supposed that every alteration to
1* Brew Bros, v* Snax (Ross) [l97o] 1 Q.B.612, per Sachs L.J* at 640.
2. (i860) F & F 115-
3. ibid, 117.
4. ibid, 117 •
5* Marsden v* Heyes |l927j 2 K.B.l. 6. [l97<3 1 G.L.R.126.
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the premises which involves pulling down a subsidiary part, is necessarily 
a breach of the covenant to repair* The test to be applied is:
"Id what has happened of such a nature that it can fairly 
be said that the character of the subject-matter of the
1
demise, or part of the demise in question has been changed" •
The question is one of fact to be determined on the circumstances of each
case* Reasonable alterations, compatible with any permitted user of the
2premises does not constitute a breach • The question whether a particular 
act constitutes a breach of covenant being one of fact, regard must be had 
to the changed and changing circumstances of Ghana, and old English decisions 
should not be followed blindly* As was pointed out by Archer J.A in 
Barclays Banky.
"It seems to me that to some extent the nineteenth century 
judicial precedents should be relied on with caution*
Each case must be viewed in the light of all relevant 
facts* It is unconvincing to argue that because in 1817 ' 
an English court held that pulling down a wall constituted 
a breach of a covenant to repair therefore in 1973* whenever 
any tenant pulls down a wall he must necessarily be in breach
of a covenant to repair • • • these cases belong to a diff­
erent age* We live in the twentieth century • • • whether 
an alteration has affected the structure of a building must
3
be viewed in the light of prevailing factors in a present age"
At common law an alteration which constitutes an improvement and does
not affect the structure of the premises is not prohibited by a covenant to
4repair* In Ampiah v* G*B*011ivant , the tenants covenanted to keep the
1* Lurcott v* Wakeley [l91lj 1 K*B*905» per Cozefls-Hardy M*R. at p. 914.
2* Thome v* Barclays Bank jj-97^ ] 2 G.L.R.126, per Azu-Crabbe J.S.C* at p* 140.
3* [l973] 2 G*L.R.137 at p* 150 • This was in the judgment of the Drdinary
Bench which was reversed by the full Bench* But the full Bench did not 
overrule this statement; and we think it is eminently sensible*
4. ( j9 f # ) D - c { kn^-’s 1 ? 46 .
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interior of the premises in good and tenantable repair and condition. During 
the tenancy, the tenants converted an opening into two doors, and two windows. 
When the landlord sued for recovery of possession it was held that these alter­
ations were improvements; and therefore that the tenants were not in breach 
of their repairing covenant.
The Conveyancing Decree, 1973 has impliedly overruled some of these common- 
1
law decisions • By section 23 (1) a tenant impliedly covenants not to make
any alterations or additions to the premises without the written consent of
the landlord; he also covenants not to cause or permit injury to walls. Thus,
2with the coming into force of the Decree , questions like whether the altera-
3
tions constitute an improvement , or change the nature and character of the 
4
property , are no longer relevant. The tenant will be liable if he makes 
any alteration or addition, or causes or permits injury to the walls of the 
premises.
4. "Fair wear and tear excepted”.
'Ik*-: - ih  r^j?Air xAt k i j a
i ftiQs J c £ j ) Q y(A<£l (t . for "fair wear and tear", or words to
that effect. The effect of thisdisclaimer is to relieve the tenant from
liability for damage caused by both the normal action of time and the elements,
and by normal and reasonable use •{'he
U>£TL let.k The effect of a repairing covenant containing an exception for reasonable 
A
5
wear and tear, was stated by Tindal C.J. thus ;
"What the natural operation of time flowing on effects, and all 
that the elements bring about in diminishing value, constitute 
a loss which, so far as it results from time and nature, falls 
upon the landlord".
1. supra, p p . -$/}..
2. 1st January, 1974.
3. Ampiah v. G.B.Ollivant, supra.
4. Thome v. Barclays Bank, op.cit.
5. Gufcteridge v. Munyard (1834) 1 Moo & R 244.
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A " fair wear and tear " exception will, though exempting liabi­
lity for repair occasioned by the normal operation of time and 
the elements, will not cover repair occasioned by abnormal or ex­
tra ordinary phenomena.*
In English law, it has been held that a fair wear and tear 
exception does not exempt the tenant from consequential damage.
The tenant is supposed to prevent any further damage which may 
ensue as a result of damage caused by time and the elements. The 
English-law position was enunciated by Talbot J. in a statement 
later adopted by the House of Lords^. Ruling on the effect of a 
fair wear and tear exception, the learned judge said:
" If any want of repairs is alleged and proved in 
fact, it lies on the tenant to show that it comes 
within the exception. Reasonable wear and tear means 
the reasonable use of-the house by the tenant and 
the ordinary operation of natural forces. The exce­
ption of want of repair due to wear and tear. -a?ea- , r0 r
r&flsonable conduct on the part of the tenant being 
assumed. It does not mean that if there is repair 
originally proceeding from reasonable wear and tear 
the tenant is relieved from his obligation to keep 
in good repair and condition everthing which it may 
be possible to trace ultimately to that defect.
The tenant is bound to do such repairs as may be 
required to prevent the consequences originally 
flowing from wear and tear from producing others."
1. Manchester Bonded Warehouse v. Carr (1880) 5 C.P.D.507*
2. Hesketh v. Marlow 1928 2 K.B.45,58-59» approved by the House of 
Lords in Regis Prop.Co. v. Dudley 1959 A.C.370*
9P5
This rule on consequential damage was rejected by the English Court of Appeal
in Taylor v* Webb ; but was restored^ythe Court of Appeal in Brown v*
3Davies and finally affirmed by the House of Lords in Regis Property Co* v*
4
Dudley . Discussing the position in that case, Lord Denning said:
"I have never understood that in the ordinary house a fair
wear and tear exception reduced the burden of repairs to
practically nothing* It exempts a tenant from repairs
that are decorative and for remedying parts that wear or
come adrift in the course of reasonable use, but it does
not exempt him from anything else* If further damage is
likely to flow, from the wear and tear he must do such
repairs as are necessary to stop that further damage*
If the slate falls through the rood through wear and tear
and in consequence the roof isjlikely to let through water,
the tenant is not responsible for the slate coming off but
5
he ought to put in another one to prevent further damage"
With respect, this is too sweeping as a statement of principle* It demons 
strates again the bias of the common law in favour of the landlord; and imposes on 
the tenant an obligation which has been expressly excepted* It also excuses 
somebody, presumably the landlord , from obligations which fall on him* Nor
2. [l937) 2 K.B.283.
3. [19587 1 Q*B,117•
4. (l958j 3 All E.R.491.
5. ibid., at pp. 511-512
*06
do the statements of Talbot J., and Denning L.J. explore all the fact- 
situations that can occur. In the particular example of the fallen slate, 
if the tenant is excused from damage due to wear and tear, then the respon­
sibility must fall on somebody else, presumably the landlord. In such 
circumstances, if the landlord knows of the defect —  as a result of having
1been ilY\formed by the tenant or through carrying out inspection of the premises 
 it is not at all clear why the tenant should be responsible for any conse­
quential damage. The liability for repairing damage caused by wear and tear 
does not lie on the tenant; and the landlord has a valuable interest in the 
property, if he willingly and knowingly suffers the damage to go unrepaired 
and consequential damage ensues,; the responsibility must be his.
It is thus proposed that the rule on consequential damage should not be 
followed in Gh^na. In all cases where a tenant*S covenant, to repair contains 
an exception for fair wear and tear, society must impose an obligation on the 
landlord to be responsible for such repair. If the landlord willingly suffers 
the damage to go unrepaired and consequential damage ensues he should be respon­
sible. The tenant should be under an obligation to inform the landlord of 
such damage. When the landlord inspects the premises or is due to inspect 
them, however, this notice ceases to be necessary.
1. It has been argued that landlords should be under an obligation to carry 
out regular inspection of premises; see, ante pp^l^S-lS^
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d. Remedies for Non-Repair
1. Damages
Where the tenant is in breach of his covenant to repair, the landlord
can sue for damages. In a landlord's action for non-repair, the measure of
damages is the amount by which the reversion is depreciated in marketable
value by the want of repair. By section 31 (1) of the Conveyancing Decree,
1973* "damages for breach of a covenant or agreement to keep or put premises
in repair during the currency of a lease, or to leave or put premises in
repair at the termination of a lease, whether such covenant or. agreement is
expressed or implied, and whether general or specific, shall in no case exceed
the amount (if any) by which the value of the reversion (whether immediate
1
or not) in the premises is diminished owing to that breach" •
It must be noted that this section provides only an upper limit; it does
2
not alter the method of assessing damages • In Ghanaian law it has been held
that in appropriate circumstances the amount which has been or would have to
be spent on putting the premises into the state to which they should have been
put by the tenant, is prima facie the recoverable amount of damages. In
3C.P.A.O. v. Thome a tenant who had covenanted to put the premises in repair 
and at the termination of the tenancy to yield up the premises in a state of 
repair, failed to make the necessary repair. At the expiration of the tenancy 
he could not deliver possession to the landlord because the premises were in 
a state of non-repair. By agreement, the parties obtained the advice of an 
expert who assessed the cost of repairs to be done on the flats at £ G 2,367 10s. 
The tenants still failing to make the repairs, the landlord sued for recovery 
of possession of the flats in a state of repair. In awarding damaged to the 
landlord, Apaloo, J.S.C., delivering the judgement of the Supreme Court, stated 
the law thus:
1. This is a verbatim reproduction of section 18 (1) of the English Landlord 
and Tenant Act, 1927*
2. Hanson v. Newmann |l934| Ch. 298.
3.
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"What is the measure of damages to which the plaintiff is 
entitled? In my judgment} it is such sura of money as would 
put the plaintiff in the same position as if the repairs 
had been carried out by the company— tenants • In other 
words, the plaintiff is entitled to receive from the com­
pany the cost of repairs by way of damages • • • I consider 
therefore that had the company carried out the repairs as 
they were obliged to do, they would in 1961, have spent the 
sum of £ G 2,367 10s, in carrying it out* The sum ought, 
primafacie, to be the damages to which the plaintiff is 
entitled"1*
2Apaloo J.S.C*, then took judicial notice of inflation — the case was decided 
in 1 9 6 6 and awarded damages of £ G 2,500 to the landlord*
By section 31 (2) of the Conveyancing Decree, 1973, however, no damages 
or compensation is recoverable for breach of a covenant #0 put or leave premises 
in repair if it is shown that imminent demolition or structural repair, <ln the 
termination of the tenancy, would render the repair covered by the covenant 
valueless*
The landlord is not bound to use the money recovered as damages in repair- 
3ing the premises •
2* Specific Performance
The tenant's covenant is normally not specifically enforceable* This 
has been the common law rule since Hill v* Barclay was decided in 1810*
We noted that in C«F*A*0* v* Thome, the landlord sued for recovery of 
the flats in a state of repair* This was ordered by the trial judge* On 
appeal, the Supreme Court held that the trial judge ought not to have ordered 
the tenants to deliver the premises in a state of repair as that order was
1* op.cit., at p*ll8 
2* ibid.
3* Doe d* Worcester School Trustees v* Rowlands (l84l) 9 C. & P.734* 
4. (1810) 16 Ves. Jun, 402.
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tantamount to decreeing specific performance. Apaloo J.S.C., delivering 
the judgment of the Supreme Court, said:
"Like all other equitable remedies, specific performance was
discretionary and ought not to be granted where the injury
complained of could be adequately compensated in damages.
An order of specific performance would, on the facts of this
1
case, be difficult of enforcement" •
It is important to note that the Supreme Court did not rule that a covenant
to repair is not specifically enforceable. In this respect, the Supreme
2Court departed from the rule laid down in Hill v. Barclay • It is submitted 
that the approach of the Supreme Court is the better one. It offers more 
flexibility— each case being decided on its facts. In appropriate cases 
therefore, where the repair involved is simple and straightforward, specific
performance should be available.
33. Re-entry
Where a covenant to repair is fortified by a proviso for re-entry conse­
quent on its breach, then breach of the covenant will result in forfeiture.
But it must be emphasised that forfeiture will result only if the covenant
4to repair is buttresed by a forfeiture clause •
1. op.cit., at p*H7
2. The Supreme Court did not even cite Hill v. Barclay. The decision of
Apaloo J.S.C. shows that the Supreme Court relied on the general principles 
governing the granting of specific performance.
3* This is more fully discussed in a later chapter when the termination of
tenancies is considered; Se-a* in ^ ^0, 3-"“ 3 0 5  *
4. Ampiah v. G.B.Ollivant op.cit,; Sackey v. Ashong, op.cit.
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e. Destruction of the Premises
At common law, a tenant who covenants to repair the premises during
the currency of the tenancy* must rebuild the premises if accidentally
destroyed by fire, storm or earthquake'*'. He continues liable for rent despite 
2the destruction • The landlord is under no implied duty to rebuild the pre- 
3 .mises • Nor is it material that the landlord has received proceeds of msur-
4ance, if he had procured the insurance in his own name and at his own expense • 
It would appear that even in cases where the tenant's covenant expressly ousts 
liability where the premises are destroyed, this does not impose an obligation 
upon the landlord to restore the premises^. The landlord is liable only 
when he expressly covenants that he will restore destroyed premises.
This common-law position is the result of the common law regarding resid- 
ential tenancies as coveyances which create, an estate in land. The tenant 
was deemed to have an interest in the land— something which remained usable 
despite destruction of the improvements. The common-law rule may not have 
been inappropriate in the circumstances in which it developed — an agrarian 
economy where farm buildings were easily replaceable and were in most cases 
incidental to the main purpose of the grant. But it does not justify the 
failure of the legislature and the courts to formulate new rules to govern 
residential tenancies, thus restricting the common-law rules to their proper 
domain. We would suggest that where premises, the subject-matter of a 
residential tenancy, is destroyed the tenancy should be held to be at an 
end, the purpose of the tenancy having been frustrated^.
The common law's failure to "take into account proceeds of insurance 
also demonstrates the failure of the law affecting residential tenancies to
1. Bullock v. Dommitt (1796) 2 Chit.608} Clarke v. Glassgow Assurance
(1854) 1 Macq. (H. of L.) 668} Redmond v. Painton |l920j 2 K.B.256.
2. This issue is diSCtfssed in the next chapter when the obligation to pay
rent is considered: See infra, pp.Q.1
3* Weigall v. Waters (1795) 6 T.R.488.
(F.N.4.5.6. p.t.o.)
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rid itself of its medieval origins* At that time there was no insurance 
available, at least not as we know it today* But it is now very difficult 
to understand why a tenant should be responsible for restoring premises 
after the landlord has received insurance money in connection with the 
self-same premises*
4* Leeds v* Chattam (1827) 1 Sim 146; Ldfft v* Dennis (1859) 1 E & E 474*
5* Weigall v* Waters (1795) 6 T.R.488*
6* The question of frustration in tenancies is discussed later: See
infra, pp* 2-8 •
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CHAPTER SIX
RENT
" • • • the principles of law laid down by the Judges 
in the 19th century—however suited to social conditions 
of that time — are not suited to the social necessities 
and social opinion of the 20th century* They should be
1
moulded and shaped to meet the needs and opinions of today" •
Introduction
At common law, 'rent' has a specialised meaning* It has been defined as:
11 • • • a certain profit issuing yearly out of land and 
tenements corporeal; and may be regarded as of a two-fold 
nature; first as something issuing out of land, as compen­
sation for possession during the term; and secondly, as an
2acknowledgement made to the lord of his fealty or tenure" •
3
Following the common law, the Conveyancing Decree, 1973» defines rent as:
It is clear from these definitions that at law rent is not simply consid­
eration paid by the tenant in return for the right to occupy premises and be 
provided with certain services* The landlord/tenant relationship is seen as 
a tenurial relationship, and rent as an incident of tenure. This is so regard­
less of whether the tenancy is one of agricultural land or residential premises 
in urban communities •
The legal concept of rent— and the rules governing the obligation to 
pay rent —  reflect quite plainly the historical origins of the landlord/tenant 
relationship and the particular socio-political formation within which the 
foundations of theC.o#iinOrt (jklO were laid^* Originally rent was a form of
1* The Rt.Hon.Lord Denning M.R., The Discipline of Law, London, 1979*
Preface, p*v*
2* Woodfall, Law of Landlord and Tenant, London, 1978t Vol*l, P»276.
3. N.R.C.D.175.
4. ibid., S.45 (1).
5* The consequences and absurdities of this conception are examined through-
" . . . any periodical payment in money or money's worth
4reserved or issued out of or charged upon land" •
out the the^ ' 
6. supra, pp.h
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feudal service owed by the tenant to his landlord* It was regarded as a 
tribute or return to the landlord of a portion of the actual or possible 
profits accruing from the land* Rent was some form of proprietary interest*
A* THE OBLIGATION TO PAY RENT
The tenant is often obliged to pay rent* In properly - drawn leases, 
there is always an express covenant by the tenant to pay rent* In the 
informal oral tenancy agreements which predominate in Ghana, the tenant 
agrees to pay rent* The obligation to pay rent is now implied in residential 
tenancies for valuable consideration by the Conveyancing Decree, 1973* By 
section 23 (1):
"In a conveyance by way of lease for valuable consideration, 
there shall be implied the covenants relating to the payment 
of rent * . ."
A covenant to pay rent must be certain or capable of being reduced to
2certainty by the time of payment • A tenancy agreement is void for uncertainty
3
if rent "is to be agreed" • Rent may, however, be made to vary with circum-
1* Holdsworth, W.S*, A History of English Law. London, 1926, Vol*7» P» 226 
2* Mansour v* Sukumah (1958) 3 W.A*L^376.
It:
" • • • must by being attached to visible land be given 
something approaching the character demanded by the 
remedies of distraint and real actions"**
stances •
The tenant impliedly covenants
"To pay the reserved rent at the times and in the
5
manner specified m  the lease" •
3* See King's Motors (Oxford) Ltd* v*
4* See Walsh v* Lonsdale (1882) 21 Ch*D*9*
5* Conveyancing Decree, 1973 S*23 (1) and 3rd Sched., Pt.I,
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The rental periods and the date on which rent is payable should be specified 
in a tenancy agreement* Rent, for most of the tenancies entered into orally 
and informally, is calculated on a monthly basis and the parties normally 
agree to pay rent monthly* The rent is normally payable in arrear* This 
conforms to the legal position, which is, that unless a tenancy agreement 
provides for payment in advance,rent is normally payable at the end of the 
rental period**
I* Nature of the rental obligation
At common law, the tenant is under an obligation to pay rent once posses­
ion of the premises is turned over to him* The landlord is not required to
do anything further* In technical terms, the tenant covenanted to pay rent
2while the landlord covenanted to assure him quiet enjoyment • This common- 
law position again emanates from the antecedents of the landlord-tenant relation­
ship* As Friedman points out:
'•The theory of the lease as a conveyance — under which a 
landlord fully discharged his duty by signing a lease and 
thereby entitled himself to instalments of rent which 
were periodically to issue out of the land— fitted in 
well with the ancient farm lease* The lease was essent­
ially of land; the house was incidental* Tenant got no
3
services from the landlord and expected none"
>5 a h  Oolafs
wilt- ikSL CJDAC/do. ml,'tits sf'fka. ^L _ a b j O A 4. In urban Ghana, housing 
rentals involve the continuous provision of services such as electricity, 
water, bathroom and kitchen facilities* The residential tenant pays not
only for the use of physical space, but also for facilities and services
which are necessary to make shelter usable by modern standards* The urban
1* See Coomber v* Howard (1845) 1 C*B*440
2* This does not mean that the landlord has an affirmative duty to maintain
and protect the tenant's use and occupation. Quite the contrary* His 
duty is negative, i.e., to refrain from disturbing the tenant's occupation 
and use*
Friedman, M*R., Friedman on Leases, op.cit*, p* 5*
4. (P.T.O.)
215
residential tenant contemplates no single unilateral act by the landlord but 
a continuous mutual exchange of consideration. In the urban residential ten­
ancy, the amount of rent usually depends in part on the facilities and services 
provided. The rental obligation in the urban residential tenancy more closely 
resembles consideration for services than profit issuing out of land or the 
acknowledgement of fealty to a lord.
The common law has not taken sufficient notice of the changed nature and
1
function of the tenancy in modern urban circumstances • The contractual 
nature of the urban residential tenancy is not sufficiently emphasised. Too 
much is made of a tenancy as a conveyance of an estate in land. It must be 
recognised that the landlords duties no longer end with the delivery of 
possession and the assurance of quiet enjoyment. The modern residential land­
lord provides many other facilities and services which together with the
2
physical structure constitute 'housing' • These goods and services are of 
the kind usually by contract. The rental obligation should therefore
be seen for what it is — not a quid pro quo for possession of an estate in 
land, but consideration for a continuous flow of goods and services.
II. Independence of covenants.
At common law, the obligation to pay rent is independent of any additional
3
obligations undertaken by the landlord under the tenancy agreement •
4. See Friedmanj^supra, pp^ *fc4» Quinn, T.M. & Phillips, £.,; "The law of land­
lord and tenant: a critical evaluation of the past with guidelines for the 
future", (1969) 38 Fordham Law Review 38; Harvey, J.B.^"A study to determine 
whether the rights and duties attendant upon the termination of lease should 
be revised", (1966) 54 Calif.L.Rev.Il4l.
1. See Lipsky & Neumann, "Landlord-tenant law in the United States and West 
Germany - a comparison of legal approaches", (1969) Tulane Law Review 36; 
Bennett, D.E.; "The modern lease— an estate in land or a contract", (1937)
16 Texas Law Review 47*
2. That the modern urban residential tenancy is "a package of goods and services" 
was recognised by a United States court in Javins v. First National Realty
Corp., 428 F.2d. 1071 (D.C.Cir.1970).
Hart v. Rogers [l9l6j 1 K.B.64; Taylor v. Webb
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The rental obligation depends on the continued existence of the estate in 
land, and not upon the landlord's performance of any covenant—  express or 
implied— -in the tenancy agreement*.
This means that the common law does not relieve the tenant from perform­
ance of his rental obligation because the landlord has defaulted in the 
performance of obligations he undertook under the tenancy agreement. Thus 
a landlord who fails to carry out repairs or provide services like electricity, 
water, kitchen and bathroom facilities is entitled to receive rent though he 
has failed in his contractual obligations. Nor, it must be pointed out, can 
the landlord rely on the tenant's breach as an excuse for not performing his 
own obligations. The principle of independent covenants means that if either
party defaults in the performance of his obligation the other party has a
2remedy on the covenant— by direct action or .counterclaim — — but no more •
The common-law rule that in a tenancy agreement are independent rather 
than mutually dependent can harldy be over - emphasised. It is the feature 
that distinguishes the tenancy relationship from a purely contractual relation­
ship.
Again, the basis of this common-law rule can be found in the historical
origins of the common-law tenancy. The tenancy is seen as the conveyance of
an estate in land; the rental obligation as an incident of tenure —  something
issuing out of the land.
With the development of residential tenancies in modern urban conditions,
3
the tenurial basis of the rental obligation was not re-examined • What the 
common law did was to preserve the old landlord-tenant law with its fixation 
on possession as the crux of the tenancy and with rent as the quid pro quo
1. See Hart v. Rogers.0P»& .: Taylor v. Webb, c p - ; Cruse v. Mount
3. See Quinn T.M. & Phillips, £., supra; Friedman, M.R.; "Leases— a last 
outpost of feudalism", (1971) 26 New York Bar Association Record 638.
2.
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for possession. The new set of rights and obligations (concerning habitability, 
electricity, water, repairs, etc.) are treated as incidental to the main trans­
action. Significantly, the additional obligations of the landlord are treated
1as separate and distinct •
III. Rent withholding
A corollary of the principle of independent obligations is the common-
law rule that under no circumstance may the tenant be justified in withholding
2rent • A tenant who assumed that basic fairness entitled him to operate on
a "no facilities, no rent" basis would be making a great mistakel He is under
an obligation to H  rent as long as he is assured of quiet possession. The 
common law unequivocally states that where the tenant withholds rent (until 
the landlord discharges an obligation he has expressly or impliedly covenanted 
to perform) this is a breach of the tenant's rental obligation; the landlord
3
may sue for damages or, if it is provided for, seek forfeiture of the tenancy •
The 'absolute' nature of the obligation to pay rent is demonstrated by
4Mills - Lamptey v. Yeboah • In this case, the landlord granted tenancy of 
a house to 'A', except for one room and a porch which was already let to 'C'.
The lease provided, inter alia, for a covenant for re-entry on failure 
by the tenant to pay rent. It is also provided that when 'C''s tenancy ex­
pired "the lessor shall automatically be deemed to have demised the said one 
room and one porch to the lessee". 'C' did not, however, vacate his premises 
at the expiration of his tenancy. 'A' then refused to pay any more rent until
he had been given possession of the whole house. The landlord therefore comm­
enced proceedings claiming arrears of rent and an order of ejectment. It was
1. But See infra, pp.'XQ.l-yS)J\-4
2. Paradine v. Jane (1647) Aleyn.26; Hart v. WindSotT (1844) 12 M & W.68.
3* ibid.
4. 1 G.L.R.18
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held by Abban J., that the tenant was in breach of his obligation to pay
1
rent and that the landlord was entitled to damages • The fact that 'A'
had not got possession of the room and porch let to 'C' was irrelevant.
There was no question of a partial failure of consideration, nor of a 
2reduction in rent • The tenant had no choice but to continue to pay the
3
full rent •
C. Abandonment
It has become trite to repeat Holmes' dictum, but it is nevertheless 
true that:
" . . .  the law as to leases is not a matter of logic 
in v a c U o ;  it is a matter of history that has not for-
4gotten Lord Coke" •
Another anachronism of the translocated common law is that the tenant 
continues to be liable for rent if, without justifiable legal reason, he 
abandons the premises^. The startling fact is that the landlord may rest
on the lease or tenancy and sue for rent as an when it becomes due. This
result follows from regarding a tenancy as an estate in land. Abandonment 
(in this conception) does not terminate the estate in land, and rent being 
an incident of tenure remains payable.
1. Relief was granted from forfeiture because the tenant paid the arrears of 
rent into court while the case was pending.
2. In traditional doctrine rent issues out of the land, and the whole rent 
is charged on every part of the land.
3. In this case the landlord continued to receive rent from 'C*. 'A' could 
have moved out because the landlord had not succeeded in assuring quiet 
enjoyment of the whole premises. But this is not practicable in a situation 
of housing shortage; in fact the tenant opposed the landlord's application 
to re-enter.
4. Gardiner v. Butler (1918) 245 U.S.603 at 6055< ^ > ^ ^  .
5. Redpath v. Roberts (1800) 3 Esp.225 ; Guthrie v. McCrindle (1949)
65 T.L.R.192
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1This cotorton-law rule was applied in Ogde v. Pearl & Sons Ltd • In 
this case premises were let for one year with an option to renew for a 
further period of four years. The tenant exercised this option, but before 
the expiry of the four years the tenant vacated the premises. The landlord 
sued to recover rent for the unexpired portion of the four - year term. This 
was unhesitatingly granted by Ollenu J., who said:
years, with an option to determine the tenancy on the expiration of the first 
eight years after giving six month's notice. After a year the tenant abandoned 
the premises. The landlord sued for damages for breach. Delivering judgment, 
Edusei J., said:
The learned judge then awarded 0 36,906 —- rent for the unexpired period of
The learned judges did not analyse the rule so as to seek to justify it; 
they just took it as an eternal 'given'. It is not even clear from their 
judgments whether the landlords had left the premises unoccupied for the rem­
ainder of the term— which they are required to do under common law if this
"Having renewed the lease for four years, it was not 
open to the tenants to dispute thbir liability for
payments of rents for the full period of the renewed
2term of four years" •
3
In Savage v. G.I.H.O.C. , premises were let to the tenant for fifteen
"There is no doubt whatsoever in my mind that the
defendants were in breach of their contract, aid what
are the consequences? The plaintiff in my judgment
is entitled to the rents for the whole of the unexpired 
4term as damages" •
fourteen years—as damages.
1.
2. ibid., at 144.
3. [197^ 2 G.L.R.242
4. ibid., at 248.
The case involved a business letting.
220
rule is to apply* In fact in Savage v* G.I*H*0*C* the case was heard on
19th April, 1973* and damages was for a period from May 1st, 1970 to
30th April, 1984; it was impossible for Edusei J*, to know that the landlord
will not re-let or occupy the premises, and he made no order to that effect.
At common law abandonment does not operate to terminate the tenancy and the
tenant's estate continues; for the landlord to recover rent, he must leave
the premises unoccupied. If the landlord had re-let or occupied the premises
1
then the tenant is under no obligation to pay rent •
The common-law position is monstrous; it imposes no obligation on the 
landlord to mitigate his losses, and it imposes no obligation on the land­
lord to re-let whatever the housing situation and no matter what opportunities 
for re-letting he may have had. But the decisions in Ogde v. Pearl & Sons 
and Savage v. G.I.H.O.C are both monstrous and illogical. They follow the 
Common law in not requiring the landlord to mitigate his losses, but do 'ftot 
insist on the foundation upon which this is based— the continued estate of 
the tenant and consequently the need for the premises to remain unoccupied.
The common-law doctrine of constructive performance has long since been 
discarded in contract law, the party not in breach being required to take 
steps to mitigate his losses. There is no justification for distinguishing 
the modern urban tenancy from theordinary executed contract. And, to quote 
Holmes:
"It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule than
that it was so laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is
still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid
down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists
2from blind imitation of the past" •
1. See Vails v. Atcheson (1826) 3 Bing 462; Hall v. Burgess (1826)
5 B. & C.332; Woodfall. Law of Landlord and Tenant, op.cit., p. 310 * para 
1-0777
2. Holmes, O.W., "The path of the lawr", (1897) 1 0 Haryard Law Rev.457 at 469*
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It is suggested that where a residential tenancy is repudiated and the 
premises abandoned the residential tenancy should be considered as terminated. 
The landlord must re-take possession of the premises and the obligation to 
pay rent must cease. The landlord must take reasonable steps to re-let.
The landlord can sue for damages for breach of the tenancy agreement. The 
quantum of damages should be the difference between the rent payable under 
the tenancy and what the landlord receives from re-letting the premises. If 
the landlord occupies the premises himself the rent specified for that type 
of premises by the Rent (Amendment) Decree, 1979 should be taken as the 
monetary value of the premises to the landlord.
d. Destruction of premises
The common-law rule is that a tenant is not relieved from paying rent 
by the whole or partial destruction of the premises (by bomb, fire, storm,
tidal wave, etc.). This is so even where premises are the subject-matter
2 3of the tenancy • Nor would equity intervene • If the tenant wants his rental
obligation to cease on the destruction of the premises, this should be ex­
pressly provided for in the tenancy agreement.
In reaching this conclusion the courts reasoned that the residential ten­
ancy (like any other lease or tenancy) is a conveyance of an estate in land,
5
and that the destruction of the premises did not destroy this estate • There 
is thus no failure of consideration. The tenant has what he bargained for 
(ownership of a term) despite the destruction of the premises; from this 
estate rent issued and ou^ht to be paid. Lord Goddard epitomised this view 
when he said:
1. A.F.R.C.fc.5. See PP.2^ - 26 .^
2. Paradine v. Jane (1647) Aleyn.26; Mathey v. Curling [1922} 2 A.C.180.
3* Leeds v. Chatham $ 827) 1 Sim.l46.
4. Paradine v. Jane, supra; Mathey v. Curling, supra.
5. Baker v. Holtzapfell (1811) 4 Taunt.45; Izon v. Gorston (1830)
3 Bing.N.C.501.
222
"In the case of a lease, the foundation of the agreement 
is that the landlord parts with his interest in the 
demised property for a term of years, which thereupon 
becomes vested in the tenant, in return for a rent.
So long as the interest remains in the tenant, there is 
no frustration, though particular use may be prevented"*.
The common-law rule may not have been out of fit at the time and in the 
circumstances in which it developed— an agricultural tenancy primarily con­
cerned with land as a factor of production. Whatever structures were on the 
land were of a rudimentary nature, and were incidental to the main purpose 
of the transaction ■4—  farming. Damage to or destruction of the premises might 
make life inconvenient, but the landcouic/ still US&cl #
This is out of fit with the realities of residential tenancies in modern 
urban Ghana. The residential tenant is not interested in land as a factor 
of production. He needs housing and that is the raison d*etre of the arrange­
ment. It is therefore suggested that if through no fault of either party
the basis of the arrangement is removed the residential tenancy should (like
. 2 
any other contract) be considered as having been frustrated • This would be
much more in accord with the expectations of society, of the tenant and, it
is submitted, of the landlord. The residential tenancy should be seen for
what it is - a contract for the continuous exchange of value, rather than
the single purchase of an estate in land for a term..
e. Deductions
The worst effects of the absolute nature of the rental obligation and 
the principle of mutually exclusive covenants would be somewhat mitigated 
by a more vigorous pursuit of the right of the tenant to make deductions 
from rent in appropriate cases.
1. Cricklewood Prop. & Investment Trust Ltd. v. Leightons Investment 
Trust Ltd. 119431 A.C.221, 245.
2. The question whether frustration applies to tenancies is discussed
below, pp.28^-215,.
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There are some old English-law cases which give the tenant a right to
1
make deductions from his rent in certain cases* In Taylor v* Beal , the 
right of the tenant to make repairs which the landlord had covenanted to do 
was recognised by two Justices in the Court of Queen's Bench*
2In the more recent English case of Lee-Parker v* Izzet , Goff J*, 
relying on these cases, held that a tenant has a right to effect repairs 
which are the responsibility of his landlord; he may then recoup himself by 
making appropriat deductions from future payments of rent*
It is submitted that Lee-Parker v. Izzet provides facility with which 
to make serious inroads into the principle of mutually exclusive obligations* 
Lee-Parker should not be limited to repairs but should be extended to cover 
all the service obligations undertaken by the landlord — like the provision 
of water, electeicity, kitchen and lavatory facilities* As Rank points out:
"It may be argued that even today, when great strides
are being made to provide court services which are both
efficient and inexpensive, there is considerable merit in
allowing a tenant to have resort to an extra-judicial remedy
3
in order to enforce a right conferred by the lease" •
The tenant's recourse to such self-help must be preceded by timely and 
adequate notice to the landlord of the default* This is to afford the land­
lord the opportunity of fulfilling his obligations* If the tenant is unable 
to give such notice after a reasonable attempt, he may nonetheless proceed 
to perform the landlord's obligation and recoup himself from the rent*
1* (1591) Cro*Eliz*22; Veigall v* Waters (1795) 6 Term*Rep*488.
2. [l97l] 1 W.L.R. 1688.
3* Rank, P.M., "Repairs in lieu of rent", (1976) 40 Conveyancer 196, 200*
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It must be empha sized that under this remedy the tenant is not relieved
of his obligation to pay rent* He has to perform the landlord's obligation,
and then recoup the cost from the rent* If he does not perform the obligation 
he has no right to withhold rent*
II. RELIEF FROM THE OBLIGATION TO PAY RENT
"A rent is something given by way of retribution to the 
lessor, for the land demised by him to the tenant, and 
consequently the lessor's title to the rent is founded 
upon this: that the land demised is enjoyed by the ten­
ant during the term included in the contract: for the ten­
ant can make no return for a thing he has not* If
therefore the tenant be deprived of the letten, the obli­
gation to pay rent ceased, because such obligation has 
its force only from the consideration, which was the enjoy­
ment of the demised"^*
a. Actual eviction
Where the landlord failed in his basic obligation to assure his tenant 
of quiet enjoyment and (either personally or vicariously) entered the premises
and removed the tenant prior to the expiration of the tenancy, the law abated
2the obligation to pay rent • Eviction by title paramount is also a defence
3to an action for subsequent rent •
If the landlord evicts the tenant from only a part of the premises the
tenant is discharged from payment of the whole rent* The reason given for
this rule is that enj’oyment of the whole consideration is the foundation of
4the obligation to pay rent and that the obligation cannot be apportioned •
It is also said that the landlord may not apportion his own wrong* It is, 
however, arguable that in applying the "no apportionment of wrong" rule 
regard should be had to the magnitude (or minitude) of the wrong*
1* Baron Gilbert, A Treatise on Rents, Dublin, 1792, P*i45#
2* See Morrison v* Chadwick (1849) 7 C.B.266; London & Country (A &Q ) v*
Wilfred Sportsman JI969J 1 W*L.R*1215*
3* See Cuthbertson v. Irving (l859“60) 4 H & M*l42* This is particularly
important because of the Hierarchical system of landholding: See supra, pp/JO-^.
4. (P.T.00
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b* Constructive eviction
Constructive eviction, like actual eviction, arises as a result of 
breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment* Unlike actual eviction, however, 
the landlord does not physically eject the tenant* The remedy arises when 
the landlord makes enjoyment of the premises so intolerable that the tenant 
abandons the premises* Constructive eviction is established when the tenant 
shows that the landlord has prevented or materially interfered with the 
tenant's enjoyment of his possessory rights** Upon abandoning the premises 
in such circumstances, the tenant's liability for rent ceases* To success­
fully assert the defence of constructive eviction the tenant has to establish 
three facts:
(1) that the landlord had acted or failed to act in a way
which violated an obligation imposed on him by statute
2or by an express or implied covenant cif the tenancy;
(2) that the nature of the landlord's act or omission cons­
tituted an interference with the tenant's quiet enjoy­
ment of the premises or indicated on intention to evict
3
the tenant;
(3) that the tenant abandoned the premises*
The tenant has to prove all three elements; failure to prove any of them 
will render the tenant liable to pay rent*
The significant point is that the common law is unwilling to classify 
the interference— want of repair, failure to provide services, etc*-^alone 
as abating the tenant's liability or modifying the quantum of rent* The 
common law insists that the tenant actually abandons the premises before the
See London & County (A* &f>.) v* Wilfred Sportsman, supra.
See Vandiyan v* Pereira [1953^  i All E.R*1109t where gas and electricity 
were cut off*
See Karam v. ^ghkar [1963/ 1 G.L.R.I38, where the landlord demolished 
part of premises so as to make it unsafe for tenant to remain in the rest*
See Kenny v* Preen [1962J 3 All E.R.814, where the landlord threatend 
the tenant by letter and by shouting and banging on the doors.
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doctrine can be invoked. The doctrine is not so much constructive eviction,
but constructive eviction with abandonment. Abandonment is the crucial
factor which places the case in the cateogory of eviction.
The attempt to mitigate the worst effects of the principle of mutually
exclusive obligations by developing the fiction of constructive eviction is
praiseworthy; but it contains a radical drawback. The doctrine of constructive
eviction only applies where the tenant abandons the premises. The fact of
gross negligence on the part of the landlord to carry out his contractual
obligations is not enough to support an abatement or reduction in rent.
The doctrine therefore, has little utility in the concrete situation of
(b
urban Ghana where the availability of alternative accommodation is severly
A
restricted. The remedy, in this respect, reflects considerations of landlord/ 
tenant relationships which do not exist in urban Ghana. To offer the Ghanaian 
tenant the right to move out when electricity or water supply is disconnected 
because the landlord has not paid the bills, or when the ceiling begins to 
buckle is to offer him no remedy at all. He just has "no where" to go. That 
socio-economic relaties in modern urban settings have eroded the foundation 
on which the requirement of abandonment rested was recognised by a New York 
Court when it said:
"Implicit in these once benign . . .  decisions was the 
presumption that there was always available other premises 
to which the tenant could move. The grim realities of 
the acute housing shortage reduce this time-worn presumption 
to sheert\a'iv<uta* ; a postulate exploded by facts"1.
The requirement of abandonment is an anachronism; retaining it makes no
2sense in the light of the present realities of the housing situation •
1. Johnson v. Pemberton (l950^ 197 Misc.739i 97 N.Y.2d.l53i 157*
2. Due to socio-economic and political facts it is not thought likely 
(at least in the forseeable future) that giving the tenant the legal 
right to withhold or reduce rent would be effective.
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III. ENFORCEMENT OF THE OBLIGATION TO PAY RENT
A landlord usually has three distinct remedies against a tenant who is 
in arrears of rent. He may:
(1) sue on the covenant to pay rent for arrears of rent;
(2) levy distress upon the tenant's goods; or
(3) seek to terminate the tenancy by forfeiture under the
a. Action for rent
Arrears of rent, like any other debt, is recoverable by an action in 
contract
b. Distress
Distress, even in England where it developed, "is an archaic remedy
2that has largely fallen into disuse" • It is a self-help remedy by which
the landlord can seize and sell chattels found on the premises.
The subject of distress is extremely intricate and it is not intended
3
to examine it, since the law on the subject is purely English law . One
only wonders why the Courts Act, 1971 continued the application to Ghana
4
of English legislation on the subject , when in 19&9 the Payne Committee 
had recommended the abolition of the "highly complex, technicial and archaic
3. See Woodfall, Law of Landlord and Tenant, op.cit. Chap.8; Foa, General 
Law of Landlord and Tenant, op.cit., pp.480 - 585*
4. The Courts Act, 1971» S.iii (1) continued the operation of certain provi­
sions of the Distress of Rent Acts, 1689 and 1737*
5* Report of the Committee on the Enforcement of Judgment Debt, London, 1969* 
Cmnd.3909» paras.912-932.
tenancy agreement.
5
law" .
1. Diep v.
2. Abingdon R Lord Denman at 819*
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c . Forfeiture
Re-entry or forfeiture is not in itself an action for the 
enforcement of the obligation to pay rent. But it often results 
in the payment of rent as tenants attempt to obtain relief from 
forfeiture
B. OBLIGATIONS OF THE LANDLORD
I . Rent cards
Section 20(1) of act 220 enjoins every landlord of a monthly
2
tenancy with a rent card within seven days of the commencement of
the tenancy. The card must contain the names and addresses of the 
parties, the amount of the recoverable rent of the premises and the 
rights and obligations of the parties. Entries in the card are to be 
kept up to date and signed by the landlord. It is the responsibi­
lity of the landlord to provide the tenant with the card. Failure 
to provide a rent card is a misdemeanour punishable with a maximum 
fine of £G 100(0.?) or six months* imprisonment or both.^
The effect(in private law) of failure to provide a rent card
is,however, not clear. In Mensah v. Abbev-Quave. the landlord failed*
of ran
to provide his monthly tenant with a rent card.In a claim for arrears .A
1. See infra, pp.2^1-305.
2. Section 20(1) actually says;"Every landlord of any premises on 
mothly or shorter tenancies". It is however, submitted that few 
(if any) such shorter tenancies exist: See Allamedine Bros, v.
P .Z..op.cit..at ^10. This is due to the fact that wages and sala­
ries are as a rule paid monthly and calculation of rent is (at 
the lowest) based on a monthly period.
3. Act 220,s.25(1) (f).
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was held that the burden of proving non-payment was on the landlord and that 
having failed to provide the tenant with a rent card as required by law, the 
landlord denied himself the vital documentary evidence for the claim. Baidoo J., 
therefore, held that the conflicting evidence adduced by the parties as to 
the rent-.due and payable must be resolved in favour of the tenant. It is 
submitted that Mensah v. Abbey-Quaye did not really determine the private- 
law effect of failure to provide a rent card. In Mensah v. Abbey-Quaye, 
the conflicting evidence of the parties was resolved in favour of the tenant 
because the landlord was responsible for the Conflict. But what if there is 
no conflict? What if a tenant argues that he is under no obligation to pay 
rent because the landlord had failed in his duty to furnish him with a rent
II. Written receipts
Every landlord is required to provide the tenant or any person making
2payment in respect of rent, with a written receipt • The receipt must give 
the particulars of the premises, the amount paid, the period for which the
It should be noted that the provision of receipts for rent paid, unlike 
the provision of rent cards, applies to all tenancies of whatever duration.
1. In English law it has consistently been held by the superior courts that 
failure to provide a rent book though a crime does not preclude the land­
lord from obtaining rent: See Shaw v. Groom 2 Q.B.504.
2. Act 220, S.33*
3. ibid.
4. See Mensah v. Abbey-Quaye, op.cit.
5. Act 220, S.25 (1) (I).
3
rent has been paid and the name of the tenant •
giving the receipt is onthe landlord, b o  cjiut,
Y i a L U p k  M a y  r t s u l b  i* H aJl  l e w d U > r c J  tAooJUA>btt'im\ d ‘-ff1-
CAjJtbu in cjcums -|oc a'Cf<LftCS c f 11c ^  &A&0 a MisdoMta 
ftoul ky a ma.*\mutyi j inn <£ £ c i q o c y / i x  Mon­
ths1 ( M P A i O r t M i n i  or.b«4k.  ■
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III* Fact or fiction?
As with so much of the provisions of Act 220, these provisions are blat­
antly disregarded* Fieldwork by the present writer indicated that about 90%
1of monthly tenants are not issued with rent cards as required by law • An
even greater number of tenants are not supplied with written receipts when 
2they pay rent • The reasons for the ineffectiveness of or non - compliance
3
with the provisions of ACt 220 are considered later • It is however of 
some interest to note that even in more educated England, with a longer acqu­
aintance with rent control legislation, the requirement to issue rent cards 
is largely ignored* The Francis Committee reported that the provisions of 
the Landlord and Tenant Act, 1962 requiring landlords to supply tenants with
4rent books is largely ignored • Tenants fear that they will be evicted if
5they insist on one • To encourage compliance with the requirement, Harry Street
has suggested that (as a last resort) rent should cease to be recoverable if
£
the landlord refuses demands to provide a rent book •
1. In the survey of 1658 monthly tenants, only 86 tenants (about 6%) had been
issued with rent cards: See also Mensah v. Abbey-Quaye, op.cit*
2* In the survey only 7 (i*e. apart from the 86 who had rent cards) of the
2,000 tenants are regularly issued with receipts when they make payments*
3* See infra, Chapter 9j 3b1-
4* Committee on the Rent Acts, H.M.S.O*, 1971, Cmnd.4609, p.216; See also 
Select Committee on Race Relations and Immigration, Report on Housing,
H.M.S.O., H.C.508-1/1970-71, para.177.
3* ibid.
6. MThe Rent Act, 197^s an evaluation", (197^) 38 Conv.39^* This suggestion
is only helpful when a case gets to court, a tribunal, or rent officer. 
Though this may reverberate through the landlord-tenant market it is 
doubtful whether it would have effect on thel(xCQq. number of tenants who 
keep their peace and continue paying rent. *
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
RENT CONTROL
"Since the First World War the tempo of social change has
accelerated beyond all imagination. With it, the challenge
1
of the law has become more powerful and urgent" •
Introduction
Restriction of rental levels is an issue which has entered into the
political economy of many countries as they grappled with the problems posed
by man's struggle for shelter in an urbanizing world. There has been vigorous
debate on the need and usefulness of rent restriction.
On the one hand are Nobel Prize winning laissez faire economists like
Milton Friedman and Frederich von Hayek who, drawing on their experience in
the United States and in Austria respectively, have argued that rent restriction 
. . 2is an unmitigated disaster • Echoing this view F.G.Pennance, introducing a 
collection of essays (all from a laissez-faire perspective), sees this as 
the lesson to be drawn from the experience of rent control!
"Their common message is simple, but devastating in its 
criticism of policy. It is that in every country examined, 
the introduction and continuance of rent control/restriction/ 
regulation has done much more harm than good in rental housing
markets— let alone the economy at large— by perpetuating
shortages,
encouraging immobility, 
swamping consumer preferences,
fostering dilapidation of housing stocks and eroding 
production incentives,
distorting land-use patterns and the allocation of scarce 
resources
1. Friedman, W., Law in a Changing Society, London, 1972, p.47*
2. See Verdict on Rent Control, Readings No.7 (I.E.A., 1972).
 and all in the name of the distributive justice it has
manifestly failed to achieve because at best it had been 
related only randomly to the needs and individual income 
circumstances of households"*.
This is a formidable catalogue of failure. It springs from classical 
economic theory's conception of 'rent' as an information and distributive
mechanism which functions properly through the 'free' equation of supply
2 . . .  and demand • Rent is seen as a mechanism which maximises utility and con­
sumer preference. The level of rent, in this model, is determined by con­
sumer preference. To quote W.F.Smith:
"The answerlies in the word 'rationing'• If some useful
commodity is fixed in supply, then it becomes important in
both an economic and business sense to use the commodity as
fully and as effectively as possible. If no rents were
charged for the use of land or buildings, these commodities
might be used by people who derive relatively little advantage
from them to the exclusion of people who can use them most
beneficially . . .  Economic rent rations a fixed resource
by excluding all potential users except the one who derives
maximum benefit from the resource, very broadly, all market
prices are rationing devices and economic rent is an important 
3
special type" •
Rent control is said to result in the above disasters because it interferes 
with the 'natural' operation of the market.
1. op- cit., p.XI
2. See Gray, M., The Cost of Council Housing, Institute of Economic Affairs, 
pamphlet No.l8, London, 1968.
3. Housing: The Social and Economic Elements, Berkeley, California, 1971» p.20.
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It is not possible to test Pennance's hypothesis in the concrete Ghanaian
context because rent control has largely been ineffective. But it may be
stated— first, at the purely analytical level— that the evidence (and it
is quite formidable) at best proves that restriction of rental levels in a
predominantly capitalist mode of housing production leads to those results.
It cannot be seen to prove that rent control qua rent control leads to those
results. It is no use abstracting the restriction of rental levels from the
particular mode of housing production and, indeed, from the economic system
as a whole. All the countries examined in that Institute of Economic Affairs'
Reading have a capitalist mode of housing production — and this includes the
United Kingdom where the mode of production of even council housing is basic- 
1
ally capitalist •
Secondly, as the analysis of the housing situation in Ghana and the private
2rental sector has shown , there is nothing 'natural' about the operation of 
the private rental market— or indeed of any market. It is man-made. It can 
be manipulated, taken advantage of or favour one side against the other as 
a result of the concrete market*- situation. The prime weakness of the laissez 
faire analysis of the 'natural' determination of rental levels is that it 
crucially ignores the role of the bargaining power of the parties in determining 
the level of rents. This failure leads laissez-faire political economists 
to posit a rather warped view of consumer need. Thus Gray writes:
1. See Beirne, P* . , Fair Rent and Legal Fiction, London, 1977*
2. See supra,
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"Profitability is a good preliminary criterion of consumers*
requirements because it reflects their willingness to pay.
Therefore in a market houses are maximised;when their value
to consumers is maximised; that is when relative rents and
prices reflect the highest subjective values that could be
I
placed on the housing stock" •
Not only is the idea of willingness illusory since most tenants have no real 
choice in the matter. It is also inadequate because it cannot account for 
the ability (or lack of it) to pay, for which one has to examine the socio­
economic circumstances of the tenant and the wider socio-economic and political 
context. With a far greater degree of precision, it can be said that the level 
of rent at any moment is much more a function of the relative bargaining stre­
ngth of landlords and tenants - which fact is determined by the socio-economic 
and political system within which the parties are operating.
The laissez-faire analysis also fails to recognize the monopoly nature 
of the rents charged by most landlords. In other words, the command of a 
scarce asset is itself a source of rent. The level of rent in the concrete 
Ghanaian context is not determined by "willingness", "utility" or "consumer
preference" however these are determined. It is determined by power - command
2
of a scarce asset. An item in a recent issue of West Africa reported the 
Managing Director of Tema Development Corporation as saying that one woman 
had eight T.D.C. houses. She let them out at 0 300 - 0 400 a month each 
compared to the official corporation rent of 0 20 and 0 30 a month. It is 
the height of naivete to suppose that the rent being charged by this lady was 
determined by peoples' willingness or requirement and a maximization of con­
sumer preference.. . It was the result of power— her command of one of the
1. Gray, M., The Cost of Council Housing, institute of Economic Affairs, 
pamphlet No.l8, London, 1968.
2. No.3300, 20th Oct.1980, p.2090.
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necessaries of human existance in a concrete housing situation characterised
1
by shortages^scarcity and over-crowding •
Another argument used by the anti-rent restriction lobby is what will 
be called "the perverse equity argument". "It is not fair to tax or restrict 
the level of profit to be made from housing investment if the return on other 
forms of investment is not controlled", they will argue. "We recognise that 
some people (particularly the poor) have difficulty in paying the economic 
rent, but that is a poverty problem to be tackled by the whole community.
Why should landlords have to carry society's burden?" The argument is perverse 
for a number of reasons. The measure of freedom it assumes in other areas 
of investment is exaggerated. There are controls and restrictions on monopolies 
and cartels in almost all developed'economies. Windfall tax is also not un­
known - the Chancellor of the Exchequer of the United Kingdom has just imposed 
a Windfall tax on the profits of oil companies operating in the North Sea 
because of the continuing increase in the price of oil. There is a good case 
for extending the windfall tax to the profits of the banksi? Secondly, it is 
not unfair for society to carve out an area of activity as being unsuitable 
for the unbridled operation of the profit motive. Admittedly, in ,’a predominantly 
capitalist economy this would have an effect on investment in that sector.
The "perverse equity argument" is not applicable to Ghana because prices of
2a whole host of things are subject to legal controls • The fact that the
controls have failed is not material to the present argument. In fact it is
arguable that one of the reasons for the failure of rent control has been the
failure of other forms of price control.♦
1. See supra, pp.
2. See Date-Bah, S.K., "Legislative control of freedom of contract", op.cit.
(There has been a measure of liberalization since the script was written.)
* The Chancellor has in his Budget of 10th March 1981 (delivered when the
thesis was with the typist) introduced such a tax on the profits of the 
banks.
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A system of rent control involves the legislative limitation of the
amount which landlords can receive from their tenants in the form of rent -
which limitation essentially prevents the landlord from extracting rent
based on the scarcity of housing supply* This is often complemented with
provisions offering the tenant greater security of tenure by restricting
the circumstances in which the landlord can lawfully evict the tenant1.
The housing shortage— for which rent control is a palliative— had
by the early 1940's become sufficiently serious to make legislation necessary
for the control of rental levels* The first in a series of legislation to
. 2control rents of premises was enacted in 1942 • The problem of high rents —
like that high prices of several other commodities — had become pronounced
3
during World War II • Workers were spending a greater portion of their income 
4on rent * To deal with this, the colonial government established a standing 
Advisory Committee on the Cost of Living* In December 1941 the Committee 
recommended the granting of a bonus to insulate workers from the worst effects 
of the difficult economic times^* In recommending this bonus the Committee 
noted that:
•’* • • there is a serious danger with regard to certain 
areas particularly in Sekondi - Takoradi where the full 
benefit of the bonus may be lost by a general increase 
in rents'*^
1* Defence (Rent Restriction) Regulations, 1942.
2* See Report of the Standing Advisory Committee on the Committee on the Cost
of Living para*8(12), reproduced in Report of the Committee of Enquiry 
into Rentals, Accra, 1951*
3* ibid*, para*8 (14).
4* ibid*
5* Report of the Standing Advisory Committee on the Cost of Living, para.8
( l 4 ), reproduced i n Report of the Committee of Enquiry into Rentals,
Accra, 1951*
6. ibid*
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It was a result of this recommendation that the government enacted the Defence
(Rent Restriction) Regulations 1942$ and thus began the chequered experience
1
of rent control legislation in Ghana •
The present parent legislation for the control of rents is the Rent Act, 
1963 (Act 220). Act 220 was enacted on the basis of recommendations by the
Committee of Enquiry into the operation of the Rent Control Ordinance (No.2),
19522.
A. APPLICABILITY OF ACT 220
3
The Act applies to all premises , subject to these exceptions:
(a) government buildings occupies by public officers by virtue
of their employment.
(b) tenancies of government buildings certified as being let at 
a rent which yields no financial gain to the government
(c) any market stall owned by a local authority
fPremises' is defined by the Act as:
". . • any building, structure, stall or other erection 
or part thereof, moveable or otherwise, which is the subject 
of a separate letting, other than a dwelling house or part 
thereof bonafide let at a rent which includes a payment for 
board or attendance, and includes land, out-buildings or 
appurtenances let together with such premises at a single
4
rent when adjouning the premises let therewith" •
1. For an account of these, see Report of the Committee of Enquiry into the 
Operation of the Rent Control Ordinance (No.2), 1952, Accra, 1962, Appendix 4
2. Hereafter referred to as the Kwaku BonsyCommittee.
3. Act 220, S.l (1).
4. Act 220, S.l (2).
4. Act 220, S.36.
238
The definition of "premises" excludes lodgers at a hotel, hostel or other 
accommodation where the tenant's rent includes payment for board or attendance. 
Such an arrangement must, however> be above aboard, and should not be entered 
into with a view to circumventing the Act. The definition further indicates 
that the building or structure need not be permanently and inextricably fixed 
to land. Therefore a movable kiosk or structure having a reasonable connection 
with land can be called "premises" within the meaning of the Act.
As observed earlier, a tenant need not comply with the English law
1
requirement of exclusive possession in order to take advantage of Act 220 •
A lease is defined by the interpretation section of the Act as including:
" . . .  every agreement for the letting of any premises, 
whether oral or otherwise, and whether the terms thereof 
grant the right of exclusive occupation to the tenant or 
include the use of any premises in common with the landlord 
or any other person or with the landlord and any other 
person"^.
Thus beside the normal legal meaning given to a lease, a mere agreement to
let any premises will also be known and treated as a full lease for the 
3
purpose of the Act • The definition further indicates that for purposes
of Act 220 a complete and valid tenancy of any duration can be made by
writing or by word of mouth. The distinction drawn by the Conveyancing Decree,
4
1973f between a tenancy for three years or less and are more than three years, 
is therefore i applicable when it is sought to apply Act 220.
1. General Application of Act 220
Act 220 is general in application——in that, there is no limitation on 
the value of premises to which it applies; nor is it limited to some parts 
of Ghana only. The fact that there is no limit on the value of premises to
1. Supra, Chapter 2>pp. 4 1 -7/.
2. Act 220, S.36.
3. This is much more like the equitable principle enunciated in Walsh v. 
-Lonsdale (1882) 21 Ch.2.9.
4. Supra chapter 3* PP*
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which Act 220 applies has been criticised by Bentsi-Enchill1. Bentsi-Enchill 
argues that the rent-fixing machinery should be confined to "small tenements"
and that in the case of "property involving large sums of money" the parties
2can take care of themselves • He argues that the general application of Act
3220 may be an inducement for corrupt practices by Rent Officers , and may
4prevent the accumulation of capital by Ghandians • He thus concludes that 
discrimination between "small" and "large" tenements is called for. This 
criticism of the general application of Act 220 seems to proceed from a 
laissez-faire ideological standpoint. Says Bentsi-Enchill:
"For the purpose of protecting those who cannot protect
themselves the case for such legislation and machinery
seems unexceptionable, especially in present-day circumstances.
But there would seem to be little or no justification for 
the changing of rent controls on all types of premises in­
cluding those where the parties can take good care of them- 
5
selves" •
He thus advocates for^
" . . .  a policy refraining as far as possible from
interfering with contractual relationships except in
6situations of clear justification" •
Such freedom of contract theorising is difficult to justify in the 
context of the concrete socio-economic realities of the Ghanaian situation.
1. Ghana Land Law, London, 1964, pp.295-196; 305-308.
2. ibid., pp.305-306.
3. ibid., pp.305“306.
4. ibid., p.307*
5. ibid., pp.295-296.
6. ibid., pp.295-296.
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Admittedly in 1964—». when Bentsi-Enchill wrote his Ghana Land Law—  the housing
shortage was not assevere as it is today* But even then there was a housing
1
shortage in urban Ghana • The situation has since worsened*
2The contention that some people can take care of themselves is inaccurate •
The landlord's.;^  are operating in a strong sellers' market situation; freedom 
of contract in such circumstances is therefore a fiction*
But Bentsi-Enchill»s suggestion that rent control should be limited to 
"small tenements" is ill-advised from a purely jurisprudential standpoint* 
Controls limited in scope tend not to work^* In the first place, there is
to take their premises out of the category of "controlled premises" if rent
>
control is limited tftiscope* A landlord may, for example, decide to let a 
whole house rather than let single rooms* Thirdly, since it does not appear 
equitable that landlords of "small tenements" should be required to charge 
controlled rents while landlords of "large tenements" are left to do as they 
please, the moral authority of the legislation is undermined and non-compliance 
"justified"*
B. PROHIBITION AGAINST PAYMENT OF ADVANCES
It is a criminal offence to demand— -as a condition for the granting,
renewal or continuance of a tenancy — an advance payment of more than one
5
month's rent m  the case of a monthly tenancy • In tenancies exceeding six
6
months, the advance payment should not be more than six months1, rent • Upon
conviction by the rent magistrate for such an offence, the landlord or his
7
agent shall be liable to a fine not exceeding £G100 •
1. Bentsi-Enchill admitted to this state of affairs at p*295* The Kwaku Bousu 
Committee reported at pp*9~10, para*4 that:
2* Admittedly some tenants are more able to pay the rent charged by landlords* 
But that is different from asserting that they can take care of themselves; 
the tenant is forced by circumstances to pay a rent higher than he would 
have contracted for if supply and demand were in equilibrium*
4* It is important to note that Bentsi-Enchill gives no indication as to where
the problem of where to draw the line • Secondly, landlords
"there is still a shortage of suitable accommodation"*
3* infra, pp*d53"£55*also Chapter 9yff-33^ “ •
(cont*) /\
^ SjOA VJe&Jrviarl, C• i£. ^ ftwt ^ L&jCvt
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The problem of huge sums of money being demanded in advance as a condition
for the grant of a tenancy is one of long standing* As far back as 1947* it
was noted that in certain places, particularly Kumasi, several months* rent
was being demanded in advance from prospective tenants, and that this was 
1
causing hardship • A statute was thus passed making it an offence to demand
payment in advance of more than one month*s rent in the case of monthly ten-
2
ancies, and more than three month's rent in the case of others • The problem
of huge sums of money being demanded as advance payment of rent is also one
3
of the complaints noted by the Kwaku Bonsu Committee •
Once again the general application of section 25 (5) is criticised by 
4Bentsi-Enchill • He argues that the provision prohibiting payment of large 
sums of money as rent in advance should have been limited to "small tenancies" 
where the tenant needs protection, and that parties in "larger tenancies" can 
take care of themselves* He asks:
" • • • what is the justification for preventing a houseowner 
who grants a twenty-year lease of a whole building to say, 
the U*A*C* from taking say; ten years rent in advance?"^*
COftkl •
the line should be drawn; nor does he offer any criteria for doing so, He 
gives no indication as to what "small tenements" are.
5. A e j t X X 0 , S X 5  ( s ')
6. ibid.
*7.
1. Report of the Committee into Rentals, 1951* supra, para.8 (22)
2. Rent Control (Amendment) Ordinance (No.39 of 1947).
3* op.cit., p.l8, para. 20 (1) (k) •
4. Ghana Land Law, op.cit., p*307*
5* ibid.
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Bentsi-Enchill argues that such advance payments may be used to build new
houses thus easing the housing situation; and that the effect of section 25 (5)
would be to prevent capital accumulation by Ghanaians thus preventing them
from entering industry**
Bentsi-Enchill was particularly clever in his choice of tenant in the 
2above question • But is the operation of such welfare legislation to be
dependent on who the tenant happens to be? Jurisprudentially, is it possible 
3
or desirable • How do we protect prospective tenants needing to rent a whole
4house for residential purposes? What about the emerging Ghanaian industrialist
or businessman; how is he to be protected from having to use a large part of
his capital as advance payment of rent? The last question is not hypothetical*
5
In Twene v* Farah , a would-be tenant anxious to set-up a store in Accra 
paid the defendant who was building a house 05*000*00, on the understanding 
that the money would be used to complete the house but would be applied to 
future rent and embodied in the tenancy agreement* A similar amount was paid 
by four other prospective tenants* In each transaction no receipt was issued* 
When the tenants moved into occupation the landlord demanded and received
i. Lem J LcwU > uk-y p- 307.
2* U.A.C. is not typical of the Ghanaian tenant* U*A*C. is the largest
conglomerate in Ghana* It is part of the Unilever empire* It has wide- 
ranging interests including textiles manufacturing, beer brewing, soap 
and toothpaste manufacturing, etc* Not many Ghanaians would be unduly 
bothered about U*A*C* having to pay ten years' rent in advance* But it 
is arguable that such atypical tenants do not provide a sufficient enough 
basis for limiting the scope of section 25 (5).
3* Supra, pr'1SS*^ D/’infra, pp*2£?3-25”5Jsee also Chapter
4* The fieldwork indicated that prospective tenants wishing to rent three- 
bedroom houses at 05*000*00 a month are being asked to pay one year's 
rent in advance*
5* (1970) C.C.120* The case involved a commercial letting>but it is none
the less revealing*
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another four months* rent in advance. The rent had been assessed by the 
Rent Officer at 045*00 a m o n t h W h e n  the tenancy agreements were drawn it 
did not reflect the 05i000*00 the tenants had each paid* The landlord argued 
that the 05,000*00 the tenants had each paid was a payment for goodwill and
not advance payment of rent* This contention was rejected by Anterkyi J.,
who saids
" . .. if it had been the practice of landlords in Accra,
or elsewhere in Ghana, to rent rooms as trading shops on
the basis of an initial lump sum payment as mere goodwill
in relation to the area of the premises, and not as rent
legally payable in advance under Act 220 • • • it must be
2deemed to be interred by this judgment*' •
3
Bentsi-Enchill notes that section 25 (5) is often circumvented; and
argues that this indicates the need for discrimination between ’’small" and 
4"large" tenements • This is difficult to understand* The ineffectiveness
of or non-compliance with the provisions of Act 220 is due to the housing
shortage and the concrete socio-economic realities, and not to the general
5application of its provisions •
C* THE RECOVERABLE RENT
I. THE RENT ACT, 1963 (ACT 220), 1963-1979*
The primary aim of Act 220 is to control the level of rents* But the
Act attempts to do this not by fixing rigid universal standards* Rather,
it provides criteria by which to determine which rents are recoverable and
which are not* The recoverable rent is the rent which can properly be charged
6- the rent imposed or sanctioned by the Act •
1. The tenants thus paid more than nine years' rent in advance.
2. (1970) C.C.120.
3. Ghana Land Law, op*cit*, P*304. The Kwaku Bousu Committee reported that
many tenants complained about having to pay "heavy advances". Twene v*
Farah also illustrates that the practice is still prevalent* Our field­
work indicated that the practice is widespread* Six months’ rent in advance 
is not uncommon in the case of monthly tenancies* In some cases one years* 
rent is demanded in advance* In one case in North-Labone, Accra, three 
year's rent was paid in advance for a ten-year lease.
(cont.)
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lThe recoverable rent is defined in the interpretation section of Act 220 • 
Basically, it is the rent which was payable on the 1st July, I960* Where the 
premises wQtffc not let on the 1st of July, i960 ——but wgf& previously the subject- 
matter of a tenancy— it is the rent at which they were last let* If the 
premises were first let after July 1st, i960, the recoverable rent is the rent 
agreed upon by the parties at the time when the premises were first let* The 
recoverable rent for furnished premises is dealt with by section 30* If the 
premises were let on 1st July, i960 or not being let on that day was prev­
iously let—  it is the rent at which the premises were last let with the 
furniture before July 1st, I960* In the case oi^premises le$ after 1st July, 
i960, the recoverable rent of the premises if let unfurnished is added to
one - sixtieth of the true value of the furniture at the commencement of the 
a
tenancy*
The recoverable rent is therefore determined —  in most cases— by the
contractual rent agreed upon at a particular point.in time* A landlord who
managed to charge an initial high rent is therefore placed in a very strong
position to perpetuate this initial advantage* However the recoverable rent
may, in the course of time, turn out to be unfair to the landlord because of
2the general inflationary trend • While the landlord should not cheat his
4. Ghana Land Law, op.cit*, p*307*
5c infra, Chapter 9>
6* The provisions of Act 220 on the determination and assessment of the recover­
able rent has been amended by subsequent legislation* It has , however, been 
decided to analyse these provisions of Act 220 in some detail because they 
represent one approach. The subsequent amendments represent another* Rent 
control, as will be demonstrated, is still a very important policy issue in 
Ghana* It is therefore important to examine both approaches in some depth*
1. Act 220, S.36.
2* infra, pp*36S-366*
3 • A c t  2 a o (S-3o•
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tenants, it is certainly unfair for a landlord to continue receiving the
same rent that was payable in i960 — twenty years later when the real value
1
of money has plummeted considerably •
It may not also be easy to determine the rent which was first or last 
charged for a particular premises about twenty years ago* This may be because 
the first tenant may have left the premises and so may a second and a thire; 
so that at the time of letting to subsequent tenants only the landlord is 
in a position to know what rent was then chargeable* This surely afforded 
a golden opportunity to landlords and they have not hesitated to take advant- 
age of it •
a* Assessment of the Recoverable Rent
Act 220 therefore provides that the recoverable rent may be assessed--
after which the newly - assessed rent becomes the recoverable rent for the
1. S a &  .
2* No landlord has the right to increase the rent payable in respect of 
any premises without an assessment* By section 25(1)(a) to do so is 
a crime* Yet one of the commonest complaints made by tenants during 
the survey was that landlords increased the rent whenever a new tenant 
moved in* In many houses, the rent paid by tenants renting the same 
size of room varied - depending on ^ hen^ tfie premises were let* Vhen 
this was pointed out to some landlor&^they fount! it difficult to 
increase rent to take account of inflation because of the personal 
relationship they have established with their older tenants* Vith the 
incoming-tenant they found it easier to charge what they consider to be 
an economic rent*
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premises. The recoverable rent may be assessed under these diff­
erent circumstances. First, the assessment may arise at the in­
stance of the landlord, tenant or any person interested irii the 
premises.* The application is to the Rent Officer who determines 
the recoverable rent for the premises?A right of appeal lies to 
the Rent Magistrate.-^
The second type of assessment occurs on the request Cl the 
Minister to the Rent Magistrate.
1. Act 220,s.5(1)(a)and s.10.
2 . ibid. See infra pp.266-267 for a discussion of the Rent Officer.
3. Act 220,s.6(1)(a). Seeinfra pp.266-267 for a discussion of the
Rent Magistrate. By section 36, the Rent Magistrate is the Dis­
trict Magistrate of the district within which the premises are
situated.
ty. The Minister with portfolio for housing.
5. Act 220,ss.6 (I)(c)and II.
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The third type of assessment is made by the Minister#He may, by Executive 
Instrument, assess the recoverable rent in respect of premises of a similar 
type in similar localities^# This provision envisaged a more general form 
of assessment# There is no evidence on record, that this provision was ever 
made use of#
In assessing the recoverable rent, both the Rent Officer and the Rent
2Magistrate are obliged to take certain factors into account • These ares
H(a) the rateable value of the premises for the assessment 
of rates thereon;
(b) the value of the land on which such premises are 
situated;
(c) the amount of anual rates in respect of such premises 
and where the premises have been let in part, any 
apportionment of the rates attributable to. such part;
(d) the recoverable rent assessed for similar premises by 
the Minister under section 13;
(e) the estimated cost in respect of repairs or the main­
tenance of such premises;
(f) the amount of recoverable rent for like premises;
(g) the current rate charged by the Ghana Commercial Bank 
on Overdrafts;
(h) the obligations of the landlord, tenant or any person 
interested in the premises under the lease; and
3
(i) the justice and mertis of each particular case" •
i# kOStQ, s .13.
2# ibid#, S#l4.
3# ibid#, S#l4.
%Vb
Where the recoverable rent for the premises has recently been assessed,
an application for assessment may not be entertained except in certain specified 
1
circumstances • These include case where the circumstances determining the 
rent of such premises have materially altered since the last assessment; where 
the last assessment was obtained by fraud, mistake or misrepresentation; where 
in the last assessment some material evidence was not brought to the attention 
of the assessing officer; or, where, in the opinion of the Rent Officer, injus'r 
tice has been 'done*
An assessment may either raise
st*f bli M  IfOtlJ. by _.U^.,.XavKl
b* Operation of the Assessment
If the assessed rent was lower than the rent previously being paid, then
the assessed rent becomes payable with effect from the end of the month in
3
which the assessment was made • On the other hand, where an assessment during
the currency of a tenancy fixes a rent higher than was previously being paid,
the newly-assessed rent is payable oialy after the landlord has given one month's
4notice to the tenant of his intention to charge the newly-assessed rent •
1. Act 220, S.10.
2* ,It must be emphasised that an assessment was not necessary 'for
tWj the recoverable rent* Act 220 contained crtS by which the recover­
able rent of all premises in Ghana could be determined. An assessment was 
only necessary when it was sought to vary this determination*
3. Act 220, S.16 (1),
4. ibid., S*l6 (2).
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This was a reversal of the principle in Hinnawi v. Bassil • In this case 
the rent payable under a tenancy agreement was increased on assessment* The 
tenant refused to pay the increased rent-— contending that he was only liable 
to pay the contractual rent. The landlord instituted proceedings to recover 
arrears of rent and for an order of possession* The majority of the Vest 
African Court of Appeal (Granville Sharp and Van Lare JJ.A.) held that the 
standard rent sets only a maximum limit and that a landlord is free to nego­
tiate to let at a lower rent* In such cases, the contractual rent should be 
the payable rent; the assessed recoverable rent can only be enforced after 
the termination or expiry of the tenancy*
It has been argued by some that the principle of Hinnawi v* Bassil 
perpetrated an injustice against landlords; and that since the tenant took 
advantage of any reduction in rent payable during the currency of a tenancy, 
it was inequitable for the landlord to be denied this right if the rent is 
increased^*
Section 16 of Act 220 has been criticised by Bentsi-Enchill • His main 
criticism is that the provision is capable of working injustice, and being 
used as a vehicle of fraud — particularly in the case of tenancies for long 
periods of time* This is because the assessment may fix rent higher or lower 
than what the parties have agreed on. The parties not being able to terminate 
the tenancy, may be forced to pay or receive rent higher or lower than they 
agreed to. Bentsi-Enchill thus concludes that:
2* Report of the Committee of Enquiry into the Operation of the Rent Control
Ordinance (No*2 of 1952), p.27» para.38; J.K.Frimpong, Towards an Effective
Control of Rents of Premises in Ghana, unpublished LL*M* dissertation, 
Faculty of Law, University of Ghana, 1973» Amah v* Picas (1957) 2 W.A.L.R.
79 per Wilson C.J. at p*8l*
1. (1958) 3 W.A.L •R.495* This case was decided on the provisions of the Rent
Control Ordinance (No*2), 1952.
3« Ghana Land Law, op.cit., pp.304-306.
f)£o
"From this viewpoint it is possible to say that the Rent
Control legislation supplies a handy instrument of fraud
by enabling a party to a valid contract to turn round and
avail himself of extraneous machinery to alter the contract
1m  his favour and to the detriment of the other party" •
Both section 16 and Bentsi-Enchill's criticism of it, seem to lose sight 
of the fact that in this field of activity the landlord and the tenant do not 
bargain on an equal footing* A tenant may have to 'agree* to pay a very high 
rent because of the need for shelter and it is only fair that—  if on applic­
ation the rent is reduced— he should pay the lower rent. A landlord who 
contracts to receive a certain rent should not be heard to say that the rent
is inadequate except in clear cases where, for example, because of a sharp
2decline in th^real value of money due to hyper-inflation or as a result of
improvements to the premises, it is demonstrably unfair for the landlord to
be made to continue charging the contractual rent. It is here being argued
that the landlord is in such a strong bargaining position that he should be
able to take care of himself. The tenant, though — being in a weaker bargain-
. 3ing position*— needs the apparatus of the state behind him •
1. Qp-Cifc. , p. 306.
2. It is not considered appropriate that a landlord should be awarded an 
increase simply because of 'normal' inflation. Inflation is a fact of 
life in the present world which everyone has to take into consideration 
in every transaction.
3* By section 2 of the Rent (Amendment) Decree, 1973 (N.R.C.D.158) and
section 2 of the Rent (Amendment) Decree, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D.5) which
repealed N.R.C.D. 158 —  the principle in Hinnawi v. Bassil has been 
revived.
9-5 |
c. Conclusion
This then was the position of the law from 1963 1973* The law had
had little or no effect on landlord—tenant relations* Rent was generally 
considered very high by tenants* There were complaints about the high level 
of rent. The National Redemption Council —  the then government— after some
initial attempts at bringing the level of rent down*, enacted the Rent (Amen-
2 3dment) Decree, 1973 to specify what rent should be payable • It is to a
consideration of the approach of this Decree that we now turn.
II. N.R.C.D.158. (1973-79)
The Decree was passed on the 20th February 1973$ and made retroactive 
4to 1st February 1973 • The Decree did not apply to the whole of Ghana; it
5
applied only to the cities of Accra, Kumasi and Sekondi - Takoradi • The 
Decree applied to "residential premises" only^. The .distinctionbetween resi­
dential tenancies and others is particularly difficult to apply because of 
the peculiarities of the business and trading patterns of Ghana. This is 
because many people, like traders, bread bakers, kenkey sellers, tailors and 
seamstresses, carry on their business or part of their business, in the pre­
mises where they reside.
l*These included appeals to landlords to reduce rents, an order to tenants 
to pay only 80% of the rent they had hitherto been paying, and the fixing 
of standard rents.
2* N.R.C.D.158 (hereafter reffered to as N.R.C.D.158).
3« N.R.C.D.158 did not replace the recoverable rent provisions of Act 220.
N.R.C.D.158 was of very limited application: See infra pp. 251.-2-^ 5*
4. N.R.C.D.158, S.10.
5. ibid., S.6 (1) and 2nd Sched* By section 6(2) the Commissioner fo‘r 
Housing had power to extend the operation of the Decree to other parts 
of Ghana. This power was not exercised until the Decree was repealed.
6. N.R.C.D.158, S.10.
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1
The Decree fixed rigid rents for certain specified pr&mises • The 
specification of rigid rents for particular types of premises is a departure 
from the policy of Act 220, the parent Act* Under Act 220, rents were cont­
rolled but the ohly general provision was that no rent could be increased 
without a special assessment of the rent for that premises* N.R.C.D*158 thus 
marked the introduction of a rigid rent control system in Ghana* The speci­
fication of rigid rents was urged on the Kwakii BoyisU Committee; but it was 
rejected^.
N.R.C.D.158 defined "premises" as a single room of the type and size
specified in the First Schedule; and, a "tenant" as a person whose income
3
does not exceed 01,000*00 per annum and who rents a single room only •
If, as regards premises covered by the Decree, the rent being paid 
before the Decree came into force is lower than that specified in the Decree, 
the tenant shall continue to pay the lower rent • Where the dimensions of 
the rented premises vary from those specified in the First Schedule, then
5
rent proportionate to that payable for the specified size and type is payable •
SI* Under the First Schedule the specified rent for types of 
room were as followss-
Sandcrete or Landcrete 
11 t»
it 1
Iron Sheet 
Wooden or Swish
12ft x 12ft « 07*50 per month
12ft x 10ft = 06*50 per month
10ft x 10ft = 05*50 per month
10ft x 10ft * 03*50 per month
12ft x 10ft as 04*50 per month
2* Report of the Committee of Enquiry into the Operation of the Rent Control
Ordinance (No*2 of 1952), op.cit*, p*19 para 22*
3* N.R.C.D.158, S.4*
4* N.R.C.D.158, S.2. This revives the principle in Hinnawj v. Bassil ^1958^
3 W.A.L.R.495 which was reversed by section 16(2) of Act 220* See supra,
pp. 249 “250.
5* N.R.C.D.158, S.1(2).
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The draftsman being aware of possible disagreement between landlord and
tenant over the appropriate rent payable in respect of some premises, provided
that in such situations the matter should be referred to the Rent Officer
1
by either the landlord, tenant or other interested person •
a. Rigid Rent Control
It has been noted that N.R.C.D.158 laid down specified rents for certain
types and size of premises; and this was so despite any variations in the
material facts of a tenancy* This approach is considered by some as an
2
improvement on the recoverable rent provisions of Act 220 • It is argued 
that specification of rigid rents simplifies the enforcement of the rent 
control mechanism by enabling each tenant to know what his landlord is entitled 
to charge*
3
The approach of the Decree can, however, be questioned • It tends to 
be too rigid* [[yJL'fQ* Ol Vf  uJhick
dfrk&cwiviQs r C--.tr>Jt; • l W ( y t v > a ^ j  m
• Thus even though two different rooms may fall under a part­
icular type and size specified in the Decree they may not have the same amen­
ities and decoration, they may be on different storeys or in different neigh­
'llbourhoods, and the agreements might offer varying degrees of security* It 
was noted that under Act 220 Rent Officers were required to take a large
number of factors— including "the justice and merits of each particular
4 5
case" —— into account when making their assessment • Presumably N.R.C.D.158
took the view that interminable argument about what precisely are "the justice
and merits of each particular case" was defeating the purpose of Act 220*
l.tU-C0J5$, S5(l).
2* See J.K.Frimpong, "The N.R.C. and the Standard Rent",; Legon Observer, 
(1973) Vol.VIII, No*3, p.57.
3* See G*R*Woodman, "The Recent Rent Control Legislation", Legon Observer, 
(1973) Vol.VIII, No.9» p.198; Report of the Committee of Enquiry into 
the Operation of the Rent Control Ordinance, op.cit., p.19 para 22.
4. Act 220, Sl4(i).
5. supra., pp.2^ - 2^.
'SfiJL' C C<uits r £>*\\co ((0^4” (1^ 73-) 7
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The force of this criticism — on the fixation of rigid rents —  
is somewhat diminished in this instance because N.R.C.D.158 was 
very limited in scope.* The Decree applied only if the tenant juocis 
a person whose income did not exceed #1,000 per annum and rental a 
single residential room in Accra, Kumasi or Sekondi-Takoradi. The 
objective of the Decree was therefore to protect only the poorest 
tenants renting the simplest accommodation. This was a departure 
from the policy of Act 220 not to distinguish between premises used 
for residential and business purposes, between valuable and less 
valuable premises, or between rich and poor tenants.
Jd. Categorisation.
But even in the pursuit of its policy-objective of protecting
the lowest-income group among tenants, the provisions of the Decree
were far from satisfactory.-^ Why should such a tenant rent a single
room only if he was to benefit? Why should a low-income tenant who
because of his large family is compelled to rent two rooms not benefit
while his bachelor colleague who rented only a single room did? fhe
above argument assumed that there is certainty as to what constitutes
a single room and also that it would be unproblematic determining
whose income does not exceed #1,006 per annum. Both assumptions are
not justified. What is a single room? Does it include a verandah or 
4/
terrace. But,jjrhaps more importantly because of the concrete context, to
1. S.4.
2. See Woodman,G.R.,"The recent rent control legislation”,op.cit.
3. For a fuller account of the problems thrown up by the categories 
established by the Decree, see Woodman,G.R.,"The recent rent control 
legislation*, op. cit.
A
what extent does kitchen and toilet facilities, shared with others, make the
premises more than a single room? How does a landlord determine the income
of his tenant? What if the tenant is self-employed, would the landlord have
1
to rely on the tenant’s word as to what his income is? And what about the 
tenant whose income flucit&tes’ from year to year, being sometimes above and 
sometimes below 01,000*00 per annum?
Now, to widei* jurisprudential issues* The distinction between different 
classes of cases inevitably makes the law more difficult to apply* As Woodman 
points out:
’’Distinctions always provide room for argument over border­
line cases* The law cannot always avoid drawing distinctions,
. . 2but it is arguaole that they should be kept to a minimum" •
Furthermore where the constraints imposed by the law apply to only a narrow 
group of cases, people will try to prevent their own case from falling into
a
this group. In this particular instance, landlords may decide to let double­
rooms or whole houses only— they may *compel**a tenant to take more than a 
single room; or, they may let to tenants earning more than 01,000*00 per 
annum* Indeed they may remove their premises from the residential sector 
altogether, and rent for commercial purposes only* The net effect of all 
these possible responses would be to make things difficult for the low-income 
tenant that N.R.C.D.158 sought to protect.
1. The self-employed do not normally maintain a written statement of account* 
In fact one of the foremost problems for a system of direct taxation in 
Ghana is how best to tax the self-employed. Most of them do not pay direct 
tax. In recent years governments have sought to fix rigid rates for differ 
ent classes and types of self-employed. It is thus surprising that this 
problem was not envisaged by N.R.C.D.158*
2* G.R.Woodman, "The Recent Rent Control Legislation", Legon Observer (1973) 
Vol.VIII, No.9, p.198 at 199.
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III. PRICES AND INCOMES REGULATIONS, 1973» L.T.803
Pursuant to the wide powers conferred on it by the Prices and Incomes
1 .Decree, 1972 , the Prices and Incomes Board has issued the Prices and Incomes
2
Regulations, 1973 •
3
As far as they are relevant , the regulations provide that no one shall
increase the rent for "any premises or land whatsoever” without the author-
4lsation in writing of the Prices and Incomes Board • Where the landlord is 
letting his premises for the first time, he must get the prior written approval
5
of the Prices and Incomes Board on the rent chargeable • Any rent fixed in
6breach of these Regulations is expressed to be void • Infringement of the
Regulations is also a crime. Upon conviction the offender shall be liable
to be imprisoned for a term of up to two years, or a fine of up to 03*000,
7
or both •
These regulations are a preposterous and idealistic piece of law-making 
in. an inflationary economy such as the Ghanaian. It is unworkable. The Board 
would need to have a vast bureaucracy reaching into the remotest village if 
the regulations are to have any chance of success. As it happens, the Board 
has only one office; and that is at "State House", Accra. It is ridiculous 
to suppose that landlords in. all parts of Ghana would apply to the Board's
g
office in Accra before increasing rent, or establishing what rent is chargeable •
And even if they do, the Board has not the machinery for processing the appli- 
9
cations • As it happens not many landlords have heard about the Prices and 
Incomes Board; and none of the landlords interviewed knew that the Prices and
1. N.R.C.D.119•
2. L.I.805.
3« For a discussion of other parts of the Regulations, see S.K.Date-Bah,
"Legislative Control of Freedom of Contract", in Essays in Ghanaian Law, ed. 
Ekaw-Daniels & Woodman, Faculty of Law, Legon, 1976* The Regulations are 
just amazing. It seeks to control the prices of any goods and services 
whatsoever - from prices in the urban supermarket to that charged by the 
village ;|*Clfmer - in the manner indicated. It represents a most unrealistic 
attempt to control the prices of all goods and services in an inflationary 
economy still predominantly controlled by private interests.
4. Reg.2(1)•
3 * R®g.2.(2).
(cont•)
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Incomes Board — at least on paper — has something to do with rents of premises •
IV. CONCLUSION
The law had not succeeded in checking rising rents the survey indicated 
that the average rent for a sandcrete room measuring 12 feet by 12 feet was 
025*00 per month* It may be recalled that N.R.C.D.158 specified a monthly 
rent of 07*50 for this type and size of room* Most landlords knew that there 
was legislation on rent control* They however did not know that, in some 
instances, rigid rents were specified, and were surprised when it was pointed 
out to them^*
The greatest drawback to the rigid rents approach is inflation. The
First Schedule was not amended from 1973 to 1979 when N.R.C.D.158 was repealed*
Within this period inflation rose from an annual rate of 22*8% in 197^ to 116%
3
in 1979 • From 1976 to 1979 the annual rate of inflation was more than 100%
for each year* From 1973 to 1979 therefore, prices in the economy as a whole
rose about five times over; and yet landlords were supposed to continue charging 
4the specified rent • It would be argued, that when the law seems so patently 
ridiculous people think they are ”justified” in ignoring it*
6* Reg.5(3).
7• Reg*5 ( 3 ) •
8. Even the more decentralised machinery of Act 220 has been largely ineffective.
9* Even the more decentralised machinery of Act 220 (see infra, pp*265r27$ has 
been largely ineffective.
1. The popular misconception was that the Prices and Incomes Board only fixed 
the prices of manufactured goods*
2* Most felt that the government (that is how it was expressed) was not serious*
3* Budget Statement by Minister of Finance to Parliament, 20th Dec., 1979*
4. It is significant that under A.F.R.C.D.5 which repealed N.R.C.D.158 (see infra 
pp*2&0) the Minister is given power to specify new rents as and when he deems 
necessary*
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This then was the state of the from 1963 to 1979* Act 220 was the principal 
enactment on the recoverable rent; it applied to the whole country and to all 
premises • From 1973* N.R.C.D.158 amended the provisions of Act 220 in a limited 
number of cases, and applied to the cities only. The Prices and Incomes Regula-
when the A,F,R,C, came to power the rent control game had to be played all 
over again. One of the few pieces of legislation passed by that caretaker 
adminstration is a new Rent Control (Amendment) Decree, 1979t which repealed
is legally chargeable •
V, RENT CONTROL (AMENDMENT) DECREE, 1979 (A.F.R.C.D.5)
a. Applicability
A,F,R,C,D,5 was passed on 20th July, 1979 but made retroactive to 21st June,
applies to the whole of Ghana; there is no limitation as to the location or 
value of the premises, or to the income of the tenant and how many rooms he
cities of Accra, Kumasi and Sekond— -Takoradi, and even in these cities applied 
only to the lowest income tenants renting the most simple of accommodation —
1, infra. Chapter 9*ff' 3 3 ^ " 3 •
2, A.F.R.C.D.5* S,12,
3, ibiti, SS.l & 8,
4, It is important to note that unlike N,R,C,D,158, A.K&C.D.5 applies to the
whole country and to all types of residential premises and tenants,
5, A.F.R,C.D,5, S.13.
tions applied to the whole country and to all premises, and also attempted to
control the level of rents. All these have been largely ineffective. Thus
2 3N.R.C.D.158 and amends Act 220 , and is now the substantive law on what rent
4
5 6
1979 • Unlike N,R,C.D,158, A.F.R.C.D.5 is general in its application . It
7
rents • Thus— - unlike N.R.C.D.158 which amended Act 220 only in the three
6. ibid,
7* ibid.
fl.f-tf c- 0.5.
* i-S axcW<w it*. Aou**} f
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A.F.R.C.D.5 applies to the whole country, to all types-and value of premises,
and to all tenants. It therefore completely amends the provisions of Act 220
on the recoverable rent. In this respect, A.F.R.C.D.5 reverts to the policy
of Act 220 in applying to the whole country and to all residential premises
and tenants*.
b. Specification of Rent
A.F.R.C.D.5 departs from Act 220, but follows N.R.C.D.158 in specifying
2rigid rents for different types of premises • It provides that, with the
coming into force of the Decree, the rent chargeable for different types of
3premises in different parts of Ghana shall not exceed the following :
Type of accommodation and size of room Location Rent Payable
Sandcrete: One-roomed accommodation 
with shared amenities (i.e., under 
multiple occupation) of a size 12ft x 
10ft.
(Regional
Capitals)
i.e.
Accra
Kumasi
Sekondi-
Takoradi
Cape-
Coast
Sunyani
Koforidna
Tamale
BolgatancjCi
Ho
Also Tema
020.00
Sandcrete: One-roomed accommodation 
with shared amenities (i.e., under 
multiple occupation) of a size 12ft x 
10ft.
Other
Areas
016.00
1. A.F.R.C.D.5, however, applies to residential premises only, while Act 220
applies to all premises whatever the purpose of the tenancy. It must thus 
be emphasised that as far as commercial lettings are concerned the provisons 
of Act 220 on the recoverable^are still applicable. See supra,
and PP.&43-1S2 also, p.OSl- 
(Cont.)
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In the case of rooms whose sizes are different from that quoted above, the
rent payable shall be at a rate of 16 pesewas per square foot for premises
in the regional capitals and Tema, and 12 pesewas per square foot in the
1
case of premises situated in other parts of Ghana •
The Commissioner for Housing may from time to time amend the Schedule
to the Decree (the table specifying the rent payable, quoted above) by Legis- 
2
lative Instrument • This is a surprising provision; for it would seem that 
the Commissioner has power to amend the Schedule without a corresponding 
power to amend section 1(2) which provides for the rent for sizes of rooms 
not specified in the Schedule. The two provisions ought to go hand in hand.
If the Commissioner, presumably as a result of inflation, deems it necessary 
to increase the rent payable for rooms specified in the Schedule, then it 
should follow that the rate for sizes not specified should be increased. It 
is suggested that section 1(3) is an example of bad draftmanship, and that 
the Commissioner should not only have the power to amend the Schedule but 
should also be able to amend section 1(2) otherwise an incongrous situation 
might be created.
The Decree also specifies the rent payable where the tenant takes a whole 
house rather than a room or rooms under multiple-occupation.
Cohtd* __ r
2. A.F.R.C.D.5* SSI &8. See infra, pp.261-2b5»ror a critique of this approach
See supra, pp.O-SS-J^i)^*
3* ibid., Sl(l) and First Schedule. This section deals only with tenants rent 
ing rooms under a system of multiple occupation, i.e., not renting a whole 
house.
1. A.F.R.C.D.5* S.1(2).
2. A.F.R.C.D.5* S.1(3).
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By section 8(1) the rent payable for a "two-roomed self-contained terraced
house” shall be 0150.00 per month or 27 pesewas per square foot whichever is 
1
lower • In the case of a "three-roomed self-contained semi-detached house”
the rent shall be 0175*00 per month or 30 pesewas per square foot whichever 
2is lower • For a "three-roomed self-contained detached house” the rent shall
3
be 0200.00 per month or 3^ pesewas per square foot whichever is lower •
The above provisions may in the course of time suffer from the worst effects
of a rent specification system in an inflationary economy. This is because
for no apparent reason the minister is only empowered to amend the Schedule 
4to the Decree . The minister has no power to fix new rents for self-contained 
houses, but can fix new rents for rooms held under multiple occupation. Rents 
for self-contained houses may therefore not just fall behind inflation, but 
also rents of other premises^.
By section 8(4) rent for self-contained house of more than three rooms 
shall be negotiated by the parties. On the face of it, this provision departs 
from the policy of Act 220 in applying to all premises despite their value.
It may be recalled that the Kwaku Bensu Committee recommended that rents of
6premises m  the "luxury class” should not be controlled • This view was, 
however, rejected by Parliament and Act 220 was made general in application.
1. It is thought that what is meant is bedrooms and not just rooms.
2. A.F.R.C.D.5* S.8(2).
3* ibid., S.8(3).
4. supra., S.1(3)*
5* New legislation can, of course, be introduced. Frequent changes in rent
control legislation may,however, serve as a disincentive to new construction.
6. Report of the Committee, p.20, para.23.
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It is suggested, however, that section 8(4) does not take the rents of 
premises in the "luxury class" outside the rent control scheme. What section 
8(4) does is not to specify rigid rents for this type of premises*; but this 
does not take them outside the rent control scheme. By section 8(5) any 
disagreement between the parties shall be referred to the Rent Officers for 
determination. And section 10 provides that in determining rent for premises 
not specified in the Decree, the Rent Officers shall have regard to the mater­
ials used in the construction of the premises and its situation or location.
The major legal difference between premises in the "luxury class" and others 
is that in the case of premises in the "luxury class" there is no upper limit 
to the rent which the parties can agree on; the rent control.mechanism does 
not come into play as long as there is agreement between the parties. The 
contractual rent is the legally payable rent until the matter is referred 
to a Rent Officer and a new rent is fixed. In the case of other premises
however, a contractual rent which is above that specified is not the legally
2payable rent-— to receive such rent constitutes a criminal offence •
It would seem that in drafting the provisions of A.F.R.C.D.5 attention 
was not given to the provisions of the Prices and Incomes Regulations (L.I.805). 
A.F.R.C.D.5 does not expressly repeal the provisions of L.I.805 dealing with 
the rents of premises; it only repeals N.R.C.D.158. And yet the provisions of
1. See supra, pp.251 -2Sfo and A.F.R.C.D.5* S.8(l)-(3)*
2. A.F.R.C.D.5* S.9*
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l
A.F.R.C.D.5 contradict those of L.I.805 in some material respects • Thus
while the Prices and Incomes Regulations provide that no landlord can charge
or increase rent without the prior written approval of the Prices and Incomes 
2
Board , section 8(4) of A.F.R.C.D.5 provides that the rent for certain classes
3
of houses shall be that negotiated between the parties • Furthermore while 
the Regulations envisage the landlord increasing the rent for the premises 
with the approval of the Board) A.F.R.C.D.5 does not envisage the landlord 
increasing rent •
The other important provision of A.F.R.C.D.5 is designed to restrict the
rents charged by persons who, having a house on hire-purchase from the Tema
Development Corporation, the State Housing Corporation and similar bodies,
sublet them^. The policy here is to restrict such landlords to 25% on top
6of their outgoings on the said premises • The 25% is of the sum
which the landlord would have paid if no deposit was paid and he had agreed
7
to pay the purchase price of the premises over a period of 25 years • Where
the landlord has made extensions or improvements to the premises as originally 
8acquired , the matter shall be referred to the Rent Officer who will determine
"a reasonable increase in rent having regard to the extensions and other improve- 
Q
ments" • Any person aggrieved by the decision of the Rent Officer may appeal
10to the Rent Magistrate •
1. Could it be that the legislature shares the popular misconception, noted 
among members of the public, that the Prices and Incomes Board does not 
deal with rents of premises?
2. supra, pp.05&-157.
3* supra, p.. W - X L l .
4. In fact by A.F.R.C.D.5, S . 2 a tenant is to continue paying the rent he 
was paying before the Decree came into force, if this is lower than that 
specified in the Decree.
5* This policy was started by N.R.C.D.158 to deal with the practice of people 
who, having taken houses from the public corporations - whose policy is 
to make houses available as cheaply as possible - sublet at exorbitant 
rents. In practice most sub-tenants pay rents far above the hire-purchase 
instalment being paid by the landlord: See West Africa, No.3300, 20/10/80,
p.2090.
6. A.F.R.C.D.5, S.7(1).
7* ibid., S.6(2).
(cont.)
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A.F.R.C.D.5, like N.R.C.D.158, revives the principle in Hinnawi v.
1
Bassil • By section 2 of A.F.R.C.D.5, if the rent payable by the tenant
before the Decree came into force is lower than that specified in the Decree,
the tenant shall continue to pay the lower rent.
It must be emphasised that the rents specified in A.F.R.C.D.5 are not
2mafldatonly imposed; they are just the upper limits • In theory, a landlord
is at liberty to charge a rent lower than that specified in the Decree. Further
more, unlike N.R.C.D.158 with its detailed provision on the rent payable for
3
different types and sizes of rooms , A.F.R.C.D.5 does not specify in as much
4detail the rents for varying sizes and types of rooms and houses • A.F.R.C.D.5
specifies rent for the standard types, and then provides that rents for other
premises not specified shall be determined by Rent Officers using the rents
;
specified as an upper limit and a guidem and having regard to the materials
used in the construction of the premises and its situation or location'*. Thus,
there is much more scope for the Rent Officers with assessment of rents under
A.F.R.C.D.5 than under N.R.C.D.158. The upper limit of rents, though, is 
6
fixed —  contrary to the policy of Act 220.
8. This is common practice.
9. A.F.R.C.D.5, S.7(1).
10. A.F.R.C.D.5, S.7(2).
1. 1^958^  3 W.A.L.R.58, see supra pp.2^ -S-2fT0.
2. A.F.R.C.D.5, s.10.
3. See N.R.C.D.158, S.l & First Schedule; also supra PfL2TI~lS2L.
4. Compare N.R.C.D.158, S.l, Schedule 1 and A.F.R.C.D.5, SS.l & 8. 
5* A.F.R.C.D.5, S.10.
6. Except self contained houses with more than three bedrooms (see, 
A.F.R.C.D.5, S.8v (4).
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Any person who demands or receives rent or attempts to eject a tenant
for failing to pay rentin excess of that specified in A.F.R.C.D.5 commits 
1
a criminal offence • Such an offender shall, upon summary conviction, be 
liable to a fine, not exceeding 02,000 or to imprisonment not exceeding two 
years or both**.
D. THE MACHINERY OF RENT CONTROL
I. THE LAV
a. Rent Officers
On the recommendations of the Kwaku Bonsu Committee, Act 220 abolished
3
the Rent Assessment Committees established by the Rent Control Ordinance, 1952 • 
The rent control machinery under Act 220 is pivoted on the assessment
of rent by the Rent Officer^. The rent officer may perforguar^Tde range of
5 . . .functions • The assessment of rents in the first instance is assigned to
him**. The rent officer cannot act suojgotUj; he only.acts on. an application
7
from the landlord, tenant or other interested person • The rent officer shall 
also investigate complaints by a landlord in respect of arrears of rent and
g
complaints by the parties to the tenancy on any other matter • He shall inves­
tigate and determine any matter relating to the Act referred to him by the
9
minister or rent magistrate • He is charged with the preparation of rent
10registers and other prescribed documents and information ; and, shall maintain
1* A.F.R.C.D.5* S.9*
2. ibid*, S*9
It must be emphasised that the machinery for the control of rents has since 
1963, been that established under Act 220* Amendments to Act 220, like 
N.R.C.D.158 and A.F.R.C.D.5* have only dealt with the recoverable rent^ 
the machinery remains the same.
3* Report of the Committee of Enquiry into the Operation of the Rent Control 
Ordinance (No.2 of 1952), op.cit., p*23* para.29*
4. ibid.
5. Act 220, S.5 (1).
6. supra.
7« Act 220, S.5(l)(a); See supra, note 1.
8. ibid., S.5(l)(b).
9. ibid., S.5(1)(c).
10. ibid., S.5(l)(<^ )*
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a register of vacant premises and furnish information concerning such premises
to prospective tenants1. Rent Officers may take measures against tenants who
have absconded and can obtain an order from the appropriate rent magistrate
2granting him powers of entry and search • He may examine any person to ascer­
tain whether the Act is being observed) and may prosecute for offences under 
3
the Act .
For the performance of these functions, the rent officer is vested with 
4immense powers • He has power to require the attendance of parties and
witnesses, and to examine them on oath'*. He may also order the discovery,
6inspection and production of documents ; and may enter in order to view or
7
order the inspection of any premises under his consideration • He also has
. 8power to call assessors or experts to assist him m  his determination ; and
9
he may order a landlord or tenant to furnish him with any necessary information •
b. Rent Magistrates
Appeals from decisions of the rent officer lie to the rent magistrate,
10who is in practice the district magistrate of the locality # -phe rent magist­
rate may vary the assessment11, or any other determination made by the rent 
12officer • The rent magistrate has power to assess the recoverable rent for
13any premises referred to him by the Minister • His assessment is final,
14though subject to appeals to the High Court on any question of law • The
1.A U i q a , S.5(D(e).
2. ibid., S . 5 ( D ( g ) .
3. Act.220, S.5(l)(h)
4. Act 220, S.5(2).
5. ibid., S.5(2)(a).
6. ibid., S.5(2)(b).
7. ibid., S.5(2)(c).
8. ibid., S.5(2)(d).
9. ibid., S.5(2)(e).
10. ibid., SS7 & 36.
11. ibid., S. 6 (1)(a)•
12. ibid., S.6(1)(b)•
13. ibid., S.6(l)(c).
14. ibid., S.8.
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rent magistrate may order the ejectment of any tenant from premises situated
 1
within his jurisdiction •
c. Jurisdiction of Rent Officers and Magistrates
The only element in a tenancy agreement which the rent officer and rent
2magistrate can alter is rent • They may deal with other issues— ‘like arrears
of rent, breach of covenant, etc.—  but they cannot alter any term of the tenancy
agreement* The rent officers and rent magistrates have an omnibus jurisdiction,
irrespective of the amount of rent involved, the amount of damages or the value 
3
of the premises • This view of the law has not, however, been unanimously
4
accepted by judges* In Dlep v* Kaba , a rent magistrate gave judgment to 
the landlord for £G6l8 beings arrears of rent and mesne profits* The tenant 
appealed to the High Court* Counsel for the landlord applied for leave to 
enforce the judgment, arguing that the High Court had no jrurisdiction to 
entertain the appeal* After rejecting this submission, Koranteng-Addow J., 
continued, obiter:
"In this instant case as the quantum of the debt was over 
and above the jurisdiction of the magistrate court the 
High Court was the only court of competent jurisdiction to 
entertain the suit"'*.
Quite clearly Koranteng-Addpw J„, thought that the jurisdiction of the rent
magistrate is limited to the jurisdiction of a district magistrate, i.e., to
6cases where the amount of money involved does not exceed £G150 •
l.AtbllQ, s .6 (  1) (d) •
2* ibid., SS*5(M and 9(2).
3* Act 220, SS*5 & 6* 
k. {l973j2 G.L.R.190.
5* ibid*, at p*193*
6, Courts Act, i960 (C*A*9)t S*52*
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Koranteng-Addow*s view on the jurisdiction of rent officers and rent 
magistrates was rejected in Woode v. Dadson*. In this case, the rent 
magistrate on the basis of findings by the rent officer, ordered a tenant 
to pay 010,250 as arrears of rent* The tenant appealed against this decision 
to the High Court* The main issue for the determination of the High Court 
was whether the rent magistrate had jurisdiction to award arrears of rent
, 2
of 010,250*00 • It was held by Edusei J*, that the jurisdiction of the rent 
magistrate is not limited to a specific sum of money* The learned judge 
pointed out that by section 37(1)(d) of the Courts Act, 1971 the District 
Court Grade I was vested with jurisdiction in "all civil causes or matters 
relating to the landlord and tenant of any premises or any person interested 
in such premises as required or authorised by any law relating to landlord 
and tenant", and that sections 5 and 6 of Act 220 which provide for the 
jurisdiction of rent officers and rent magistrates did not limit their juris­
diction of rent officers and rent magistrates did not limit their jurisdiction. 
It is submitted that Edusei J.'s., view of the law is the law. A more
interesting question, however, is whether this ought be law? In other
4
words, is it good law? Bentsi-Enchill does not think that it is • He cons­
iders it without justification that questions involving large sums of money 
should be dealt with by rent officers and rent magistrates — particularly since
1. [1976J 2 G.L •R*I85. Unfortunately the earlier opinion of Koranteng-Addow J.,
was not brought to the attention of the court.
2* By the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372), S*37(l)(a) &(b) the general jurisdiction 
of the District Court Grade I is limited to claims not exceeding 02,000*00.
3* (Act 372).
4. Ghana Land Law, op.cit., p.307*
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their determination is final on questions of fact • He argues that this 
might serve as an incentive to bribery and corruption. He therefore questions 
the whole philosophy of Act 220 in applying to all premises with no limitation 
as to value, and asks:
"And this leads to the question whether it would not be better 
to confine the operations of the Rent Officers to small ten­
ancies where the inducement to corruption is likely to be
smaller and where their assistance can be of telling signif- 
„2icance" •
Ofori-Boateng is unhappy about the practical operation of this arrange-
3
ment • He is particularly concerned because some of the rent magistrates 
who are given the task of supervising the rent officers are not trained 
lawyers. He contends that Act 220 envisaged that the rent magistrates would 
be trained lawyers with experience at the bar so that they can supervise the
4lay rent officers • He therefore laments the fact that lay rent magistrates 
are having to supervise lay rent officers. Noting that the effect of this 
has been that lay rent magistrates have been endorsing the recommendations 
of rent officers without further enquiry^, Ofori-Boateng recommends that only 
trained lawyers should exercise the supervisory role envisaged by Act 220.
It is, of course* of some concern that untrained rent officers and lay 
rent magistrates should be vested with so much power, and have jurisdiction
1. Ghana Land Law, op.cit., p»2>07.
2. ibid., p.306. At p.307 Bentsi-Enchill makes it clear that this question 
applies equally to the jurisdiction of the rent magistrate.
3* "Rules of Evidence Under Act 220". (1972) 4 R.G.L.43,at p.50.
4. He cites no authority for this contention. The Report of the Kwaku Bonsu 
Committee upon which Act 220 was passed envisaged no such thing.
5* See, eg., Republic v. Tamakloe; Ex parte Kessie (1968) C.C.90.
\
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in cases involving large sums of money • But this drawback should be considered
2
in the wider context • In fact the Kwaku Bonsu Committee examined this issue 
and reported:
'•After considering the nature of the cases to be dealt with
and the complaints of landlords and tenants generally, what
seems necessary is a system by which a permanent officer deals
in the first instance with all rent complaints, trying to
settle as many of these as possible and expeditously • • • •
where however, parties to any complaint or application are
unable to reach agreement before such officer, then the matter
would have to go to court. A system such as this would meet
the reluctance of both landlords and tenants to go to law on
matters affecting rents and will also reduce the number of
3
cases to be dealt with by the magistrates” •
d. Appeals to the Rent Magistrate
The rent magistrate cannot act sMo motu to vary the recoverable rent
assessed by the rent officer, but he may so act when there is an appeal to
4him against decision of a rent officer • A landlord, tenant or other inter­
ested person appealing against the decision of the rent officer shall, within
ten days of the decision of the rent officer, send a copy of his statement
5
of appeal to the rent officer • Within fourteen days of receipt of the state­
ment, the Rent Officer shall forward the statement together with: (a) copies 
of all relevant documents certified by him to be the exact copies of the
documents; (b) a statement of the facts of the matter, and (c) the reasons
6for his assessment or other determination • A rent magistrate to whom an
1. Allegations of corruption against rent officers is not unknown; See The
Mirror, 2nd Feb., 1979* There is no record of any such allegation being
proved.
2. A culture in which people are reluctant to go to court with such matters, 
the expense of legal action and the absence of legal aid.
3. Report of the Committee of Enquiry into the Operation of the Rent Control
Ordinance (No.2 of 1952), op.cit., p.23i para, 29*
4. Act 220, S.6(l)(a) & (b).
5. ibid., S.12(1) & (2).
6. ibid., S.12(2) & (3).
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appeal has been made may vary the assessment or determination • It is important
to note that the rent magistrate cannot vary the assessed recoverable rent
unless an application has been lodged with him in the manner described above.
2
In Re ,Lokhmal & Sons*Application , Aduraua-Bossman J.S.C., delivering the 
judgment of the Supreme Court said:
"It is surely obvious that if an application be not made to
a tribunal hight or low, within the period of time prescirbed
by a statutory enactment for submitting the application to
it, it will be incompetent for the tribunal to entertain the
3
application after the prescribed period" •
e. Referrals
It was noted that Ofori-Boateng was concerned about the practice of 
certain lay magistrates enforcing the recommendations of rent officers with-
. 4
out further enquiry • What exactly is the supervisory role envisaged by 
Act 220 for the rent magistrate? What are the functions of the relflfc, magistrate 
vis-a-vis the rent officer? By section 5(1)(a) the rent officer has jurisdiction 
to assess the recoverable rent for premises, and by section 15(a) the rent 
officer shall issue a certificate specifying the recoverable rent. The rent 
officer does not need to refer anything to the rent magistrate in this connection.
However by section 5(1)(b) the rent officer is given jurisdiction to 
investigate other questions like arrears of rent, breach of covenant and 
ejectment; and in these areas the rent officer is not given the power to 
make a binding order. By section 6(2) the rent magistrate has jurisdiction 
to determine any matter referred to him by a rent officer. What then is the 
rent magistrate supposed to do when the rent officer makes hi& findings and 
refers the matter to him?
1. Act 220, S.6.
2.  f l9 6 2 ] lG .L .R .5 3 .
3* ibid., at p.56«
4. supra, pp .QJti- n o .
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There are a number of conflicting judicial decisions on this issue.
In Republic v. Accra Rent Magistrate; Ex; parte.Ofosu-Amaah*"the tenant 
applied to the High Court for an order of certiorari to quash an eviction 
order made by a rent magistrate. The application was based on the grounds 
that the rent magistrate did not act in accordance with the principles of 
natural justice in making the order in that: (a) the parties to the suit 
were not notified to be present; and (b) were not present and were not given 
an opportunity to be heard when the eviction order was made. Archer J., as 
he then was, held that even when an issue is referred to the rent magistrate, 
after an investigation by the rent officer, both parties must be heard.
Otherwise the order would have been made contrary to the principles of natural
2 . .justice • This is also the view taken by Anterkyi J., m  Saad v. City Food
3
Supply , and by Amissah J.A. (sitting as an additional judge of the High Court)
in Republic v. Tamakloe; Ex pai4c Kessie .^ All these cases decide that when
the rent magistrate becomes a case from the rent officer, he
has to rehear the case or at least listen to submissions before arriving 
at his decision-— to make an order for payment of arrears or a binding order 
of ejectment. Otherwise his order must be quashed^ for he would not have 
acted judicially.
The above view was rejected by Conssey J., in v> Thome"*. In 
this case the landlord applied to the rent officer to have the tenant ejected. 
The rent magistrate, acting on the findings of the rent officer, made an order 
of ejectment. The tenant applied to the High Court for an order of certiorari
1. [1965] G.L.R.613.
2. Hejhowever^ found that on the facts of the case natural justice had not 
been violated.
3. (1967) C.C.33.
4. (1968) C.C.90.
5. (1970) C.C.31.
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contrary to the principles of natural justice in not giving him a hearing 
before making the order. This contention was rejected by CoUssey J., who 
said:
f,It is my submission that after the investigation by the 
rent officer, and he had made his findings as required, 
then it is imperative that when the time limited for appeal 
has elapsed, he should forward his investigations and finding 
to the rent magistrate, who shall make the order for ejectment 
as in this case. The right of appeal on the facts is provided 
for by the Act. I do not think that when the investigations 
and finding of the rent officer are forwarded to the rent 
magistrate . . .  the legislature intends that there should 
be a hearing at that stage . . .  I have here, with respect, 
parted with Mr.Justice Archer in Ex pofje- Ofosu-AmaahM*.
2Where judges of co-ordinate jurisdiction disagree on the law , in our 
system of jurisprudence, based on the principle of stare decisis, the hope 
is that the highest court of the land will soon hand down an authoritative 
decision to end the controversy and to insure a measure of certainty in the law.
It is suggested that the opinion of Coussey J., is the better one. The 
other decisions that it is contrary to natural justice for the rent magis­
trate to come to a legal conclusion from facts which both parties have had 
the chance to challenge and had in fact readjusted on oath through both 
cross-examination and re-examination; facts the aggrieved party has had a 
chance to challenge on appeal, but did not do. A re-hearing under such
circumstances would be giving an unwarranted indulgence to persons who sit 
4
on their rights. It is not a breach of the principles of natural justice 
for an officer who is required to act judicially to make an investigation 
and then make a recommendation which is not binding until confirmed by a higher 
tribunal.
1. &hqgwan v. Thome (1970) C.C.31*
2. The disagreement is further evidenced by two recent decisions of the High 
Court: Sackey v. Kumah |l978j G.L.R.361 and Tackie v. Bannerman (unreported)
3. S t J L  o f *  L - V i J & v t C a -  A c J ^ 2 X &
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It is not being advocated that a rent magistrate to whom a matter is 
referred should not act judicially* He must act judicially; but it cannot 
properly be said that a rent magistrate has not acted judicially because 
he made an order without re-hearing the case and calling evidence* A rent 
magistrate must have a record of the proceedings before the rent officer so 
as to be able to determine judicially whether the findings of the rent officer 
is supported by the facts* In Ex pgfjlL Kessie*, the rent magistrate did not 
have a record of the proceedings before the rent officer (in fact, the rent 
officer made no record of the evidence), but relied soley on a note by the 
rent officer specifying what order he wanted made* Amissah J.A*, rightly 
quashed the decision of the magistrate based on this note* But it is respect­
fully submitted that the learned judge proceeded on an erroneous ground* The 
rent magistrate had not acted judicially, but this was not because he had not 
re-heard the case* It was because the magistrate had not before him the pre­
requisites which will enable him to decide the matter judicially*
II, Organisation and Practice
The legal provisions - and some of the decided cases - establishing the
rent control machinery have been analysed* The machinery on the ground and
how it functions (or does not function) is now examined*
Physical organization of rent offices
Act 220 envisaged a largely decentralised machinery for the enforcement 
of rent control so that landlord/tenant can be settled expeditiously^* In 
practice the machinery is not so decentralised* There is only one rent office
each in Cape-Coast, Sekondi-Takoradi, Kumasi and Accra* There are about
flirt a
1,000,000 people in Accra^ about 500,000 in Kumasi* The office in Accra is
✓
housed in a temporary - looking wooden structure situated in the centre of
the city* All the offices have no library facilities*
1* op.cit*
2* Report of the Committee of Enquiry into the Operation of the Rent Control 
Ordinance (No.2), 1952, op.cit., p*23» para*29*
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This is contrasted with the court system in Accra. There are magistrate 
courts in Labadi, Teshie, Nungua, Osu, Mamprobi, Kaneshie and Accra Newtown.
In addition to the magistrate courts there are circuit courts, the High Court, 
the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court. And y§t the reason for the estab­
lishment of rent officers, and vesting them with the wide jurisdiction and 
power noted was to bring justice nearer to the people and to engender local 
participation in and identification with the process*.
The situation described for Accra prevails in other parts of the country.
In fact rent offices have been established in only the regional capitals and
2
the large urban towns. The rest have no rent offices •
a. Personnel and function
There are only some few rent officers. There is one rent officer in 
Cape Coast for a population of 51*653* one in Sekondi-Takoradi for a population
ih
of about 100,000, one rent officer and three assistants^for a population of 
3
about half million • In fact Ofori-Boateng thinks that the limited number 
of rent officers is largely responsible for the ineffectiveness of the rent
4control scheme • The Rent Commissioner who was to be charged with the general 
administration of the scheme"*, has never been appointed. There are no research 
officers, just some typists and some messengers.
1. Report of the Committee of Enquiry into the operation of the Rent Control 
Ordinance (No.2), 1952, op.cit., p.23* para.29*
2. The present writer visited Ada-Foah during his fieldwork, and there is 
no rent officer.
3. Unfortunately the figures for Accra have been mislaid. It is, however, 
unlikely to be much different.
4. "Rules of evidence under Act 220", (1972) 4 R.Q.L.43 at 50.
5* Act 220, S.2.
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It was noted that the rent offices and the rent officers envisaged by
Act 220 were to be more than rent assessment bureaux; they were also expected
to serve as housing agencies which will provide facilities -— information and
1
assistance — to prospective landlords and tenants • Such a service would 
have been immensely beneficial to landlords and tenants. The rent officers 
were to offer technical advice concerning available accommodation, suitable 
conditions and rents in respect of particular premises. This service is not 
being provided by rent officers. Investigation by the present writer at 
rent offices in Accra and Kumasi indicated that rent officers do not provide 
this service. This was hardly surprising considering the physical conditions 
and the resources with which they work. The rent offices do not have the 
resources and the personnel with which to handle this type of operation.
Act 220 gives no indication on how rent officers were to get information 
about available accommodation. It certainly would be wishful thinking to 
expect landlords to furnish rent offices with such information since they 
would then be compelled (at least officially) to let at the recoverable 
rent. But rent offices have no officers in the field collecting such inform­
ation. In any event, considering the concrete housing situation, few land­
lords need the services of the rent office in advertising vacancies.
1. supra, pp. £65^ 2-66 .
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B. CONCLUSION
1
This then has been the law since 1963* It has been largely ineffective • 
As far back as 1957 the United Nations Technical Assistance Programme team 
reported:
"Though rent controls in the Gold Coast are all - embracing
and drastic on paper, covering old property, new property
and even commercial premises, they are being honoured more
in the breach than in observance* This applies to the
requirement of the filing of first rents, to the enforcement
of sanctions against recalcitrant landlords who deprive
dissident tenants of essential services, to those who take
key money surreptitiously and to those who shun repairs,
put out tenants' belongings or raise rents to unconscionable
levels* The office charged with enforcing this law is staffed
by a skeleton force hardly equipped to enforce a single phase,
2much less all of the law" •
When the present writer carried out field investigation between July -
December 1978, the average rent for a sandcrete room in a multi-occupational
3
dwelling in Accra was 023*00 per month • The average rent for a three bed-
4
room self-contained house in Accra and Kumasi was 0500 per month • Huge
sums of money are demanded in advance as a condition for the grant of a
tenancy^. The present writer has not been to Ghana since the enactment of
A*F*R.C.D*5» but it is doubtful whether it has fared any better than its 
6predecessors • An item m  a recent issue of West Africa confirms this
1. See Frimpong, J*K*; Towards an Effective Control of Rents of Premises in 
Ghana, op.cit, ; Date-Bah, S.K., "Legislative control of freedom of 
contract", op.cit*
2. Housing in Ghana, op*cit*, p.40, para*l4l.
3* This was at a time when N*R*C*D*158 was in force and stipulated a rent 
of 07*50 for this type of premises*
4. It can thus be seen that the level of rent at the time of the enquiry is 
double that stipulated now by A.F.R.C.D.5
5* supra, pp.
6. Reports gathered from newspapers (see Daily Graphic, 21 June 1979) and
friends in Ghana indicate that in the heyday of the A.F.R.C* 'revolution'
(cont•)
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1
suspiCe'IJQY^  • It reported the Managing Director of Teraa Development
Corporation as saying that a lady who had eight T.D.C. houses was charging
2rents of 0300 - 0400 per annum for each house when the official rent was 
020 - 030.
It is argued by some that the failure of the rent control scheme has
jbo tkjLsVCAAf p e e ls id \j)Wvc^V\ l L  h  ass
been administered • While not disputing that the scheme has been ineptly 
administered, it is submitted that the failure of the scheme and other 
aspects of residential tenancy law raises more fundamemtal questions about 
the functioning of residential tenancy law in the concrete socio-economic 
context of Ghana. It raises questions about socially-transforming laws 
and Ghanaian society. The inefficient administration of the rent control 
scheme is only a sympton of a more deep-seated malaise. Residential tenancy 
law (and in some respects other aspects of law) have to be analysed in the
4
political economy of Ghana if the diagnosis is to be scientific •
the level of rents fell. But more recent reports indicate that the 
revolutionary fervour having subsided things have gone back to square 
one. The full significance of this development is analysed below,
pp.S4&-3©£>.
1. No.3300, 20th Oct., 1980, p.2090.
2. By A.F.R.C.D.5* S.6 she could not charge more than 25% on top of her
monthly outgoings as monthly rent, i.e., if she had not made extensions 
to the property.
3. Ofori-Boateng, J., "Rules of evidence under Act 220", op.cit., pp.49“51» 
Frimpong, J.K., "The N.R.C. and the standard rent", op.cit.
4. See chapter 1, pp and chapter 9* f f .33H--S6S.
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
SECURITY OF TENURE
"In the past, the tempo of social change was very much less 
repid than it is today and it cannot be assumed that the 
lawyers' law' will always remain a prerogative of the 
professional lawyer, a backwater removed from urgent social 
and political problems"*.
Introduction
The security of tenure enjoyed by the tenant, or the circumstances in 
which the landlord ought to be able to evict his tenant and recover possession 
of the premises is one such area of law which has today become an urgent 
question of political economy. As man's struggle for shelter in an urbanizing 
world has defied human ingenuity, the urgency of the problem has intensified. 
But, to introduce a measure of historical perspective to the whole debate
QnJ to <Lxf Ivcl^  1UJL fLsL* itjkts cfc
landlords is the preoccupation of patronizing, paternalistic and socialistic
busy-bodies, it may be pointed out that one of the earliest developments of
this branch of the law was that equity was prepared to grant relief from
2forfeiture, at least for non-payment of rent •
The policy - issues raised by rent control generally have already been
3 .discussed • In the specific instance of security of tenure, the policy objec­
tions raised by the critics have been premised on laissez faire potions of 
private property rights and freedom of contract. It goes like this: "a man 
must have a right to do as he pleases with his own house. If he contracts 
to let the house that is his business. Once the contract ends he must be 
able to recover his house. The government/state/public/society has no right
1. Friedman, W., Law in a Changing Society, London, 1972, pp.51-52.
2. infra, pp. 2) O  £.
3. supra, pp.S-S/-£4~3 •
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to force him to keep a tenant if he does not want to* If society thinks 
that the tenant needs to be housed, that is society's responsibility"*
This argument (or variants of it) have been analysed at various points 
of the essay* It has been pointed out that long before the Rent Acts were 
dreamed up equity was vigorously restricting the enforcement of common-law 
rights* It has also been argued that contract is no longer a private and
individual affair, but that in most case— including residential tenancies-
2it is a social institution* It has also been argued that the objective
facts of the housing situation in urban Ghana do not allow for freedom of
3
contract theorising* Moreover, in the present economic situation, public 
housing on a large enough scale is not possible* In addition, and perhaps 
crucialy, the very notion of sacred private property rights is, in the concrete 
Ghanaian context, misplaced* The cocoa farmer, goldminer or timber planter- 
with the help of multifarious clerks, agencies, boards, etc*, (some, no doubt, 
unnecessary) exports the produce of his labour* From this the country derives 
scare foreign exchange to import cement, machinery, roofing sheets, iron, etc*, 
(or raw materials for their production) and also provides free education, free 
medical care, etc* These building materials are then used (bought, admittedly) 
by someone to build a house* The landlord relied on society to build the 
house, and he continues to live in a society* To argue that the landlord be 
left to do as he pleases borders on the obscene*
1* See infra, pp. 3 ^ 0  “3  ^ 2- * 
2* supra, pp. |70- 171*
3. ibid*
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Section 17 of Act 220 regulates and restricts the landlord's common-law
right of recovery of possession, and protects the tenant against unlawful
1
eviction from rented premises • But, it has consistently been held by the 
Ghanaian courts that before a landlord can bring his claim within section 17 
of Act 220 he must have a common-law right to terminate the tenancy* The 
common-law rules for the termination of tenancies are, therefore, first 
considered*
A* The Termination of Tenancies
I* Effluxion of time.
At common law a tenancy for a fixed (?) term determines automatically
on the expiration of the definite period* Hence a tenancy for a fixed term
of five years created on 1st October 1979» would determine automatically
immediately after 30th September 1984* The tenancy is said to determine
automatically because there is no requirement that notice be served by
either party, ^ t is, however, important to note that though a tenancy may
3
have expired at common law, a landlord legally cannot recover possession
4solely on the ground of expiration of the stated period • But it is not
5
correct to assert— as indeed Kludze does — that the duration of a ten­
ancy is no longer of any consequence, and that:
• a tenant who takes a ten-year lease would be in
the same position as a tenant who agrees on a two-year
lease"^*
1* Rami a v* Mpuissie (1945), D.C.(Land) *38-*47, 177 (decided on the basis 
of the Rent Restriction Regulations, 1943)? Moubarak v* Eguakun (1956J 
1 W*A*L*R*88 (decided on the basis of the Rent Control Ordinance (No*2), 
1952} infra, pp.$07 S ' 3-.
2* ibid., Bassil v* Said Rftad (1958) 3 W*A#L*R*231 (decided on the basis
of similar provisions in the Rent Control Ordinance (No*2), 1952*
3* He may succeed in effectively, albeit illegally, evicting the tenant*
4* Bassil v. Sfarijlani (1967) C*C*20} Karam & Sons v* Traboulsi R-964J
G.L.R*513*
5* Kludze, A.K*P«, "The termination of leases", (1975) 7R*G.L*10, at p*32*
6* ibid.
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It has consistently been held by the courts that section 17 of Act 220
only restricts and does not enlarge the landlord's power of recovery of 
1possession • The landlord cannot recover possession merely by establishing
2 . .one of the conditions specified in section 17 of Act 220 • In addition the
3
landlord has to show that he is entitled to possession under the common law •
4This, as Woodman points^ Qvr|, is why the duration of a tenancy is still
important; for once the tenancy has determined by the effluxion of time only
section 17 of Act 220 protects the tenant from eviction,
A tenancy for a definite (7) period may, however, be made determinable 
on the occurrence of a contigency within the period, such as death. At 
common law this will result in the earlier determination of the tenancy,
II, Surrender
When a tenant surrenders his tenancy to his immediate landlord, who
accepts the surrender, the tenancy merges in the landlord's reversion and 
5is determined . Surrender has been defined as thes
", • • yielding up of an estate for life or years to
him that hath an immediate estate in reversion or
remainder, wherein the estate for life or years may
6drown by mutual agreement between them" •
It is clear from the definition that the surrender must be to the immed­
iate landlord; the transfer of the tenancy to a superior landlord does not 
effect a surrender but operates merely as an assignment of the lease•
1, Ramia v, Mouissie, op,cit,,; Moubarak v, Eguakun, op.cit; Bassil v.
Said Rgad, op.cit,
2, ibid,
3* ibid,
4, Woodman, G.R,, "In defence of section 17 of the Rent Act (Act 220)", (1975) 
7R.G.L.144.
5* See Asafu-Adjaye v. (1970) C.C.45 (This was a case involving land)
6. Co.Litt.377b.
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The surrender of a joint tenancy is not effective unless made by all 
1
the tenants •
Surrender may be either express or by operation of law.
a. Express surrender
The express surrender of a tenancy of a period of more than three years
must be in writing and signed by the tenant or his agent duly authorised in 
2writing • A tenancy for a period not exceeding three years may be surrendered
. 3
orally if the transfer takes effect in possession • A contract to surrender
4must be evidenced in writing and signed by the tenant or his agent • But an 
oral surrender made for value and supported by a sufficient act of part per­
formance would be effective in equity as a surrender'*.
b. Surrender by operation of -law
Surrender by operation of law rests on the principle of estoppel. It
requires some act by the parties evidencing an intention to terminate the
tenancy. In such circumstances the requirement of writing is dispensed 
6with • Surrender by operation of law will take place if the tenant accepts
7
a fresh (and valid) tenancy from his immediate reversioner , or where it 
is agreed that the duration of the tenancy shall be extended thereby creating 
a new tenancy.
c. Surrender and sub-tenants
The voluntary surrender by a tenant per se does not extinguish a sub­
tenancy or prejudice the rights of a sub-tenant; but the landlord can take
1. See Nyame v. Ansah (1970) C.C.99* a case involving land*where the law 
was thus stated by Edusei J. :
MIn the absence of express authority it was not competent 
for one of two joint tenants to surrender rights jointly 
held by them*’.
2. Conveyancing Decree, 1973 (N.R.C.D.175)i S.l(l).
3. ibid., S.3(D(f).
4. ibid., S.2(a).
5. ibid., S.3(2).
6. ibid., S.3(2).
7‘ See Asafu-Adjaye v. Abboqd (1970) C.C.45.
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regular steps to determine the sub-tenancy. In Karam v. ^ghkar , the
head-tenant granted a sub-tenancy of part of the premises. In breach of the 
head-lease the sub-lessor/head-tenant ceased paying rent. Later the sub­
lessor voluntarily executed a deed of Surrender in favour of the head-lessor. 
It was held by the Supreme Court that the mere surrender of the head-lease 
by the sub-lessor did not operate to dispossess the sub-tenant of his subsid­
iary interest.
Surrender by a head-tenant would be subject to any equities. At common
law this meant that a sub-tenant would be liable for arrears of rent due on
the head-lease^. In Karam v. /iShkar, the facts of which have been already
noted, the sub-tenant was held liable for all the arrears of rent due on
the head-lease-— notwithstanding that he occupied only a portion of the 
3
premises • This was a monstrous state of affairs^though the sub-tenant was 
entitled to recoup himself from his landlord/head-tenant. Fortunately, this 
is no longer the position in Ghana; section 23(2) of the Conveyancing Decree, 
1973 (N.R.C.D.175) expressly exempts the sub-tenant from liability for pay­
ment of rent reserved under the head-lease.
III. Notice to Quit
A tenancy for a fixed term cannot be determined by notice unless this
4is expressly provided for in the tenancy agreement • Thus a tenancy for a 
substantial term often contains provisions enabling the tenant to determine
it sometime during the course of the tenancy agreement. In Savage v.
5
G.I.H.O.C. t premises were let by the landlord for a term of fifteen years
1. [1963] 1 G.L.R.138.
2. See Webber v. Smith (1689) 2 Vern.103*
3* supra, at p.143.
4. See Savage v. G.I.H.O.C. ^973j 2 G.L.R.242.
5. ^973} 2 G.L.R.242.
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with an option to the tenants to determine the tenancy on the expiration 
of the first eight years after giving six months' notice of their intention 
to do so. After less than a year the tenants vacated the premises. In 
an action by the landlord for arrears of rent and for general damages, it 
was held that the tenancy had not been terminated becuase the notice to 
terminate the tenancy was not in accordance with the provisions of the lease. 
The law was thus stated by Edusei J.,:
". • • there were two ways in which the lease . . .
could have been terminated: either (a) by effluxion or
(b) by notice to quit . . .  As a general rule thereis no
need for a notice to quit in the case of a lease for a
definite term . . .  since the tenancy terminates autom-
atically upon expiration of the agreed term. The other
1way is by notice to quit as stipulated • • ." •
Since a notice to quit is a unilateral act performed in the exercise 
of a contractual right, it must conform strictly to the terms of the contract; 
and the onus of proving its validity lies on the party giving it. In Monta v.
1st December 19&0, for a fifteen-year term. However, the deed gave the tenant 
the option to determine the lease "at the expiration" of the first ten years 
provided he gave six months' written notice of their intention to do so.
On l4th May, 1970 the tenant served a written notice on the landlord signify­
ing his intention to determine the lease as from 1st December, 1970. The land­
lord started proceedings to determine the validity of the notice, contending 
that on a proper construction of the deed the notice could only be given to
2
Paterson Simons , premises were demised to the tenant by a deed dated
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take effect— at the earliest-*-six months after the expiration of the first
ten years* This contention was rejected by Meftsa-Boison J*, who held that
a tenancy determinable Mat the expiration” of a specified date, might be
determined exactly at the end of the specific period; it is where a tenancy
is made determinable ”on or after” a specified date that the notice could
be given only after the expiration of the period certain*
a* Periodic tenancies
A periodic tenancy, in contrast with a fixed-term tenancy does not
expire with the effluxion of time; it will continue indefinitely— from period
to period — until determined by the service of an appropriate notice to quit
by one of the parties*
The parties are free to stipulate their own provisions for the service
of notices to quit; but in the absence of any express stipulation, the common-
1 2law rules —  suitably modified to suit Ghanaian conditions —  will apply •
The parties cannot agree on any terms which would be repugnant to the nature
of the tenancy* Thus a stipulation that one party may not give a notice to 
.3quit is void ; for it is an incident of a periodic tenancy that it is terminable
by either party*
1* Yearly tenancies
At common law a tenancy from year to year is determined by at least six 
4months! notice • At English law the notice must expire at the end of a 
completed year'** This means that if a tenancy from year to year commenced 
on 1st September, a notice to terminate it must be given at the latest 1st March 
to expire bn 31st August. A half-year's notice not expiring on a completed 
year of the tenancy is not good notice*
1* See Allamedine Bros v.
2* Ramia v. Mouissie (19^5) D.C.(Land) ?38J47» 177*
3* See Gray v. Spyer 2 Ch*22
4. See Sidebotham v. Holland |l895j 1 Q*B*378*
5* See Sidebotham v. Holland, ibid*
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2. Other periodic tenancies
At common law,the length of notice required to terminate a
periodic tenancy other than a yearly tenancy, is a full period's
notice.^ At English law such notices must expire at the end of
2the period m  question,
3* Allamedine Bros, v. P.Z.^
The technical English-law rules on the service of notices 
to quit may not be wholly applicable in Ghana. They may have to 
be suitably modified to suit Ghanaian, conditions. This is the 
import of the unanimous opinion of the Court of Appeal in All­
amedine Bros, v. P .Z. In this case, counsel for the tenant had 
argued that since the notice purporting to determine a monthly 
tenancy did not expire with the periodic month (as required by 
English law) the tenancy had not been terminated. This content­
ion was rejected by the court.Delivering the refreshing unani­
mous decision of the court Sowah J.A.said that the English-law 
rules t
"....were developments suitable to English expe­
rience and circumstances and may not necessarily 
"bbe ideal , .
1. Ramia v. Mouissie D.C.(Land) '38-'47,I77j Allamedine Bros, v.
P.Z. 1971 2G.L.R.h’03.
2. See Precious v. Reddie [lQ2*f| 2K.B.I^9.
3 . op. cit.
b . op. cit.,^0 9 .
A
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Guided by section 23(2) of the Interpretation Act* i960 — — which defines a
2period by reference to the calendar — and strengthened in the knowledge 
that there is no Ghanaian authority in support of the English-law rule,
Sowah J*A*, proceeded to posit the concrete circumstances which call for 
a modification of the English-law rules* In Ghana, said the learned justice 
of appeal:
"the bulk of tenancies concern monthly tenancies and 
a majority of such tenants are liable to be transferred 
from their stations at fairly short notice* I think 
these should be able to give notice of their intention 
to terminate their tenancies at any time during the 
month provided they give notice calculated on the basis 
of section 23(2) of the Interpretation Act* There must 
however be re^procity or mutuality on this matter, namely, 
that landlords must be entitled to give notice on similar 
basis'1^ *
J. . ; - .
1* C * A * 4 i
2* The Interpretation Act, i960 (C*A*4), S*23(2) reads:
nif the period indicated in the enactment begins on a 
date other than the first day of any of. the twelve months 
of the calendar it is to be reckoned from the date which 
it is to begin to the date in the next month numerically 
corresponding, less one, or, if there is no corresponding 
date, to the last of that month*
For example: a month beginning on 15th January ends on 
14th February; a month beginning 31st January ends on 
28th February (or 29th February in a leap year)’1*
The Act applies only in the interpretation of statutes*
3* Allamedine Bros, v* P,Z* (*97lJ 2 G*L*R*403, 410*
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Allamedine Bros, v. P.Z. involved a monthly tenancy; but from the 
reasoning of the Court of Appeal, it is submitted, the opinion1 of the 
court is not limited to monthly tenancies* It applies to all periodic ten-
English-law rules may be suitably modified at every instance to suit the
concrete realities of the Ghanaian context*
2* Mode of service.
Unless otherwise provided for in a tenancy agreement, section 39 of
the Conveyancing Decree, 1973* stipulates that a notice to quit must be
in writing. A notice by the landlord shall be sufficiently served on the
tenant if left addressed to him on the premises, or sent to him by registered
2mail, or left at his last known address in Ghana • Notice by the tenant 
shall be sufficiently served if delivered to the landlord personally, or
3
sent to him by registered mail, or left at his last know*address m  Ghana •
IV* Frustration
Under normal contract law principles, if a contract becomes incapable
of performance due to unforeseen events or through no fault of either party,
4
both parties are discharged from their contractual obligations • The per­
formance of the contract is said to have been frustrated— the whole basis
5 6 of the contract having been destroyed • In Taylor v* Caldwell , the
plaintiff agreed to let out a music hall for four days for the express purpose
of it being used for giving concerts and fetes* The music hall was burnt down
2* Conveyancing Decree, 1973» (N.R.C.D.175)* S.39*
3* ibid*
4. See Cheshire & Fifoot, The Law of Contract 9th (ed*), London, 1978, 544-548.
ancies* The technical English-law rules o ‘ of
to Ghan£. Thenotices to quit may not, therefore, apply
5* See Krell v* Henry [I903] 2 K.B.740; Appleby v* Myers (1867) L.R 
2 C.P.65I.
6. (1863) 33 & S.826.
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before the performances could start. It was held that the plaintiff was 
not entitled to damages because performance of the contract has been frusti—  
ated; and that both parties should be relieved from their contractual obli­
gations.
In English law a controversial question that is still undecided by the
House of Lords is whether the doctrine of frustration can be applied to a 
1
tenancy • There is no consensus of opinion among leading academic and judical 
authorities in England on whether frustration applies to tenancies or not*
The v^lw that has so far prevailed in England—— at least at the lower
2courts— is that the doctrine of frustration dons not apply to tenancies •
This is based on the theory that a tenancy creates not merely a contract but
3 4also an estate in land • The "estate concept" argument is this • "A contract 
is frustrated when the venture cannot be carried out* But in the case of a 
tenancy the venture contemplated by the parties is the transfer of an estate 
to the tenant. The contractual obligations are but incidental to this trans­
fer, and, even if some of them become impossible of performance this does 
not affect the continuance of the estate. The foundation of the agreement 
is the creation of the estate, and so long as the foundation exists there 
is no frustration". Lush J., epitomised this view when he said:
"It is not correct to speak of this tenancy agreement 
as a contract and nothing more. A term of years was
5
created by it and vested in the appellant tenant • " •
1* There is no Ghanaian case on the issue.
2* Paradine v* Jane (1647) Aleyn 26; Ma they v* Curling /l922j 2 A.C.180; 
Swift v. Macbean [1942] 1 K.B.375, Denman v. Brise (J949] 1 K.B.22.
3* See Evans, The Law of Landlord and Tenant, ( _ 0 A 197^ , p*l88;
Woodfall, The Law of Landlord and Tenant, 28th (ed.), 1_<0 |fVd Q 1^1 
l°\79 * PP-312-313, 927-928.
4* ibid.
5. London and Northern Estates Co. v. Schelesinger [1916] 1 K.B.20, at 24.
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This traditional view has, however, not gone unchallenged* It was
first questioned by Atkin L.J., (as he then was) in flflthey v. Curling1,
2and has been challenged by some academic writers •
Opinion in the House of Lords is divided* In Cricklewood Property and
3
Investment Trust, Ltd. v. Leighton’s Investment Trust, Ltd* , Lord Russell 
and Lord Goddard took the view that the doctrine of frustration cannot apply 
to a demise of real property* Relying on the "estate-concept” argument,
Lord Goddard said:
•’In the case of a le£&se, the foundation of the agreement 
is that the landlord parts with his interest in the demised 
property for a term of years, which thereupon becomes vested 
in the tenant, in return for a rent* So long as the interest 
remains in the tenant, there is no frustration, though part-
4lcular usemay be prevented” •
This last way of stating the law has been by Lord Simon as
coming perilously near to arguing in a circle, for why should frustration be
5
excluded merely because the foundation happens to be the transfer of an estate?
In his vfcdw theret is no difficulty in applying the doctrine of frustration 
6to tenancies • Lord Wright took the view that the doctrine of frustration 
is modern and flexible and ought not to be by an arbitrary dogma^*
1. [l922j 2 A.C.180, at 193-194.
2* Yahuda, S,f"Frustration and the chattel interest” (1958) 21 M.L.R*637j 
Williams, G., "The Coronation cases” (19^1) 4 M*L*R*248.
3. [1945] A.C.221.
4* ibid., at p.24%
5* ibid., at p.229*
6* ibid.
7. [1945]  A.C.221, at p.24l.
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Lord Porter expressed no opinion on the matter* The result of these
conflicting dicta is that until the House of Lords resolves the issue, the
position in England— ‘at least in the lower courts— is that the doctrine
is excluded in the case of a tenancy*
The English law position may not have been inappropriate at the time
and in the circumstances in which it developed— an Agricultural tenancy
primarily concerned with land as a factor of production* But this is far
removed from the realities of the residential tenancy relationship in modern
Ghana • The residential tenancy relationship is today a facilitative institu -
ion for the provision and use of that package of goods and services called
housing. The modern residential tenancy has nothing to do with land as a
factor of production* The provision and use of housing are the raison d1 etre
of the arrangment* It is therefore suggested, that if through no fault of
either party,, the provision and use of that commodity are made impossible —
such as, through the premises being destroyed, requisitioned or burnt down,
2or the tenant dying or having to go to war — performance of the tenancy should 
be considered as having been frustrated and the parties should be relieved 
of their obligations*
V. Forfeiture
The landlord may become entitled to re-take the premises, and so determine
the tenancy, either under the terms of the tenancy agreement or by operation
of law. This is known as the landlord's right of forfeiture, or of re-entry*
A tenancy is subject to forfeiture only if there is some provision to that
3
effect in the tenancy agreement • Every tenancy agreement confers rights
1* This is the case with residential tenancies in urban conditions and it 
is surprising that the common law has not developed new rules to deal 
with urban residential tenancies but has continued to treat it as part 
of the general law of landlord and tenant*
2* In all these situations the English courts will hold that performance 
of the tenancy has not been frustrated; see Whitehall Court Ltd. v* 
Ettlinger [l920j 1 K.B.680; Ma they v* Curling, op.cit*, Paradine v*
Jane, op.cit.; Denman v. Brise, op.cit*
(Cont•)
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and imposes obligations on both landlord and tenant* Where these are framed 
1
as covenants , the landlord has no right to determine the tenancy, if the
tenant breaks an^ of his covenants, unless the agreement contains an express
. . .  2 provision for forfeiture on breach of the covenant •
3
In Sackey v* Ashong , the tenant covenanted to repair the premises; but
the covenant was not fortified by a forfeiture clause* In an action by the
landlord to recover possession because of the tenant's alleged breach of
the covenant to repair, it was held by the West African Court of Appeal,that
in the absence of express provision,breach of a covenant of repair does not
give a right of re-entry to the landlord*
The tenant's obligation may however be expressed as a condition for the
4grant or continuance of the tenancy • In this case the tenancy becomes 
liable to forfeiture if the condition is broken, even if there is no forfeiture 
clause* The law on the right to forfeit was thus stated by Ollennu J,, as 
he then was, in Bassil v* Said Rqad:
"Now at common law there can be no forfeiture for 
breach of a covenant under a lease unless there is 
express provision in the lease for re-entry • • •
And where there is a provision for re-entry upon breach, 
or where the breach is not merely of a covenant but of
a condition and therefore forfeiture can attach without
. . 5express provision for re-entry»• • •"
3* Ampiah v* G»B,Ollivant (1948) D*C*(Land) 1948-51, 46; Basil v* 
Said Rflad (195^ ~ T wTa7l .R.231.
1. For the distinction between conditions and covenants, see supra^»|33
2* ibid*, note*3*
3. (1956) 1 W.A.L.R.108.
4* For the distinction betweenconditions and covenants, see supra p*(3^<
5. (1957) 2 W.A.L.R.231, at p.235*
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It is important to note that where a tenant is in breach of a condition 
or a covenant fortified by a for feiture clause, the tenancy does not thereby
right*
a* Exercise of the right of re-entry
A landlord who is entitled to re-enter for breach of covenant or condition,
must in either case take positive steps to show unequivocally that he intends
to determine the tenancy* His right of re-entry is exercisable either by
2
taking possession peacefully or by bringing an action in ejectment* Notwith­
standing the right of re-entry the landlord is not entitled to enter the
3
premises vi et armis and take possession against the wishes of the tenant*
A landlord can only forfeit the tenancy by entering the whole premises; he
cannot do this whilst any protion of the premises is occupied by a tenant,
4
unless he can enforce forfeiture against that particular tenant• Since a 
landlord's rent is due from each and every portion of the premises, a right 
of re-entry can be exercised over the entire premises when there is default 
of payment of rent by a tenant in respect of a portion of the premises held
b. What amounts to retaking possession?
6
In Yamak v* Yawson, a covenant supported by a forfeiture clause was
broken by the head-leasee* The head-lessor then served notices on the sub­
tenants in the premises asking them not to pay rent to the head-lessee but 
to pay them to her-the head lessor' s*~solicitor* In an action challenging 
validity of this notice, it was contended on behalf of the head-lessee that 
mere notice to the sub-tenants directing them to pay rent to the head-lessor 
was not sufficient to constitute re-entry* This contention was rejected by
1* See Quesnel Forks Gold Mining Co* v. Ward 1920 A*C*222*
2* See Karam v* ftshkar J1963J 1 G.L.R.138, at p*l44*
become void, only voidable* The landlord has to take steps to enforce his
3* ibid.
4* Karam v*
3* ibid* 
6*
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Edusei J*, who held that the action of the head-lessor amounted to a termin 
ation of the head-lease and the grant of a new tenancy to the sub-tenants 
on the same terms, and that this amounted to a resumption of possession by 
the head-lessor*
But the mere vacation of the premises would not amount to an exercise
of re-entry did not take any steps to enforce his right* Later the head-
lessee surrendered the premises* It was held by the Supreme Court that
this did not amount to re-entry and therefore that the sub-tenants were
2not affected* Nor is a notice to quit tantamount to re-entering •
The issue and service of a writ of possession, however, constitutes
re-entry; it is conclusive indication that the landlord has irrevocably
decided to treat the breach as having determined the tenancy* In Nukpa v*
3
Hunter , a landlord who had a right of re-entry served a writ for recovery 
on the tenant, but subsequently accepted rent from him* In an action for 
recovery of possession, it was held by CoUssey J., that the issue and service 
of a writ of possession is an irrevocable election to enforce the right of 
re-€ntry, and that no subsequent act can qualify this position*
It is immaterial that after the issue and service of the writ the case 
is withdrawn and never dealt with on its merits^* In Karam v* Achkarf
a landlord vested with a right of re-entry issued and served a writ of poss­
ession on the sub-tenant; but this was subsequently withdrawn in court* It 
was held that this constituted a sufficient act of re-entry* The law was 
thus stated by Crabbe J*S*C*, delivering the unanimous decision of the Supreme 
Court:
3. (1950) D*C*(Land) 253.
4, See Jones v* Carter (1846) 15 M. & W*7l8» Moore v* Ullcoasts Mining
of the right of re-entry* In Karam v* a landlord with a right
1* supra*
2* Karam v* A^hkar, supra, at p#l47* 
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"It seems to me that the mere service upon the plaintiff 
of the writ which contained a demand for possession would 
operate to determine his sub-lease • • • • In my judgment 
the fact that the action was withdrawn and never dealt with 
on the merits is immaterial to the question whether the
1
defendant had exercised his undoubted right of re-entry" •
c. Waiver
A landlord*s right of re-entry may be lost by waiver of the breach 
grounding the right. Waiver may be express, or implied by some act or 
conduct by which the landlord may be deemed to. have acknowledged continuance 
of the tenancy. Waiver may be implied if:
(I) the landlord is aware of the acts or omissions of the tenant 
which make the tenancy liable for forfeiture, and
(II) the landlord does some unequivocal act recognising the continued 
existence of the tenancy.
Both elements must be present to constitute waiver; it is not enough merely
for the landlord to know that the tenant is in breach. A positive act of
the landlord is necessary for it to amount to waiver; a merely passive
2attitude in the landlord will not suffice •
Demand and/or acceptance of rent is the act most frequently relied on
3
from which waiver may be inferred. In Bassil v. Siad Rqad , the law was 
thus stated by Ollennu J., :
"Moreover the evidence shows that the plaintiff has been
receiving rent with full knowledge of the breach. He is
therefore deemed in law to have waived the breach and he
4
cannot, therefore, be entitled to recover possession" •
1. supra, at pp.147-148.
2. See Perry v. Davis (1858) 3 C.B.(N.S.) 769? Matthews v. Smallwood
[191(5 1 Ch.777 at 786.
3* (1957) 2 W.AL.R.231.
4. supra, at p.235*
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Demand and/or acceptance of rent, and any subsequent act of the landlord
will not, however, amount to waiver if done after the landlord has exhibited
his final and unequivocal decision to treat the tenancy as having determined.
1In Nukpa v. Hunter , the landlord issued and served a writ of possession 
on a tenant who was in breach of a covenant supported by a forfeiture caluse. 
Subsequently the tenant tendered and the landlord accepted rent due after 
the writ was served. In an action for possession, the tenant contended that 
the tender and acceptance of rent constituted waiver of the right to re-enter. 
This contention was rejected by CoUssey J., who said:
"When once a landlord unequivocally and finally elects to
treat a lease as void, as for instance, where he serves
a writ of recovery of the land, no subsequent receipt of
rent or other actluill amount to waiver so as to deprive
2him of his right of re-entry"
1. Extent of waiver
3
By section 32 of the Conveyancing Decree, 1973 t waiver of a covenant 
or condition:
" . . .  shall be deemed to extend only to a breach of the 
covenant or condition to which such waiver specifically 
relates and shall not operate as a general waiver of the
benefit of any such covenant or condition, unless a cont­
rary intention appears"
Many covenants are liable to broken by a single act, (e.g., a covenant against
assignment), which once waived, cannot again ever entitle a landlord to exer­
cise his right of re-entry. Other breaches (e.g., of a covenant to repair) 
are of a continuing nature. In such case$ a waiver will extend only to a 
prior breach.
1. (1950) D.C.(Land) *48-*51» 253.
2. Nukpa v. Hunter (1950) D.C.(Land) ’48J51» 253, at 257.
3. N.R.C.D.175.
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Waiver operates only in respect of past breaches, i.e., breaches committed 
in the period prior to the act which constitutes waiver. Therefore, if the 
tenant continues in breach after a waiver has been given, a right of re-entry 
will rise anew in favour 'of the landlord in relation to what is, in effect, 
further breach of the same covenant. This is made clear by section 33 of the 
Conveyancing Decree, 1973» which provides that notwithstanding any licence:
" • • • all rights under covenants and powers in force
are available as against any subsequent breach of
covenant, condition or other matter not specifically
authorised or waived, in the same manner as if no licence 
1
had been granted" •
d. Statutory restriction on re-entry and forfeiture
The tenant is given portection against the loss of his tenancy by forfei­
ture. First, he is given every opportunity to remedy the breach that has
2given rise to the landlord's right to re-enter • Second, if he fails to remedy
a breach within a reasonable time of being warned by the landlord to do so
and the landlord brings an action for forfeiture against him, the tenant is
3
entitled to apply for relief •
4
By section 29(1) of the Conveyancing Decree, 1973 »
"29 (I) A right of re-entry or forfeiture under any provision in
a lease for breach of any covenant, condition or agreement
in the lease shall not be enforceable, by action or other­
wise, until —
(a) the lessor serves on the lessee a notice:
(I) specifying the particular breach complained of;
1. Conveyancing Decree, 1973 (N.R.C.D.175)* S.33(2)(a).
2. Conveyancing Decree, 1973 (N.R.C.D.175)» S.29*
3* ibid., S.30•
4. (N.R.C.D.175)•
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(II) If the breach is capable of remedy, requiring the lessee to 
remedy the breach} and
(III) (except where the breach consists of a non-payment of rent) 
requiring the lessee to make reasonable compensation in money 
for breach; and
(b) the lessee has knowledge of the fact that such notice has been 
served;
and the lessee fails within a reasonable time thereafter, to
remedy, and (except where the breach consists of non-payment
of rent) to make reasonable compensation in money, to the satis­
faction of the lessor, for the breach11 •
1# Service of notice
Unless otherwise provided for in a tenancy agreement, section 39 of the
Conveyancing Decree, 1973» stipulates that the notice must be in writing*
The notice shall be sufficiently served on the tenant if left addressed to
him on the premises, or sent to him by registered mail, or left at his last
known address in Ghana** Where the notice has been sent by registered mail
to the last known postal address of the tenant, he shall be deemed— unless
the contrary is proved”— “to have knowledge of the fact that the notice has
been served as from the time at which the letter would have been delivered
2in the normal course of post •
2* Terms of notice
Reasonable details of the breach must be given, so that the tenant may
know with reasonable certainty what is required of him* In the interpretation
of section 146 of the English Law of Property Act, 1925“— the putative father
of section 29 of the Conveyancing Decree— the English courts have held that
a notice is not invalidated merely because it includes more than the landlord
3is entitled to provide*
1* Conveyancing Decree, 1973 (N.R.C.D.175)i S.39«
2. ibid., S.29(2).
3* Blewett v. Blewett 
1 W.L.R.IO60.
2 All E.R.188; Silverster v. Ostrowska
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3* Time for Compliance
Again, there are no Ghanaian decisions on the issue, but in the construc­
tion of section 146 of the English Law of Property Act, 1952, the English
courts hav.e held that three months is usually a reasonable period within
1which the tenant must comply with the notice •
e. The Right of the Tenant to claim Relief 
The pre-1973 position
I. Breach of the covenant to pay rent
One of the aims of the- old Court of Chancery was to prevent the enforce­
ment of a legal right from producing hardship* Therefore, since the sole 
object of a right of re-entry was to give a landlord security for the rent, 
equity was always prepared to relieve the tenant against forfeiture provided
he paid all that was due by way of arrears of rent together with costs and
2 3interest • In Mills-Lamptey v* Yeboah , the landlord granted a tenancy
of a house to a tenant, except for one room and a porch which was already let
to 'C'. The lease provided, interalia, for a covenant for re-entry on failure
by the tenant to pay rent* When later the tenant refused to pay rent, the
landlord commenced proceedings for recovery of possession* While the case
was pending, but before hearing began, the tenant made payment into court
for five months arrears of rent* In granting relief against forfeiture,
Abban J., stated the law -thus:
question of what constitutes 'reasonable time' depends on the circumstances 
of each particular case*
1* See Penton v* 1 Q*B*276* It is submitted that the
2»Sta>loubrak v* Eguakun (l95^ J 1 W.A*L*R*88; Ocansey v* Teiko |l973j 1 G.L.R.203 
3. [l97ll 1 G *L*R. l8.
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"The authorities clearly establish that the court may 
grant relief against forfeiture for re-entry on non­
payment of rent provided that the rent was in arrears 
for six months and was paid before the trial and provid­
ed that the lessor could be put in the same position as
1
before" •
The six-month limit was however not a strict time-scale. As with all equit­
able jurisdictions, the primary concern of the court was with the justice 
and merits of each individual case. As was said in one English case;
2" . • . the court will not boggle at a matter of days”
It was immaterial that the landlord had actually re-entered and re-taken
3
possession of the premises. In Ribeiro v# Chahin , the landlord re-entered 
the premises after the tenants had breached a condition to pay rent. In an
action by the tenants, the West African Court of Appeal granted relief from
forfeiture. Abbot J., considered the question whether relief can be granted 
after the landlord had actually re-entered and re-taken possession, and 
answered thus:
» 4"I am clearly Ok the opinion that it can”
II. Other covenants or conditions
Where the tenant is in breach of a condition or a covenant fortified by 
a forfeiture clause and the landlord brings an action to enforce forfeiture, 
the tenant may still apply for relief. The courts have the right to grant
1. supra, at p«23*
2. Thatcher v. Pearce & Sons |l968] 1 W.L.R.748, 756, per Simon p.
(relief granted on application made six months and four days later).
3. (1954) 14 W.A.C.A.476.
4. supra, at p.478.
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relief from forfeiture,having regard to the circumstances of each particular 
case. In Schandorf v. Zeini\  Amissah J.A., relied on English cases and 
section 146(2) of the Law of Property Act, 19Xci as giving the Ghanaian courts
2. Post-1973 law
Since 1st January, 1974, the power to grant relief from forfeiture is 
statutorily conferred by the Conveyancing Decree, 1973*
Section 30 provides:
,f(l) Where a lessor is proceeding by action or otherwise to enforce 
a right of re-entry or forfeiture under any provision in a 
lease, or for non-payment of rent, the lessee of the property 
and also a sub-lessee of the property comprised in the lease or 
any part thereof may, either in the lessor’s action (if any) or 
in any action brought by such person for that purpose, apply to 
tht court for relief.
(2) Subject to subsection (1) of section 29» where a lessee applies 
to the court for relief, the court may grant or refuse relief as 
it thinks fit having regard to the proceedings and conduct of the 
parties and to all the other circumstances; and the relief when 
granted may be upon such terms, if any as to costs, expenses, 
damages, compensation, penalty or otherwise, including the grant­
ing of an injunction to restrain any similar breach in the future, 
as the court in the circumstances of each case thinks fit".
2the power to grant relief from forfeiture m  appropriate ciecurastances •
1.
2. supra, at p.437*
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It is important to note that section 30 treats a right of re-entry
arising from non-payment of rent and one arising out of breach of other
1
conditions or covenants in the same way. The six-months rule is therefore 
no longer applicable when relief is sought from forfeiture due to non-pay­
ment of rent* It is all a question of discretion for the court — taking into 
account all the facts of each case*
I. Limitation of time
Section 30 (1) opens with the words:
"Where a lessor is proceeding by action or otherwise to . 
enforce a right of re-entry or forfeiture • • • •"
There is no Ghanaian decision interpreting this phrase; but in the interpret­
ation of similar words in section 146(2) of the English Law of Property Act,
2 , »1925 —— which section 30(1) reproduces verbatim — the English courts have
held that the landlord cannot be said to be "proceeding" where he has secured
. 3judgment and has obtained possession of the premises by way of execution •
In other words, relief may be granted at any time before the landlord has 
actually entered possession. If the Ghanaian courts follow this interpret-
4
ation - as, indeed, they are most likely to do —  this would mean that Ribeiro 
. 5
v* Chahin is no longer good law.
II. Denial of title
No relief is available against forfeiture for denial of the landlord's 
title. The rule is that a tenant who denies his landlord’s title is automat-
'-J\
ically made liable to forfeit his tenancy— a rule derived from the fendal
1. supra, p. 3 01.
2. This section was by section 111(2) of the Courts Act, 1971 (Act 372) made
applicable to Ghana, until repealed by the Conveyancing Decree, 1973
(N.R.C.D.175).
3* Wilson v. Rosenthal (1906) 22 T.L.R.233; Charrington v. Camp ML902 1
1 Ch.386. J
4. The Ghanaian courts have a tendency of following—— some would say slavishly
English decisions.
5. (1954) 14 W.a .C.A.476^ p 3oj .
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principle that repudiation of the lord destroys the tenure • This outmoded
2doctrine was applied in Safo v. Badu • In this case, the landlord applied 
for a possession order against a tenant who refused to attorn tenant to the 
landlord who had inherited the premises. It was held by the High Court that 
at common law a tenant who denied the title of his landlord was automatically 
made to forfeit his tenancy^
"And no relief is available against forfeiture at common
3law for denial of the landlord's title".
In England it has been held that section 146 of the Law of Property Act, 
1925 — which is the statutory basis upon which releif from forfeiture is 
granted— 'is inapplicable where denial of title is the ground for forfeiture 
because the section applies only to forfeiture "under any proviso or stipula-
4 £tion m  a lease" • In Safo v. Badu , relief from forfeiture was not claimed
under section 30 of the Conveyancing Decree, 1973* although the denial of
title took place on 18th September, 1974^, and the learned judge did not
consider the issue. It may be that both counsel for the tenant and the learned
judge impliedly accepted the English decisions, and agreed that forfeiture
1
for denial of title is not affected by section 30 • But it would have been
that much better if the issue had been argued and ruled upon by the court} ■ 
for it is at least arguable that the right of forfeiture for denial of title 
is a provision—  albeit implied— of every residential tenancy agreement.
1.
2*
3.
4.
5.
6.
1.
Doe d. Ellerbrock v. Flynn (1834) 1 C.M. & R.137? Wisbech st.Mary 
Parish Council v. Lilley |l956^  1 W.L.R.121.
[l977l 2 G.L.R.63.
[1977J 2 G.L.R.63, 66, per. Korsah J.
Warner v. Sampson J1958J 1 Q.B.404; reversed on other grounds 1959 
1 Q.B.297.
op.cit.
The Conveyancing Decree came into force on 1st January, 1974.
It is not clear from the case whether the landlord complied with the notice 
requirement of section 29* It is arguable that not to deny the landlord's
(cont.)
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f. Relief to sub-tenants
Under normal cortrnon-law rules, privity neither of contract nor of estate
exists between the landlord and a sub-tenant, and therefore termination of
1
the head-tenancy automatically determined the sub-tenancy ; for "every sub­
ordinate interest must perish with the superior interest on which it is depen-
2 . / xdent" • But by section 30(1) of the Conveyancing Decree, 1973i a sub-tenant
of the whole premises or any part thereof can apply for relief when the head-
landlord proceeds by action or otherwise to enforce a right of re-entry or
forfeiture# A sub-tenant granted relief may be granted a new tenancy of
the whole of the premises or any part thereof upon such terms as the court
may think fit; provided that the duration of the new tenancy may not be longer
3
than that of the original sub-tenancy •
It is important to emphasise that the granting of relief from forfeiture 
is a purely discretionary matter for the court.
g. Conclusion
The determination of a tenancy—-by any of the above means— does not
4entitle the landlord to evict the tenant • In addition, the .landlord must
satisfy one of the conditions specified in section 17(1) of the Rent Act,
1963 .^ Tenants whose tenancy have determined, but who cannot be ejected
because the landlord has not satisfied section 17(1) «nay continue in poss-
6ession as statutory tenants . The tenant may, or course, decide to quit on
title is a condition of a tenancy and that forfeiture for denial of title 
is governed by section 29*
1. See Great Western Railway v. Smith (1876) 2 Ch.D.235.
2. Bendall v. McVhirter
3* Conveyancing Decree, 197
4. infra, pp»3 O'!" 3 I 2-.
5. infra, pp. $07 ' 3 I 3- •
6. Rent Act, 1963 (Act 220), SS.36, 28-29*
s.30(3). Ste-vJU* ft O^ O-Of 5 1 /(JJ)
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the determination of his tenancy; but if he decides not to,he cannot be 
lawfully evicted unless the landlord satisfies section 17(1).
B. THE EVICTION OF TENANTS 
It need hardly be pointed out that whatever rights are conferred upon 
tenants and whatever obligations are imposed on landlords — such as, imply­
ing a warranty of habitability or restricting the level of rent— would riot be
worth the paper they are written on if landlords are to retain their common
2law right of eviction on. the termination of a tenancy • Thus any attempt 
at constructing a more equitable regime of laws to regulate the residential 
tenancy relationship must be underpinned by rules affording the tenant security 
of tenure and restricting the landlord's right to eject tenants. Such rest­
riction must, however, not be made absolute. A landlord must be able to 
regain possession if he has reasonable cause for so wanting. The security 
of tenure provisions of section 17 of the Rent Act, 1963 (Act 220) seeks to 
maintain a balance between absolute freedom and prohibition.
Security of tenure is important because, unlike sale which has to be
regulated and/or controlled at the time the contract is being entered into
3
becuase it is a once-for-all transaction , the residential tenancy relation­
ship can be regulated and/or controlled after the contract is entered into 
and the tenant is in possession. By making it very difficult to evict a 
tenant, thereby providing him with enough leverage, the tenant is able to 
resist attempts to make him pay a rent higher than that fixed by law, and 
is more capable of insisting on any rights he may have.
1. However, the landlord may effectively eject the tenant - even if such 
eviction is illegal and in contravention of the Rent Act, 1963* See 
infra, pp.JS2 “333*
2. This is particularly so in Ghana where monthly tenancies, which under 
the common law can be terminated after a month's notice, predominate.
3* k.g., price control and implied terras like a warranty of merchantability.
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Under section 17 of the Rent Act, 19&3 (Act 220) no eviction order
shall be made by the appropriate Rent Magistrate, or by any judge of competent
1
jurisdiction except in the circumstances specified in the section •
I. Reasonableness of the order
I W  CMffc Uatwi-r Intlcl that the granting of an eviction order against
the tenant is not automatic on the satisfaction of section 17(1)* It is
discretionary. Section 17(1) does not ^ \)fL/ cJ
juci(j<L$ to iiYia^ jL, ati m / i ord tf ft] a < \ v j ci^oums^ 
a i\c m * Actfktr ^oivis i/iob to M a k e  v r b . e ^ M n l u s  ifc
m l U  (XC(L , The satisfaction of any of the conditions specified
in section 17(1) is therefore a necessary condition for the grant of an 
eviction order; not a sufficient condition. Section 17(1) is enabling not 
mandatory. The law was thus stated by Ollennu J., (as he then was) in Bassil 
v. Said Rqhd:
'•In my opinion section 11(1) is not to be interpreted as
mandatory upon a court to make an order for recovery of
possession whenever anyone of the grounds therein set
is proved to exist. The proper interpretation of that
section should be that the court may grant an order of
possession or ejectment of a tenant whenever any of the
grounds stated in the section is proved, but only in the
circumstances in which it would at common law be obliged
2to make such an order" •
II. Determination of Tenancies
As the above quotation shows, the courts have consistently held that 
an eviction order will not be made unless the landlord is, at common law, 
entitled to determine the tenancy. In other words, in addition to satisfying
1. S.17(1), infra pp. SIS. -331-
2. Bassil v. Said Road, 1^957} 2 V.A.L.R.231* The case was decided on
the basis of similar provisions in the Rent Control Ordinance, 1952.
308
section 17(1) a landlord seeking to evict a tenant must also establish that
he has a common-law right to determine the tenancy —  or, indeed, that he has
1 2 already done so • In Ramia v. Mouissie , the tenant held premises from
the landlord by a verbal agreement. The terms of the agreement were not
in evidence except that it was clear that rent was payable monthly. When
the tenant defaulted in paying rent, the landlord sued for arrears of rent
and recovery of possession. The trial court gave judgment for the landlord
for arrears of rent but refused an eviction order. The landlord appealed
3
to the High Court, where it was argued on his behalf that the law provided 
for eviction if rent was in arrear. This contention was rejected by Smith J., 
who held that the regulations were aimed at restricting not enlarging the 
powers of the landlord. The landlord must establish firstly that he could 
recover possession apart from the regulations, and secondly that the regulations 
did not prevent him from exercising rights he would otherwise have had. The 
landlord was required to give a month's notice to the tenant of his intention
4to recover possession • Not having done so he had no right at common law 
to recover possession.
The effect of the security of tenure provisions is, in the words of 
Windsor - Aubrey J.,:
The above statement was quoted with approval by Ollennu J., (as he then was) 
in Bassil v. Said Rqad^. In this case, there was a reduction of rent during
2 G.L.R.403.
2. (1945) D.C.(Land) *38-^ 47, 177* The case was decided on the basis of
similar provisions in the Rent Restriction Regulations, 1943*
3» The Rent Restriction Regulations, 1943*
4. The tenancy was held to be a monthly tenancy.
5« Moubarak v. Eguakun 1^95(>) 1 W.A.L.R.88,. The case was decided on the
basis of similar provisions in the Rent Control Ordinance, 1952.
"to afford greater not less protection to the tenant than
5
existed under common law"
1. See Bassil v. Said Rqad, supra; Allamedine Bros, v.
6* aupra.
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the currency of a tenancy* The landlord claimed that it was a temporary 
concession, but the tenant contended that it was a permanent reduction* The 
landlord sued for recovery of possession on the grounds of non-payment of rent 
and breach of a covenant not to sub-let without the consent of the landlord*
The court refused to grant an eviction order, holding that there was no 
arrears of rent— —the landlord being estopped from claiming any arrears of 
rent on the principle of promisory estoppel enunciated by Denning J*, as he 
thep was, in the High Trees case** As regards the covenant against sub-letting, 
the court held that since the covenant was not backed by a forfeiture clause 
there was no right of re-entry consequenton its breach* The landlord there­
fore had no right to terminate the tenancy and could not take advantage of
2the provisions of the Ordinance •
In more recent cases—  decided on the basis of section 17(1) — the 
courts have maintained the position that a landlord would only be granted 
an eviction order if he has a common-law right to terminate the tenancy or, 
indeed the tenancy has determined j and also satisfies one of the conditons
3 4specified in section 17(1) * In Bassil v* -Sfarijlani , a landlord was
refused an eviction order even though the tenancy has determined through
the effluxion of time* The court pointed out that expiration of the tenancy
is not one of the conditions specified in section 17(1); for the landlord
to succeed he must satisfy one of the conditions specified in section 17(1)
in addition to the expiration of the tenancy* Again, in Karam & Sons v*
' . 5TraboulSy ♦ the landlord was refused an eviction order after the tenancy 
had expired. The court held that the tenant who had stayed on had become
1. |1947J K.B.130.
2* Rent Control Ordinance, (No*2), 1952, S.11(1).
3* See Allamedine Bros* v* P.Z. |l97l] 2 Gi»B*403*
4* High Court, Accra, 1 October 1966; digested (1967) C.C.20.
5. fl964| G.L.R.513.
a statutory tenant and could not be evicted except in accordance 
with the provisions of the Rent Act, I9 6 3 1 .
The above interpretation of section I?(I) has been seriously 
challenged by Kludze. The main weapon in Kludze's amoury is the
n ti
word tenant in the opening words of section 17(1), This provides 
that:
".... no order against a tenant for the recovery of 
the possession of, or for the ejectment from, any 
premises shall be made or given..."
Kludze argues forcefully that only tenants are protected by section 
17(1). And that since a person whose tenancy has expired or other­
wise determined is only a former tenant such a person is not pro­
tected by section 1 7 (1 ).
3
It is submitted that Kludze*s view is not correct. Analysis 
of judicial interpretation of the precursors of section 1 7 (1 ) 
shows that the orthodox interpretation has consistently been foll- 
owed. This is important. As Woodman points out, by re-enacting 
these provisions the legislature may be deemed to be endorsing 
these judicial decisions.^ This view is supported by the fact
1. Act 220, s.17(1).
2 . Kludze,A.K.P., "The termination of leases", (1975) 7 R*G.L.I0,p.27 et. 
seq.; "The equitable tenant and protection against eviction", (1 9 7 6 )
8 R.G.L. 63,66-68.
3. For a robust defence of the orthodox interpretation,see Woodman,G.R.,
" In defence of section 17 of the Rent Act", (1975) 7 R.G.L. 144.
4. See Ramia v. Mouissie (1 9 ^ 5 > D.C.(Land) ,38-,^ 7 177; Moubarak v.
Eguakun (1956) I W.A.L.R. 88; Bassil v. Said Raad (1957) 2 W.A.L.R.23I.
5 . ibid.,p . 1
3H
in two instances new provisions were enacted in order to reverse 
judicial interpretation of the previous enactment.*
Secondly, Kludze*s view, would render the whole of section
o
I?(I) redundant. A tenant does not need the protection of sec­
tion I?(I) he simply cannot be evicted. But, surely, section 
17(1) is aimed at protecting some people. It is submitted that 
it is aimed at providing security to those whose tenancies have, 
by the normal operation of the common-law rules,determined . It 
is these people whose leases have expired, but who by virtue of 
section 17(1) cannot be evicted, that Act 220 refers to as"sta- 
tutory tenants".^
I. s.I6(2)-(5) reversing the effect of Hinnawi v. Bassil (I95&) 3 W.A.L.R. 
^95j and s.I7 (I)(g) reversing the effect of.Azar v. Saad (1957)
2 W.A.L.R. 2hZ.
2. See Woodman,G.R. ,"In defence of section 17 of the Rent Act", op. cit. , 
at 1 5 0 .
3. SS.2 B and 2 9 . It may be noted that Kludze*s view ,as Woodman points 
out has the effect of rendind these provisions frustrate because 
by his interpretation there can be no statutory tenants.
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But, perhaps crucially, Kludze's view, if accepted, would make rent 
control and the structuring of a more equitable regime of laws to govern 
the residential tenancy relationship impossible. This would be particularly 
so with monthly tenancies which predominate in Ghana^* A landlord confronted 
with a vigilant tenant who is insistent upon his rights, and would not pay 
more than the legal rent would give the tenant a month's notice after which 
the tenancy determines. And the tenant, being them only a former tenant, 
will have no protection. Prudence will thus compel tenants to be docile 
since insistence on his rights would result in his being homeless after two 
months. Thus the whole policy of the Rent Act, 1963— 1—the restriction on 
the level of rents—*-is defeated on Kludze's interpretation. It is, therefore, 
submitted that the othordox view is more in line with the letter and spirit 
of section 17(1) and of Act 220 generally.
III. Scope of section 17(1)
2Act 220 must be applicable • In addition the tenant must pay rent.
Gratuitous tenancies are,therefore, outside the scope of section 17(1)*
3
In Safo v. Badu , the landlord applied for recovery of possession because 
the tenant had refused to attorn tenant to him. The tenant was a tenant at 
will and paid no rent. Counsel for the tenant argued that an eviction order 
could not be made because the landlord did not satisfy any of the conditions 
specified in section 17(1)* This contention was rejected by Korsah J., 
who said:
1. Judicial notice was taken of this fact by Sowah, J.A., delivering the 
unanimous decision of the Court of Appeal, in Allamedine Bros, v. 
P.Z. [l97l] 2 G.L.R.403.
2. See supra, pp»2.37~ 'X-tyQ,
3. £1977] 2 G.L.R.63.
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"The Rent Act, 19&3 (Act 220), sought to regulate the 
relationship of landlord and tenant only where the consider­
ation of rent is a feature of the lease or tenancy, but left 
untouched tenancies existing under the common law where land­
lords did not eXact rent as consideration for the letting 
of premises* Thus, the rights of the landlord and tenant 
at common £ law, in cases where the consideration of rent is 
not a feature of the letting of premises, are unaffected by 
Act 220.
It is significant that Act 220 is entitled the Rent Act
and not the Landlord and Tenant Act; for we have only a
statute regulating tenancies on which the incidence of rent
is a feature and not one regulating the relationship of land-
1
lord and tenant m  general"
" • • • no order against a tenant for the recovery of the 
possession of, or for the ejectment from, any premises shall 
be made • • • except in any of the following circumstances:
"(a) where any rent lawfully due from the tenant has not 
been paid or tendered within one month after the date on 
which it became lawfully due";
The rent in arrear must be lawfully due. Therefore arrears of rent 
arising from non-payment of part of contractual rent in excess of the recover­
able rent — as defined by Act 220 and subsequent legislation — - can not be
athe basis for eviction.
IV. Specific grounds for recovery of possession 
Under section 17(1):
a. Arrears of rent
i -  S<i£- ''jVv.a-
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The rent must be in arrear. It has been noted that there are certain
circumstances in which the tenant is legally justified in making deductions 
1from future rent • Where such deduction is permissible the landlord has
2no cause of action-— there is simply no arrears of rent •
In interpreting this paragraph, some judges have held that at least two
3
months’ rent must have fallen into arrear. In Dennis v. Agbetetei , 
Francois J., as he then was, said:
It is submitted that this view, though a practical formulation of the position 
as regards monthly tenancies in which rent is payable in arrear, is not
q
accurate as a formulation of general principle. It is patently misleading 
in the case of fixed tenancies and other periodic tenancies in which rent 
is not payable monthly.
1. supra, pp.
2. See Rank, P.M., ’’Repairs in lieu of rent”, (1976) 40 Conveyancer 196, 
202-206.
3. High Court, Ho, 31 October 1969* degested (1970) C.C.21.
4. ibid.
5. (1969) C.C.94.
6. ibid, per the Court of Appeal (Ollennu, Apaloo and Lassey J.J.A.)
”A claim for forfeiture will only lie if rent for at least
4two months remains unpaid”
The same view was taken in Asante v. Brown^. In this case, it was held
that an eviction order may only be made
" • • . where the rent has not been paid or tendered within
one month after the date on which it became due, which means
6that at least two month's rent have fallen into arrears” •
1 -  S ® 1- K U n d j i a ,  « ( • i c
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It has also been persuasively argued by Kludze that the amount of rent 
in arrear need not be the full rent*. It is sufficient if it is part of
the rent lawfully due and it has not been paid or tendered after one month
from the date on which it became lawfully due. This view is better than 
the view of Francois J,, that at least two months' rent must be due. In 
Dennis v. Agbetelfrl.Francois J., took the view thati
"It is not the intention of the legislature that a land­
lord should add up bits of rent not fully satisfied and
when an amount equivalent to at least two months' rent
2has been reached to ask for ejectment" •
This interpretation is of doubtful validity. As has been argued, section 
17(1)(a) doe^ * not say that two months’ rent must be in arrears before eviction
can be granted. It says that ejectment may be granted where:
"any rent lawfully due . . .  has not been paid or tendered 
within one month after the date on which it became lawfully 
due"5.
This, it is submitted, includes parts of any monthly, quarterly or yearly
rent not paid after a month from when it became lawfully due.
b. Breach of Covenant
"(b) where any obligation of the tenancy, other than
that specified in paragraph (a), so far as such
obligation is consistent with the provisions of 
this Act, has been broken or not performed".
It is clear from the paragraph that breach of a term which is inconsistent 
with the provisions of Act 220 cannot be the basis for an eviction.order.
1. Kludze,A.K.P., "The termination of leases", (1975) 7 R.G.L.10, 16-18.
2. (1970) C.C.21.
3. Rent Act, 1963 (Act 220), S.17(1)(a), (emphasis supplied).
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Therefore a tenant who, for example, has undertaken to paySlft
in advance as a condition for the grant cannot be evicted if he defaults;
for the obligation though contractual is inconsistent with the provisions 
1
of Act 220 •
c. Nuisance or annoyance
M(c) where the tenant or any person residing with him 
has been guilty of conduct which is a nuisance or 
annoyance to adjoining occupiers;1
Neither "nuisance" nor "annoyance" is defined by Act 220. This is lamented
2by some judges • Nuisance has been defined by Kludze as:
" . . .  an act or omission which constitutes or results in
an interference with, disturbance of, or annoyance to, another
person in the use, exercise or enjoyment of a right, title,
ownership or occupation of land, premises, easement or other
3
right connected with land . . .
What constitutes a nuisance or annoyance to others will always remain a question
4of fact. In Ofon v. Arthur the caretaker of ' B1 let a room to 'A1 who 
in turn sub-let to fC’. 'C' immediately upon assuming possession wrote letters 
to the Tema Development Corporation— the lessor —  alleging that the principal 
tenant was disreputable and urging the corporation to grant the original ten­
ancy to him. This application was turned down and the caretaker gave 'C' 
notice to quit. When *C' refused to vacate the room, the caretaker applied 
for an eviction order on the grounds that ' C' was a nuisance. In granting 
the order, Kingsley-NyinahJ., had this to say:
1. S.25(5).
2. Ofori v. Arthur (1970) C.C.112, per Kingsley-Nyinah, J.
3. "The termination of leases", (1975) 7 R.G.L.10, 19*
4. supra.
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MIt is not at all surprising, then, that neither the Rent 
Regulations, 1964 (L.1.369)* nor its parent statute, the 
Rent Act, 1963 (Act 220) ventures a definition of the word 
•nuisance1 or the word 'annoyance'• This omission I think 
entitles one to interprete the word not abstractly, but 
beneficially, having regard to the peculiar facts and circum- 
syances of each particular case. I do earnestly hope that 
when this Act 220 comes to be revised, or amended, the drafts­
man would give us reasonable and practicable definition of
1
these important words 'nuisance' and 'annoyance'" •
The difficulties envisaged by Kingsley-Nyinah J., have already claimed
2
a victim. In Dennis v. Agbetetei , it was held that the pounding of fufu
2 . . .on the top floor of a single storey house amounted to a nuisance • This decision
is questionable in as far as it seeks to curtail the preparation and enjoyment
3
of a staple Ghanaian dish • It is not clear from the digest whether there 
was any facility on the ground floor for the pounding of fufu and the tenant 
had failed to avail himself of this facility. If no such facility existed 
then this decision would seem to be prohibiting the eating of a staple Ghanaian 
dish. This would run counter to a deep-seated Ghanaian mode of life. Such 
socially-transforming law is likely to be ignored.
Although it may appear a digression, it is worthwhile breifly looking 
at other experiences in other countries with socially - transforming laws.
The experience of Prohibition in the United States is an important starting- 
point. But, perhaps more importantly, the decision in Dennis v. Agbetetei 
is an example of laws passed, judicial decisions delivered, common - and 
civil-law rules imported into Africa and Third-World countries without a 
counsideration of the socio-economic milieu within which they are to operate—  
an important consideration in the successful engineering of social reform.
A couple of illustrations seem appropriate.
1. Ofori v. Arthur (1970) C.C.112.
2. (1970) C.C.21.
3. See Kludze, A.K.P., "Termination of leases", (1975) 7 R.G.L.10, at p*20.
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In 19^4, the Ivory Coast enacted a series of measures designed to promote 
the breakdown of the extended family, promote monogamy and foster the cohesive 
nuclear family. Polygamous second and subsequent marriages were declared 
null and void and receipt of the marriage consideration was made illegal.
All these were done in the face of entrenched traditional patterns in the 
population which varied from the legislation on every point. Field research 
has shown that this attempt at law-leading social change has proved a dismal 
failure1.
In Ethiopia, after World War II, it was considered that there was need
for a modern set of codes to replace in a large measure customary and religious
practices from diverse sources. The new codes, enacted between 1957 and 19&5
incorporated very little of practice; indeed the aim was to transform. The
draftsman, Professor R.David, and the Codification Commission drew on what
they considered to be the best of European common - and civil law systems
and added a few innovations of their own. Though the Codes were programmatic
in the extreme, research shows that they have had little or no effect on
2Ethiopian social and economic life •
Another example is the Soviet modernizing experiment in Soviet Central 
Asia from around 1926 to early 1929* The Soviet Union enacted new codes 
for female emanicipation in a traditional muslim society. This involved 
rules permitting women to appear in public without the veil, encouragement 
of divorce, etc. These changes met with such severe hostility and opposition
3from men, but also from women, that the whole scheme had to be abandoned ,
1, See Mundt,R,J», "The internalization of law in a developing country, the 
Ivory Coast Civil Code", (1978) 16 African L,Std,176; Levasseur,A.A.;
"The modernization of law in Africa with particular reference to family .
law in the Ivqry Coast", (in) Foster, P and Zolberg, A,R,, (eds.) Ghana Art ci 
Hia- tVOVy Co f Clii 1^1 1
2. See Vanderlinden,J., Introduction au Droit de L'Ethiopie moderne, Paris,
1971* esp,pp,212ff ; Beckstrom, J., "Handicaps to legal social engineering 
in a developing nation", (1974) 22 Am.J, of Comp. Law 697*
3* Massell, G., "Law as an instrument of revolutionary change in a traditional
milieu: the case of Soviet Central Asia", (1968) 11 Law and Society Review 179•
319
The essential message of all these failures is that lawmakers (the myth
that judges do not make law has long since been exploded by the American
Realists) should be supremely couscions of the sociology and, in the particular
case of Dennis v. Agbetetei, the eating - habits of the people; for
"artificial rules", says Malinowski, writing about laws which do not take
account of sociological, psychological and physiological factors, "either
do not work or work at such a cost to the most fundamental institution • • •
1
that all the substance of the social life and culture is destroyed" •
From applied juristics to the more mundane business of Act 220. It is
important to note that a landlord in occupation is an adjouning occupier in
2
the same right as any other occupier of premises • Therefore a landlord in
occupation of part of the premises or adjoining premises is within the terms
of the paragraph if he establishes nuisance or annoyance by the tenant.
d. Immoral or illegal user
"(d) where the tenant or any person residing with him has been 
convicted of using the premises or allowing the premises 
to be used for immoral or illegal purposes;"
It is important to note that if the landlord’s application is based on
3
this paragraph an actual conviction must be proved • Anything short of a 
conviction— an allegation, custody pending trial or a confession— would 
not suffice.
1. Introduction (to) Hogbin,|..Law and Orderin Polynesia, London, 193W p.XXI
2. Dennis v. Agbetetei (1970) C.C.21
3» See Frederick Platts & Cd.Ltd. v. Grig or £l95oj 1 T.L.R. £ fyCJ .
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It is difficult to envisage what sort of crime qualifies as immorality
under this paragraph# Indeed) the immorality aspect of the paragraph seems
superfluous# Conviction necessarily means that an act, or omission is criminal
— illegal# But what is an immoral crime? Conviction for using premises for
gambiling or as a brothel means that such conduct is illegal# But is it
necessarily immoral? It is submitted that the purpose of the paragraph would
be served without unnecessary excursions into ethical questions#
e# Waste, neglect or default
”(e) where the condition of the premises has in the opinion
of the Magistrate of Judge deteriorated owing to acts of 
waste by, or the neglect or default of, the tenant or any 
person residing with him;”
A landlord seeking eviction on the ground of waste, negleqt or default 
of the tenant must prove that the premises have deteriorated as a result of 
the act or omission of the tenant# An arnebiorating waste or any structural 
alteration which has not diminished the value of the property cannot be the 
basis of an eviction order*# 
f# Notice to quit
”(f) where the tenant has given notice of his intention to quit
in writing and in consequence of such notice the landlord 
has contracted to sell or let the premises or had taken 
any other steps as a result of which he would, in the opinion 
of such Magistrate or Judge, be seriously prejudiced if he 
could not obtain possession;”
This provision is in accordance with good sense and the principle of
promisory estoppel the foundations of which were laid by Denning J#, as he
2
then was, in the High Trees case • To succeed under this paragraph, the lanlord
1# For the different kinds of waste, see supra, pp# ISO.— 1^  3
2# For the subsequent development of the principle see Lord 
Denning, The Discipline of Law, London, 1979* pp#197“223*
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must have acted in consequence of the tenant's notice# It is not good enough 
if the landlord acts before the tenant's notice or, indeed, if at the time 
of acting the landlord had no knowledge of the tenant's notice#
The notice must be in writing, and must be valid in law to determine 
the tenancy*•
g. Required by landlord for occupation
Under paragraph (g) an eviction order may be made where the premises
are reasonably required for personal occupation as a dwelling house by the
landlord himself, a member of his family or any person in the full time
employment of the landlord#
It is important to note that for the purpose of this paragraph the
word "family" should not be understood in its customary law signification
2of extended relations • The interpretation section of Act 220 defines "member 
of the family" ass
• • the father or mother, a wife, husband, child,
3
brother or sister . • • •
4Other relations are therefore excluded. In Qwusu v# Asante , a tenant was 
ordered by a district court to vacate premises because it was reasonably 
required for the use of the landlord's nephew# On appeal to the High Court, 
the order was. quashed becQUse a nephew is not a member of the landlord's 
family as defined by section 36 of Act 220. The law was thus stated by 
Me^sa-Boison Js
1# See supra, pp#CL9^ f- * .
2# For the concept of the family in customary law, see A.N.Allott, "Legal 
personality in African law", in M.GlUckman (ed); Ideas and Procedures 
in African customary law, London, 1969* P*179i at 182-189jKludze,A.K.Pi 
Ewe Law of Property, London, 1973» PP*30“79» Woodman, G.R., "The family 
as a corporation in Ghanaian and Nigerian Law", (197^) H  Af.Law Studies, 
p# 1#
3- S- 34.
4 -[inn] xC L fL-xxo.
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"Section 36 as it now stands does not include a nephew 
in the category of members of the landlord's family*
That, in the matrilineal pattern of Ghanaian society 
may sound odd to deny the nephew, who may possibly inherit 
the whole estate on the death of the landlord, the status 
of his being a member of the landlord's family in the sense 
of being a dependent, while the landlord was alive. Whether 
that was the r$jab intention of the legislature or the draft- 
man's oversight that is the present state of the law and 
the court must give effect to it"1.
It must be pointed out that the definition is not an oversight by the drafts­
man. The issue was considered by the Kwaku Bousu Committee— on whose recommend­
ations Act 220 was enacted. The
"We agree that, it:is desirable that the number of persons
for whom a landlord may recover possession should be limited,
and therefore recommend that family be defined in the new
Act as including father, mother, wife/husband, childrem,
2brothers and sisters" •
1. [l973] 2 G.L.R. 220, 221. The learned judge's assertion that the pattern
of Ghanaian society is matrilineal is inaccurate. The Akan are matilineal.
But others, like the Ga, (see Field,M.J., Social Organisation of the Ga 
People, London, 1940), the Ewe (see Kludze,A.K.P.•, Ewe Law of Property,
London, 1973^  and the Gonja (see Hatjsa' v. Haruna |l96^ 2 G.L.R.212)
are patrilineal. Nor is the implied assertion that intestate succession 
in Ghana is matrilineal accurate. Once again, intestate succession among 
the Akan is matrilineal. But others, like the Ga (see Coleman v. Shang 
[1959] G.L.R.390, |l96lj A.C.481*—  (|egal decisions which hold that the 
Ga Mashi follow a modified system of matrilineal succession see Vanderpnye 
v. Botchway (1951) 13»Sel«Judg., Ct. of App., 164 are "a colossal 
pyramid of error"! Allott,A.N., A Note on the Ga Law of Succession, 1953i 
Bull.S.O. A.S. 164), the jlldangb^  (see Pogucki,R., Gold Coast Land Tenure,
Vol.II, Accra, 1955^ P*39)» the Ewe (see Kludze, supra.pp.256 at seq.), 
and the Gonja (see HaUsa v. Haruna, supra) practice a patrilineal system 
of intestate succession. Such sweeping generalizations are therefore in­
accurate and there is no reason to lump all the people of Ghana together 
as having a matrilineal pattern, whatever that means. This process of 
'lumping together' is justified by some in the name of uniformity and progress. 
In Biei v. Akomea (1956) 1 W.A.L.R.174 the following statement was made:
"This court cannot allow local customs to override general principles and 
practice in these days of changing conditions".
(Cont•)
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It is obvious that mother or father, a wife, husband, child, brother or
1
sister means son or daughter, etc*,,as determined by the law of Ghana •
Therefore a landlord who being already married under the customary law
purports to marry another woman under the Marriage Ordinance, 19^8, cannot
claim an eviction order on the grounds of requiring thepremises for the
2second lady because such a purported marriage is null and void ; the woman
is therefore not his wife*
The question whether a person is a son or daughter, father or mother
of the landlord will be determined by the domiciliary law of the landlord.
3
In Coleman v. Shang the Court of Appeal^in determing who a wife or child
4is for the purposes of the Statute of Distribution , said:
’•Under the Statute of Distribution a 'wife' means a 
’lawful wife', and child means ’a lawful child'. The 
question of 'lawful wife1 and * legitimate child' are questions 
of statuSfc to be decided by the law of domicil* There­
fore, if a marriage between a man and a woman is by the law 
of their domicil a valid marriage, the 'wife' is a lawful 
wife for the purposes of the statute no matter whether or 
not the marriage is invalid by the law of England or any
1*(cont*)
While minor points of local detail may be smoothed over in the name of 
uniformity and progress, it is submitted that this does not justify 
condemning millions of people to a social formation alien to them*
2* Report of the Committee of Enquiry into the Operation of the Rent Control 
Ordinance (No*2 of 1952), Chp.V., para.44.
1* See Coleman v* Shang G.L.R.390,
2. Cap*127 (1951 Rev.), S.l4.
3* supra.
4. 1670 (22 & 23 Car.2, C.10).
3 24-
other place* Similarly, if a child is legitimate by
the law of the country whereat the date of its birth
its parents were domiciled, he is a legitimate child
for purposes of the statute, no matter whether the
1
child would be illegitimate by English law"*
Thus whatever the circumstances in which a child is born —  father not married 
to mother, issue of a man married under the Marriage Ordinance9 1948 and
another woman, etc* — -it is a son or daughter^ and has a father or mother,
2once paternity is acknowledged*
3
There is no limitation on the age of children* In Nimako v* Archlbold, 
the landlord claimed recovery of possession on the ground that he required 
the premises for occupation by himself and his family* The case went as far 
as to the Supreme Court, where it was argued on behalf of the tenant that 
the words "any member of his family" in the Rent Ordinance, 1952, section 11(1) 
(d) did not include children who are of age or married* This contention was 
rejected by the Supreme Court* Siriboe J*S*C«, delivering the unanimous opinion 
of the court, said:
" • • • the view of this court is that the Rent Control 
Ordinance or customary law does not place any limitation 
on the class or age of the landlord's family, for whose 
occupation the landlord should establish that he reason-
4
ably requires possession of his premises from the tenant"*
1* Report of the Committee of Enquiry into the Operation of the Rent Control 
Ordinance (No*2 of 1952)t p*29t Chp*V, para.45.
2* See Coleman v* Shang, supra; Kludze, A*K*P*, Ewe Law of Property, London, 
1975* On the question of legitimacy in the Ghanaian law, which is different 
from p a t e r n i t y ■ legitimacy being a status of a child dependent on the 
relationship between his two parents, while paternity is the relationship 
of father and child —  see Woodman, G*, "Too many illegitimate children?", 
(1975) 12 U*G.L*J*51.
3. [l966] G.L*R*6l2*
4* ibid*, at p*6l6.
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For an order to be made on this ground, it must be established that 
the premises were constructed to be used as a dwelling-house.* The test is 
not whether the premises are being used as a dwelling house, or can be so 
used, but whether they were constructed to be used as a dwelling house.
The Kwaku Bonsu Committee recommended that*
Where the landlord claims that he needs the premises to house an employee,
he must prove to the satisfaction of the court that he usually provides accom-
2modation to the class of employees to which the employee in question belongs .
The court has a discretion in deciding whether to grant the order or not.
The landlord must prove that the premises are "reasonably required" and that
3
he is acting in good faith. In Qwusu v. Aidoo, the plaintiff left a store 
which he was occupying when he quarrelled with his landlord, who was his 
mistress. He then sought to move into his own store which he had let to the 
defendant. It was held that the plaintiff did not "reasonably require" the 
premises for his own use, in as much as he was under no obligation to quit 
the store he was occupying. The court said:
"The question whether premises are reasonably required by a 
landlord for his own use is a question of fact for the Court.
In considering whether it is reasonable or not to make an order 
for possession the Court considers the interest of the landlord 
and of the tenant . . . .
Where, as in this case, a landlord elects upon his wife's good 
grace to occupy her store whilst letting out his own premises
1. Report of the Committee of Enquiry into the operation of the Rent Control
Ordinance (No»2) of 1952), p«29t chap.V, para.45•
2. S.17(l)(g)(i).
3. (1946) D.C.(Land) 1933-47, 241(decided on the basis of similar provisions
in the Rent Restriction Regulations, 1943). The case ift*olved a commercial
letting; but, it is submitted that the same principle would apply to residen-
" . • • it is more reasonable to relate the words dwelling
house to the nature of the premisds or to the purpose for
which they were intended rather than to the purpose to which
1
the landlord intends to put them • • • •
tenancies.
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at profit can he, on falling out with his wife and vacating 
her store in order to assuage her, claim that he reasonably 
requires his own premises for his own use?”1*/
The landlord has to show that he genuinely needs the premises at the present 
time and not merely that he prefers it to, or that it is more convenient than,
2
other premises available to him* In the Nigerian case of Breedy v* Khalife, 
the court expressed the law thuss
“The words "reasonably required" connote something more
than desire, although, at the same time, something less
3
than a necessity will do" •
It is a matter of fine judgment to be determined by the court* In Nimako v*
4
Archibold, the landlord applied for an eviction orderon the ground that he 
required it for occupation by himself and his children* The landlord had been 
living with four children in uncomfortable circumstances and had to travel 
a considerable distance to and from work* It was argued on behalf of the 
tehant that the landlord did not "reasonably require" the premises but wanted 
it because it was more comfortable and convenient* This contention was 
rejected by the Supreme Court which held that on the totality of the evidence 
the premises were reasonably required by the landlord*
The court must also weigh the equities* An order will not be made on
this ground if the court is satisfied that having regard to all the circum­
stances of the case—  including whether alternative accommodation is available
to the landlord or tenant — greater hardship would be caused by making the
5
order than by refusing it • The burden of proving reasonable requirement of 
the premises is on the landlord, but that of establishing greater hardship is
1* op*cit*, at p*24l*
2* (1952) 20 N.L.R.91*
3* ibid*, per de Comarmond S.P.J. at p*92*
4* [l966] G.L.R.612.
5. S.17(l)(o)(H).
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on the tenant* In Bikhazi v* Secretary of State of U.S*A*1 the landlord 
UMS granted ..jpPSS&iJSi 0H Of fou 0 Af -fkc^ i^.-W^CCJpV^W OuxJUj' L/lt £<>
M i r t e u i t ;  Ux m IotJ. had > afc&ft&usZs \v\. h<iota-
rlo
OkI j
The court held that the onus was on the tenant to show that 
greater hardship would be caused by granting the order than by refusing it 
and that the tenant had failed to discharge this onus*
The existence of alternative accommodation is a factor to be taken into 
account in determining the question of greater hardship* But the existence
2
or otherwise of alternative accommodation for the landlord is not conclusive*
Failure by the tenant to attempt to secure alternative accommodation would
weighl\£avily against hira*^  So would failure by the tenant to attempt to
4
regain premises owned by him* The landlord is under no obligation to provide
the tenant with alternative accommodation before recovering possession*^
h* Premises required by the landlord for his business
"(h) where the lease has expired and the premises are 
reasonably required by the landlord to be used by him for 
his own business purposes, such premises being constructed 
to be used as such, if the landlord has given not less than 
six months' written notice to the tenant of his intention 
to apply for an order for the recovery of the possession of, 
or ejectment from, the premises'.'•
1. (1952) D*C.(Land) *52^5^ 125 (decided on the basis of similar provisions 
in the Rent Control Ordinance, 1952)*
2. See A1 lame dine Bros v* IVZ [l97lj 2 G*L.R*403j Nimako v* Archibold
[l966j G.L.R.6l2t Rawanji Bros* v* P*Z, |l975j 2 G.L.R.352-*
3. see Rawanji Bros* v* P.Z., supra, at 360 where such conduct was described
as being "not only unreasonable but unconscionable"*
4* ibid.
5* Nimako v* Archibold [1966J G*L*R*6l2, 617*
\Wq± -tenant
(X t f c O W  a t  ?1 y \ Q  - a  ft  QX i4 o d  \ ( X j C C O M h v o  o i a  A t
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The landlord must prove that the premises were constructed for use for 
business purposes; the use to which the premises is being put is irrelevant*
The provision can therefore be used to evict a residential tenant if the 
premises he is occupying was constructed for use for business purposes* Act 
220 does not define what a business purpose is; presumably, it excludes use 
for residential purposes* 
i» Premises required for remodelling,etc*
Under section 17(1)(i) a landlord may be granted an order of ejectment 
where the tenancy has expired and the tenant is a statutory tenant, if the 
landlord intends:
(I) to pull down the premises and construct a new one; or,
(II) to remodel the premises and the remodelling cannot be effected 
with the tenant in occupation; or,
(III) to carry out a scheme of re-development, if the landlord has 
given not less than six months' written notice of his intention 
to apply for such an order*
Where the landlord requires premises for any of these reasons, he must first
furnish the appropriate rent officer with a statutory declaration to this effect*1
It seems reasonable that a tenant should not stand in the way of a land-
2lord who wants to carry out repairs or alterations to premises* However, 
to ensure that these may not be used as a pretext for evicting undesired ten­
ants, Act 220 provides that the court, in making the eviction order, may
3
specify a period within which the work is to be done* The court may also 
order that if the landlord fails to implement his intention within the stipul­
ated time, the former tenant be reinstated as a statutory tenant at the rent 
previously payable or be paid such compensation as the court may consider 
reasonable*^
1* Rent Regulations, 1964 (L*I* 369), reg*l8*
2* See Seraphim v. Pacific Stores ]l974j 1 G*L*R*301, 304.
3* S.17(l)(i)(aa).
^  ibid*
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It ia not every type of remodelling which will enable the landlord to 
get an eviction order. It must be established that the remodelling cannot 
be done while the tenant is in possession.^
What amounts to "remodelling" or a "scheme of re-developmentg is not
defined by Act 220. It is submitted that this is a question of fact to be
2
determined by the courts in particular cases. In Aschkar v. Somuah, the 
proposed work td be carried out on the premises involved inter alia the removal 
of two interior walls dividing the tenant's premises from the rest of the 
building. The court held that this was an adequate ground for an eviction 
order. The West African Court of Appeal said:
" . . .  the true test for determining whether a scheme of 
re-development put forward by the landlord is a scheme within 
the meaning of the Ordinance sufficient to merit the making 
of an order for ejectment is, can the scheme be carried out
3
if the landlord does not recover possession of the premises".
4
This test was used by the Court of Appeal in Seraphim v. Pacific Stores.
The courts have therefore taken a pragmatic approach in their interpretation 
of 'remodelling' and a "scheme of re-development"; they have not been bothered 
with distinguishing between remodelling and a scheme of re-development. This 
may be expedient for the expeditions resolution of disputes, but it has its 
drawbacks• Where an order i s made under (II) above —
1. S.17(l)(i)(il).
2. (1937) 2 W.A.L.R.264.
3* ibid., at p.268.
4. | W 4 J  1 G.L.R.301.
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remodelling the tenant shall have the option to acquire the re­
modelled premises as a statutory tenant.^ This right does not ex­
ist if the order is made under (III) a scheme of re-development. 
It is therefore submitted, that tedious though it may be, the 
courts will have to distinguish between remodelling and a scheme 
of re-development if they are to comply with section 1 7 (1 )(i).
j. Employment has ceased
" (j) where the premises were let to the tenant 
by reason of his employment in the service of 
the landlord and such employment has ceased".
p
In Harcutunian v. Medz-Moroukian it was held that the granting 
of an order under this rule is not dependent on the lawful termina­
tion of the tenant’s employment. It is enough if the employment has 
in fact been terminated.
1. S;I?(I)(i)(ac) and S.18(1).
2. fl962"] 2 G.L.R.94.
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k. Landlord has returned to Ghana
M(k) where the landlord was personally in occupation of the 
premises and has let the premises substantially furnished 
for a term during his absence from Ghana or that area of
Ghana fn Whichothe premises are situated and has returned
and requires the re-occupation of the premises for himself, 
so, however that no order granting the possession of, or the 
ejectment from, the premises shall be granted on or after the 
commencement unless the lease is in writing and sets out that 
the lease has been granted for a term during the absence of
the landlord from Ghana or such area”*
V. Effect of Eviction Order on Sub-tenants
An order for recovery of possession or of ejectment will not operate 
to affect the rights of any lawful sub-tenant in possession of the premises
was granted an order to recover premises from the tenant. On appeal, this 
order was set aside. The tenants then granted a sub-tenancy. On a further 
appeal, the second judgment was set aside. The landlord then sought to 
execute the order for recovery of possession against the sub-tenant& The 
sub-tenantS commenced proceedings against the head-lessor claiming that they 
were lawful sub-tenants and therefore protected by section 11(5) of the Rent 
Control Ordinance, 1952. This contention was upheld at the High Court by 
Jiagge J., (as she then was), overturned by the Court of Appeal, and finally 
restored by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that since the sub­
tenancy was created after the first judgment had been quashed ando^citime 
when no action was before the courts it was a lawful sub-tenancy. The sub­
tenants w&ro. therefore protected.
1 2 or any part thereof. In Chahin v. Epope Printing Press, the landlord
1. Rent Act, 1963 (Act 220), S.17(5)•
2.
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It is important to note —  as Chahin v. Epope Printing Press illustrates —  
that only lawful sub-tenants are protected. In construing this provision 
the courts have taken the view that a sub-tenant whose tenancy was created
in contravention of a covenant not to sub-let is not a lawful sub-tenant
1 2 and therefore not protected • This, as has been argued, need not necessarily
be the case. The fact that a sub-tenancy was granted in breach of covenant
should not, ipso facto, result in the sub-tenancy being unlawful.
VI. Security of tenure:fact or fiction?
It should not be supposed that the provisions of the Rent Act 19&3 bave
resulted in tenants enjoying a more improved measure of security than they
3
would have under the common law. It is a notorious fact that some tenants 
are evicted without a court order. One writer has written that tenantss
" • • • do not wish to incur the displeasure of their land-
lprdsf such displeasure could lead to ejectment that is often
effective, even if illegal and in breach of the provisions 
4of the Rent Act.
In the survey® of 2,000 residential tenants, 1631 said that they had been 
evicted from previous accommodation without a court order. Admittedly, this 
does not necessarily mean that the eviction was unlawful} for section 17 
of the Rent Act, 19&3 does not say that a tenant shall not be evicted without 
court order. What it does is to specify the circumstances in which a court 
order may be granted;it is still possible for a tenant to decide to vacate 
premises without insisting on an eviction order. What is therefore more
1. See Kuntoh v. Joseph (1955) D.C.(Land) >52^ 55i 341.
2. supra., pp. i f 7 - i .
3* It is not been suggested that the security of tenure provisions of the 
Rent Act have had no effect at all., cf. all the cases discussed in which 
an eviction order was refused. But a lot more instances do not go to court.
4. Date-Bah, S.K., "Legislative Control of freedom of contract", in
W.Ekow-Daniels & G.Woodman (eds), Essays in Ghanaian Law, Accra, 197&, 
University of Ghana, p.118, at 129*130.
(Cont.)
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important is that 1578 of the 1631 said that they did not wish to leave but 
had to* 187 of these were forcefully evicted; none of them complained to 
the police»and, as far as they knew, none of these landlords was prosecuted*
And yet section 27(1) of Act 220 makes it a criminal offence for a landlord 
to do or refrain from doing any act which the terms of the tenancy impose 
on him, if it is aimed at inducing the tenant to quit the premises* It is 
disheartening, but not surprising, that none of the landlords seems to have 
been prosecuted;for section 27(1) was enacted because it was thought that 
landlords were getting away with illegal termination and harrassment because 
tenants could not bear the cost involved in civil litigation* It was, there­
fore, hoped that placing the responsibility on the state would result in more 
vigorous enforcement and a consequent decline in the practice*
Many issues are raised by the ineffectiveness of the law —  rent restriction, 
security of tenure, provisions against illegal termination and harrassment, 
implied term, etc*— to achieve their desireelpolicy - objectives* It is to 
a consideration of these issues that we now turn**
C0*k<l.
5* The survey was carried out by the present writer in Accra, Kumasi and 
Sekondi-Takoradi between June and December, 1978*
1* Last chapter*
CHAPTER NINE 
THE SOCIAL CONTEXT AND ITS INFLUENCE ON THE LAW
" * * • the centre of gravity of legal development lies 
not in legislation,A$F in juristic science nor in judicial 
decisions, but in society itself'1*•
Introduction
There has been a rather misplaced confidence in the miraculous capacity 
of law to achieve policy - objectives* Laws have been enacted without regard 
to what Friedman calls the "legal culture" within which these regulatory 
norms are to operate* "Legal culture" has been defined by Friedman ass
"* • • those values and attitudes in society which determine 
what structures are used and why, which rules work and which 
do not and why"^*
Residential tenancy law in Ghana is an amalgam of translocated English 
3
common-law and "local" legislation (of dubious suitability) superimposed 
upon this translocated (and agricultural-based) foundation*
The law has been largely ineffective* Restriction of rental levels, 
security of tenure, implied terms and numerous criminal offence have largely 
remained dead-letter rules* And it is doubtful whether new law •‘■-implied 
warranty of habitability,r e p a ir in g  o b lig a tio n s  on la n d lo rd s —  would fa re  
any better* Measuring the effectiveness of law is not easy •^Effective law/J 
writes Allott,"should generally do what they are designed to dcP• The purpose 
of various aspects of residential tenancy law should therefore be noted* The
1* Ehrlich, &*, Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law, Cambridge,
Mass*, 1936, Foreword*
2* Friedman, L*M*, "Legal culture and social development", (1969) ^ Law and 
Society Review 29*
3* The 'locality' of these enactments is suspect* The Conveyancing Decree,
1973* which is supposed to be suited to the present-day needs of Ghana 
(vides the Memorandum to the Decree) is at most points a verbatim repro-
(Cont*)
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purpose of lav on rent restriction is to restrict rental levels* thaton secur­
ity of tenure to provide the tenant with a secure homeand to ensure that the 
tenant is not evicted otherwise than in accordance with law, that prohibit­
ing the payment of premiums and advances to ensure that these are not demanded 
and paid, that requiring the provision of rent books and receipts to ensure 
that this is done* A law requiring a landlord to let premises in a condition 
of habitability is designed to prevent the letting of unlivable premises} and 
an implied term prohibiting sub-letting or assignment without the consent of 
the landlord is designed to stop such practices occuring* The aim of the law 
is not to punish breach* The multifarious criminal offences created by resid-
U?U>
ential tenancy^are designed to induce compliance with the law; it is not the
raison d* etre of the law to puni&h offenders but to induce compliance*
Lav is purposive activity1* Kelsen's view that lav is primarily addressed
o
to officials to impose sanctions in certain cases is rejected* The difficulty 
involved in measuring compliance for different types of lav; criminal lav,
facilitative law, mandatory, law, prohibitory law and institution-establishing
3
norms, ha 5 been noted by Allott •
Though recognising the difficulty involved in measuring lav - effectiveness
and the limited nature of the fieldwork carried out, the available evidence
4indicates that there is a low level of compliance with the legal rules • Host
duction of the English Law of Property Act, 1925*
4. See Allott, A.H., The Limits of Law, op.cit., pp.VIII - IX, 28-32.
5* ibid*, p*29«
1* See Fuller, L*L*, The Morality of Law* New Haven, 2nd (edn.), 1989}
Allott, A*N*, The Limits of Law, op*cit*,f Seidman, R*B**, The State*
Law and Development* London, 1978*
2* See Kelsen, H*, General Theory of Law and State* New York, 19&1, pp*57-6l.
3* Allott, A*N*, The Limits of Law, op*cit*, pp.28-32.
4* supra, p p . I 7 £-1 £0, - 2 3  D, W  7*2.. ,
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of the norma on this branch of the law-— certainly those on restriction of 
rental levels, security of tenure, provision of rent cards and receipts and 
restrictions on payment of advance premiums — will, in Allott's termino­
logy, be said to be frustrate* Allott defines a frustrate norm as*
"A norm or law Emitted in due form, a valid norm with
1
zero or minimal complianceM •
One further example may bilcited as evidence of the minimal compliance
with aspects of this branch of the law* in the recent allowances announced
for members of parliament of the Third Republic, a housing allowance of 
, 2
£1,500 a month was granted to M*P*s • This was so despite the fact that
by A*F*R*C*D*5 the maximum rent for a three bed-room house in Accra (where
parliament sits) is 02001 And this is the maximum; a two-room house should
not attract more than 0150 a month and a three-roomed, semi-detached not
4
more than £173 a month • It is considered unlikely that M*P*s require some­
thing bigger than a three bedroom house for which there is no maximum rent 
fixed* It is submitted that this is a seal of acknowledgement by the executive 
and the legislature that they are aware that whatever the block-letter rules 
of the law may require, in practice rents are much higher*
What are the reasons for the failure of the law to achieve its desired 
policy-objectives? It is submitted that the answer lies in the concrete 
socio-economic political context within which the law seeks to operate*
It has been noted that the rent control scheme has been inadequately 
and inefficiently administered^* It is argued by some that the ineffective­
ness of the scheme— a large part of residential tenancy law— is due to this
1* Allott, A*N*, The Limits of Law, op*cit*, p*309*
2* See West Africa, No*3294, 8th September 1980, p.1732.
3. S.8(3)*
4* SS*8(1) & (2).
5* supra, p p •
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administrative factor* It was intimated earlier that while conceding that 
the scheme has beem ineptly administered the underlying problems are more 
fundamental and deep-rooted* Indeed it would be surprising whether in the 
concrete realities of the Ghanaian situation the scheme is otherwise than 
ineptly administered*
The underlying causes of the ineffectiveness of the present law (and 
why ambitious reform is not being advocated) are to be found in the nature 
of the housing situation and the characteristics of the rental sector, ineffect­
ive communication of law, an economic situation characterised by shortages 
and the failure of other forms of control, institutionalised and pervasive 
corruption, lack of participation by the citizenry in the political process 
and a consequent disenchantment with, alienation from and delegitimation of 
the polity, and the culmination of all these'— hyperinflation of acute prop­
ortions*
It must be emphasised that these issues must be looked at as a whole*
For reasons of analysis, presentation and manageability an attempt has been 
made to disengage and analyse and part at a time* But they form a complete 
whole* It is, therefore** not being argued that the ineffectiveness of the 
law is attributable to each particular one of them* It is not being af^ued, 
for example, that a landlord decided to charge and a tenant to pay rent higher 
that) legally prescribed in response to the realities of supply and demand,
What is being argued is that all these factors taken,together have induced 
our primary role-occupants (but also our secondary role-occupants) to break 
(or is it ignore?) the law*
A* Communication of Law
"A law or "legal system", writes Allott, "is a system of communication"1*
A law or system of law (like residential tenancy law) must be communicated 
to role-occupants— landlords and tenants mainly, but also officials of the law
1* Allott, A*N*, The Limits of Law* op*cit*, p*5*
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like magistrates* rent officers and lawyers——  if it is to have an effect on 
behaviour*. And that —  influencing the behaviour of role-occupants —— la the 
test of the effectiveness of residential tenancy law* not so much how many 
people are convicted of the multifarious offences created by the law*
Law is purposive activity# It must thus be stated that the primary role- 
occupants of residential tenancy law are landlords and tenants* It is the 
behaviour of these actors that the law seeks to influence* They are the all- 
important people* Lawyers* rent officers and Magistrates perform the second­
ary function of advising landlords and tenants on what the lawiis>or administer­
ing the law when there is a breach* But the purpose of the law is to regulate 
conduct"— to change* modify or influence behaviour* activity or institutions.
Legal messages must thus be directed* first and foremost* to landlords and
2
tenants* The Kelsenite view that the primary norm is that addressed to the 
judge or other official to execute sanction for breach and that it is the 
secondary norm which is addressed to the role-occupant and that the latter 
is only an epiphenomenon of the former is rejected*
The rules for the communication of law in Ghana are derived from English 
practice* The effectiveness of these rules—  official publication and serial­
isation followed by ignorantia juris — even in their birth-place have been
3
questioned by Allott * Allott notes the lack of publicity that attends the 
parliamentary process — the real business of law-making as opposed to trivia­
lities about late-night sittings* fillibustering* etc*
That these rules are inadequate for England raises serious questions for
4 5legal science in Ghana* For as both Allott and Seidman note* in England
1* See Seidman* R*B** The State, Law and Development§ op*cit«* pp.105-128j 
Allott* A*N*« The Limits of Law, op.cit** pp.28-39* 73-971 Friedman* L*M** 
Law and Society* New Jersey* 1977* pp.111-115*
2* Kelson* H*, General Theory of Law and State* New York* 19&1* PP*57~6l{
Pure Theory of Law* Berkeley* California* 1970* pp*54-58.
3* Allott* A*N** The Limits of Law* pp*cit*« pp.73-81.
4* ibid*
5* Seidman* R*B** The State* Law and Development* op.cit., pp.105-128.
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and the industrialised countries enactment of legislation is sometimes followed 
by official government publicity through advertising or propaganda in the 
press and on radio and television (note that 98% of households in the U*K* 
have at least one television set)*
Another factor is that in addition to lawyers (who were the traditional 
information-brokers), these days enactment of some legislation sparks of 
publication by an army of agencies and organizations* Thus in the particular 
field of residential tenancy law, enactment of legislation in the U*K* would 
provoke the print of handbooks, journals, articles, leaflets, handbills, etc* 
by groups like Shelter, the Legal Action Group, the Housing Aid Centre, Child 
Poverty Action Group, Law Centres and local authorities* Advice on these 
matters could also be received from Citizens Advice Bureaux, phone-in programs 
and housing departments of local authorities* Despite this impressive array 
of infrastructural support, Allott notes a large measure of anomie ("ignorance
j
or lack of Law among those members of a society normally subject to it^  in 
2England and Wales • Allott*s view, as he admits, is impressionistic and not
based on empirical research into popular knowledge and understanding of laws*
But his experience as a law teacher of some 30years and also as a Justice of
the Peace entitles us to accord some weight to his view* In the particular
field of an aspect of residential tenancy law, what research there is supports
the view that there is a large measure of anomia among the people of England
and Wales* In a survey carried out in Islington, London, under the supervision
of Michael Zander, it was found that a significant proportion of those quest-
ioned( between one-third and half) had never heard of the Rent Acts, the rent
3
officer and the rent tribunalI And a third of those who have heard of these
4strange legal animals do not know what they dol •
1* Allott, A*N*, The Limits of Law, op.cit*, p*309*
2. ibid., pp.73-81*
3* Zander, M*, "The unused Rent Acts", New Society, 12th September, 1988*
4* It is thought likely that the level of anomia today would have been 
reduced as a result of the work of the agencies noted*
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It should be plain by now that the translocation of such a system for 
the communication of law toGGhana and its continued use is singularly ill- 
advised*
I. Language as a Communication problem*
Ghana has no indigenous national language* English i$ the official 
language* Statutes, regulations and lav reports appear only in English*
A sizeable number of landlords and tenants in urban Ghana are illiterate*
There are no available figures for urban Qhana', but for the country as a 
whole the 1970 population census shoved that 56*8% ot the total population 
aged six years and over have never been to school* The proportion of 
illiterates in the urban areas will be lower that the national average, but 
it would still be significant* The effect of this factor alone in limiting 
the effectiveness of law will be considerable*
But it should not be supposed that the lot of the literate landlord or 
tenant is markedly better* It has been noted that in the fielAc| residential 
tenancy law the landlord and the tenant are the primary role-occupants* This 
self-evident fact does not appear to have been grasped by the law-maker• It 
is doubtful whether a middle school leaver, or a landlord on tenant who has 
been to secondary school, or even a graduate will understand the provisions 
of the Conveyancing Decree, 1973, on the burden and benefit of covenants 
running with the tenancy or the reversion* Law (including residential tenancy 
law) is expressed in lawyers* language — •legalese1• This:
"has been sharpendd and made precise as a means of 
communication within the legal profession* It has 
developed as a means to the goal of resolving legal 
conflicts through the intervention of judges and 
lawyers”1*
1* Aubert, V*, "Some social functions of legislation”, (19&6) 10 Acta Sociolo- 
gica 99»
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The law is not written as a programme of social action, but as a tool 
for conflict-resolution* And this is so despite the fact jthat the primary 
aim of the law is to mould and regulate the conduct of a lay audience with­
out legally trained intermediaries* In an article on the Rent (Amendment) 
Decree, 1973 (N.R.C.D.158), Gordon Woodman suggested that a legal officer 
be employed by the Ministry of Information and charged with the task of
preparing leaflets, etc*, explaining such legislation in more understandable
1
English to the general public • Five years after this suggestion was made 
(when the present writer visited Ghana) this simple but sensible suggestion 
has not been implemented* It is thought unlikely that it has now been 
implemented*
But it should not be supposed that if statutes were made more compre­
hensible then the understanding of landlords and tenants would be enhanced* 
There is no code on residential tenancy law* The Conveyancing Decree, 1973 
(N*R*C*D*175) end the various rent control legislation assume a knowledge of
the common law of landlord and tenant* A reading of the security of tenure
provisions of the Rent Act, 19&3 (Ac$ 220) without a knowledge of the coamon-
law rules for the termination of tenancies is pretty useless* in fact a
reading of the security of tenure provisions will not y+8*ld much without a 
reading of the judicial decisions on the provisions*, And it is a bit far­
fetched to expect landlords and tenants to spend their leisure-time reading 
the Ghana Law Reports*
1* See Woodman, G*R*,"The recent rent control legislation”, Legon Observer 
(1973) Vol.VIII, No.9, p.198, at p*200.
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II. Lack of infrastructure
In the United Kingdom, the United States and the industrialised Vest
the role of information - borker was traditionally performed by lawyers*
In Ghana there are far too few lawyers to perform this task satisfactorily*
At Independence in 1957f there were three hundred lawyers for a population
of eight million* Moreover most lawyers in Ghana see themselves as advocates
rather than as solicitors, counsellors or advisers1* Lawyers therefore
spentl a very high proportion fo their time in court or preparing for court
cases (litigation-work generally) rather than as information-brokers or
2
doing solicitors' work-like drafting leases* Nor has the profession the 
support of specialised legal services - journals, digests, periodicals, 
reviews, etc* -which support the lawyer's information-broker role in the 
United Kingdom and the United States* There is no book on residential ten­
ancy law* The last issue of the Ghana Law Report was in 1978* There are 
two periodicals the Review of Ghana Law and the University of Ghana Law Journal* 
The last issue of the Review of Ghana Law was in June 1978* The publication
latest one being for 1977*
It was noted that in the United Kingdon (in more recent times) groups 
other than lawyers have played a major part in the communication of residen-
Centre, the Legal Action Group and the Citizens Advice Bureau*
The role of the press and media in the communication of law is also 
likely to be greater in the industrialised countries* Fewer people have
4access to radio and television in Ghana than, say, in the United Kingdom*
1* See Luckham, R*, "The economic base of private law practice", the Essays 
in Ghanaian Law, op*cit*, p*177« espj pp*182-191*
2* ibid*
3# supra, p. 3 3 d? .
4* Unfortunately the statisticsfoL Ghana are not available*
of the University of Ghana Law Journal is even more
3
tial tenancy law* Ghana has no equivalents for Shelter, the Housing Aid
3^ 3
The same would be true of newspapers* In fact,in recent years newspapers have 
become very scarce commodities even in Accra* The situation in the oH\G^T 
regional capitals and urban centres is likely to be worse*
It is thus clear that infrastructure that supports the communication 
of law in VWu industrialised countries is lacking in Ghana* The result of 
this has been a large measure anomia*
III* The level of anomia
Various indices of the level of knowledge about residential tenancy law 
was collected during the survey carried out by the present wat-Cf. Five hundred 
landlords and two thousand tenants were interviewed* 60% of tenants and 65% 
of the landlords interviewed have heard about rent control* The numbers 
however fell drastically when it came to the Conveyancing Decree, 1973*
Only 2% of tenants and 3% of landlords have heard about the Conveyancing 
Decree, 1973*
Though a high proportion of landlords and tenants have heard about rent 
Control, the numbers which had a knowledge of the content of the law was 
much lower* Only 5%  of tenants and 7% of landlords knew what the fixed 
rent for premises were I In fact;there was often an expression of incredu­
lity when they were told what the standard rent was —  the usual reaction 
beings "the government is not serious111
That there is a large measureof anomia among landlords and tenants was 
recognised by the Kwaku Bonsu Committee appointed to enquire into the oper­
ation of the Rent Control Ordinance (N0*2), 1932* The Committee which sat 
in all parts of the country and heard evidence from landlords and tenants, 
rent assessment committees, lawyers, etc*, reported:
 ^ "There appears to be, however, some ignorance on the
part of landlords and tenants as to their rights and 
obligations and a system by which landlords and ten-
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ants can be educated as to their duties and rights 
is clearly necessary1*1.
It nay be pointed out that though the Committee reported in 1962 the
system of education recommended has not been established.
IV. Consequences of poor Communication
"Unknown law", writes Allott, "is ineffective law” • A law cannot have
the desiredeffect (at least not consciously) unless it is communicated to 
3
role - occupants • It is thus submitted that one of the reasons for the larg­
ely ineffective operation of residential tenancy law is the failure to 
communicate.
But uncommunicated law is law nonetheless. Fuller's view that uncommuni-
k
cated law is not law is rejected • It confused two different levels of analysis!
validity and effectiveness. Validity is established by recourse to the rule
5 6of recognition or the Grundnoria • .ft is, of course, not impossible for a
rule of recognition or Grundnorm to require communication as part of the test
of validity) but this is not necessary. Effectiveness, on the other hand,
7
is always dependent on good communication •
B. The Housing Situation
In analysing the housing situation in urban Ghana, the following character-
Q
istics were noted !
(1) that there is an acute housing shortage and consequent over crowding;
(2) that as a result of continuing urbanization and low-level housing 
construction the situation is worsening;
(3) that the rented accommodation market is largely non-socialised 
(i.e., it is controlled by private interests), attempts at sociali­
zation having largely failed;
1. Report of the Committee of Enquiry into the operation of the Rent Control 
Ordinance (No.2). 1952, Accra, 19&2, P«19* para.21.
2. Allott, A.N., The Limits of Law, op.cit., p.73*
3* Seidman, R.B., The State. Law and Development, op.cit., pp.105-128; 
Friedman, L.M., Law and Society, op.cit., pp.111-115; Allott, A.N.,
The Limits of Law, op.cit., pp.73*81.; Mutungi, O.K.., "The Communication 
of law under conditions of development! the Kenya case", (,1973) ' 9 East 
African Law Journal II.
(Cont•)
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(4) that the private rented accommodation market is the dominant 
feature in the housing market, public housing have made
^ minimal progress and owner-occupation becoming increasingly 
difficult because of lack of finance; and
(5) that even where on the face of it- an area of the market seems 
to be socialised, it may in practice form part of the private 
rented sector*
These characteristics are crucial in the non-functioning of the present 
law and should serve as a timely reminder to any attempt at law reform*
Much of residential tenancy law-rent restriction, security of tenure, 
implied terms, provision of rent books and receipts, etc•'— attempts to regul­
ate and modify the results that would otherwise flow from the economic forces 
of supply and demand* But since demand far outstrips supply and the supply 
side is privately - controlled the bargaining position and the power of the 
landlord vis-a vis the tenant is greatly strengthened* In his need to have 
a roof over his head the Ghanaian tenant has, for example, been prepared to 
pay far in excess bf the legal rent* The landlord charges a rent higher than 
the legal rent because (for one reason) he knows he controls a scarce and 
essential commodity* The tenant is prepared to pay because he needs a house 
and there is not much chance of his getting one through the public sector 
or by 'owner-occupation'* He is also in competition with prospective tenants* 
There are thus two parties who (for different reasons) are induced to break 
(or, is it ignore?) the law because the pull of the realities triumph over the 
push of the law*
(Cont*)
4* Fuller, L*L*, The Morality of Law, op*cit«, pp*38-41*
5* Hart, H*L*A*, The Concept of Law, London, 19&1, pp*97-107*
6* Kelsen, H*, General Theory of Law and State, New York, 1961.
7* supra, pp. 337-3^6.
8. supra, pp*^7 -56*
346
There is a sociological dimension to this argument which must be high­
lighted* it is that where there are more people seeking a facility than can
•for
be providedAthere is a strong inclination to offer bribe in order to obtain 
the facility1* This partly explains why there is so much corruption in Ghana 
(because many goods and facilities are in scarce supply) and why price control 
and other forms of control (like import licence control and foreign exchange 
control) hare been largely ineffective* In the particular case of residential 
tenancy law, the bribe offered (in order to secure accommodation) may take 
the form of a preparedness to pay more than the legal rent or non-insistence 
on legal rights (like a landlord's duty to repair)*
C* Failure of other forms of control and types of law 
I, Moneylending operations
Moneylending operations in Ghana are sought to be controlled through
2the Loans Recovery Ordinance , 1918 which gave the Ghanaian courts the right 
to re-open y. ^  J- P^'O. (Vi OndJj; I
Ci tfc) and the Moneylending Ordinance, 1941^ which sought to prohibit 
moneylending at a profit by Unlicensed persons* The
these two enactments is to seek to subject moneylending to considerable legal
d.
control•
Despite the H* j i . 1Q^ <CJ)Y\fr® (s
the paper-rules have had litxle effect on the ground • Bankcredit and housing 
finance lending are scarce in Ghana* It may not go to the person with the 
strongest case* A lot of people are not sufficiently credit-worthy* These 
needy victims of the system have recourse to moneylenders* A dependency
1* See de Graft-Johnson, K*E*, Administration and Corruption in Ghana,
Umpublished paper prepared for the conference on Administrative Reform 
and Corruption at the Institute of Development Studies, University of 
Sussex, Brighton, March 12-14, 1975* at pp*11-12*
2* Cap*175 (1951 Rev.).
3. Cap*176 (1951 Rev*)*
4* See Date-Bah, S.K., "Legislative Control of Freedom of Contract", in
Essays in Ghanaian Law, op.cit*, pp. 121-122, *
5- Sft-Q/ S-161 of- oJo- l £ U < c A -  Euxt L&mJ cf
fupo.rUj , of- ob- %^ 5 •, (tf- 7b ' ft! . '
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relationship based on need is created* The borrower —  even if aware of his
legal rights-— does not want to jeopardise his only source of credit by
1 2 resort to law • The lending contracts are quite unconsionable • Since a
person building a house may have had to take such a loan, the propensity
to charge the highest attainable rent is increased* But even if a landlord
had not taken such a loan, the ineffectiveness of controls in one part of
a socio-economic and legal system snowballs into other areas as anarchy becomes
the accepted norm*
II* Price Control
The chequered history of price control starts with the enactment of the
3 3Control of Prices Act , 1962* This was at a time when shortages of commodi­
ties had started occurring as a result of foreign exchange difficulties*
A consequenCeof these scarcities was that to allow market force to operate 
uhbridled would lead to very high prices* In 19&5 the offence of hoarding 
was created^* The ■ on price control k£> bihlbliSktJ &y the
Price Control Decree, 1974 (N*R*C*D*305)• Thd^ Decree the commis­
sioner responsible for Trade,acting on the advice of the Prices and Incomes 
Board,to fljp M C o m  ^C\sCJi£ J^bC <|.(3Cd!s.
Attempts at legislative control of price are not limited to sale of 
goods contracts* Wide-ranging regulatory powers are conferred on the Prices
L o i m
3
4
5. S.l
Is cpwfro/pJL Cxwtfqc.hv in Essays in GWnnaian
&  %*. 7 6 - # ' 111 ,2i;K(w3^ -  .
Set, CoJol- S' Ctncf I-/Cm JL, tOHfroU irt
♦ Gkarta.wn lU fltft iU tck /", (fW iJ (I J Ousted, of ,lQ), M  A f/jo g * SbuJltX US) S
• See Control of Prices (Amendment) Act, 19&5t S*’l* 7 ”
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and Incomes Board by the Prices and Incomes Board Decree, 1972 (N*R*C.D*119)• 
Pursuant to these powers the Board has issued the Prices and Incomes Regulations, 
1973 (L*I*805). The regulations provide that no person shall increase the 
price of any goods or services whatsoever without the prior written consent 
of the Board1* It has been pointed out that the Board has neither the person­
nel nor the resources to perform this taskm and that it is preposterous to 
suppose that this Accra-bound, centralised body Cdfl (ML JouM.
It can be seen that on paper there is a tough legal regime for the control
of prices** The reality is very different* The controls have been largely
ineffective* Kalabule^ is the order of the day. Prices arecLimjnost cases
far above the controlled price* When the present writer visited Ghana in
1978 the controlled price for a bag of cement was 016, but the average price
at which one could actually buy it was between 050-060* This is due to the
periodic shortages* It is also the result of the Kalabule—  which involves
4
shop managers and all • The goods are therefore seldom seen in the supermarkets 
and big retail outlets* This was the judgment of Tony Killick in 1973 on 
the price control system:
"The controls were mostly ignored* Only in shops located 
in the towns was there any significant observance; in the 
rural areas, and on the urban markets, they were almost com­
pletely disregarded"^*
1* Reg*l(l)*
2* supra, pp*l5&~2'$S<
3* See infra, pp.
4* See "Price control and trade malpractices", (1980) XII The Legon Observer 
201*
5* "Price Controls in Africa: the Ghanaian experience", (1973) H  Journal of 
Modern African Studies 405, at 423*
* A measure of liberalization and decontrol has been introduced since the
script was written* This does not, however, affect the gravamen of the 
argument as the controls had been largely ineffective*
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By 1976« the socio-economic situation haring worsened, Date-Bah's judgment 
was even more damningt
"These rules hare been effective only in the supermarkets 
and retail outlets of the established large distributors*
In the marketplaces, the small kiosks and the samll shops 
of the petty traders from whom the majority of Ghanaians 
buy their consumer goods, the price control regulations ^ 
are of little effect* Even in the heart of the cities; in 
Accra, Kumasi, Sekondi-Takaradi, Cape Coast, the market 
women sell goods much above the controlled price largely 
with impunity* The city dwellers are so glad to come by 
some of the goods which periodically become short that 
the price at which they buy them becomes not as important 
as the access to the goods"1*
It may be pointed out that other forms of prices —  transport charges,
tailoring charges, foodstuffs, etc*,— -have proved incapable of being controlled*
The effect of the failure of other forms of price control on residential
tenancy law is that landlords realizing the failure of other controls and
knowing that the goods and services they have to buy are being sold at prices
far higher than the controlled prices have little incentive to follow the 
2legal rules • They are not persuaded*
That there is a relationship between the various controls in a society 
(and that failure in some parts have a knock - on effect in the others) is
evidenced by the fact that in the heyday of the A*F*R*C* "revolution" prices
3
in all spheres fell • When Ghanaians thought they had a government which could
1* Date-Bah, B*K«, "Legislative control of freedom of contract", in Essays 
in Ghanaian Law, op.cit*, p.118, at 124*
2* The commonest reaction when landlords were told that the controlled rent 
for their premises were (during the field research) wast "The government 
is not serious"* When law becomes ridiculous the urge to break (or rather 
ignore^it is increased} See de Graft-Johnson, K*E*, op.cit.
3* See The Legon Observer, Vol.XII No*9, 27 June - 10 July 1980, p*201;
Ghanaian Times, June 22 1979, P«12; Daily Graphic, June 21 1979, p*l6i 
This is why liberalization and decontrol in some spheres would further 
weaken the moral authority of controls in other spheres*
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effect controls in all areas and when prices started falling some landlords
1
voluntarily reduced rents • The fact is that no group is prepared to be 
law-obiding if anarchy prevails in other sectors* It is interesting to 
note that all prices in Ghana have gone back to their "pre-revolutionary11 
heights2*
III* Other types of law
The system of direct taxation has been largely ineffective* Many people
do not pay their taxos. The problem is greatest among the self-employed*
This has been largely due to the difficulty of assessment as most of these
3
self-employed do not keep proper accounts , and to the inefficient system of 
collection* The law has reacted to this by laying down standard rates of 
tax for certain classes of people* Thus lawyers, say, of five years* standing 
may have to pay £2,000 a year while lawyers of more than ten years1 standing 
may have to pay 05»OOO* Tailors, bakers, seamstress, etc*, all have standard 
rates* The fairness of such a system is questionable* But even more important 
is the fact that a lot of people do not pay any tax at all* It was even
suggested recently (by the government, Ho less) that the Chief Justice has not
4 3
paid his taxes , though this was strenuously denied by the Chief Justice •
It also seems (from reports from friends, Ghanaian newspapers and West
Africa) that crimes like armed robbery and car stealing are on the increase*
Corruption is widespread and pervasive^*
There is thus a large measure of anarchy (lack of law or lawlessness)
in Ghana today*
1* ibid.
2* See "Price Controls and trade malpractices", (1980) XII The Legon Observer,
p.201.
3* They are unlike|ry to declare the correct figures even if they kept them*
4* See West Africa No*3293» 1st Sept*1980, p*l677*
5* See West Africa No*3294, 8th Sept*, 1980, pp.1689-1693*
6* See infra, pp.35/* 3^6.
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IV Consequences of anarchy
Law, Allott has argued, is a confidence-trick, and!
"Confidence diminishes or disappears if the law is cast
into disrepute through nonobservance of its laws* This
general failure of conviction or confidence in law is now 
widespread in Africa on the part of subjects of the law"1*
Anarchy breeds anarchy* Non-compliance with laws in other parts of the 
system (or an assumption that this ti$>)has diminished the authority of resid­
ential tenancy law to persuade its subjects to conform to it* No group is 
willing to comply with the law if it is not confident that others will do 
(or are doing) likewise* This is an important revelation on the sociology
of law - effectiveness* The laws of a society have an inter-relationship*
Breakdown in enforcement of, or non-compliance with one area soon spreads 
to other areas as confidence in law (and in society) is gradually eroded*
D. Corruption
o
Corruption has no single commonly-accepted definition • It includes 
bribery, extortion, nepotism, profiteering, hoarding, embezzlement and the 
general wrongful use of public or private property, office, or influence •
The aim of this section is to demonstrate how corruption has served 
to limit the effectiveness of residential tenancy law* The causes of and 
factors promoting corruption will therefore not be analysed* It may be just
4
noted that there are both structural and cultural factors promoting corruption •
1* Allott, A*N*, The Limits of Law, op*cit*, p*39*
2* See Heidenheimer, A*J* (ed), Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative 
Analysis* New York, 1970*
3* See Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Bribery and Corruption, Accra, 
1975 (P*0*Anin, Chairman).
4* See Report of the Anin Commission, supra; Werlin, H*H*; "The roots of
corruption: the Ghanaian case", (1972) 10 J. of Mod.Afri.Studies 247; Vraith, 
R«, & Simpson, £*, Corruption in Developing Countries, London, 19&3;
Mends, E*, "Traditional values and bribery and corruption", (1970) 5 The 
Legon Observer 13; Ocran, T*M*, Law in Aid of Development, Accra, 1978; 
Seidman, R.B., The State, Law and Development, op*cit*, pp*l67-l85*
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I* The pervasiveness of corruption
It is difficult to measure the degree of corruption prevailing in a 
country* One difficulty is the problem of definition* Another is that 
corruption belongs to that area cfaferred to by criminologists as "hidden 
crime"* The magnitude of the problem was not lost on the Anin Commission —  
a commission established to enquire into the problem of corruption in Ghana*
The Commission sat for about three years) it toured the whole country and 
heard evidence and received memoranda from a large number of people and 
institutionsBut in its Pinal Report the Commission said:
"We were conscious throughout our enquiry9 therefore, that 
we were perceiving a kind of iceberg* We could only describe 
and measure accurately the part above the sea* The greater 
bulk submerged below the sea we were aware of but could not 
accurately describe* We could, however, make certain reason­
able assumptions"1*
The extent of corruption in Ghana cannot therefore be demonstrated by
factual and statistical evidence of the type normally acceptable for scientific
generalization* But there is evidence of some scientific credibility* Reports
of various commissions and committees of enquiry attest to widespread corrup-
2
tion in various sections of the society • The Report of the Commission of
Enquiry into the operation of the State Housing Corporation and the Committee
of Enquiry into alleged irregularities and malpractices in the operations of
Tema Development Corporation have been examined at some length and both dis-
3
close widespread corruption • The Anin Commission reported:
1* supra, chapter 1, para*13.
2* See* Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Irregularities and Mal­
practices in the grant of Import Licenses^ Accra, 19^7; Report of the 
Commission to Enquire into the Kwame Nkrumah Properties, Accra,1966) 
Report of the Commission into the Affaris of NAPE CttULtd*, Accra, 19$$ i 
Report of the Commission to Enquire into the assets of specified persons 
(Chairman, Sowah, E*N*P*), Accra, 1968 and 1969*
3. supra, pp. ^ 7S (> ,
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"Inspite of many commissions of enquiry since 1953* and 
especially since 19&6, to expose and deter the practice, 
corruption is widely prevalent at all levels of society"1*
2The Report goes on to say that corruption is "pervasive and deep-rooted"
3
and that it is "endemic throughout the whole society" •
As far back as 19^8, the Vatson Commission reported:
"It would be idle to ignore the existence of bribery and
corruption in many walks of life in the Gold Coast admitted
to us by every responsible African to whom we addressed the
question* That it may spread as further responsibility
devolves upon the African is C\ possibility which cannot be 
4
denied" •
In 19&4,the Akainyah Commission reported:
"It is unfortunate and pathetic that the love of money has 
become an obsession with some of us, and drives us to any 
length to fcet rich quick without stopping to think of the 
consequences* So long as we can get the money, we do not 
care whether or not the country is plunged into bankruptcy"^*
And in 19&7 The White Paper to the Ollennu Commission Report^gaid:
" . • • the attendant bribery and corruption were • • • •
not spasmodic but organised and systematically operated through '
agents at different levels of society, involving various persons,
6some of them supposedly respectable and obviously unsuspected" •
In addition to the reports of the commissions of enquiry may be added
7
the large folklore of corruption •
1* op.cit., chapter 3* para*58.
2* op.cit., chapter 3* para.39.
3* op.cit., chapter 5» para.63. The Report continued: "this Commission is
satisfied that the practice of corruption is indeed widespread in this 
country, and that it affects practically every sector of public life where 
the possibility of corruption exists.
4* Report of the Commission to inquire into disturbances in the Gold Coast 
London, H*M.so., 1948, p.8.
5* Report of the Commission of enquiry into alleged irregularities and Mal- 
(Cont•)
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As evidence of this folklore the following examples are cited* J.A.Peasah* 
in an article in The Legon Observert wrote:
"There is no repentance and there is always the preparedness
to seize the earliest opportunity for some more looting"**
Noting that corruption is not restricted to politicians* Attu Kwamena adds:
" • • • those who held various degrees of power in the civil
service* in commercial concerns* in corporations* in political
2
parties* in traditional authorities* and so on" •
Refu$aL to handle letters* files or claims* or to process applications* etc**
unless "something" is given to the typist* messenger or official is widespread*
Police officers demanding money before allowing cars and lorries to pass through
3
road blocks or for overloading or other breach of regulations is common-placel 
Sharpston has written!
"In 1969* it was reliably reported that a quarter of all 
Ghana*a consumption of cigarettes was satisfied by smuggling 
• • • • On top of that* a third of all drugs and supplies 
of the Ministry of health are, at a conservative estimate*
4stolen or diverted" •
So pervasive and widespread is corruption that Le Vine has written about
5
the emergence of a "culture of corruption" * and peasah of "institutionalised 
6
corruption" • Outlining the characteristics of the culture of corruption,
Le Vine writes:
practices in connection with the issue of import licences* Accra* 19&4* p*38
6. W.fiWo.^ /67, AccMfi^ 67/f>. 6.
7* The phrase folklore of corruption is borrowed from M r  dal* G** "The *soft 
state* in underdeveloped countries", (1968) 15 U*C*L*A* Law Rev*1118*
1* "Institutionalized Corruption" (1967) 2 The Legon Observer*11
2* "The cure for corruption in Ghana", The Echo* 12 April 1970, p*7*
3* See the Report of the Anin Commission* op*cit*
4* Sharpston* M*J*, "The economics of corruption". New Society* London,
26 Nov*1970, p.44*
5* Le Vine, V** Political Corruption: the Ghana Case, Stanford* 1975*
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"Briberyf graft, nepotism, favouritism and the like have 
become connon-place at all levels of officialdom; and what 
is more much of the public had come to expect officials 
to conduct their business in a spirit of subterfuge, dis­
honesty and mendacity on all sides"1*
The pervasive and institutionalised nature of corruption and approval
of, acquiescence in or resignation to the problem is evidenced by the growth
of a new indigenous term, Kalabule. This term encompasses all corruption--
practices like profiteering, hoarding, bribery, nepotism, favouritism, queue-
jumping. "chit-constracting, etc., Kalabule may be defined as pervasive and
cokLup&or?. an<p|
growth of this term and its use by a quiescent society seems to be the final
seal of recognition (approval?) by a society riddled with and crippled by
corruption of a pervasive and cankerous king*
II* Corruption and law
Law, it has been argued, is a confidence-trick* Few phenomena are as
potent and dangerous in their capacity to erode confidence in law and in
society as corruption* It has been note<4, at various points of this thesis,
that ad hoc criminal offences have been created by residential tenancy law*
It is therefore interesting to note that the Anin Commission reported police
officers (who enforce the criminal law) as being "notoriously corrupt" • In
fact a former Inspector-General, in his evidence to the Commission, admitted
3that his men were corrupt • Allegations of corruption against rent officers 
is also rampant* In an article in The Mirror* S*N*Essien wrote:
6* supra*
1* supra, pp*|d— 1 3 *
2* Final Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Bribery and Corruption, 
Accra, 1975• Chapter 5» para*67*
3* ibid*
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''There are occasions when such officials appeared to have 
allowed their conscience to be influenced by certain consider­
ations thereby giving credence to the accusations that they 
are biased in their judgment"*•
Allegations of corruption against rent officers are not proved* But that 
is not the important point* It is the folklore—*-the commonly-held belief —  
that they are corrupt that is important* It is not necessary to adduce scien­
tifically - valid evidence of corruption (though the reports of the various 
commissions of enquiry is formidable);jit is enough that a folklore of corrupt­
ion exists — that people think corruption is widespread* It results in the 
erosion of confidence in law and in society and induces people not to conform 
with the law nor to report breaches of it* Commenting on the folklore that 
rent officers are corrupt, Essien writes:
"This is why^majority of tenants appear to have little
2interest in the Rent Control Department" •
Corruption andfcT'OL folklore of corruption begets more of the same* 
Commenting on the folklore of corruption and the dire consequences it has 
for Ghanaian society, the Anin Commission reported:
"If people are conditioned to believe that success^in their
society is seldom achieved with clean hands, but at the same
time, they are under pressure to succeed in business or in
their normal vocations, they are not likely to be scrupulous
3
or squeamish about their methods" •
1* Feb*21, 1979* P«6j 22-0, S-3^- .
2* The Mirror, 2nd Feb*1979* P*6 
3* op.cit., chapter 3* para*54.
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E* Political Legitimacy
Ghana is still grappling with the problem of the legitimacy of the polity* 
This is due to lack of participation iniif\i/ political process and lack of mob­
ilization for national policy-goals, and to the fact that the polity has failed 
to satisfy the aspirations of its citizens*
I* Political participation
In the period between World War II andj.independence mass participation 
in politics was tremendously increased1* The party which tapped and articul­
ated the diverse interests involved in the drive for social, economic and 
political mobility and the intense anti-colonial nationalism was the C*P*P«, 
which eventually led the country to independence*
Some writers on Ghanaian politics have claimed that the C.PVP* was a well-
o
organised party at the grassrooth^-level in the late 1950's • But this
optimists' view of the golden period of Ghana politics has come under increas- 
3
ing attack • Fieldwork observation, interviews with party officials and a 
perusal of party records at both the local and national level, including an 
examination of party finances and membership^led Kilson to challenge the 
optimists' view* He concludes that:
" • • • the C*P*P* had minimum local organisation in the
it.
late 1950's, albeit adequate to win elections*' •
1* See Austin, D*, Politics in Ghana, London, 1964; Apter, 0*, Ghana in 
Transition, Princeton, New Jersey, 1972*
2* ibid*
3, see Zolberg, A*R*, Creating Political Order: The Party-States of West 
Africa, Chicago, 19&6, esp* Chaps*4-5; Kraus, J*, "Political change, 
conflict and development in Ghana", in Foster, P. and'Z.olberg, A.R., 
(eds)* Ghana and the Ivory Coast, Chicago 1971* P»33l Kilson, M*,
"The grassroots in Ghanaian politics", Ghana and Ivory Coast, supra, p*103*
4* supra, p*ll4*
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Aristotle Zolberg, the foremost critic of the optimists1 view, notes that 
though the early observers saw party activity at its height, bringing to­
gether varied interests,these were not held together by the party structure,
but the common interest of the moment « There was mass mobilization, but no
2
organizational base strong enough to sustain it • It should be remembered
that the major issue during the nationalist period focussed.1 on the question
of governing personnel rather than on governing procedures*
But even this period of mass mobilization in Ghana politics marked the
initial spurt prior to the decline of mass participation in the political
process* Once the question of political leadership was settled (or at least
set aside between elections) mass participation was not encouraged* In the
period 1958*66 the C*P*P* forsook organisation and popular participation in
3
favour of the development of a personality cult • As Tawia Adamafio suggested!
"We must look upon the Osagyefo as our saviour and messiah*
Let us exploit him for the benefit of the nation* Let us
4make an institution out of him" •
The C*P*P* became more and more authoritarian* Local branches were not 
encouraged* Institutions like the Trades' Union Congress, the United Ghana 
Farmers' Council and the National Council of Women were transformed into 
organs of the party* The establishment of these para-party tributaries was
1* supra, p*34*
2* They failed to heed to Weber's advice (vide: Weber,. M*, The Theory of
Social and Economic Organization. New York, 1904, p*33) that in a modern
state legitimacy may last only if institutionalised*
3* See Kilson, M*, supra*
4* Ghanaian Times, 10 April 1961, p*6*
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harmful to grassroots participation, particularly at the local level* More­
over the party (and the government) did not impose effective accountability 
on the monopoly position of these para-party organisations at the loval level* 
This left the people frustrated and helpless in the face of corruption, mal­
administration and malfunctioning leading to alienation from the party-state* 
Corruption was rampant in these C*P«P* - created organizations*1 Such behav­
iour on the part of functionaries in para-party agencies had a predictable 
effect on the local populace; it demoralized large segments of the masses 
and spawned alienation*
When the regime was overthrown in 1966, it was with a whimper rather 
than a bang, with few bewailing its passing and many expressing relief*
"Popular alienation from politics”, writes Kilson, "entailing the spread of
cynicism and demoralization among the masses, was the outcome of the C*P*P*
2regime's behaviour at the grassroots"*
The demise of C*P*P* rule was followed by three years of military rule
under the N*L*C* Thus for another three years Ghanaians were denied even
the most basic act of political participation, the vote (it may be remembered
that from 1962 to 1966 elections in Ghana were meaningless)• This was followed
by the election of 19&9 end the return to civilian rule under the Progress
Party government* But the Second Republic was short-lived* It was abruptly
brought to an end in 1972 by another military coup d*etat* Ghanaians were
treated to another eight years of military rule with no participation in
the political process, except perhaps the ill-fated f l i r t a t i o n  w ith  and
refrendum on Union Government* In 1979* general elections preceded the 
A
return to civilian rule and the birth of the Third Republic*
1* See Special Audit Investigation into the Accounts of the United Ghana 
Farmers' Council Cooperatives, Accra, 196(>; also Report of the Committee 
of Enquiry into the Local Purchasing of Cocoa, Accra, 1967*
2* Kilson, M*, supra, p*122*
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The facts are staggering* Ten of the last fifteen years of the nation's 
political life have been spent under unelected military governments which 
offered the citizenry no participation in the political process* But, and 
equally importantly, even during the civilian regimes (except perhaps for 
the early days of the C*P*P*) the people have only been 'needed' and sought 
after in the few weeks of an election campaign or when a show of strength was 
desired* The consequences of this periodic interest in the citizenry are 
reflected in the response of a Qhanaian villager to a rule prohibiting the 
taking of bribes from candidates during the 1969 election campaign* He askeds
"Why shouldn't l take money from the candidate when he comes 
to ask for my vote? 1 am poor and probably will never see 
him again except perhaps if another election comes along"*
II* Unfulfilled aspiration
"Legitimacy", writes Seidman, "Demands that rulers appear to govern in
2
the interest of the governed"* But Ghanaians have long since ceased to
believe that governments (which are the popular personification of the polity)
have been or are governing their interests* /\ , sample survey carried out
by Fred Hayward in 1970 showed that 72% of Ghanaian respondents agreed with :
the statementt: ."There is practically no connection between what a politician
3
says and what he will do once elected"* An average of 62% responded cynically
4
to the following statements!
1* See Hayward, F*M*, "Political participation and its role in developments 
Some observations draw from the African context", (1973) 7 Journal of 
Developing Areas 591*
2* Seidman, R.B*, The State, Law and Development, op*cit*, p*152*
3* Hayward, F*M*, "Political expectations in rural Ghana", (1972) Rural Africana*
4* ibid*
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(1) To me9 most politicians do not seem to really mean what 
they say;
(2) Most politicians can be trusted to do what they think is 
best for the country;
(3) Most politicians are looking out for themselres above all 
else.
And Ghanaians are not flippant in attributing such ill-motive to their 
politicians* Reports of various commissions of enquiry attest to widespread 
corruption among the country's politicians1* The Anin Commission reported!
" • • • the evidence which has come up from the various
Commissions of Enquiry since 1933 has shown that this country's
politicians, by and large, have yet to rise above these 
2temptations" •
The military regimes have not been probed, but there is a large body of folklore 
of corruption about them*
Corruption by governments and politicians is gradually destroying the 
legitimacy of the polity*
The legitimacy of the state is also being eroded by the fact that the 
country has done so badly* Ghanaians have witnessed countries which are less 
well-endowed in both natural and acquired resources (neighbours like Togo 
end Benin ) do much better than they are, and seen a country like the Ivory 
Coast (with which she is on par as far as resources, natural and acquired, go) 
become a paradise next-door* They have seen the promise held by independence 
frittered away and the enthusia$tfengendered by self-rule killed by corruption 
and maladministration. The old vision is gone; the spirits of the people has 
flagged.
1* See supra, pp* 35^ 356*
2* Final Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Bribery and Corruption,
Accra, 1973* Chap.3, para*42.
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The polity is not completely delegitimised« but the process is in an 
advanced state* It could be arrested and reversed, but it would be a task 
of herculean proportions* In a recent paper delivered to the African Studies 
Association in Philadelphia, Professor Merrick Posnasky, an undoubted friend 
of Ghana and for many years head of the Q apartment of A r c h a e o l o g y  at the 
University of Ghana, Legon, noted}
"The economic deftline has resulted in a growing, though 
fluctuating, breakdown of national confidence in the govern­
ment and an escalation of the prevailing pessimism about the
1
future prospects for Ghana's recovery" •
III* Effect of the creeping delegitimisation of the polity*
Lawrence Friedman has written that:
"One particularly important aspect of lay legal culture is
the theory of legitimacy that prevails within a particular
«2group" •
3
And Law, it has been argued, is a confidence trick • Whan people lose 
confidence in the polity, become disenchanted with and alienated from the 
state and increasingly cease to identify with the state (a lot of skilled 
Ghanaians have voted with their feet by emigrating to neighbouring countries ) 
they rebel against its rules* In the situation that is present Ghana people 
are increasingly losing faith in the polity and have "little sense of loyalty 
to its rules"”**
1* printed in West Africat No.3306, 1 December 1980, p*24l8*
2* Law and Society, op.cit., p*77*
3* Supra, p*354*
4* See Addae-Mensah, X*, "The causes and effects of the exodus of Ghanaian
graduates science teachers", (1979) XI The Legon Observer p*31*
5« de Graft-Johnson, K*E*, Administration and Corruption in Ghana, op*cit*, p.21.
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P. Inflation
1
Ghana is in the throes of a hyper-inflationary situation • The rate 
of inflation has for the past three years averaged about 100% per annum*
Taking the decade 1970-80, two distinct economic periods are discernible, 
the period 1971-1974 and 1975-1980.
I* 1971-74
The rate of inflation during this period rose from 9*6% in 1971 to a 
moderate (in relative terms) 18*1% in 1974*
II. 1975-1980
Against the background of the OPEC oil price increases of 1974, recession 
in the economies of Ghana*s major trading partners, severe balance of payment 
problems, falling production, large budgetary deficits : and high growth in 
money supply, Ghana reached three digit inflation during this period • The 
official figures show that the rate of inflation is slowing , but some economists 
think that the government is tampering with the figures •
TABLE 7
CHANGES IN MONEY SUPPLY, G.D.P. AND INFLATION (%)
Year Money
Supply
G.N.P. Inflation
1973.74 24.4 6.3 23.3
1974-75 33.0 412.4 19.3
1975-76 37.7 -3.7 43.1
1976-77 46.9 +3.6 81.8
1977-78 69*4 +3.4 104.0
1978-79 30.4 +2.0 79.8
1. See Table 7j Steel, P.M., "Hyperinflation in Ghana", (1979) XI, The Legon 
Observer 308.
2. Table 7*
3. See Tables7« 8 and 9* 
km Table 7.
(Cont.)
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TABLE 8
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE AND TAX RATIOS 1972-73/1978-79
YEAR GOV'T REVENUE GOV'T EXPENDITURE DEFICIT
•- AMOUNT PERCENTAGE AMOUNT AMOUNT
A 0 MILLION G.D.P* 0 MILLION 0 MILLION
1972-73 391.6 - 545.1 153.5
1973-74 583.6 15.1 738.5 154.9
1974-75 804.8 15.6 1161.5 356.7
1975-76 814.8 13.3 1438.6 623.8
1976-77 1084.2 11.1 1945.2 861.0
1977-78^ ’ 1365.0 7.8 3175.2 1810.0
1978-79* 2525*4 7.0* 4390.2 1864.8
SOURCE: BUDGET PROPOSALS FOR 1979/80 and 1980/81
’provisional
5. Aboagye, A,A., "Questionable fall in the rate of inflation", (1980) 12 
The Legon Observer, 166.
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III* Inflation and law
The figures make grim reading — the story is pathetic* A nation which 
held so much promise is fast becoming a nonentity* The people— -the role 
occupants —  do not have these figures* But they do not need them* They 
have witnessed hyper inflation at work* They have been hit where it hurts 
most— in their pockets* Their standard of living has plummeted, and the 
cost of living has soared to dizzy heights*
Confidence is low* Some (the educated and the skilled) have pronounced 
judgment with their feet and emigrated to neighbouring countries* The majority 
are making the best of a bad situation* And it is "all systems go"* Confidence 
is lew, so is respect for law and constituted authority* Survival is the 
name of the "game"* The Ghanaian has become an adept ''situation!st9 (the 
ability to spot situational openings and to exploit them, by whatever means, 
to one's advantage)* In this culture, Law (and residential tenancy law) has 
had to take a back seat (go into abeyance)*
Secondly, inflation has made an important part of residential tenancy 
law (rent restriction) ridiculous* When the present writer visited urban 
Ghana in 1973 the applicable law on the recoverable rent was N*R*C*D*153*
This has been in force since 1973 end fixed a rent of 07*30 for a sand crete 
room of 12ft x 12ft* In the intervening period (1973*73) prices in the 
economy have more than quadrupled* And yet the law was not amended* Little 
wonder that one was always met with the response "the government is not serious" 
when the attention of landlords was drawn to the paper-rules* N*R*C*D*158 
has since been replaced by A*F*R*C*0*5 but the rent it fixed is only slightly 
less ridiculous (and is constantly being made more so by the gallopping hyper** 
inflation)* Inflation has made the law ridiculous* And when law appears 
ridiculous to the society which it is supposed to serve there is a great 
incentive to break— or rather ignore— *, but little inducement to comply with 
the law.
1* See supra, pp*25^*255*
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IV* Conclusion
This study has not come up with a blueprint for solving Ghana's 
residential tenancy problems nor a model urban residential landlord and 
tenant code* Indeed one of the central themes of this thesis has been to 
emphasise that the problems of this area of socio-economic activity cannot 
be divorced from the socio-economic and political malaise that has afflicted 
the country* In this respect, the study is diagnostic rather than prescrip­
tive* For this reason it may be seen as negative rather than positive (there 
is a bodyo| opinion in Ghana which regards analysis which does not come up 
with solutions as negative and, by implications, useless)* This charge 
(if made) is rejected*
In the first place it is submitted that research which is primarily 
diagnostic rather than prescriptive is a legitimate and important field 
of academic enquiry*
Second, and more importantly, though the study on the face of it 
appears purely diagnostic, it entails one major prescription* Simply put, 
it is: "Stop, Look, Listen) stop manufacturing law, it has its limits"!
This leads to the third and even more important line of defence* This 
study has emphasised the interrelatendness of economic, demographic, adminis­
trative, social and political factors in the field of rented accommodation*
It has been argued that the effectiveness of law is conditioned by the 
concrete ifeentext within which it operates* It is not within the competence 
of the legal scientist to posit solutions to architectural, planning, 
demographic, economic, social and political problems* Like law, the legal 
scientist has his limitations*
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and
Lastly,, most importantly, it is submitted that it is not the job of 
A
social science as an academic discipline (and Law is a social science) to 
lay down blueprints for the transformation of society (for that, in the 
final analysis, is what is required). The problems of Ghana and the rented 
accommodation sector are, in the final analysis, problems of political economy. 
Solution will depend on action in the field of political economy* Oneway, 
as political man, hare views on these matters, but these are views on the 
political, economic and social ordering of society and not one's views qua 
legal scientist*
